Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Douglas Macgregor Colonel (ret) U.S. Army, PhD Executive VP Burke-Macgregor Group LLC +1 703 975 6954 Doug.Macgregor@Burke-Macgregor.com
Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (2003) is a book by Michael Lewis that tells the story of how Billy Beane, the general manager of the Oakland Athletics baseball team cast adopted a fundamentally new, analytical, evidencebased, sabermetric approach to assemble a winning baseball team. Beanes new approach brought the A's to the playoffs in 2002 and 2003. Beane had to fight coaches, scouts and industry executives that rejected his game changing concept. Beanes model changed baseball. Any team that fails to use his model today is a dinosaur. Pause now and watch this clip from the Movie, Moneyball:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jjf1O4jMqeM
To get ahead in the Army officers must embrace the orthodoxy of how the Army fights.
Army Officers learn early what questions are acceptable to ask, as well as, what answers are acceptable.
Army Officers discover that acceptable technologies, tactics and organizations are those that do not contradict or threaten to disrupt the Army Status quo views on warfare. Without a top-down Redefinition of Warfare that is inherently joint, the Armys organization for combat and modernization parameters will not change.
Then, the nation pays heavily to re-equip the old, shrinking force (The French Army approach between 1920 and 1940).
1. Maintain the military power to ensure no one power or coalition of powers can dominate the Eurasian landmass and restrict the U.S. freedom of maneuver in any area of importance to the U.S. 2. Defend the Western Hemisphere and ensure the security of U.S. borders and coastal waters; 3. As required, conduct punitive military operations to neutralize or destroy unambiguous threats to U.S. national security interests.
US Military Strategy
US Operational Concepts
4. Defend and maintain the lines of communication and bases necessary for the execution of the above tasks. Outcome: Build regionally focused, integrated, Joint Force Commands, (not ad hoc Joint Task Forces), designed to conduct all arms/all effects operations (new operational concept) in dispersed mobile warfare. Outcome: Reorganize the Army to expand the nations range of strategic options; Combat Groups Forces in Being capable of conducting operations on land under Joint C2 against a mix of potential opponents, conventional and unconventional.
Operational
Tactical
Acquisition
New Organization for Combat: Fewer Single Service C2 Echelons, Faster Decision Cycle, Cheaper to Modernize
(Conduct Integrated Operational Maneuver) ARMYJoint HQ Force
Command
Corps HQ Integrated All (Joint Capable) Arms Command
Division HQCOMBAT
GROUP (Joint Plugs)
Company
Company-Team
The Fighters!
These are modular HQTRS. More C-2 modules can be added as required.
Army, Navy, AF, Marine capabilities for employment plug in under one star or below.
Modern warfare, conventional or unconventional, demands Joint C2 structures that accelerate decision cycles and integrate the functions of maneuver, strike, intelligence, information, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and sustainment across service lines. Flag officers are drawn from all services. Stand up initial 3 star Joint Force Headquarters at Joint Base Lewis-McChord. Develop template for JFCs across regional unified commands.
Joint TF CDR
Corps/AF/Fleet Corps/AF/Fleet Corps/AF/Fleet /MEF CDR /MEF CDR /MEF CDR
Army
TBD
Navy
Marines
There wont be time for a pick-up game in a future crisis or conflict. By the time the U.S. gets its operational construct and C2 act in order, China (or any other future great power or coalition of powers) will defeat U.S. forces and achieve its own strategic aims.
US Force Japan
Failure in war is most often the absence of one directing mind and commanding will. Sir Winston Churchill
US Force Korea
Alaskan Command
Flag Officer Totals: Four Stars: 4 Three Stars: 15 Two Stars: 35 Total: 54 Flag Officers
Integration within a relatively flat, joint command structure is a vital step in the direction of combining ground maneuver forces with Strike, ISR and sustainment capabilities from all the Services.
JFC
5x
Deputy Commander
MNVR
STRIKE
+
MNVR
Deputy Commander
STRIKE
IISR
SUST
Five regionally focused Joint Force Commands (JFCs); Services provide one-star commanded mission focused ISR, Strike, Maneuver or Sustainment capability-based force packages to JFCs on rotational basis; Deputy CDRs for ISR, Strike, Maneuver and Sustainment assist JFC CDR to employ mission focused capability force packages; Reduced multi-Star headquarters improves tooth to tail ratio.
JFC
JFC
JFC
JFC
JFC
TRADOC
Readiness & Training
Forces Command
FORSCOM
Cyril Northcote Parkinsons (1909-1993) Law Applies: Work expands to fill the time available for its completion, "and that a sufficiently large bureaucracy will generate enough internal work to keep itself 'busy' and so justify its continued existence without commensurate output.
Mission focused force packages organized around maneuver (ground), Strike, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) and sustainment capabilities for employment under Joint C2.
RECON M A N E U V E R M A N E U V E R
58 M1 Tanks 82 M2/3 BFVs 36 LRAS HMMWVs 10 120mm Mortars 16 155mm SP Guns Target Acquistion
Battery
VS.
Fires Battalion
Support Battalion
(CSA plans to restore the third maneuver battalion to Armored and Infantry BCTs increasing their strength to roughly 4,500 men.)
New equipment must be tied to a new force design with a Joint purpose!
Brigadier General commands 5,150 troops
ARMED RECON
STRIKE
SUSTAINMENT
HHC
293 Troops
RECON TRP
129 Troops
RECON TRP
129 Troops
RECON TRP
129 Troops
AGS
ARMORED GUN CO
43 Troops
Estimated cost of fielding four LRSG all arms battle groups equipped with 1,010 Puma variants in 5 to 7 years = $7.2 billion; Versus 1,748 Bradley Replacements (GCVs) for $28.8 billion in 8 years. PUMA variants are non-developmental, speeding delivery. (Pumas can be built in U.S.).
COMBAT ENGINEER CO
104 Troops
MTR BTRY
96 Troops
At the height of the Korean conflict, 8th Army (in Korea) contained 201,000 U.S. Soldiers.
1. Army can provide 35,000 to 50,000 ready, deployable troops at all times; The National Command Authorities (NCA) always know what forces/capabilities can deploy; 2. Funding for O&M is managed more efficiently. Preserves depth in the Army Force; 3. Army Force Packages are precisely aligned with strategic air and sea lift; 4. No more last minute, hasty assembly of units and equipment for crisis or conflict; 5. Deployments become predictable improving the quality of life for soldiers and families;
Crisis or Conflict requires the deployment of forces to Joint Force Commands inside regional unified command.
Combat Groups within the Deployment Phase are notified by Army readiness and training command for immediate deployment in 96 hours or less.
CSG CSG
Affordable readiness can best be achieved by adopting some form of rotational deployment scheme for the entire U.S. Army both at home and overseas.
MG (ret) Robert H. Scales Jr., USA, Yellow Smoke:
The Future of Land Warfare for Americas Military, 2003
Follow on deployment
AAG
Army Readiness & Training Command begins notifying follow-on forces in training phase for potential deployment as air and sea lift become available.
ICG ICG
ICG ICG
ICG ICG
C4I
C4I
C4I
C4I
TMD
TMD
TMD
STG
STG
ACG
ACG
ACG
ACG
Victory required a single commander with absolute authority to harness the power of ground, air and naval forces in a way that brought the strengths of each to maximum effectiveness. No duplication of effort, no untapped resources, no inter-Service rivalry.
General of the Army Dwight David Eisenhower, 1947
ENG
ENG
CSG CSG
CSG CSG
CSG CSG
CSG CSG
ICG ICG
C4I
C4I
JFC
TMD
STG
STG
ACG
ACG
ENG
CSG CSG
CSG CSG
GROUP CMD
Fewer Required Command Gates Create Flexibility in Professional and Intellectual Development.
Eliminating unneeded echelons offers the opportunity to promote younger officers faster to flag rank. (Scraps Colonel level of command)
PLATOON LEADER/STAFF
New Human Capital Strategy values talent more than longevity! (C2I = Character, Competence, Intelligence).
This is the path to more agile and effective organizations and more empowered junior leaders.
Without reform and reorganization, the nation ends up with a smaller, less capable, Hollow Army than the one we have today.
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the Armys generals fought for the Armys historic budget share and end-strength. New ideas and new organizations were treated as disruptive. Officers with ideas vanished. General Marshall spent 6 years (1939-1945) replacing the Armys club of generals and recovering Army Forces from 20 years of neglect. After 1945, Army Four Stars testified no war for decades and created the hollow constabulary army on wheels that failed in 1950 Korea. After 1991, the Army generals set out to preserve the Army status quo with a failed technological make-over (Force XXI, Future Combat System). Result: Lots of Generals, fewer soldiers, less capability.
Bold, new initiatives can succeed. Incremental changes court failure in defense reform and produce few, if any, $ savings.
Organize for a different future, the unexpected, Strategic Surprise; a Korean-like Emergency in 1950 or a Sarajevo-like event in 1914, not counterinsurgency and nation building; Modernize, but dont build a better carburetor. Go for fuel injection with a new, inherently joint force design! With a new force design (Combat Group), $ Savings emerge; unneeded programs and equipment are identified and shed; Reduce and eliminate command overhead the Army no longer needs: Reduce redundant overhead, adopt joint rotational readiness;
Recommendation 1:
From March 1942 to April 1945 when there were 11 million men in the Army and Army Air Corps the US had only 4 four star generals to command them. How many four stars do we have to direct today's Active Army and Air Force? Answer: 21 Four Stars for 879,000 soldiers and airmen. From 7 December to 31 December 1946 when there were 4,183,466 million men in the Navy and 480,000 in the Marines the US had 4 four star admirals to command them: How many four stars do we have to direct todays Active Navy and Marine Corps?
Answer: 10 Four Star Admirals and 5 Four Star Marine Generals for a combined force of 490,000.
What is to be done?
1. Freeze all flag rank promotions pending DoD wide Flag Officer review, identify Flag rank Billets for downgrade 1 or more stars and those billets for elimination; 2. Direct Unified Command Plan to consolidate COCOMs into five RCCs Pacific, Atlantic (formerly EUCOM and AFRICOM), Central, Northern, Southern and Central Commands; 3. Establish initial 3 star Joint Force Headquarters at Joint Base Lewis-McChord. Develop template for JFCs across regional unified commands.
Recommendation 2:
End the state of war/national emergency. Urge the President to reverse President Bushs Executive Order 13223 that suspended Flag and General Officer End Strength Limits after 9/11. Current USA 4 Star 10 3 Star 51 USAF 11 44 USN 10 38 USMC 5 17 Total 36 150
2 13
24 111
Bureaucratic Bloat Increases Costs and Obstructs Effective and Efficient Operational and Administrative Command
http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/rg1302.pdf http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/10C32.txt
Recommendation 3:
SECDEF should exercise his authority, direction, and control,* to increase value while reducing cost.
Change is a marathon, not a sprint. Direct the following actions: 1. Document current baseline capability inside Army; 2. Model the forces described in this briefing in simulation.
NOTE: Israeli Defense Force and U.S. Army modeled BTP/TUF forces in simulation. Results dramatically favored the new force design. (Points of Contact Available on Request)
3. Identify existing gaps/overlaps/seams. Overlaps help identify current and future systems and/or investments that are not needed inside the Joint Force. 4. Develop an Army Reorganization Roadmap for execution to include milestones and requirements. 5. Direct the CSA to stand up, exercise and validate the formations outlined in the reorganization proposal and report to the Secretary of Defense on the execution of the roadmap. Reorganize the Force! * 10 USC 113 (b)