Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A presentation by Douglas Macgregor, PhD Colonel (ret) U.S. Army Lead Partner Potomac League LLC
Karzai is very dirty by all accounts, but I am not sure you could replace him with someone who isnt. Plus, its not our place to choose an Afghan head of state (as we did this one). The more I think about it the more I think we need to talk seriously about leaving.
A former CIA officer with extensive experience in the Middle East and Afghanistan recently returned from Afghanistan.
Afghanistan is a country, not a nation. It has four distinct national groups in it -- three tied by ethnicity and/or religion to one of the country's neighbors and divided from the fourth by the Hindu Kush; the fourth being a collection of loosely confederated tribes.
The best we can do is withdraw our forces with the publicly stated understanding that how the Afghans govern themselves is their business. However, if the Afghans harbor anyone al Qaeda or anyone else who threatens the United States and its allies, we must state clearly we will annihilate those who threaten us without concern for the welfare of those Afghans who harbor them.
Damage control, not total victory, is the most realistic goal for U.S. national military strategy in Afghanistan.
The problem is clear/hold/build cannot be executed on behalf of another government (particularly a weak and corrupt government) by a foreign army (unless the foreign army plans to permanently and ruthlessly occupy on the old European or Ottoman colonial models). Americans dont want that!
Buying off the Pashtun Tribes with hard cash as Petraeus did in Iraq wont work! Incentive structure does not exist.
If the large-scale commitment of general purpose ground forces is not the answer for Afghanistan, what is the answer?
Next Steps:
Economy of Force (damage control) is the principle that must shape future U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan and most of the Islamic World. Limit American involvement in Afghanistan when necessary to modest, low-profile SOF and covert operations backed by air and naval power to eliminate al-Qaeda elements/camps and local elements that support them. Meanwhile, work with those in the region who will work with us in the fight to destroy, suppress and neutralize Islamist terrorism. But scale back expectations regarding change in the Islamic World in general and Afghanistan in particular.
Remember, a culture that supports the "Rule of Law," respect for private property, pluralism/tolerance, due process, a standard of integrity and competence for public officials, as well as the separation between the government and private/communal sectors in society does not emerge spontaneously nor does it emerge through foreign military occupation. Remember, no matter what happens in Afghanistan and/or Pakistan, al-Qaeda will survive and remain a threat, but not an existential threat. There are many options for them from Morocco to London, England!
Dont confuse liquidating al-Qaeda with liquidating the Taliban. Defeating the Taliban/Pashtun is on par with "eliminating global poverty. Its a bridge too far and it is unnecessary.
The Taliban are the organic socio-religious glue that unites the tribes against non-Pashtun invaders -- whether British, Russian, or American. They fight us because we are there. The Pakistani military and security services will use and manipulate the Pashtun (43 million people), but they are not going to give them WMD. When conflicts or crises involve U.S. forces, the use of American military power should be limited or terminated before the cumulative human and political costs defeat the original purpose of U.S. military action; destroying/disrupting AQ, not creating a modern nationstate in Afghanistan where none exists. (Selected SOF/CIA with air power makes sense.) In 1959, President of France, Charles de Gaulle confronted similar circumstances when he decided to leave Algeria. French generals insisted a withdrawal would deliver Algeria into the hands of Soviet-backed communists. It did not and de Gaulle replaced the generals.