Back up Slides

Culture does not change because we desire to change it. Culture changes when the organization is transformed.
Frances Hesselbein, My Life in Leadership, 2011

The purpose is clear. It is safety with solvency. The country is entitled to both.
President Dwight David Eisenhower, 1958

Why not rely on the Army National Guard to perform the ground force mission?
Answer: The ARNG can mobilize huge numbers of soldiers if given months or years to do so. However, 21st Century military power is not based on the mass mobilization of the manpower and the resources of the entire nationstate. In addition, ARNG units cannot cultivate and maintain the skills to employ todays complex armor, missile and ISR capabilities. When response times are limited and the U.S. confronts enemy armies, air forces, air defenses and naval forces, shifting the so-called heavy force into the ARNG renders it unusable. In the 21st Century, the demand is for ready, deployable combat forces-in-being, highly trained forces that can take hits and keep fighting, forces capable of decisive action on land within a joint warfighting framework.

Why not rely on the Marine Corps to conduct combat operations on land?
Answer: The Marine Corps has very limited maneuver/exploitation capability. It deploys two small tank battalions (33 tanks each) and four LAV (armored trucks) battalions with very limited artillery. In the words of a Naval War College Analyst: The Marines are similar to the Jordanian Army, with one third of the Jordanian Armys armored vehicles. Here is the Marine dilemma: in Najaf, two battalions of the Armys tanks did what a lighter marine battalion could not, inflicting huge casualties on Mr. Sadrs insurgents while taking almost none of their own. The 70-ton tanks and 25-ton Bradleys pushed to the gates of the Imam Ali shrine at the center of the old city. Meanwhile, the marines spent most of the fight raiding buildings far from the old city. Even so, seven marines died, and at least 30 were seriously wounded, according to commanders here, while only two soldiers died and a handful were injured.
Alex Berenson, The New York Times, August 29, 2004

The ISR-Strike-Maneuver-Sustainment Framework:

Burke-Macgregor Group LLC

The Framework is not just about things. It s about integrating existing and future capabilities within an agile operational framework guided by human understanding. Its an intellectual construct with technological infrastructure.
The Framework is the next logical step in the evolution of warfare beyond the ad hoc coordination of Federal Agencies or combined arms, airground cooperation, air-sea battle, amphibious and special operations.
U.S. capabilities must be integrated at the operational level to detect, deter, disrupt,

neutralize or destroy opposing forces/threats decisively; Apply the ISR-Strike-Maneuver-Sustainment Framework as a methodology for investment planning and programming as constrained budgets compel force optimization; Develop the framework inside a reduced number of regional unified commands.

Notional Future Operational Architecture in Regional Unified Command

Combatant Commander
(Regional Unified Command)

Notional Future Regional Unified CMD Resource Management Headquarters

JFC JFC
JFC

Strike & MD
ISR SUST MNVR

JFC

JFC
JFC

Integrated Command Structure for a Combat Group

Brigadier General
Combat Maneuver Group Commander
Colonel Chief of Staff

Lieutenant Colonel

Lieutenant Colonel

Lieutenant Colonel

Lieutenant Colonel

Lieutenant Colonel

Maneuver (Operations including PSYOPS)

ISR

Strike COORD

Sustainment (Personnel/Logis tics)

Civil Affairs

Intelligence functions split, but integrated to support maneuver, strike and IISR

Forward Presence/Engagement: Myth versus Reality

The large, forward U.S. Naval and Ground presence in the Mediterranean and the Pacific did nothing to prevent these events from occurring:
The Muslim Brotherhood succeeded in taking over Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, using mostly nonviolent means to create Shariah Lawcompliant constitutions/states. Most of Africa is vulnerable to civil wars, genocide, and anarchy. Since the 1950s, Western countries have poured more than $1 trillion of aid into Africa without changing these fundamentals. Sailing aircraft carriers up and down Irans coast accomplished nothing except to put military personnel and assets at risk. Chinese tensions with Japan regarding Japanese nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands potentially entangles the U.S. in a dispute of no importance to U.S. interests.

Experience makes the case for preparedness to surge from a joint rotational readiness posture, not for forward presence as currently executed. Surging is more economical and, potentially more effective in crises and conflict; what forces do after they arrive in a crisis or conflict is far more important than how fast they arrive.

Field Army Analysis

based on force in Transformation under Fire (Praeger, 2003) Roughly 250,100 troops in the deployable Field Army on rotational readiness. Maneuver Echelon (136,600) 4X 12 X 6X 4X
CMG Light Reconnaissance Strike Group (5,150) Combat Maneuver Group (Armored) (5,500) Infantry Combat Group (Motorized) (5,000) Airborne-Air Assault Group (5,000)

Strike Echelon (36,000)

2X
4X 4X

STRG
TMDG

Strike Groups (UCAV/MLRS) (3,000) Theater Missile Defense Groups (4,000) Aviation Combat Groups (3500)

ICG

AVN

AAG

Sustainment Echelon (57,500) 8X 2X 1X

CSG
ENG
Combat Support Groups (6,000) Engineer Groups (construction) (4,000) Chem-Bio Wafare Group (3,000)

ISR Echelon (20,000) 4X

C4I C4I Groups (5,000)

420,000 number originates with projections for future Army budgets.

CW

Example: Theater Missile Defense Group (TMDG)

This Combat Group from the Strike Echelon can be deployed for Homeland Defense or Expeditionary Missions.

THAAD

C4I/SUST BN
PATRIOT

4000 Troops 27 THAADs 48 PATRIOTs 72 NASAMs

The Joint Force needs this capability.

Ballistic Missiles

ADA 2x PATRIOT Batteries BN 3x NASAM Batteries

Commo Relay Co
X-Band

1x THAAD Battery

Cruise Missiles

ADA 2x PATRIOT Batteries BN 3x NASAM Batteries

Commo Relay Co
JLENS

1x THAAD Battery

ADA 2x PATRIOT Batteries BN 3x NASAM Batteries

Commo Relay Co

1x THAAD Battery

National Command Authorities should begin fielding TMD Groups from existing assets.
Aircraft

NASAM

Without ground-based TMD, the Joint Force is at risk.

Drones

Engineer Groups (Construction)

Time for Cross-Service Consolidation! US Army US Air Force

US Navy

Consolidate Expeditionary Battlefield Construction Capabilities from all Services

Consolidate and Civilianize Major Civil Engineers

ENG

ENG
Manages contracts for civil works and military bases within CONUS of permanent structures. (i.e. bridges, levees, home ports, dams, reservoirs, land management, buildings, etc.)

Expedient construction of sea ports, airfields, logistics hubs, bridges, roads, etc. in an expeditionary combat zone environment.

How can the Army modernize in a period of fiscal austerity?

Dont bind Army efforts through massive programs intended to stamp out 20,000 ideal designs over two decades of production runs (FCS); Dont build a better carburetor. Go for fuel injection; equip a new force design with new technology; Dont stuff a squad into one platform and court catastrophic losses!
Rapid prototyping applies to the operational force design and the technologies they employ. When tied to a new force design, rapid prototyping explores/develops new capabilities quickly with smaller inventories of new equipment in soldiers hands before larger investments are made; Using a proven platform mitigates risk and speeds up delivery. Innovate, dont invent from scratch. (German/IDF approach). The Puma AFV

What works now should triumph over unobtainium.

Unit Cohesion, Training and Recruiting are inseparable

1. Significant increases in fight power in land warfare come through the co-evolution of new concepts of operation, new organizational structures, and new patterns of leadership and training, all of which are designed to exploit new technology and create new capabilities. 2. New ways to recruit and train are essential to support the required cultural change provide cohesive formations capable of self-organizing. 3. Decision-making must be pushed to lower levels where tactical leaders in contact with the enemy determine the best method of fulfilling the Joint Force Commander s intent regarding the attainment of operational objectives. 4. Ground combat forces must be organized, trained and led with these points in mind, or no amount of technology will propel the Army into the 21st Century.

Lessons observed, but not learned.

The primary purpose of an army - to be ready to fight effectively at all times seemed to have been forgotten. The leadership I found in many instances was sadly lacking
General Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, 1956

The Problem in 2011

The Army lacks a true measure for discriminating between levels of performance, which negatively impacts leader development.

The Solution in 1950 and Today

Get the right leaders into positions of authority and responsibility (Courage/Competence); Ensure leaders at every level (Squad leader through Four Stars) demonstrate performance against an objective standard (Accountability/Integrity); Create an environment conducive to initiative and independent action within a commonly understood operational framework from lowest to highest levels (Trust/Confidence); Cultivate the elasticity of mind necessary for adaptation to new conditions (Imagination/Adaptability).

Graduates (of Army Schools) lack the ability to quickly develop creative solutions to complex problems in a timeconstrained environment.
A better means for talent management is needed in the Army. 2011 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership Technical Report 2012-1

The Army will need a new approach in 2013!

There is only one tactical principle which is not subject to change. It is to use the means at hand to inflict the maximum amount of wound, death, and destruction on the enemy in the minimum amount of time."
General George S. Patton Jr., 1942 Build powerful synergies with the technologies and concepts developed by U.S. Aerospace and Maritime Forces; Prepare for Warfighting Operations that integrate functional capabilities Maneuver, Strike, ISR, Sustainment across service lines inside an integrated Joint C2 operational framework. Punch above its weight, mobilizing fighting power disproportionate to its size (High lethality, low density ); Organize for joint operations in a non-linear, nodal and dispersed, mobile warfare environment inside a much more lethal battle space than anything seen since WW II; Ensure the Army has the capability to close with the enemy, take hits, sustain losses, keep fighting and strike back decisively. (Mobile, armored firepower!)

AirSea Battle: Option or illusion?

On 26 October 2012, Mr. Robert O. Work, Under Secretary of The U.S. Navy, made the following points in a briefing at the Center for Naval Analysis:
Air Sea Battle sees the solution primarily in terms of joint operationsin this case involving naval and aerospace forces. Air Sea Battle focuses on winning a two-sided guided munitions salvo competition in order to facilitate concurrent and follow-on operations (the nature of follow-on operations is not addressed). Air Sea Battle will lead to new Navy-Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures in the near term, and new platforms, sensors, and weapons in the future.

ASB will require enough munitions to cover an area equivalent to 2/3 the size of the continental US. Assuming it does not escalate to a nuclear exchange what will this operation accomplish?

China as Theater of War: Implications for Army Planners

We may find ourselves with a full-scale war on our hands. The result [in China]would be the same sort of disaster which overtook Napoleon in Spain - a slow sinking into the deepest sort of bog.
Major General Ishiwara Kanji on Tokyos decision to invade China after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937

Japanese Army Minister Sugiyama Hajime predicted the broader war with China would last only two months. Instead Japans war with China dragged on for 8 years until August 1945.

Initial operations to invade northern China, while seizing Shanghai, and several coastal cities took only 250,000 troops. However, by 1945 the Imperial Japanese Army of 5.9 million deployed 4.2 million soldiers to occupy China and Manchuria. Chinese Nationalist and Communist forces simply withdrew into mountainous central China to rebuild and preserve their forces.
It took three generations (close to 80 years) for the Mongols to conquer China. In the same amount of time the Mongol Armies conquered Persia, Russia, the Middle East, Central Asia and Eastern Europe.

Who is Douglas Macgregor?

Burke-Macgregor Group LLC

Colonel (ret) Douglas Macgregor was commissioned in the US. Army in 1976 after 4 years at West Point and 1 year at VMI. In 1991, Macgregor was awarded the bronze star with V device for valor for his personal leadership of the lead cavalry troops that destroyed an Iraqi Republican Guard Brigade in the Battle of the 73 Easting, the U.S. Army s largest tank battle since World War II. His latest book, Warrior s Rage. The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting (Naval Institute Press, 2009) describes the action from his tank turret. As the Chief of Strategic Planning and Director of the Joint Operations Center at SHAPE( 1997-2000), Macgregor supervised the conduct and planning of the Kosovo Air Campaign and subsequent occupation of Kosovo. On 16-17 January 2002, the Secretary of Defense directed General Tommy Franks to meet with Macgregor to discuss his concept for the attack to seize Baghdad. Though modified to include less armor and large numbers of Army and marine light infantry, Macgregor s offensive concept was largely adopted. Macgregor s concepts from his groundbreaking books on military transformation, Breaking the Phalanx (1997) and Transformation under Fire (2003) continue to exert influence inside the worlds militaries. His books are available in Chinese, Korean and Hebrew, as well as English. Macgregor holds a PhD in international relations from the University of Virginia.