PROPERTY

AGDON BOHOL CAMBA FRANCISCO SAULOG

CRUZ VS. DENR

G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000 Ponente???

CRUZ VS. DENR

FACTS:
1. Isagani Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of certain provision of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA)on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. 2. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. 3. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.

CRUZ VS. DENR

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional. 2) Whether ancestral domains are considered private lands in the same way as ordinary titles private lands.

HELD:
1) No. The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural resources somehow against the regalian doctrine. 2) Yes. Jurisprudence and IPRA are very clear that these lands are private. However, the reality on the ground is speaks differently, for instance, DENR still considered that ancestral domain within the protected areas are still art of the public domain.

MUNICIPALITY OF CAVITE VS. HILARIA ROJAS and her husband TIUNG SIUKO, alias SIWA
G.R. No. L-9069 March 31, 1915 Torres, J.

MUNICIPALITY OF CAVITE VS. HILARIA ROJAS and her husband TIUNG SIUKO, alias SIWA
FACTS:
1) Petitioner leased to the petitioner a parcel of land which formed part of a public plaza belonging to the municipality of Cavite known as Plaza Soledad, on condition that she pay rent of P5.58 quarterly in advance, and that she obligate herself to vacate said land within sixty days subsequent to notification to that effect. Upon such notification, the respondent refused to vacate the land, forcing the municipality to file a complaint before the CFI to order the former to vacate the land. 2) Petitioner contends that the lease that was secured by the respondents was null and void for the said land is an integral portion of a public plaza of public domain and use, and the municipal council of Cavite has never at any time had any power or authority to withdraw it from public use and to lease it to a private party for his own use, and so the defendants have never had any right to occupy or to retain the said land under leasehold, or in any other way, their occupation of the parcel being furthermore illegal 3) The lower court dismissed the complaint declaring that the said municipality had no right to require that the defendants vacate the land in question.

MUNICIPALITY OF CAVITE VS. HILARIA ROJAS and her husband TIUNG SIUKO, alias SIWA
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lease that the respondents secured from the petitioner is valid

HELD:
No. Decision of the lower court is reversed. Defendant must restore and deliver possession of the land. A municipal council cannot sell or lease communal or public property, such as plazas, streets, common lands, rivers, bridges, etc., because they are outside the commerce of man, and if it has done so by leasing part of a plaza the lease is null and void, for it is contrary to the law, and the thing leased cannot be the object of a contract.

MUNICIPALITY OF CAVITE VS. HILARIA ROJAS and her husband TIUNG SIUKO, alias SIWA
According to the plan that was prepared by a naval engineer, which exhibits the boundary line between the properties of the municipality of Cavite and the naval reservation, defendant's house did form part of the promenade called Plaza Soledad, and this was also so proven by the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the defendant has no right to continue to occupy the land of the municipality leased by her, for it is an integral portion of Plaza Soledad, which is for public use and is reserved for the common benefit. According to article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of general service supported by said towns or provinces." The Civil Code, article 1271, prescribes that everything which is not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of this commerce, as was decided by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of February 12, 1895, which says: "Communal things that cannot be sold because they are by their very nature outside of commerce are those for public use, such as the plazas, streets, common lands, rivers, fountains, etc."

CITY OF MANILA VS. INSULAR GOVERNMENT

G.R. No. ??? Date??? Ponente???

CITY OF MANILA VS. INSULAR GOVERNMENT

FACTS: 1) The city of Manila filed a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of a certain parcel or tract of land situated in Paco, a district of the said city. The said city alleged that it was the absolute owner of the said land; that said land was assessed by the city of Manila in the sum of $1,780; that there existed no liens of whatever character against said land; that the land was unoccupied; that the said city obtained title to the said land by reason of being the successor to all the rights and actions of the old city of Manila (ayuntamiento de Manila), to which said property formerly belonged. 2) The Insular Government opposed the inscription of the said land to the petitioners name upon the ground that the land in question is the property of the Government of the United States under the control of the Insular Government. 3) One of the examiners of titles of the Court of Land Registration made an examination of the title claimed by the petitioner and reported to the judge of the Court of Land Registration the application filed by the city of Manila is not accompanied by any document relative to its alleged ownership; that in the office of the register of deeds there is no record of any act or contract opposing the claim of the applicant; nor does there appear, from the investigations held, any fact contrary to those quoted in the application; and that the city of Manila, in order to acquire title to the land above mentioned, must show the ownership which the former ayuntamiento had over said land. Therefore, the examiner was of the opinion that the title of the City of Manila is defective and cannot be registered.

CITY OF MANILA VS. INSULAR GOVERNMENT

FACTS:
4) The cause was duly brought on for trial and during the trial of said cause the petitioner attempted to establish that the old city of Manila, its predecessor, had rented said land, had received rents therefor, and in a general way had administered the same. 5) The respondent maintained that the land in question was public land, belonging to the Central Government and the same had never been granted to any person or corporation or municipality by the Spanish Government. 6) The judge of the said court granted the registration of the rest of said described property in favor of the city. 7) Against this order the respondent gave notice of his intention to appeal.

CITY OF MANILA VS. INSULAR GOVERNMENT

ISSUE:
Whether or not the questioned property is owned by the city of Manila.

HELD:
- No. The Supreme Court ruled that the mere renting of property and receiving the rent therefor cannot, of themselves, in the absence of other proof, support a claim of ownership of such property.

- One of the earliest provisions of law relating to the rights of pueblos in the insular possessions of the Spanish Government is that of settlements and pueblos of natives.
- Article 53 of the Ordinances of Good Government indicates that 1) that the King continued to be the absolute owner of said lands; 2) that the pueblos were only given the mere usufruct of the same; 3) that the King might at any time annul such grant; and 4) that a designation, of the particular land so granted, was a necessary prerequisite for the holding of the same for the purposes indicated, by the said pueblo.

CITY OF MANILA VS. INSULAR GOVERNMENT

- The municipalities of the Philippine Islands are not entitled, by right, to any part of the public domain for use as communal lands. The Spanish law provided that the usufruct of a portion of the public domain adjoining municipal territory might be granted by the Government for communal purposes, upon proper petition, but, until granted, no rights therein passed to the municipalities, and, in any event, the ultimate title remained in the sovereign.

- The petitioner herein not having presented proof showing that the land in question had been granted to it by the former sovereign in these Islands, and not having shown that it was entitled to said lands by virtue of some law of the present sovereign of these Islands, the Court of Land Registration was not empowered to grant the registration of said lands in favor of said petitioner. The judgment, therefore, of the lower court is hereby reversed.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND TANCINCO ET AL

Gr No. ??? Date??? Ponente???

FACTS:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND TANCINCO ET AL

1) Respondents are registered owners of a parcel of land bordering the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers 2) In 1973, Respondents then filed a n application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond property 3) According to their witness, the alleged accretion was claimed to have existed since 1939. In 1951, when the land was dry and almost at the level of the pilapil of the property of the respondents, a new pilapil was established and the soil from the old pilapil was transferred to the new pilapil and such new lots were converted to fishponds. 4) The asst. provincial fiscal filed an opposition on the ground that there was no accretion to speak of because what respondents did was to simply transfer their dikes further down the river bed, and thus, such accretion was man made and artificial. 5) The trial court and the CA granted the applications for the lots based on the finding that such lots are accretions to the private respondents fishponds.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND TANCINCO ET AL

ISSUE:
Whether or not said lots can be registered to the respondents

HELD:
No. The lots in question are classified as property of public domain. They do not meet the requirements set in art 457 to claim the said lands. Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides: To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

(That the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensible.) In the case at bar, the alleged alluvial deposits / lands came into being not because of the sole effect of the current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND TANCINCO ET AL

(That the accretion was gradual and imperceptible) In the case at bar, the lands only existed after the transfer of their dikes towards the river in 1951. The claim that such existed since 1939 deserved no merit since several surveys were made in 1940 and 1960, in the area and such lots were not included/ mentioned. Such lands were only declared for taxation purposes only in 1972. The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land.

Said lots are therefore classified as property of the public domain under

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND TANCINCO ET AL

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and Art. 502. The following are of public dominion: Rivers and their natural beds; Hence, cannot be registered under the land registration act and the adjudication of said lands as private property is null and void.

BAGUIO CITIZENS ACTION VS. THE CITY COUNCIL AND CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO
G.R. No. L-27247
April 20, 1983 De Castro, J.

BAGUIO CITIZENS ACTION VS. THE CITY COUNCIL AND CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO FACTS:
1) A petition for declaratory relief was filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch II, praying for a judgment declaring Ordinance 386 passed by the City Council of Baguio as invalid and void ab initio. 2) Ordinance 386 - AN ORDINANCE CONSIDERING ALL SQUATTERS OF PUBLIC LAND, OTHER THAN THOSE EARMARKED FOR PUBLIC USE IN THE CITY OF BAGUIO WHO ARE DULY REGISTERED AS SUCH AT THE TIME OF THE PROMULGATION OF THIS ORDINANCE AS BONAFIDE OCCUPANTS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE LOTS AND WHICH SHALL HEREAFTER BE EMBRACED AS A CITY GOVERNMENT HOUSING PROJECT AND PROVIDING FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

BAGUIO CITIZENS ACTION VS. THE CITY COUNCIL AND CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO Facts:
3) CFI of Baguio, Branch II, dismissed the petition on the grounds that: a) another court, the Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I, had declared the Ordinance valid in a criminal case filed against the squatters for illegal construction, and the Branch II of the same court cannot, in a declaratory proceeding, review and determine the validity of said judgment pursuant to the policy of judicial respect and stability; b) those who come within the protection of the ordinance have not been made parties to the suit in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 64 and it has been held that the non-joinder of such parties is a jurisdictional defect; and c) the court is clothed with discretion to refuse to make any declaration where the declaration is not necessary and proper at the time under all circumstances.

BAGUIO CITIZENS ACTION VS. THE CITY COUNCIL AND CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordinance allowing squatters of public land to be considered bona-fide occupants of their respective lots is valid

HELD:
The ordinance in question is null and without force and effect.

BAGUIO CITIZENS ACTION VS. THE CITY COUNCIL AND CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO
Court of First Instance, Branch II Supreme Court a) another court, the Court of First Instance of Baguio, CFI, Branch I, did not declare the whole Ordinance valid. This is clear when it stated Branch I, had declared the Ordinance valid in a criminal that "had the issue been the legalization of illegal occupation of public land, case filed against the squatters for illegal construction, covered by Republic Act No. 947, ... the Ordinance in question should have been and the Branch II of the same court cannot, in a ultra vires and unconstitutional." Said court merely confined itself to Sections 2 declaratory proceeding, review and determine the and 3 of Ordinance 386. It did not make any definite pronouncement whether or validity of said judgment pursuant to the policy of not the City Council has the power to legalize the illegal occupation of public land judicial respect and stability; which is the issue in the instant case.

b) those who come within the protection of the - There is nothing in Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which says that the ordinance have not been made parties to the suit in non-joinder of persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by accordance with Section 2 of Rule 64 and it has been the declaration is a jurisdictional defect. Said section merely states that "All held that the non-joinder of such parties is a persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be jurisdictional defect; and affected by the declaration; and no declaration shall, except or otherwise provided in these rules, prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the action." - Although it is true that any declaration by the court would affect the squatters, the latter are not necessary parties because the question involved is the power of the Municipal Council to enact the Ordinances in question. Whether or not they are impleaded, any determination of the controversy would be binding upon the squatters. c) the court is clothed with discretion to refuse to make Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city any declaration where the declaration is not necessary officials will elevate it into a lawful act. In principle, a compound of illegal entry and proper at the time under all circumstances. and official permit to stay is obnoxious to our concept of proper official norm of conduct. Because, such permit does not serve social justice; it fosters moral decadence. It does not promote public welfare; it abets disrespect for the law. It has its roots in vice; so it is an infected bargain. Official approval of squatting should not, therefore, be permitted to obtain in this country where there is an orderly form of government (City of Manila vs. Garcia).

BAGUIO CITIZENS ACTION VS. THE CITY COUNCIL AND CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO
Being unquestionably a public land, no disposition thereof could be made by the City of Baguio without prior legislative authority. The law has laid in the Director of Lands the power of exclusive control, administrations, disposition and alienation of public land that includes the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concessions or disposition and management of the lands of public domains.

Summary of Doctrines