Mukul Asher - EPF in Malaysia and Singapore

Managing National Provident Funds in Malaysia and Singapore
By Mukul G. Asher
Professor, Public Policy Programme National University Of Singapore E-mail: mppasher@nus.edu.sg Fax: (65) 778 1020
To be presented at the World Bank Conference on Public Pension Fund Management, 24 ~ 26 September 2001, Washington D.C.
Organization
I. Governance Structure II. Importance of Investment Policies And Performance III.Main Characteristics of the EPF And The CPF IV.Investment Policies And Performance: The Accumulation Phase V. Will The EPF And The CPF Be Adequate For Retirement? VI.Distribution Of Accumulated Funds VII.Suggestions For Reform
The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore
2
Governance Structure
The EPF (Established in 1951) The CPF (Established In 1955), Have Statutory Authority Status.
Malaysias EPF Is Under The Ministry of Finance.

Singapore's CPF Is Under The Ministry of Manpower
Governance Structure Contd.

Malaysias EPF: Operational (Mainly Administrative) Autonomy The EPF Board Has Representation From The Government, Employers, Employees And Professionals. The Investment Panel Is Separate From The Board. It Has Six Members, Executive Chairman Of The EPF, And Representatives Form The Finance Ministry And Private Sector Experts. There are Indications That The Trade Unions and Other Groups in Malaysia are Uneasy About the functioning of the Investment Panel. They Desire Greater Transparency and Representation on the Investment Panel.
4

Malaysias EPF Contd.: Investment By The EPF Have Been Wholly Domestic. Lack of Policy Autonomy And Research Capability Insulation From Political Risk In Investments Primarily Through Government Guarantees of Individual Investments. However No Guarantee of Return on Overall Balances Moderately Open Information Regime

Singapores CPF Operational (Mainly Administrative) Autonomy The CPF Board Has Representation From The Government, Employers, Employees And Professionals. It Has 12 Members. Key Challenge: How To Get Competent and Independent Representation on the Board in a Mono-centric Power Structure ?

Singapores CPF Contd.: Investment Function In Reality Performed Outside The CPF Boards Jurisdiction By The Government Of Singapore Investment Corporation (GSIC), And Other Government Investment Holding Companies.
No Statutory Obligation On These Holding Companies To Reveal Investment Portfolio And Performance of CPF Balances. International Investment Is However Believed To Predominate.

Singapores CPF Contd.: Lack of Policy Autonomy and Research Expertise.
Very Selective Openness Relating to Information; So Extensive Data Collected and Stored in Its Supper Computer Is Used in A Strategic Manner And Not As A Public Good. Therefore, Unsurprisingly Data Made Publicly Available Are Insufficient for Independent Analysis.
A Guarantee of 2.5% Nominal Return on the CPFs Accumulated Balances. The CPF Act Requires That the Permission of the Finance Minister Be Obtained for Paying Interest Rate Higher Than 2.5 Percent. No Other Provision For Insulation Against Political Risk.
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Importance of Investment Policies and Performance

The National Provident Funds of Malaysia (the EPF) And Singapore (The CPF) Are Nominally DC-FF Schemes Such Schemes Rely On The Power of Compound Interest To Realize This Power, Need Effective Asset Diversification; Low Administration and Investment Management Costs; And Internationally Benchmarked Pension Fund Governance
Main Characteristics Of The EPF And The CPF

Contribution Rate More Complex And Varied The Objectives, Higher The Contribution Rate Required.
THE CPF
CPF has many other objectives beside Retirement. It Administers many schemes covering Housing, Medical Savings Accounts, Tertiary Education, and permits extensive pre-retirement investments in real estate and financial assets. CPF Contribution Rate effective from January 1, 2001: 36% (20% By The Employee And 16% By The Employer); With The Wage Ceiling Of S$ 6000 Per Month. Lower contribution Rates for Those > 55 (18.5% for those between 5560; 11.0% for those 60-65; 8.5%for those >65).
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Main Characteristics Of The EPF And The CPF Contd.

Contribution Rate Contd.: Self-employed May Join Voluntarily (But Must Contribute to the Medisave Account). They Get Tax Relief for CPF Contributions up to the Combined Employer and Employee Contributions, Subject to Same Ceiling. The CPF Contributions are channeled into three Accounts. Ordinary Account:
For those below 55 years, between 72.2 percent and 61.1 percent of the contributions are channeled into this Account depending on age, with the proportion decreasing with age. Balance in this Account can be used for housing, preretirement investment schemes, and others. For most members, housing is the pre-dominant expense.
11

Contribution Rate Contd.: Special Account: This Account is for Retirement. For those < 55 years, between 11.1 percent and 16.7 percent of the contributions are channeled into this Account, with the proportion increasing with age. The proportion for Retirement purposes is rather low by international standards.
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Contribution Rate Contd.: Medisave Account: For those < 55 years, between 16.7% and 22.2% of the contributions are channeled into this Account, with the proportion increasing with age. Funds from this Account are used to pay for hospital and selected out-patient services; and for Catastrophic Health Insurance Premium which covers between 20 and 40 percent of the total hospital bill. The Medisave amount can not be withdrawn until death, when it reverts to the nominee. The Average Medisave balance of 55 year old in mid 2001 was S$16,000, while the required sum for those with enough balances is S$21,000. So many do not have even the minimum balances.
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Contribution Rate Contd.: The EPF 23% (11% By The Employee And 12% By The Employer, With No Wage Ceiling). From April 1 2001, There were plans to reduce Employees Contribution Rate to the EPF to 9% for a Period of One Year. Higher Priority to Short-Term Stabilization Over Retirement Security implicit in this has proved to be very unpopular The trade union and other public pressure has forced a change from mandatory to voluntary reduction in the contribution rate.
Self-employed are Permitted to Join the EPF voluntarily, but Few Do.
14

Contribution Rate Contd.: The Contributions to the EPF are channeled into three Accounts. I. Account I: 60 percent
Main purpose is Retirement.

20 percent of the Balance in this Account over RM 55,000 may be withdrawn for investments in Unit Trusts approved by the EPF. Members not permitted to purchase stocks directly. Potential amount that can be thus invested, and potential number of individuals which can participate is limited. II. Account II: 30 percent Main purpose is Housing. III. Account III: 10 percent Main Purpose is Healthcare. There are however no health insurance schemes.
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III.Coverage
III.Contributors/Labor Force In 2000: 54.7% For The EPF, And Rising As Formal Sector Expands. For CPF (in 1999): 62.0% And Falling, But Not of Concern Due To 25% of Labor Force Consisting of Foreign Workers.
IV.Total Labor Force in June 2000 For Singapore: 2.19 Million
V. For Malaysia as at end 2000: 9.2 Million
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Contributors/Members In 2000: 50.5% For EPF, And 43.2% For CPF. EPF(2000): Total Members 9.97 Million (of which 0.6 Million Foreign Workers). [AACGR:1990-2000: 5.3%) Pressure to exclude foreign workers on grounds of disproportionate administrative and compliance costs Active Members: 5.03 Million. [AACGR:1990-2000: 5.5%) Total Employers 318, 220 (Default Rate 5.65%) [AACGR:19902000: 6.2%) CPF(1999):Members 2.83 Million; [AACGR:1987-99: 3%) CPF Contributors (1999) 1.22 Million. [AACGR:1987-99: 2.3%)
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III.Contributions And Withdrawals
III.Too Many Pre-Retirement Withdrawals Distract From The Retirement Objective

IV.AACGR: EPF (1990-2000): Contributions: 15.2%; Withdrawals 18.0%. Withdrawals/Contributions EPF (1990-2000): 37.6%. V. AACGR CPF (1987-99): Contributions 9.2% Withdrawals 9.5%. Withdrawals/Contributions CPF (1987-99): 71.9%.
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III.Members Balances : III.EPF: RM 180.1 Billion (55.4% of GDP) End 2000 IV.CPF: S$ 90.3 Billion (56.8% of GDP) End 2000 IV.Average Balance per member for EPF: Year 2000 III.RM 18,067 V. Average Balance per member for CPF: Year 2000 III.S$ 31,137 VI.Per Capita GDP: 2000 III.RM 12,883 VII.Per Capita GNP: 2000 III.S$ 42,212
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VIII.These Balances Are A Significant Proportion of Total Savings And Stock Market Capitalization. Given low levels of free-float and liquidity, market prices (and even management control) may be significantly impacted by the provident fund authorities.
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Investment allocation of the EPF, 1991-2000

80 70
Composition of investment (%)
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
MGS D&L Equi MM
Time
21
Investment Policies And Performance: The Accumulation Phase Contd.

Investment Performance of The EPF
Average Returns Over 40 Years Satisfactory in Absolute Terms.

Challenge Is How to Sustain At Least The Current Level of Returns In The New Economic Environment, particularly as there is considerable unease concerning the perception that the EPF and other provident and pension funds are being used to help support the government-favored firms and business groups.
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Table 1 Malaysia: Nominal and Real Rates of Dividend On EPF Balances 1961-2000
Period Nominal Dividend Rate % 7.04 8.24 8.16 Inflation Rate (CPI) % 3.49 3.14 3.47 Real Rate of Dividend % 3.55 5.11 4.70
AACGR (%) (1961-2000) AACGR (%) (1983-2000) AACGR (%) (1987-2000)
AACGR (%) (1990-2000) For Nominal GDP: 10.56% - This is higher than the nominal dividend rate. So low replacement rate. AACGR (%) (1990-2000) For Members Balances: 14.18% Note: This return is after taxes and investment management fees.
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Table 2 Nominal Return Risk Performance of Malaysian and other Markets, Jan 1988 Jan 2001 period
There are other ways to compare the EPF Returns.
Malaysia Global (KLSE) Bond Cumulative Returns 78.1 139.1
Global Equity 172.8
AsiaPac -12.3
US
Japan
401.8
-25.6
Returns (% P.A.)
Std. Dev. (% P.A.)
4.5
35.7
6.8
6.3
7.9
14.0
-1.0
22.3
13.0
13.7
-2.2
25.0
KLSE: Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange
Source: Eliza Lim Importance of Portfolio Diversification, Asian Pension Funds Seminar, organized by the Citigroup Asset Management, Kuala Lumpur, May 911, 2001. Lim is Asset Consultant with Towers Perrin, Hong Kong.
Note: Exchange rate risk is not taken into account in Table 2.
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Table 2 Comments on Table 2

- The annual return on KLSE is lower and volatility (as represented by the standard deviation) is much greater than the EPF dividends to members. (7.68 percent per year for 1987-99 period) - The EPF dividend is also higher than Global Bond, Asia-Pac, and Japan market returns. - But it is slightly lower than Global Equity; and substantially lower than US market returns.
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Table 2 Comments on Table 2 contd.

- If returns net of taxes and investment management fees are considered, than only the US (and Europe but not UK) returns are likely to have exceeded the EPF returns during this period. But volatility in other markets is much lower.
- The pension funds in Chile had annual real rate of return of 10.9 percent between 1981-2000. The return to the members was somewhat less due to administrative and investment management costs, and taxes. This is clearly higher than the EPF, and comparable to the U.S. and Europe.
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Table 2 Comments on Table 2 contd.

Implications - Improve KLSEs quality and depth. - Some international diversification will be needed as funds continue to accumulate. At present rates EPFs balances may be RM 1,000 billion in next 15 years or so. Current Market Capitalization of the KLSE is only about RM 400 billion. - Needs to increase understanding of and develop expertise concerning the international markets. - Develop expertise and tools to manage the exchange rate risk when diversifying internationally.
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Investment Allocation And Returns: The CPF Three Pools of investment funds I. Members Balances Invested By the CPF Board. Largest Pool (S$ 90.3 Billion As At End 2000) On the CPFs balance sheet, 100 percent of the S$90.3 billion is shown as invested in non-marketable government securities (or as advanced deposits to the Monetary Authority of Singapore for buying such securities. Singapore Governments total Internal Debt as at end March 2001 S$138.9 billion (87.4 percent of year 2000 GDP)
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The interest on government securities is same as that paid by the CPF Board to its members. It is a weighted average of one year fixed deposits (80% weight), and savings account rate (20% weight) of the four domestically owned commercial banks.
Interest is paid quarterly and is variable (subject to a minimum of 2.5 percent). By administrative decision, balances in the Special Account (which is for Retirement only) receive 1.5 percentage points higher interest than on other balances. From October 1, 2001, the higher interest will also be paid on Medisave Balances. This further demonstrates the administrative nature of the interest rates.
29

The receipts from the sale of government securities are not needed to finance government expenditure as the budget has been in surplus for more than two decades. The money is channeled through the Consolidated Fund to investment holding companies of the Singapore Government, such as Temasek Holdings and Singapore Government Investment Corporation. The operations of these holding companies are by law and practice secret and no public disclosure is required or made.
30

The non-transparency and non-accountability of the CPF balances, along with administered rate of interest has turned the CPF from nominally DC-FF scheme to a Notional Defined Benefit (NDB) Scheme, financed on PAYG basis. To the extent the government holding companies earn higher than what is paid to the CPF members, implicit tax on CPF wealth occurs.
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The implicit tax is recurrent, and it is regressive as lowincome individuals hold proportionally greater wealth in the form of CPF balances. Moreover, as only about a third of the labor force pays personal income tax, the low-income members do not receive tax subsidy for contribution, income on preretirement investments, and at the time of withdrawal.
II. Investment of the Insurance Funds S$ 2.9 Billion as at End 1999. III. The CPFIS Scheme
32
10 8 6
Fig. 2 Singapore's CPF : Average Annual Compound Growth Rate (AACGR)

9 .3 5 8 .0 9 7 .0 4 7 .5 3
4 2 0
2 .0
3 .4 1 2 .8 3 0 .8 8
AACGR (%)(83-99)
Re a l Ra t e o f re t urn o n B a la nc e s GD P ( R e a l )
AACGR (%)[1987-99]
R e a l r a t e o f r e t u r n o n In s u r a n c e Fu n d s A v e r a g e Mo n t h l y N o m i n a l Ea r n i n g s
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CPFIS Scheme
This is a pre-retirement withdrawal scheme. A Member May Open A CPF Investment Account With Approved Agent Banks, All of Whom are Locally Controlled Banks. Their Charges and Fees Are Not regulated. Individual CPF Members May invest their Ordinary Account balance as well as Special Account Balance In approved assets. All investments must be in Singapore dollars. Only safer Investments are permitted from the Special Account. Form the Ordinary Account up to 35% can be invested in shares and corporate bonds by the members directly. As at end April 2001, S$2.1 billion (17% of the Potential) was invested from the Special Account; with about 90% in insurance products, both investment-linked and endowment.
34
CPFIS Scheme Contd.

There is no limit on investments in shares through the approved Unit Trusts.
Till September 30, 2001, 100.0% of the profits realized (less accrued interest which would have been payable by the CPF Board on ALL of the amounts withdrawn under this scheme) may be withdrawn by the individuals.
This proportion will be reduce to 50% for the period October 1, 2001 to September 30, 2002; and to zero thereafter.
35
CPFIS Scheme Contd.

As At December,31 2000, Total amount Withdrawn Under the CPFIS was S$ 18,741 (US$10,771 Million) (43.7% of the Potential) by 516,386 members,Or 17.8% of total members. The Average Investment Per Member Thus was S$36,293(US$20,858). As At March 31, 2001, Total Investments Under CPFIS was S$ 20.192 Billion (US$ 11,218 Million).
36
CPFIS Scheme Contd.

The Allocation was:
Stocks and Loan Stocks S$9,550 Million (47.3%); Insurance Policies S$9,063 Million (44.9%); Unit Trusts S$1,285 Million (6.4%); Others S$294 Million (1.5%).
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CPFIS Scheme Contd.

Thus, Individuals have Invested on Their Own and Not Through Unit Trusts.
Transactions Costs of Unit Trust Investments Are High, With 5 to 7 Percent Spread Between the Offer and Bid (Buy and Sell) Prices Common. In addition, there is an annual investment management fee of between 1 and 2 percent of total investments of members.
Some Effort to Address This Issue, but Low Average Investment and Small Size of the Unit Trusts Market Major Constraints. Investment Performance Under This Scheme Appears To Be Unsatisfactory. But Insufficient Data for Rigorous Analysis.
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Will The EPF And The CPF Be Adequate For Retirement?

V. EPF
Low Balances Per Member. In 2000, RM 18, 067, Only 1.4 Times The Per Capita GDP.
No estimates of the replacement rate provided by the EPF Board. But it is likely to be quite low for most members.
39
Will The EPF And The CPF Be Adequate For Retirement? Contd.
CPF (Figure 3 and 4) The CPF Board Estimated In 1987 (No updates Since Then) That The Replacement Rate Will Vary Between 20 And 40 Percent For The Members, With No Inflation Protection, And Only A Very Limited Protection Against Longevity. Fig 3 Shows That Average Balance Per CPF Member Doubled Between 1987-99, While The Average Monthly Earnings In 1999 Were 2.4 Times The Earnings in 1987. Thus, Monthly Earnings Have Risen Faster Than Average Balances Per Member. For October-December 2000 Period, Average Cash Balance Withdrawn At Age 55 was Only $19,111.
40
Fig. 3
Singapore : Average Balances per member and Average Monthly Earnings , 1987-99
35000 30000 25000

($)
20000 15000 10000 5000 0 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Year Average Monthly Earnings (including Employers CPF Contribution) Average Balance Per Member
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Fig. 4
Singapore CPF : Average Balance Per Member/Average Monthly Earnings (including employers contribution)
14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Y ear Average Balance Per Member/Average Monthly Earnings (including employers contribution)
11.6
11.1 10.1
10.4
10.3
10.4 9.4 9.2 9.3
10.5 9.6
10.1
9.9
42
Why Low Balances?

Singapore: Highly Unequal Wage Structure. In 1999: 51.4% of Contributors Had Monthly Wage < S$ 2,000: Only 6.3% Had Wages > S$ 6,000. The share of wages in Singapores GDP is unusually low at 42 percent; while the share of profits is 48 percent of GDP. High Rate of Pre-retirement Withdrawals (71.9% for the 1987-99 period). Tied to the Centrality of Real Estate Sector in the Economy. Low Real Rate of Return, in Large Part Due to Implicit Tax on CPF Wealth. Current Political Economy and Governing Philosophy Major impediments to the Reduction or elimination of This Tax.
43
Why Low Balances? Contd.

Singapore Contd.: High Transactions Costs Restricted Competition and No Regulation Over Prices Charged for Investment Services. For a sample of 14 funds in Singapore, the EXPENSE RATIO (I.e. total cost of running the fund divided by the fund size) varied between 2.9 percent and 5.7 percent. The ratio excludes several charges such as tax at source, front-end load, brokerage and other transaction costs, and foreign exchange gains and losses. Individual Decentralized Arrangement With Wide Investment Choices Under the CPFIS Scheme Likely To Lead to Higher Cost Than a Centralized System, With Limited Individual Choice Would.
44
Why Low Balances? Contd.

Malaysia Highly unequal Wage Structure. In 2000 60.18% of the Active Contributors to the EPF Reported Monthly Wages Below RM 1,000; 23.96% Between RM1,000-2,000; and only 3.37% Reported Wages Above RM 5,000. Moderate Rate of Pre-retirement Withdrawals Tied to Housing withdrawals 1/3 of the Accumulated Balances can be Withdrawn at Age 50 Rate of return is reasonable, but could be Higher Restricted Competition and No Regulation Over Prices Changed for Investment Services. Individual Investments through Unit Trusts has High Transaction Costs Due to The Undeveloped Nature of this Market.
45
The Supplementary Retirement Scheme (SRS)

Implemented From April 1, 2001 Employers Are Not Allowed To Contribute. Self Employed May Participate. Contribution and Income (Except Dividends) Can Be Accumulated Tax Free.
46
SRS Contd.
50 Percent of Accumulated Balances at the Time of Statutory Withdrawal Subject to Applicable Marginal Income Tax Rate. Withdrawals can be Made Over a Period of Ten Years to Permit Flexibility in Conversion of Investments in to Cash (Withdrawals Can only be Made in Cash), and for tax Planning.
47
SRS Contd.
Full Taxation Plus 5 Percent Penalty for Early Withdrawal Some Restrictions (Eg Concerning Property and Certain Types of Insurance) on Investment of SRS Funds.
48
SRS Contd.
Limitations: Only One Third of the Labor Force Which Pays Income Tax Has the Potential to Benefit From the SRS Restrictive Conditions Foreigners Must Keep the Balances in the SRS for at Least 10 Years. Only Half of the Accumulated Balances Exempt From Tax. Penalty for Early Withdrawals: 100% Tax, Plus 5 Percent Penalty.
49
SRS Contd.
High Transaction Costs Restricted Competition Among the SRS Providers No Regulation Concerning Fees to Be Charged by the SRS Providers or by Investment Managers. So, for Those With Small Balances And/or Low Marginal Tax Rates, Transactions Costs May Outweigh Tax Benefits.
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SRS Contd.
Assessment Impact of the SRS Will Be Marginal As It Does Not Address Lack of Protection Against Inflation and Longevity; and Does Not Help the Lifetime Poor. The Exchange Rate risk may deter expatriates, particularly as the minimum period of membership is ten years. Will Benefit Local Banks and Investment Managers
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Distribution of Accumulated Funds

Importance Of Inflation And Longevity Protection And Survivors Benefits.
Options:
Lump-Sum, Periodic Withdrawals, Annuities or a Combination. Annuities are Like Any Other Financial Product, So Cost of Purchasing Annuity (Therefore Rate of Return from Annuity Purchase) Varies With the Market Structure and the Features (Individual Vs. Joint Annuity, Inflation Indexing etc.) Provided.
52
The Decumulation Phase of the CPF

The CPF Permits: Withdrawal at Age 55 of All Accumulated Balances over and Above the Required Minimum Sum. If a Members Balances are Below the Required Minimum Sum, it Does not Have to make it up From Other Sources. A Significant Proportion of the CPF Members Accumulated Balances Fall Below the Minimum Sum. Children May Top-up Parents CPF Account.
53
The Decumulation Phase of the CPF Contd.

Required Minimum Sum As of July 2001: S$ 70,000, of Which S$ 30,000 in Cash: S$ 40,000 Can be Pledged in Property.
This will become S$ 80,000 on July 1, 2003, with the Amount Equally Divided Between Cash and Property.
Three Options with the Cash Component of the Minimum Sum Buy a Life Annuity from an Approved Insurance Company. Currently, Inflation Index annuities are not Available in the Market. In 1999, >10% of the 26,000 Covered Under the Minimum Sum Scheme chose the Annuity Option Keep it with an Approved Bank Leave It with the CPF Board This Effectively Increases the Politically Sensitive Withdrawal Age For This Component.
54
The Decumulation Phase of the EPF

The EPF Has Traditionally Permitted Lump Sum Withdrawal: 1/3 of the Total Balance at Age 50 The Remaining at Age 55 Given the longevity of the Population, the Withdrawal Age is Too Low.
55
The Decumulation Phase of the EPF Contd.

In July 2000, the EPF Introduced Two Differed Annuity Schemes. These Can be Purchased in Small Amounts Throughout the Persons Working Period. In Principle, This is Desirable. The Key is However the Implicit Rate of Return on the Annuity Products, in Comparison with the EPF Dividend Rate. As the Former is Lower, then the Dividend Rate for the Existing Two Annuity Products, the Response may be Adversely Affected. As at end December 2000, 33,412 Members Had bought Annuities Totaling RM 764.4 Million
56
The Decumulation Phase of the EPF Contd.

In May 2001, the government appointed a consultant to review the annuity schemes. This was a result of opposition from the trade unions and the public. Options being considered: EPF to provide annuities in-house Continuation of the current insurance companies based arrangements Positive aspect is that the usefulness of the deferred annuity concept has been accepted by all parties. The disagreements centre on risk sharing and returns to be provided.
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Suggestions For Reform

Key Challenges: Managing Investments of growing balances for which development of financial and capital markets and greater attention to corporate governance will be necessary Achieving transparency and accountability Giving higher priority to fiduciary responsibility Reducing administrative costs, and investment management fees and charges
58
Singapore - CPF
End Implicit Tax on CPF wealth immediately In the Medium-Term (two to three years) consider making CPF a DCFF system in reality by: i. Establishing a CPF Authority, with independent Board of Directors, whose sole objective would be to act in the interest of the members. Appropriate legislation be introduced to accomplish this. The investment policies and performance of the CPF Authority should be completely transparent, and de-linked from the government holding companies. All investments, wherever feasible, should be mark-to-market.
ii.
iii. All returns on investment must be made known and go directly to the members individual accounts.
59
Singapore - CPF contd.

Consider providing limited investment options to individuals on a pooled basis, to be administered by the proposed CPF Authoritys Investment Committee. A member may divide the balances among the options on a periodic basis. Default options on investment allocation can be introduced in cases where no choice has been made.
This will permit individuals to shift to different risk-return profile at different ages, and permit some accommodation of different preferences. Develop the market for annuity products, and make their purchase compulsory.
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Singapore - CPF Contd.

End discrimination in tax treatment against non-CPF retirement benefits. There are broader social security reforms needed in Singapore (such as the introduction of tax-financed redistributive tier, and revamping of the current inadequate health insurance arrangements), but these are beyond the scope of this paper.
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Malaysia - EPF
The main challenge is to invest growing balances in good quality assets with commensurate real returns. It will need to find ways to reduce the rapid accumulation of net additions to its balances as the risks (including political and fiscal risks) are too high in having a government agency manage such large funds in relation to GDP and the stock market capitalization. This will require institutional reforms of Malaysias stock markets, other financial and capital markets, and improved corporate governance. The EPF must continue its gradual shift towards greater transparency of investment policies and performance, including widening the scope of mark-to-market practices. It will need to engage in more effective investment diversification, including international diversification.
62
Malaysia EPF contd.

It will also need to develop expertise in contracting out of balances to various specialized investment management funds, even as it continues to enhance its in-house investment management skills and capacities. The EPF needs to find a practical solution to continuing offering deferred annuity option, making it mandatory once sufficient expertise and experience has been developed. The annuity product (or at least a periodic payment) should be made compulsory. The withdrawal age must be increased (at least for those below 30 years of age) to 60.
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Malaysia - EPF Contd.

The EPF should encourage greater involvement of outside experts, and its members to enhance its autonomy in pursuing its fiduciary objectives. However, the EPFs role in economic development should not be totally abandoned, but made more transparent and accountable. Greater diversification of pension funds industry should be encouraged by permitting companies to set up pension plans and by permitting those with large balances to join private pension plans. There are broader social security reforms (such as developing tax-financed redistributive tier, risk-pooling through national health insurance with appropriate design to address moral hazard issues) which are beyond the scope of this paper.
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Thank you
65

Mukul Asher - EPF in Malaysia and Singapore

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Managing National Provident Funds in Malaysia and Singapore

Malaysias EPF Is Under The Ministry of Finance.

The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore

Governance Structure Contd.

Governance Structure Contd.

The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore

Governance Structure Contd.

The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore

Governance Structure Contd.

The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore

Governance Structure Contd.

Importance of Investment Policies and Performance

The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore

Main Characteristics Of The EPF And The CPF

Main Characteristics Of The EPF And The CPF Contd.

Main Characteristics Of The EPF And The CPF Contd.

The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore

Main Characteristics Of The EPF And The CPF Contd.

The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore

Main Characteristics Of The EPF And The CPF Contd.

Main Characteristics Of The EPF And The CPF Contd.

Main purpose is Retirement.

Main Characteristics Of The EPF And The CPF Contd.

V. For Malaysia as at end 2000: 9.2 Million

The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore

Main Characteristics Of The EPF And The CPF Contd.

Main Characteristics Of The EPF And The CPF Contd.

III.Too Many Pre-Retirement Withdrawals Distract From The Retirement Objective

The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore

Main Characteristics Of The EPF And The CPF Contd.

The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore

Main Characteristics Of The EPF And The CPF Contd.

The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore

Investment allocation of the EPF, 1991-2000

Composition of investment (%)

60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

MGS D&L Equi MM

Investment Policies And Performance: The Accumulation Phase Contd.

Average Returns Over 40 Years Satisfactory in Absolute Terms.

The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore

AACGR (%) (1961-2000) AACGR (%) (1983-2000) AACGR (%) (1987-2000)

Malaysia Global (KLSE) Bond Cumulative Returns 78.1 139.1

Global Equity 172.8

KLSE: Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange

Table 2 Comments on Table 2

The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore

Table 2 Comments on Table 2 contd.

The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore

Table 2 Comments on Table 2 contd.

Investment Policies And Performance: The Accumulation Phase Contd.

The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore

Investment Policies And Performance: The Accumulation Phase Contd.

The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore

Investment Policies And Performance: The Accumulation Phase Contd.

The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore

Investment Policies And Performance: The Accumulation Phase Contd.

The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore

Investment Policies And Performance: The Accumulation Phase Contd.

The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore

Fig. 2 Singapore's CPF : Average Annual Compound Growth Rate (AACGR)

The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore

CPFIS Scheme Contd.

The Public Policy Programme, National University of Singapore