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1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
5-Yr CAGR 5% 6% 6%
$611.90 $673.90 $756.40 $898.40 $1,032.20 $1,097.50 $1,204.00 $1,305.80 $1,371.70 $1,401.70 $1,423.20 437.3 488.4 564.6 670.9 775.4 851.1 952 1043.6 1098.9 1109.8 1139.7 277.9 315 368.6 446.4 525.2 591.4 668.9 736.9 779.2 749.8 785 260.2 298.4 349 423.8 500.8 564.8 640.7 707.8 750.9 719.3 753.3 -1.1 -3.2 -3.2 -2.3 -1.9 -2 0.1 3.2 6.4 7.5 -2.2 261.3 301.6 352.2 426.1 502.6 566.8 640.6 704.6 744.5 703.9 755.5 162.2 190.5 223.3 265.9 312.6 347.9 387.5 429.8 464 443.9 467.9 $135.20 $195.10 $217.80 $247.30 $267.90 $340.70 $399.20 $521.20 $456.40 $287.40 $429.50 ($35.00) $1.49 $1.67 $1.43 $1.63 $0.80 $0.96 54% 58% $8.00 $2.52 $2.50 $1.62 64%
6% 5% $21.00 9% 9% 11%
$41.50 $36.40 $25.30 $656.50 $674.00 $706.20 $40.00 $1.30 $40.00 $482.90 $516.60 $463.00 211.6 209.8 208.5 $210.00 $249.00 $228.40 $28.40 $30.10 $54.50 $139.70 $168.00 $199.70 $184.40 $212.60 $236.70
$10.50 $15.38 $18.25 $33.88 $35.38 $32.75 $31.50 $36.00 $35.88 $36.94 $36.88 $6.00 $9.63 $12.38 $16.38 $25.38 $24.38 $23.63 $26.63 $28.25 $25.50 $24.56 $10.25 $15.31 $18.25 $32.75 $32.00 $27.75 $27.88 $33.38 $32.38 $36.94 $34.88 13.9x 17.6x 17.5x 26.0x 21.5x 16.6x 14.5x 15.1x 13.1x 15.3x 13.8x $2,260.60 $3,366.00 $3,926.60 $6,930.00 $6,713.70 $5,785.00 $5,630.60 $6,487.20 $6,066.60 $6,794.00 $6,470.80 7.20% 23.90% 23.30% 71.50% 45.40% 42.50% 26.50% 38.00% 28.30% 4.60% 6.40% 10.10% 17.50% 24.30% 72.50% 46.70% 44.30% 28.30% 40.70% 31.00% 1.40% 2.90% 12.30% 17.20% 19.60% 74.60% 48.70% 46.10% 29.50% 46.70% 35.60% 0.60% 1.00% 18.80% 19.10% 20.00% 74.70% 49.70% 47.20% 29.60% 55.60% 41.60% 0.00% 0.30% 14.90% 17.50% 21.20% 75.10% 50.90% 48.50% 30.30% 62.50% 47.00% 0.00% 0.00% 6.30% 11.30% 20.00% 77.50% 53.90% 51.50% 31.70% 71.00% 50.40% 8.00% 8.00% 9.70% 8.50% 5.00% 2.20% 1.50% 11.40% 10.90% 8.00% -4.30% 5.40% 16.70% 16.10% 13.80% 9.50% 0.00% 79.10% 79.90% 80.10% 79.20% 80.10% 55.60% 56.40% 56.80% 53.50% 55.20% 53.20% 54.20% 54.70% 51.30% 52.90% 32.20% 32.90% 33.80% 31.70% 32.90% 94.00% 131.30% 161.70% 123.70% 103.40% 53.50% 56.40% 58.30% 54.40% 53.80% 25.70% 25.50% 26.20% 18.60% 17.60% 25.70% 40.60% 47.10% 20.10% 17.60%
5%
North RJR Nabisco Standard Atlantic DiMon Inc. Holdings Commercial Trading Co.
31-Dec-98 $74,391.00 30993 15501 13811 890 12921 7672.4 $6,076.40 $3,834.00 $3.16 $3.14 $1.68 53%
31-Dec-98 $93.10 60.9 36.3 29.1 24.9 4.2 1 $14.50 ($7.09) ($7.09) 0%
31-Dec-98 $20,563.00 9493 3602 2467 880 1455 718 $2,016.00 $2,069.00 $2.22 $2.22 $2.05 92%
30-Jun-98 $2,171.80 266.9 200.2 156.7 83.8 72.9 52 $52.50 $16.90 $1.17 $1.16 $0.66 56%
31-Mar-98 $1,492.80 145 85.8 65.3 37.8 37.1 26.9 ($61.30) $2.18 $2.05 0%
30-Jun-98 $4,287.20 613.6 329.5 278.4 64 231.3 130.4 $110.20 ($16.70) $3.71 $3.68 $1.11 30%
$468.30 $16,197.00 185.50 2,429.00 $309.90 $3,851.00 $35.50 $18.4.0 $34.88 $53.50 13.8x 16.9x $6,470.80 $129,951.50
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Earnings Shares outstanding Months 0-6 Months-6-12 Average shares outstanding EPS Change in EPS
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Earnings @ 20% growth rate Shares outstanding Months 0-6 Months-6-12 Average shares outstanding EPS Change in EPS EPS if no buyback Change in EPS
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DE ratio increases leading to running off with debt capacity may be only at book value May be the change in DE ratio overstates the change in companys level of financial risk and reduction of borrowing capacity
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Management trying to squeeze out a few more EPS in deteriorating situation to meet the markets forecast May not be a meaning restructuring of the company May not be a genuine change in management attitude towards maximizing stockholders value Simply a cyclical attempt to retain control over the stockholders investment
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North Median RJR Nabisco Standard Universal Atlantic DiMon Inc. (excl.UST) Holdings Commercial Corp Trading Co. 10.20% 65.40% 39.00% 31.30% 1.10% NM 0.40% 89.40% 90.00% -0.50% 46.20% 17.50% 12.00% 3.50% 8.40% 2.40% 53.20% 54.40% 2.20% 12.30% 9.20% 7.20% 2.40% 12.50% 2.70% 65.40% 71.90% 10.20% 9.70% 5.70% 4.40% 1.80% 22.50% 3.40% 52.30% 72.30% 4.20% 14.30% 7.70% 6.50% 3.00% 25.60% 6.50% 31.20% 59.40%
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Tobacco Product Manufacturers Philip Morris Three-Years (1996-1998) Corporate Credit Rating Outlook EBIT interest coverage (x) EBITDA interest coverage (x) Fund flow/total debt (%) Free operating cash flow/total debt (%) Return on capital (%) Operating income/sales (%) Total debt/capital (including ST debt) (%) A Stable 11.2 12.7 56.3 41.8 38.4 26 49.3
North Tobacco RJR Nabisco Standard Atlantic DiMon Inc. Universal Corp Companies UST Inc. Holdings Commercial Trading Co.a Medianb B+ Stable 1.3 1.6 6.8 5.6 11.8 38.1 90.6 BBBStable 2.5 3.7 14.5 6.8 10.3 15.6 55.1 BB+ Negative 2.6 3.3 12.3 10.1 13.4 16.4 67.8 BBPositive 3.3 5.4 6.7 -2.6 6.6 3.6 77.5 AStable 3.5 4.4 18.5 2.9 16.9 7.6 65.8
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Brand name and market positions Cash flow generations Cyclically Product diversification Geographical diversification Asset tangibility Litigations
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Even at interest rate of 8.7% (Ex. 7) interest will be only 11% of forecasted EBIT Lower rating factors..
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Discussion Question
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Sales EBIT Interest Pre-tax earnings Taxes Net Income Net Debt Interest Rate Interest Coverage Debt Rating
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Valuation Model
Status Quo PV Tax Shields Value of UST 6469 Net Debt 0 Stock Price 34.875 Shares Repurchased Shares 185.5 Market Equity 6469 Debt/Market Equity 0 $1 Billion Recap Plan 380 6849 1000 36.924 27.08 158.4 5849 0.17
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As debt ra tio increases, interest expenses increase. Interest coverage ratio drops and rating declines. This increa ses the cost of debt
Cost of Capital = Cost of Equity (Equ ity/(Debt + Equity)) + After-tax Cost of Debt (Debt/(Debt + Equity))
If interest expen ses exceed the EBIT, th e tax benefit will decline: Tax rate = EBIT/Interest Exp *Tax rate As cost of capital changes, Change in firm value = (Old Cost of cap ital - New Cost of Capital)(Current firm value)(1+g) / (New Cost of Capital-g) If investors are rational, increase in stock price = Change in firm value/ Tota l number of shares outstanding If sto ck can b e bough t at tod ays price, Increase in stock price = Change in firm value/ Remain ing shares outsta nding . Debt Ratio Thre e key assumptions: 1. Operating inco me remains unchange d as the debt ratio change s 2. All existin g debt is refinanced at th e new cost o f debt 3. Debt is used to buy back stock rather tha n invest in projects 99%
0%
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tD: PV of debt tax shields tD: value effect of firms financing VUnlevered : PV of operating cash cash flows
As borrowing increases default risk will offset the value created by borrowing When borrowing is more default risk will more than offset the value created by borrowing Value of CBankruptcy and Distress can be computed by..,
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Ente r the de bt/e quity ratio that you think the firm will have =
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To estim ate the prob ab ility of distress 1. Open s olver (from tools ) 2. Set the value equal to the m arket price of bond 3. Solve for the probability of dis tres s
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Elephant in the room No straight forward model exists to adjust beta estimates for costs of financial distress Could estimate the present value of expected costs of financial distress by assuming,
Financial markets will price them equivalently to an insurance policy or a put option
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Price
Exercise price
Volatility
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Loss of PV of Tax Credits On Sales and customers: Future Service and reliability. Large costs of switching suppliers Lost up-front relationship specific costs. On Firm Opportunities: Higher Supplier Charges / trade credit Cutback in R&D, advertising On Operating Costs: Higher Labor Costs / Higher costs of investing in long term relationship On Flexibility: Debt restrictions and covenants Expected(Costs) = Prob. of bankruptcy * Cost of Bankruptcy
Indirect costs are related to economic distress not bankruptcy. This is true for firms that enter bankruptcy. Many avoid bankruptcy restructure their debt quickly
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employees jump ship Suppliers refuse to grant credit Customer seek more stable suppliers Lenders demand higher interest rates Impose more restrictive loan covenants if potential bankruptcies looms
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Life Cycle
Start- up firms: more equity Mature firms: more debt. Debt ratio similar to comparable firms in the same business Retained earnings being the most preferred choice Work down the preference list, rather than picking a financing mix directly
Comparable firms
Financing Hierarchy
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The Operating Income Approach: In this approach, the optimal debt for a firm is chosen to ensure that the probability that the firm will default does not exceed a management-specified limit. The Cost of Capital Approach: In this approach, the optimal debt ratio is chosen to minimize cost of capital, if operating cash flows are unaffected by financing mix, or to maximize firm value. The Adjusted Present Value Approach: In this approach, the effect of adding debt to firm value is evaluated by measuring both the tax benefits and the bankruptcy costs. The Return Differential Approach: In this approach, the debt ratio is chosen to maximize the difference between ROE and cost of equity Comparables Approach: The debt ratio is chosen by looking at how comparable firms are funded
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Share price will quickly and fully reflect the changes in investors perceptions because of
Present value of new debt tax shields created by the recapitalization - Marginal tax rate times the value of debt outstanding Present value of the costs of financial distress Signaling effect
Stock holders opinion on expectation of insiders Bind management to deliver predictable operating results in order to service the debt Investors may bail out of stock; allowing others to buy in
Incentive effects
Clientele effects
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Control on investing in risk projects Higher debt requirements forces manager to earn more to service debt High debt payments in LBO force managers to conserve cash by eliminating unnecessary expenditures More careful with shareholders money
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Run out of profitable and internal investment opportunities Firms debt capacity would not be more profitably employed in financing new investments,
Shares are undervalued (if debt used for buying back shares) Signal optimism on the part of managers and directors regarding future cash flows, which suggest they will be sufficiently sizeable in the future to meet the burden of interest and principal payments Commitment on the part of insiders not to divert the resources of the firm to other uses
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Could be a vehicle for signaling the new managements concern with the financial side of the business as well as producing visible gains in EPS and ROE
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Benefits of added debt will be wiped out by the premium paid for buying back
Other alternatives
Debt-for-securities swap Special dividend using add debt Adding debt through acquisitions if the acquisition premium is low
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Time
Lo w, as pr oject s dry up .
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Have all of the tax advantages of debt While preserving the flexibility offered by equity
Duration Currency Effect of Inflation Uncertainty about Future
Grow th Patterns Cyclicality & Other Effects
Duration/ Maturity
Currency Mix
Fixed vs. Floating Rate * More floating rate - if CF move w ith inflation - w ith greater uncertainty on future
Straight v ersus Conv ertible - Convertible if cash flow s low now but high exp. growth
Special Features on Debt - Options to make cash flow s on debt match cash flow s on as sets
Design debt to have cash f lows that match up to cash flows on the assets f inanced
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Designing Debt
Duration Currency Effect of Inflation Uncertainty about Future Growth Patterns Fixed vs. Floating Rate * More floating rate - if CF move with inflation - with greater uncertainty on future Straight versus Convertible - Convertible if cash flows low now but high exp. growth
Duration/ Maturity
Currency Mix
Special Features on Debt - Options to make cash flows on debt match cash flows on assets
Design debt to have cash flows that match up to cash flows on the assets financed
Zero Coupons
If tax advantages are large enough, you might override results of previous step Analyst Concerns - Effect on EPS - Value relative to comparables Ratings Agency - Effect on Ratios - Ratios relative to comparables Regulatory Concerns - Measures used Operating Leases MIPs Surplus Notes
Can securities be designed that can make these different entities happy?
Factor in agency conflicts between stock and bond holders Consider Information Asymmetries
Observability of Cash Flows by Lenders - Less observable cash flows lead to more conflicts
Type of Assets financed - Tangible and liquid assets create less agency problems
If agency problems are substantial, consider issuing convertible bonds Uncertainty about Future Cashflows - When there is more uncertainty, it may be better to use short term debt Credibility & Quality of the Firm - Firms with credibility problems will issue more short term debt
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Company life stage Use of funds Capital markets favor of the company Base assumptions Industry average norms Industry dynamics Shareholders objectives and preferences Agency cost Signaling cost Financial distress cost
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Financial Slack
Financial Slack can be defined as the amount of funds a firm has available to invest without visiting the external financial markets after paying interest and before paying dividends + Depreciation The following factors influence whether firms should have more equity (financial slack) or more Debt in their capital structures..,
Firms Track Record of Picking Good Investments The likelihood of good investments and opportunities arising (growth industry?)
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MM theory
Trade-off theory Signaling theory Debt financing as a managerial constraint Pecking order theory
Retained Earnings Straight Debt Convertible Debt External Common Equity Straight Preferred Stock Convertible Preferred
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