Professional Documents
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15.1
15.2
2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
like individuals/firms that make choices. Strategies-the choices made by the players (output/pricing, etc.). Strategy combinations-a list of strategies for each player. Payoff-the outcome (utility, profit, etc.) from selecting a strategy.
15.3
2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
response function-the players best response given the strategies of other players. Equilibrium strategy combination-a strategy combination where every players strategy is the best response to the strategy of all other players.
15.4
equilibrium- An equilibrium strategy combination where there is nothing any individual player can independently do that increases that players payoff. Each players own strategy maximizes that players own payoff.
15.5
forms-simply represents the outcomes in payoff matrix (connects the outcomes in an obvious way). Extensive form description-a game tree. Each decision point (node) has a number of branches stemming from it; each one indicating a specific decision. At the end of the branch there is another node or a payoff.
15.6
2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
strategy better than all others, regardless of the actions of others, is a dominant strategy. If one strategy is worse than another for some player, regardless of the actions of other players, it is a dominated strategy.
15.7
15.8
player 2, the strategy Middle is dominated by the strategy Right. When you find a dominated strategy, it can be eliminated from the game. Therefore, Figure 15.1 becomes Figure 15.2.
15.9
15.10
player 1, the Up strategy dominates both Middle and Down. For player 1, Up is therefore a dominant strategy. The Middle and Down rows can be eliminated from player 1s strategy. This leaves the game shown in Figure 15.3.
15.11
2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
15.12
Up. For Player 2, the dominant strategy is to move Left. (Up, Left) or 4,3* is therefore the equilibrium payoff. It is a Nash equilibrium where both players will settle on a strategy and not want to move.
15.13
2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
15.4 shows payoffs for the two individuals suspected of car theft. The figures represent the jail time in months for Petra and Ryan. What is the equilibrium outcome of this game?
15.14
15.15
easy way to find equilibrium is to draw arrows showing the direction of strategy preferences for each player. Horizontal arrows show preferences of player 2, vertical arrows show preferences for player 1. Where the two arrows meet, there is a Nash equilibrium (see Figure 15.5).
15.16
2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
15.17
1. 2. 3.
The arrows meet where both Petra and Ryan fink (Fink, Fink) and this is the equilibrium for the game. Interesting aspects of the prisoners dilemma:
There are many real life applications. The equilibrium results form a dominant strategy for both players. The equilibrium outcome is not ParetoOptimal (both would be better off if they both remained silent).
15.18
Coordination Games
Often
situations may have no equilibrium or they may have multiple equilibria. In these situations, other forms of behaviour must arise for a solution to be found.
15.19
15.8 shows the payoffs for various strategies using Microsoft Word (Deans preference) and Corels WordPerfect (Richards favourite). The figures represent how much better/worse each author is under the various strategies measured in more/less papers written.
15.20
2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
15.21
indicated by the arrows, there are two equilibria in this game. Therefore the Nash equilibrium is insufficient to identify the actual outcome. There exists a coordination problem when the players must decide on what equilibrium to settle on.
15.22
2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
is no definitive method of solving coordination games, actual outcomes often depend upon: laws, social customs or pre-emptive moves by players before the game. In some cases there simply is no equilibrium.
15.23
2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
in which each players payoff diminishes as the values of the other players strategy increases are known as games of plain substitutes. In games of plain substitutes, the players impose negative externalities on each other.
15.24
2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
in which each players payoff increases as the values of the other players strategy increases are known as games of plain complements. In games of plain compliments, the players impose positive externalities on each other.
15.25
2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
cross-effects in the payoff functions are negative. There exists mutual negative externalities. y10 and y20 are the Nash equilibrium values of the strategies. From the Nash equilibrium, y10 is a best response to y20
15.26
2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
15.28
2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
15.29
strategy combinations in the Lense of Missed Opportunity are preferred by both players to the Nash equilibrium. When players impose mutual negative externalities on one another, they produce too much and would be better off cutting back on their strategy values.
15.30
2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
(A,A)
pq
(A,B)
(B,A) (B,B)
15.31
0
0 1
p(1- q)
(1- p)q (1- p)(1- q)
1
1 0
payoff is the probability weighted average of the payoffs associated with each outcome:
Claires
payoff is a linear function of her strategy, p: 1(p,q)=(1-q)+p(2q-1) payoff is a linear function of his strategy, q: 2 (p,q)= p+q(1-2p)
2005 Pearson Education Canada Inc.
Zaks
15.32
1.
2.
3.
15.33
1.
2.
3.
15.34
find the Nash equilibrium, plot the best response functions and find where they intersect. Nash equilibrium is p0 =1/2 and q0 = 1/2 (see Figure 15.21).
15.35
15.36