CCNA Security 06

CCNA Security
Chapter Six Securing the Local Area Network
2009 Cisco Learning Institute.
Lesson Planning
This lesson should take 3-4 hours to present The lesson should include lecture, demonstrations, discussions and assessments The lesson can be taught in person or using remote instruction
Major Concepts
Describe endpoint vulnerabilities and protection methods
Describe basic Catalyst switch vulnerabilities

Configure and verify switch security features, including port security and storm control Describe the fundamental security considerations of Wireless, VoIP, and SANs.
Lesson Objectives
Upon completion of this lesson, the successful participant will be able to:
1. Describe endpoint security and the enabling technologies
2. Describe how Cisco IronPort is used to ensure endpoint security 3. Describe how Cisco NAC products are used to ensure endpoint security 4. Describe how the Cisco Security Agent is used to ensure endpoint security 5. Describe the primary considerations for securing the Layer 2 infrastructure 6. Describe MAC address spoofing attacks and MAC address spoofing attack mitigation
Lesson Objectives
7. Describe MAC Address table overflow attacks and MAC Address table overflow attack mitigation 8. Describe STP manipulation attacks and STP manipulation attack mitigation 9. Describe LAN Storm attacks and LAN Storm attack mitigation 10. Describe VLAN attacks and VLAN attack mitigation 11. Describe how to configure port security 12. Describe how to verify port security 13. Describe how to configure and verify BPDU Guard and Root Guard 14. Describe how to configure and verify storm control
15. Describe and configure Cisco SPAN

16. Describe and configure Cisco RSPAN
Lesson Objectives
17. Describe the best practices for Layer 2 18. Describe the fundamental aspects of enterprise security for advanced technologies 19. Describe the fundamental aspects of wireless security and the enabling technologies 20. Describe wireless security solutions 21. Describe the fundamental aspects of VoIP security and the enabling technologies Reference: CIAG course on VoIP security. 22. Describe VoIP security solutions 23. Describe the fundamental aspects of SAN security and the enabling technologies 24. Describe SAN security solutions
Endpoint Security Considerations

Introducing Endpoint Security Endpoint Security with IronPort Endpoint Security with Network Admission Control Endpoint Security with Cisco Security Agent
Introducing Endpoint Security

Securing the LAN Addressing Endpoint Security Operating Systems Basic Security Services Types of Application Attacks
Cisco Systems Endpoint Security Solutions
Securing the LAN

Perimeter
MARS ACS
Firewall
Internet
VPN IPS
Areas of concentration: Securing endpoints Securing network infrastructure
Iron Port
Hosts
Web Server Email Server
DNS
LAN
Addressing Endpoint Security

Policy Compliance Infection Containment Secure Host
Threat Protection
Based on three elements: Cisco Network Admission Control (NAC) Endpoint protection Network infection containment
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Operating Systems Basic Security Services

Trusted code and trusted path ensures that the integrity of the operating system is not violated Privileged context of execution provides identity authentication and certain privileges based on the identity Process memory protection and isolation provides separation from other users and their data
Access control to resources ensures confidentiality and integrity of data
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Types of Application Attacks

Direct I have gained direct access to this applications privileges
Indirect
I have gained access to this system which is trusted by the other system, allowing me to access it.
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Cisco Systems Endpoint Security Solutions

Cisco Security Agent IronPort
Cisco NAC
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Endpoint Security with IronPort

Cisco IronPort Products IronPort C-Series Iron-Port S-Series
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Cisco IronPort Products

IronPort products include: E-mail security appliances for virus and spam control Web security appliance for spyware filtering, URL filtering, and anti-malware Security management appliance
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IronPort C-Series
Before IronPort
Internet
After IronPort
Internet
Firewall Encryption Platform MTA
Firewall
DLP Scanner
Antispam
Antivirus Policy Enforcement Mail Routing DLP Policy Manager
IronPort E-mail Security Appliance
Groupware
Groupware
Users
Users
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IronPort S-Series
Before IronPort
Internet
After IronPort
Internet
Firewall
Firewall
Web Proxy Antispyware Antivirus Antiphishing URL Filtering
IronPort SSeries
Policy Management
Users
Users
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Endpoint Security with Network Admission Control

Cisco NAC The NAC Framework NAC Components Cisco NAC Appliance Process
Access Windows
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Cisco NAC
The purpose of NAC: Allow only authorized and compliant systems to access the network To enforce network security policy
NAC Framework Software module embedded within NACenabled products Integrated framework leveraging multiple Cisco and NAC-aware vendor products Cisco NAC Appliance In-band Cisco NAC Appliance solution can be used on any switch or router platform
Self-contained, turnkey solution
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The NAC Framework

Network Access Devices Hosts Attempting Network Access
Enforcement
Policy Server Decision Points and Remediation
Credentials Credentials EAP/UDP, Cisco Trust Agent EAP/802.1x Notification RADIUS Access Rights
AAA Server Credentials
Vendor Servers
HTTPS
Comply?
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NAC Components
Cisco NAS
Serves as an in-band or out-ofband device for network access control
Cisco NAA
Optional lightweight client for device-based registry scans in unmanaged environments
Cisco NAM
Centralizes management for administrators, support personnel, and operators
M G R
Rule-set updates
Scheduled automatic updates for antivirus, critical hotfixes, and other applications
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Cisco NAC Appliance Process

1.
Host attempts to access a web page or uses an optional client.
Network access is blocked until wired or wireless host provides login information.
THE GOAL
Authentication Server
M G R
Cisco NAM
2.
Host is redirected to a login page.

Cisco NAC Appliance validates username and password, also performs device and network scans to assess vulnerabilities on device.
Cisco NAS
Intranet/ Network
3.
The host is authenticated and optionally scanned for posture compliance
3a.
Device is noncompliant or login is incorrect.

Host is denied access and assigned to a quarantine role with access to online remediation resources.
Quarantine Role
3b.
Device is clean.
Machine gets on certified devices list and is granted access to network.
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Access Windows
Scan is performed
Login Screen (types of checks depend on user role)
Scan fails Remediate
4.
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Endpoint Security with Cisco Security Agent

CSA Architecture Model CSA Overview CSA Functionality Attack Phases
CSA Log Messages
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CSA Architecture
Administration Workstation Server Protected by Cisco Security Agent
Alerts
Events
SSL
Security Policy Management Center for Cisco Security Agent with Internal or External Database
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CSA Overview
Application
File System Interceptor
Network Interceptor
Configuration Interceptor
Execution Space Interceptor
Rules Engine State Correlation Engine Rules and Policies
Allowed Request
Blocked Request
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CSA Functionality
Network Interceptor File System Configuration Interceptor Interceptor Execution Space Interceptor
Security Application
Distributed Firewall
Host Intrusion Prevention Application Sandbox Network Worm Prevention File Integrity Monitor
X X
X
X
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Attack Phases
Probe phase Ping scans Port scans Penetrate phase Transfer exploit code to target Persist phase Install new code Modify configuration Propagate phase Attack other targets Paralyze phase Erase files Crash system Steal data
Server Protected by Cisco Security Agent
File system interceptor Network interceptor Configuration interceptor Execution space interceptor
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CSA Log Messages
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Layer 2 Security Considerations

Introduction to Layer 2 Security
MAC Address Spoofing Attacks

MAC Address Table Overflow Attacks STP Manipulation Attacks LAN Storm Attacks VLAN Attacks
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Introduction to Layer2 Security

Layer 2 Security Overview of OSI Model
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Layer 2 Security
Perimeter
MARS ACS
Firewall
Internet
VPN IPS
Iron Port
Hosts
Web Server Email Server
DNS
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OSI Model
When it comes to networking, Layer 2 is often a very weak link.
Application Stream
Application Presentation Session Transport Network Data Link Physical
Application Presentation
Compromised
Session Protocols and Ports IP Addresses Initial MACCompromise Addresses Physical Links Transport Network Data Link Physical
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Layer 2 Vulnerabilities
MAC Address Spoofing Attacks MAC Address Table Overflow Attacks STP Manipulation Attacks Storm Attacks
VLAN Attacks
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MAC Address Spoofing Attack

1 2 12AbDd
Switch Port
AABBcc
MAC Address: AABBcc
The switch keeps track of the endpoints by maintaining a MAC address table. In MAC spoofing, the attacker poses as another hostin this case, AABBcc
Port 1 Port 2
MAC Address: 12AbDd
MAC Address: AABBcc
Attacker
I have associated Ports 1 and 2 with the MAC addresses of the devices attached. Traffic destined for each device will be forwarded directly.
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MAC Address Spoofing Attack

I have changed the MAC address on my computer to match the server.
1 2 AABBcc
Switch Port 1 AABBcc 2
Attacker
MAC Address: Port 1 AABBcc
Port 2
MAC Address: AABBcc
The device with MAC address AABBcc has changed locations to Port2. I must adjust my MAC address table accordingly.
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MAC Address Table Overflow Attack
The switch can forward frames between PC1 and PC2 without flooding because the MAC address table contains port-to-MACaddress mappings in the MAC address table for these PCs.
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MAC Address Table Overflow Attack

2
Bogus addresses are added to the CAM table. CAM table is full. MAC X Y C 3/25 VLAN 10 VLAN 10 flood Port 3/25 3/25 3/25
XYZ
1
Intruder runs macof to begin sending unknown bogus MAC addresses.
3/25 MAC X 3/25 MAC Y 3/25 MAC Z
VLAN 10
Host C
The switch floods the frames.
4
Attacker sees traffic to servers B and D.
C
D
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STP Manipulation Attack

Spanning tree protocol operates by electing a root bridge
F F F
Root Bridge Priority = 8192 MAC Address= 0000.00C0.1234
STP builds a tree topology STP manipulation changes the topology of a networkthe attacking host appears to be the root bridge
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STP Manipulation Attack

Root Bridge Priority = 8192
F F
F F F
F
Root Bridge
Attacker
The attacking host broadcasts out STP configuration and topology change BPDUs. This is an attempt to force spanning tree recalculations.
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LAN Storm Attack

Broadcast Broadcast Broadcast Broadcast Broadcast Broadcast
Broadcast, multicast, or unicast packets are flooded on all ports in the same VLAN. These storms can increase the CPU utilization on a switch to 100%, reducing the performance of the network.
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Storm Control
Total number of broadcast packets or bytes
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VLAN Attacks
Segmentation Flexibility Security
VLAN = Broadcast Domain = Logical Network (Subnet)

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VLAN Attacks
802.1Q Trunk VLAN 20 Server VLAN 10
Attacker sees traffic destined for servers
Server
A VLAN hopping attack can be launched in two ways: Spoofing DTP Messages from the attacking host to cause the switch to enter trunking mode Introducing a rogue switch and turning trunking on
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Double-Tagging VLAN Attack

1
Attacker on VLAN 10, but puts a 20 tag in the packet
The first switch strips off the first tag and does not retag it (native traffic is not retagged). It then forwards the packet to switch 2.
802.1Q, Frame
20
The second switch receives the packet, on the native VLAN
Trunk (Native VLAN = 10)
4 Note: This attack works only if the trunk has the same native VLAN as the attacker.
The second switch examines the packet, sees the VLAN 20 tag and forwards it accordingly.
Victim (VLAN 20)
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Configuring Switch Security

Configuring Port Security
Verifying Port Security

BPDU Guard and Root Guard Storm Control
VLAN Configuration
Cisco Switched Port Analyzer Cisco Remote Switched Port Analyzer Best Practices for Layer 2
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Configuring Port Security

Port Security Overview Port Security Configuration
Switchport Port-Security Parameters

Port-Security Violation Configuration Switchport Port-Security Violation Parameters Port Security Aging Configuration Switchport Port-Security Aging Parameters Typical Configuration
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Port Security Overview

MAC A
Port 0/1 allows MAC A Port 0/2 allows MAC B Port 0/3 allows MAC C
0/1 0/2 0/3

MAC A MAC F
Attacker 1
Allows an administrator to statically specify MAC Addresses for a port or to permit the switch to dynamically learn a limited number of MAC addresses
Attacker 2
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CLI Commands
Switch(config-if)# switchport mode access
Sets the interface mode as access

Switch(config-if)# switchport port-security
Enables port security on the interface

Switch(config-if)# switchport port-security maximum value
Sets the maximum number of secure MAC addresses for the interface (optional)
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Switchport Port-Security Parameters

Parameter
mac-address mac-address vlan vlan-id vlan access vlan voice mac-address sticky [mac-address]
Description
(Optional) Specify a secure MAC address for the port by entering a 48-bit MAC aaddress. You can add additional secure MAC addresses up to the maximum value configured. (Optional) On a trunk port only, specify the VLAN ID and the MAC address. If no VLAN ID is specified, the native VLAN is used. (Optional) On an access port only, specify the VLAN as an access VLAN. (Optional) On an access port only, specify the VLAN as a voice VLAN (Optional) Enable the interface for sticky learning by entering only the mac-address sticky keywords. When sticky learning is enabled, the interface adds all secure MAC addresses that are dynamically learned to the running configuration and converts these addresses to sticky secure MAC addresses. Specify a sticky secure MAC address by entering the mac-address sticky mac-address keywords.. (Optional) Set the maximum number of secure MAC addresses for the interface. The maximum number of secure MAC addresses that you can configure on a switch is set by the maximum number of available MAC addresses allowed in the system. The active Switch Database Management (SDM) template determines this number. This number represents the total of available MAC addresses, including those used for other Layer 2 functions and any other secure MAC addresses configured on interfaces. The default setting is 1. (Optional) For trunk ports, you can set the maximum number of secure MAC addresses on a VLAN. If the vlan keyword is not entered, the default value is used. n vlan: set a per-VLAN maximum value. n vlan vlan-list: set a per-VLAN maximum value on a range of VLANs separated by a hyphen or a series of VLANs separated by commas. For nonspecified VLANs, the per-VLAN maximum value is used.
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maximum value
vlan [vlan-list]
Port Security Violation Configuration

Switch(config-if)# switchport port-security violation {protect | restrict | shutdown}
Sets the violation mode (optional)

Switch(config-if)# switchport port-security mac-address mac-address
Enters a static secure MAC address for the interface (optional)

Switch(config-if)# switchport port-security mac-address sticky
Enables sticky learning on the interface (optional)
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Switchport Port-Security Violation Parameters

Parameter
protect
Description
(Optional) Set the security violation protect mode. When the number of secure MAC addresses reaches the limit allowed on the port, packets with unknown source addresses are dropped until you remove a sufficient number of secure MAC addresses or increase the number of maximum allowable addresses. You are not notified that a security violation has occurred. (Optional) Set the security violation restrict mode. When the number of secure MAC addresses reaches the limit allowed on the port, packets with unknown source addresses are dropped until you remove a sufficient number of secure MAC addresses or increase the number of maximum allowable addresses. In this mode, you are notified that a security violation has occurred. (Optional) Set the security violation shutdown mode. In this mode, a port security violation causes the interface to immediately become error-disabled and turns off the port LED. It also sends an SNMP trap, logs a syslog message, and increments the violation counter. When a secure port is in the error-disabled state, you can bring it out of this state by entering the errdisable recovery cause psecure-violation global configuration command, or you can manually re-enable it by entering the shutdown and no shut down interface configuration commands. Set the security violation mode to per-VLAN shutdown. In this mode, only the VLAN on which the violation occurred is error-disabled.
restrict
shutdown
shutdown vlan
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Port Security Aging Configuration

Switch(config-if)# switchport port-security aging {static | time time | type {absolute | inactivity}}
Enables or disables static aging for the secure port or sets the aging time or type
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Switchport Port-Security Aging Parameters

Parameter
static
time time
Description
Enable aging for statically configured secure addresses on this port.
Specify the aging time for this port. The range is 0 to 1440 minutes. If the time is 0, aging is disabled for this port.
type absolute
Set absolute aging type. All the secure addresses on this port age out exactly after the time (minutes) specified and are removed from the secure address list.
Set the inactivity aging type. The secure addresses on this port age out only if there is no data traffic from the secure source address for the specified time period.
type inactivity
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Typical Configuration
S2
Switch(config-if)# switchport switchport switchport switchport switchport switchport

PC B
mode access port-security port-security port-security port-security port-security
maximum 2 violation shutdown mac-address sticky aging time 120

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Verifying Port Security

CLI Commands View Secure MAC Addresses MAC Address Notification
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CLI Commands
sw-class# show port-security
Secure Port MaxSecureAddr CurrentAddr SecurityViolation Security Action (Count) (Count) (Count)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Fa0/12 2 0 0 Shutdown
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Total Addresses in System (excluding one mac per port) :0
Max Addresses limit in System (excluding one mac per port) : 1024 sw-class# show port-security Port Security : Port status : Violation mode : Maximum MAC Addresses : Total MAC Addresses : Configured MAC Addresses : Aging time : Aging type : SecureStatic address aging : Security Violation Count : interface f0/12 Enabled Secure-down Shutdown 2 1 0 120 mins Absolute Disabled 0
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View Secure MAC Addresses
sw-class# show port-security address Secure Mac Address Table ------------------------------------------------------------------Vlan ---1 Mac Address ----------0000.ffff.aaaa Type ---SecureConfigured Ports ----Fa0/12 Remaining Age (mins) ------------: 0
------------------------------------------------------------------Total Addresses in System (excluding one mac per port)
Max Addresses limit in System (excluding one mac per port) : 1024
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MAC Address Notification

MAC B SNMP traps sent to NMS when new MAC addresses appear or when old ones time out.
NMS
F1/2 F1/1 F2/1 MAC A
Switch CAM Table F1/1 = MAC A F1/2 = MAC B F2/1 = MAC D (address ages out) MAC D is away from the network.
MAC address notification allows monitoring of the MAC addresses, at the module and port level, added by the switch or removed from the CAM table for secure ports.
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BPDU Guard and Root Guard

Configure Portfast BPDU Guard Display the State of Spanning Tree Root Guard
Verify Root Guard
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Configure Portfast
Server
Workstation
Command Switch(config-if)# spanningtree portfast Switch(config-if)# no spanning-tree portfast Switch(config)# spanning-tree portfast default Switch# show running-config interface type slot/port
Description Enables PortFast on a Layer 2 access port and forces it to enter the forwarding stateimmediately. Disables PortFast on a Layer 2 access port. PortFast is disabled by default. Globally enables the PortFast feature on all nontrunking ports. Indicates whether PortFast has been configured on a port.
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BPDU Guard
Root Bridge
F F
B
BPDU Guard Enabled
Attacker
STP BPDU
Switch(config)# spanning-tree portfast bpduguard default
Globally enables BPDU guard on all ports with PortFast enabled

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Display the State of Spanning Tree

Switch# show spanning-tree summary totals Root bridge for: none. PortFast BPDU Guard is enabled UplinkFast is disabled BackboneFast is disabled Spanning tree default pathcost method used is short Name Blocking Listening Learning Forwarding STP Active -------------------- -------- --------- -------- ---------- ---------1 VLAN 0 0 0 1 1 <output omitted>
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Root Guard
Root Bridge Priority = 0 MAC Address = 0000.0c45.1a5d
F F
F
Root Guard Enabled
Attacker
STP BPDU Priority = 0 MAC Address = 0000.0c45.1234
Switch(config-if)# spanning-tree guard root
Enables root guard on a per-interface basis

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Verify Root Guard

Switch# show spanning-tree inconsistentports Name Interface Inconsistency -------------------- ---------------------- -----------------VLAN0001 FastEthernet3/1 Port Type Inconsistent VLAN0001 FastEthernet3/2 Port Type Inconsistent VLAN1002 FastEthernet3/1 Port Type Inconsistent VLAN1002 FastEthernet3/2 Port Type Inconsistent VLAN1003 FastEthernet3/1 Port Type Inconsistent VLAN1003 FastEthernet3/2 Port Type Inconsistent VLAN1004 FastEthernet3/1 Port Type Inconsistent VLAN1004 FastEthernet3/2 Port Type Inconsistent VLAN1005 FastEthernet3/1 Port Type Inconsistent VLAN1005 FastEthernet3/2 Port Type Inconsistent Number of inconsistent ports (segments) in the system :10
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Storm Control
Methods Configuration Parameters Verifying Settings
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Storm Control Methods

Bandwidth as a percentage of the total available bandwidth of the port that can be used by the broadcast, multicast, or unicast traffic Traffic rate in packets per second at which broadcast, multicast, or unicast packets are received Traffic rate in bits per second at which broadcast, multicast, or unicast packets are received Traffic rate in packets per second and for small frames. This feature is enabled globally. The threshold for small frames is configured for each interface.
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Storm Control Configuration

Switch(config-if)# storm-control broadcast level 75.5 Switch(config-if)# storm-control multicast level pps 2k 1k Switch(config-if)# storm-control action shutdown
Enables storm control

Specifies the level at which it is enabled Specifies the action that should take place when the threshold (level) is reached, in addition to filtering traffic
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Storm Control Parameters

Parameter
broadcast multicast
Description
This parameter enables broadcast storm control on the interface. This parameter enables multicast storm control on the interface.
unicast
level level [level-low]
This parameter enables unicast storm control on the interface.

Rising and falling suppression levels as a percentage of total bandwidth of the port. level: Rising suppression level. The range is 0.00 to 100.00. Block the flooding of storm packets when the value specified for level is reached. level-low: (Optional) Falling suppression level, up to two decimal places. This value must be less than or equal to the rising suppression value. Specify the rising and falling suppression levels as a rate in bits per second at which traffic is received on the port. bps: Rising suppression level. The range is 0.0 to 10000000000.0. Block the flooding of storm packets when the value specified for bps is reached. bps-low: (Optional) Falling suppression level, up to one decimal place. This value must be equal to or less than the rising suppression value. Specify the rising and falling suppression levels as a rate in packets per second at which traffic is received on the port. pps: Rising suppression level. The range is 0.0 to 10000000000.0. Block the flooding of storm packets when the value specified for pps is reached. pps-low: (Optional) Falling suppression level, up to one decimal place. This value must be equal to or less than the rising suppression value. The action taken when a storm occurs on a port. The default action is to filter traffic and to not send an SNMP trap. The keywords have these meanings: shutdown: Disables the port during a storm trap: Sends an SNMP trap when a storm occurs
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level bps bps [bps-low]
level pps pps [pps-low]
action {shutdown|trap}
Verify Storm Control Settings

Switch# show storm-control
Interface
---------Gi0/1 Gi0/2
Filter State
------------Forwarding Forwarding
Upper
---------20 pps 50.00%
Lower
--------10 pps 40.00%
Current
-------5 pps 0.00%
<output omitted>
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VLAN Configuration
Mitigating VLAN Attacks Controlling Trunking
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Mitigating VLAN Attacks
Trunk (Native VLAN = 10)
1. Disable trunking on all access ports. 2. Disable auto trunking and manually enable trunking 3. Be sure that the native VLAN is used only for trunk lines and no where else
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Controlling Trunking
Switch(config-if)# switchport mode trunk
Specifies an interface as a trunk link

. Switch(config-if)# switchport nonegotiate
Prevents the generation of DTP frames.

Switch(config-if)# switchport trunk native vlan vlan_number
Set the native VLAN on the trunk to an unused VLAN
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Cisco Switched Port Analyzer

Traffic Analysis CLI Commands SPAN and IDS
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Traffic Analysis
IDS RMON Probe Protocol Analyzer
A SPAN port mirrors traffic to another port where a monitoring device is connected.
Intruder Alert!
Without this, it can be difficult to track hackers after they have entered the network.
Attacker
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CLI Commands
Switch(config)# monitor session session_number source {interface interface-id [, | -] [both | rx | tx]} | {vlan vlanid [, | -] [both | rx | tx]}| {remote vlan vlan-id} Switch(config)# monitor session session_number destination {interface interface-id [, | -] [encapsulation replicate] [ingress {dot1q vlan vlan-id | isl | untagged vlan vlan-id | vlan vlan-id}]} | {remote vlan vlan-id}
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Verify SPAN Configuration
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SPAN and IDS

IDS
F0/2
F0/1
Use SPAN to mirror traffic in and out of port F0/1 to port F0/2.
Attacker
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Cisco Remote Switched Port Analyzer

Overview Configuring RSPAN Verifying RSPAN Configuration
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Overview
An RSPAN port mirrors traffic to another port on another switch where a probe or IDS sensor is connected. This allows more switches to be monitored with a single probe or IDS.
Source VLAN RSPAN VLAN
Intruder Alert! IDS
Source VLAN
Attacker
Source VLAN
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Configuring RSPAN
1. Configure the RPSAN VLAN
2960-1(config)# vlan 100 2960-1(config-vlan)# remote-span 2960-1(config-vlan)# exit
2960-1
2960-2
2. Configure the RSPAN source ports and VLANs

2960-1(config)# monitor session 1 source interface FastEthernet 0/1 2960-1(config)# monitor session 1 destination remote vlan 100 reflector-port FastEthernet 0/24 2960-1(config)# interface FastEthernet 0/2 2960-1(config-if)# switchport mode trunk
3. Configure the RSPAN traffic to be forwarded

2960-2(config)# monitor session 2 source remote vlan 100 2960-2(config)# monitor session 2 destination interface FastEthernet 0/3 2960-2(config)# interface FastEthernet 0/2 2960-2(config-if)# switchport mode trunk
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Verifying RSPAN Configuration
2960-1
2960-2
show monitor [session {session_number | all | local | range list | remote} [detail]] [ | {begin | exclude | include}expression]
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Best Practices
Layer 2 Guidelines VLAN Practices
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Layer 2 Guidelines
Manage switches in as secure a manner as possible (SSH, out-of-band management, ACLs, etc.) Set all user ports to non-trunking mode (except if using Cisco VoIP) Use port security where possible for access ports Enable STP attack mitigation (BPDU guard, root guard) Use Cisco Discovery Protocol only where necessary with phones it is useful Configure PortFast on all non-trunking ports Configure root guard on STP root ports Configure BPDU guard on all non-trunking ports
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VLAN Practices
Always use a dedicated, unused native VLAN ID for trunk ports Do not use VLAN 1 for anything Disable all unused ports and put them in an unused VLAN Manually configure all trunk ports and disable DTP on trunk ports Configure all non-trunking ports with switchport mode access
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Wireless, VoIP, and SAN Security

Enterprise Advanced Technology Security Considerations Wireless Security Considerations Wireless Security Solutions VoIP Security Considerations VoIP Security Solutions
SAN Security Considerations

SAN Security Solutions
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Enterprise Advanced Technology Security Considerations

Topology Overview Infrastructure-Integrated Approach Cisco IP Telephony Solutions Storage Network Solutions
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Overview
Wireless
VoIP
88
Overview
SAN
89
Infrastructure-Integrated Approach
Proactive threat and intrusion detection capabilities that do not simply detect wireless attacks but prevent them Comprehensive protection to safeguard confidential data and communications Simplified user management with a single user identity and policy Collaboration with wired security systems
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Cisco IP Telephony Solutions

Single-site deployment Centralized call processing with remote branches Distributed callprocessing deployment
Clustering over the IPWAN
91
Storage Network Solutions

Investment protection
Virtualization
Security
Consolidation
Availability
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Wireless Security Considerations

Cisco Wireless LAN Controllers Wireless Hacking Hacking Tools Security Considerations
93
Cisco Wireless LAN Controllers
Responsible for system-wide wireless LAN functions

Work in conjunction with Aps and the Cisco Wireless Control System (WCS) to support wireless applications
Smoothly integrate into existing enterprise networks

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Wireless Hacking
War driving A neighbor hacks into another neighbors wireless network to get free Internet access or access information
Free Wi-Fi provides an opportunity to compromise the data of users
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Hacking Tools
Network Stumbler Kismet AirSnort CoWPAtty ASLEAP Wireshark
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Safety Considerations
Wireless networks using WEP or WPA/TKIP are not very secure and vulnerable to hacking attacks. Wireless networks using WPA2/AES should have a passphrase of at least 21 characters long. If an IPsec VPN is available, use it on any public wireless LAN.
If wireless access is not needed, disable the wireless radio or wireless NIC.
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VoIP Security Considerations

VoIP Business Advantages VoIP Components and Protocols Threats VoIP SPIT
Fraud
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VoIP Business Advantages
PSTN
VoIP
Gateway
Little or no training costs Mo major set-up fees Enables unified messaging Encryption of voice calls is supported
Lower telecom call costs
Productivity increases
Lower costs to move, add, or change
Lower ongoing service and maintenance costs

Fewer administrative personnel required

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VoIP Components
Cisco Unified Communications Manager (Call Agent) MCU Cisco Unity IP Phone Router/ Gateway
PSTN
IP Backbone
Router/ Gateway
Router/ Gateway
IP Phone
Videoconference Station
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VoIP Protocols
VoIP Protocol H.323 MGCP Megaco/H.248 SIP RTP RTCP SRTP SCCP Description
ITU standard protocol for interactive conferencing; evolved from H.320 ISDN standard; flexible, complex
Emerging IETF standard for PSTN gateway control; thin device control Joint IETF and ITU standard for gateway control with support for multiple gateway types; evolved from MGCP standard IETF protocol for interactive and noninteractive conferencing; simpler but less mature than H.323 ETF standard media-streaming protocol IETF protocol that provides out-of-band control information for an RTP flow IETF protocol that encrypts RTP traffic as it leaves the voice device Cisco proprietary protocol used between Cisco Unified Communications Manager and Cisco IP phones
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Threats
Reconnaissance
Directed attacks such as spam over IP telephony (SPIT) and spoofing

DoS attacks such as DHCP starvation, flooding, and fuzzing Eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks
102
VoIP SPIT
If SPIT grows like spam, it could result in regular DoS problems for network administrators. Antispam methods do not block SPIT. Authenticated TLS stops most SPIT attacks because TLS endpoints accept packets only from trusted devices.
Youve just won an all expenses paid vacation to the U.S. Virgin Islands !!!
103
Fraud
Fraud takes several forms:

VishingA voice version of phishing that is used to compromise confidentiality. Theft and toll fraudThe stealing of telephone services.
Use features of Cisco Unified Communications Manager to protect against fraud.

Partitions limit what parts of the dial plan certain phones have access to. Dial plans filter control access to exploitive phone numbers. FACs prevent unauthorized calls and provide a mechanism for tracking.
104
SIP Vulnerabilities
Registration hijacking: Allows a hacker to intercept incoming calls and reroute them. Message tampering: Allows a hacker to modify data packets traveling between SIP addresses. Session tear-down: Allows a hacker to terminate calls or carry out VoIP-targeted DoS attacks.
SIP User Agents
Registrar
Registrar
Location Database
SIP Servers/Services
SIP Proxy
SIP User Agents
105
VoIP Security Solutions

Using VLANs Using Cisco ASA Adaptive Security Appliances Using VPNs Using Cisco Unified Communications Manager
106
Using VLANs
Voice VLAN = 110 Data VLAN = 10
5/1
802.1Q Trunk
IP phone 10.1.110.3
Desktop PC 171.1.1.1
Creates a separate broadcast domain for voice traffic Protects against eavesdropping and tampering Renders packet-sniffing tools less effective Makes it easier to implement VACLs that are specific to voice traffic
107
Using Cisco ASA Adaptive Security Appliances

Ensure SIP, SCCP, H.323, and MGCP requests conform to standards Prevent inappropriate SIP methods from being sent to Cisco Unified Communications Manager Rate limit SIP requests Enforce policy of calls (whitelist, blacklist, caller/called party, SIP URI) Dynamically open ports for Cisco applications Enable only registered phones to make calls Enable inspection of encrypted phone calls
Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance
WAN
Internet
108
Using VPNs
Use IPsec for authentication Use IPsec to protect all traffic, not just voice Consider SLA with service provider Terminate on a VPN concentrator or large router inside of firewall to gain these benefits: Performance Reduced configuration complexity Managed organizational boundaries
SRST Router Telephony Servers
IP WAN
109
Using Cisco Unified Communications Manager

Signed firmware Signed configuration files Disable:
PC port Setting button Speakerphone Web access
110
SAN Security Considerations

Overview SAN Transport Technologies World Wide Name Zoning Operation
Virtual Storage Area Network
111
Overview
IP Network
SAN
Specialized network that enables fast, reliable access among servers and external storage resources
112
SAN Transport Technologies

Fibre Channel the primary SAN transport for host-to-SAN connectivity iSCSI maps SCSI over TCP/IP and is another host-to-SAN connectivity model FCIP a popular SAN-toSAN connectivity model
LAN
113
World Wide Name

A 64-bit address that Fibre Channel networks use to uniquely identify each element in a Fibre Channel network Zoning can utilize WWNs to assign security permissions
The WWN of a device is a user-configurable parameter.
Cisco MDS 9020 Fabric Switch
114
Zoning Operation
Zone members see only other members of the zone. Zones can be configured dynamically based on WWN. Devices can be members of more than one zone. Switched fabric zoning can take place at the port or device level: based on physical switch port or based on device WWN or based on LUN ID.
Disk4 Host2
SAN
Disk2 Disk3 Disk1
ZoneA
Host1
ZoneC
ZoneB
An example of Zoning. Note that devices can be members of more than 1 zone.
115
Virtual Storage Area Network (VSAN)

Cisco MDS 9000 Family with VSAN Service
Physical SAN islands are virtualized onto common SAN infrastructure
116
SAN Security Solutions

Security Focus SAN Management Fabric and Target Access VSANs
iSCSI and FCIP
117
Security Focus
SAN Protocol Target Access
Fabric Access
SAN Secure SAN
SAN Management Access
IP Storage access
Data Integrity and Secrecy

118
SAN Management
Three main areas of vulnerability:
1. Disruption of switch processing
2. Compromised fabric stability

3. Compromised data integrity and confidentiality
119
Fabric and Target Access

Three main areas of focus:
Application data integrity LUN integrity Application performance
120
VSANs
Relationship of VSANs to Zones
Physical Topology
VSAN 2 Disk2 ZoneA Host1 Disk3 Disk1 ZoneC Disk4 Host2
ZoneB VSAN 3
ZoneD Host4
ZoneA Disk5 Host3 Disk6
Two VSANs each with multiple zones. Disks and hosts are dedicated to VSANs although both hosts and disks can belong to multiple zones within a single VSAN. They cannot, however, span VSANs.
121
iSCSI and FCIP

iSCSI leverages many of the security features inherent in Ethernet and IP.
ACLs are like Fibre Channel zones VLANs are like Fibre Channel VSANs 802.1X port security is like Fibre Channel port security
FCIP security leverages many IP security features in Cisco IOS-based routers:

IPsec VPN connections through public carriers High-speed encryption services in specialized hardware
Can be run through a firewall
122
123

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CCNA Security

Chapter Six Securing the Local Area Network

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

Describe basic Catalyst switch vulnerabilities

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

15. Describe and configure Cisco SPAN

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

Endpoint Security Considerations

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

Introducing Endpoint Security

Cisco Systems Endpoint Security Solutions

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

Securing the LAN

Areas of concentration: Securing endpoints Securing network infrastructure

Addressing Endpoint Security

Operating Systems Basic Security Services

Access control to resources ensures confidentiality and integrity of data

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

Types of Application Attacks

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

Cisco Systems Endpoint Security Solutions

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

Endpoint Security with IronPort

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

Cisco IronPort Products

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

Firewall Encryption Platform MTA

IronPort E-mail Security Appliance

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

Web Proxy Antispyware Antivirus Antiphishing URL Filtering

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

Endpoint Security with Network Admission Control

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

Self-contained, turnkey solution

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

The NAC Framework

Policy Server Decision Points and Remediation

AAA Server Credentials

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

Cisco NAC Appliance Process

Host is redirected to a login page.

The host is authenticated and optionally scanned for posture compliance

Device is noncompliant or login is incorrect.

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

Scan fails Remediate

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

Endpoint Security with Cisco Security Agent

CSA Log Messages

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

File System Interceptor

Execution Space Interceptor

Rules Engine State Correlation Engine Rules and Policies

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

Server Protected by Cisco Security Agent

CSA Log Messages

2009 Cisco Learning Institute.

Layer 2 Security Considerations

MAC Address Spoofing Attacks