18 Rto

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow, 10-11 March 2009
Presented by
Peimann TOFIGHI-NIAKI
A300/A310 Family Flight Operations Engineer Flight Operations Safety Enhancement
Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

Rejecting Takeoff Procedure & Training
Content
Background
Operational Standards Factors involved in the decision-making Prevention Strategies
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved.
Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 Revisiting the Stop or Go decision
Slide 2
Background
Improvement of the rate of RTO overrun accidents/incidents:
Implementation of policies, training practices and operational guidelines developed by the Industry
Slide 3
Background
Split between high speed and low speed RTO
92% Low Speed (<100 kt)
8% High Speed (>100 kt)
Potential runway overrun accidents/incidents

Source: IATA Steades 2002

Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow 2009 Revisiting the Stop or Go decision Slide 4
Background
Analysis of 94 RTO overrun accidents/incidents 1961 to 1999 revealed that more than half of RTO overrun accidents/incidents occurred at speeds greater than V1:
Unknown 20% Greater than V1 54% Less than or equal to V1 26%
Importance of making the STOP or GO decision prior to reaching V1 and of a timely V1 callout
Slide 5
Background
Experience has shown that rejected takeoffs at higher speeds, on a balanced field runway (i.e. accel/stop distance at V1 equals runway lenght), can be hazardous even if the performance is correctly calculated
WHY? Factors that may detract from a successful RTO
Slide 6
Background
Error in aircraft TOW determination (loadsheet)

Error in T/O data calculation (V1, VR, V2, FLEX TEMP) Tire damage
Brake worn or not working properly

Too high residual brake temperature Incorrect runway line-up technique Delay in initiating the stop action during T/O roll if failure Runway friction coefficient lower than expected
Factors that may detract from a successful RTO

Background
Performance Training
Slide 8
Content
Background
Slide 9
Operational Standards - Decision

STOP
or GO = Captains decision
Split into low and high speed regime: 100 kt
Below 100 kt
Any indication of system malfunction should result in a STOP decision
PNF callout THRUST SET
100
STOP or GO
Low
Speed
Airspeed
80
100
Slide 10
Above 100 kt
Be go-minded and do not delay the decision Only major failures may justify a STOP decision
STOP
Engine or APU fire warning Sudden loss of thrust ECAM alerts (refer to FCOM) Indications that the aircraft will not fly safely STOP or GO
STOP or GO
STOP or
Nose gear vibrations
GO
Bang without thrust loss

Open sliding windows EGT over limit
GO
STOP
Low
Speed
High Speed
Airspeed
80
100
V1
Slide 11
At V1
CAPT must remove his hand from the Thrust Levers
Above V1
Takeoff must be continued No action below 400 ft
A height of 400 ft is recommended as a good compromise between the time required to stabilize the flight path and the acceptable delay to initiate the procedure associated to the failure.
STOP or GO
STOP or GO
STOP or
GO
STOP
GO
Low
Speed
High Speed
V1
PNF callout
or auto-callout
Airspeed
80
100
V1 VR
V2
Slide 12
Operational Standards - Stopping procedure
Task sharing & Stopping procedure
Slide 13
Review of the procedure
DECEL: the deceleration is felt by the crew, and

confirmed by the speed trend on PFD. It can also be confirmed by DECEL light
1 2
A320/A330/A340
CAPT
Calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "STOP"
1 1 2
F/O
Calls . . . . "REVERSE GREEN" "DECEL"
Trust levers . . . . . . . . . . IDLE Reverse thrust . . . MAX AVAIL
ATS . . . . . . . . . DISCONNECT
A300 Family
ex: A320
Slide 14

AUTO BRK does not activate below:
Review of the procedure
72 kts (GS) for A320-A330-A340 80 kts (GS) for A300 Family
1 4 2 3
CAPT
Calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "STOP"
1 1 2
F/O
Calls . . . . "REVERSE GREEN" "DECEL" "70 kts" ("80 kts" for A300 Family)
Trust levers . . . . . . . . . . IDLE Reverse thrust . . . MAX AVAIL
1 3
Cancels any audio warning
Aircraft stopped
2
3 4
Reverse thrust . . . . STOWED Parking brake . . . . . . . APPLY PA call . . "ATTENTION CREW AT STATION" Calls for . . . . "ECAM ACTION"
2
ex: A320
Advises ATC Locates EMERGENCY EVACUATION C/L Completes ECAM ACTIONS
Slide 15
Content
Background
Slide 16
Factors Involved in the Decision Making
Unexpected conditions during takeoff roll:

Atmospheric conditions Indicated airspeed discrepancy at 100 kts or before Aircraft tendency to pitch up Loss or difficulty to maintain lateral control Malfunction of engine system Unusual noise and/or vibration (e.g.: nose gear vibration, tire burst, engine stall, suspected bomb explosion ) System failure(s) triggering ECAM warnings/cautions and/or cockpit indications
Broken crew-seat latch

Bird strike Traffic conflict / Runway Incursion (particularly on congested airports) Open windows, doors Any type of indication that the aircraft is unsafe or unable to fly
Lack of proper communication between flight crew (e.g.: untimely power check, speed callout, )
Stop or go?

Severity of the malfunction Aircraft speed Atmospheric conditions Runway characteristics and condition Dispatch under MEL
Slide 18
Performance of the decision-making is affected by:

Limited decision-making time Recognition time of unexpected conditions (i.e. unusual or unique situations)
Lack of understanding of cues associated to problems which may occur during takeoff roll
Non-adherence to published callouts (e.g. 80kts thrust set, 100 kts, V1) Crew coordination Complacency Inadequate/Incomplete pre-flight briefing

Slide 19
Content
Background
Slide 20
Prevention Strategies
Objective:
When an event occurs during the takeoff roll, the crews reaction must be automatic (instinctive) and correct
Airlines policy and procedures
Captains decisions, low/high speed philosophy, standard

callouts, task-sharing, SOP, who has the authority to reject Education and Training
Slide 21
Standard callouts: Develop the proper stop or go mindset:
STOP or GO STOP or GO STOP or GO
STOP
GO
low speed / high speed
Airspeeds 0
80
100
V1 VR
V2
Power set
High speed regime!
Timely V1 callout
Slide 22
Standard Operating Procedures:
Each takeoff is unique!
Pre-flight preparation
Takeoff data (high weight, high V1, ), aircrafts technical status (MEL item, ), runway conditions, bird activity, windshear
Exterior inspection
Tire conditions, brake wear
Takeoff briefing:
Includes all essential data associated to the T/O with present conditions
P/F and PNF role during take off roll

Includes an abnormal condition briefing
Captains decision in case of malfunction STOP or GO -, PF/PNF

respective role in case of GO decision, and Captain/F/O respective role in case of STOP decision
Line-up technique
Slide 23
Education and Training:
Example of takeoff safety training program
Slide 24
Ground training
Meaning of V1, understanding of reasons for RTO, technical understanding of takeoff performance, contaminants, reverse thrust, flap selection and reduced V1, influence of line-up techniques, power setting technique,
Simulator sessions
Handling of engine failure Simulator excercises, when practicable, where the crew have to recognize situations that are not the result of a clear and distinct loss of thrust:
Engine stall accompanied with loud bang (without loss of thrust) Tire burst Traffic conflicts (Abort) Engine oil low pressure close to V1
Slide 25
Simulator sessions (contd)

Maximum braking techniques, RTO on balanced field, tire failures, warnings/cautions that may be triggered at high speeds, timely V1 callout,
Items to be discussed and reviewed during recurrent training:

Engine failure very close to V1: what are the consequences in case of a go decision? Advantage of a go decision and immediate return, but also potential problems Nose gear vibration, opening sliding windows should not lead to a stop decision above 100 kt Tire burst within the 20kts range from V1: stop or go? Birdstrike at high speed
Windshear or uneven aircraft acceleration during T/O roll
Slide 26
Conclusion
Develop airlines policy to define:

Who makes the decision to stop or go (i.e. Captains decision)? When is a stop decision recommended pending upon the speed regime and the nature & severity of the malfunction? What are the actions in case of stop or go decision during the takeoff roll and the respective task-sharing?
Enhance the stop or go decision mindset and task-sharing, during the takeoff briefing based on the present conditions and on potential abnormal situations Practice during training, and/or review the conditions that may validate a stop or go decision Educate a proper understanding of the aircrafts stop or go performance, and outline proper operational interpretation of V1 (i.e. V1 is a decision/action speed)
Slide 27
FOBN: Revisiting the Stop or Go Decision
Slide 28

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Flight Operations Safety Awareness Seminar Moscow, 10-11 March 2009

Revisiting the Stop or Go decision

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved.

Improvement of the rate of RTO overrun accidents/incidents:

Split between high speed and low speed RTO

92% Low Speed (<100 kt)

8% High Speed (>100 kt)

Potential runway overrun accidents/incidents

Source: IATA Steades 2002

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved.

WHY? Factors that may detract from a successful RTO

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved.

Error in aircraft TOW determination (loadsheet)

Brake worn or not working properly

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved.

Factors that may detract from a successful RTO

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved.

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved.

Operational Standards - Decision

Split into low and high speed regime: 100 kt

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved.

Operational Standards - Decision

Nose gear vibrations

Bang without thrust loss

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved.

Operational Standards - Decision

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved.

Operational Standards - Stopping procedure

Task sharing & Stopping procedure

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved.

Operational Standards - Stopping procedure

Review of the procedure

DECEL: the deceleration is felt by the crew, and

Trust levers . . . . . . . . . . IDLE Reverse thrust . . . MAX AVAIL

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved.

Operational Standards - Stopping procedure

Review of the procedure

72 kts (GS) for A320-A330-A340 80 kts (GS) for A300 Family

Trust levers . . . . . . . . . . IDLE Reverse thrust . . . MAX AVAIL

Cancels any audio warning

Advises ATC Locates EMERGENCY EVACUATION C/L Completes ECAM ACTIONS

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved.

Factors Involved in the Decision Making

Unexpected conditions during takeoff roll:

Broken crew-seat latch

Factors Involved in the Decision Making

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved.

Factors Involved in the Decision Making

Performance of the decision-making is affected by:

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved.

Captains decisions, low/high speed philosophy, standard

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved.

Standard callouts: Develop the proper stop or go mindset:

STOP or GO STOP or GO STOP or GO

low speed / high speed

High speed regime!

Standard Operating Procedures:

Each takeoff is unique!

P/F and PNF role during take off roll

Captains decision in case of malfunction STOP or GO -, PF/PNF

Education and Training:

Example of takeoff safety training program