Case Study of Malaysias Counter Insurgency Strategy: Study on the effectiveness of Malaysian Counter Insurgency Strategy

A counter-insurgency or Counterinsurgency (COIN) operation involves actions taken by the recognized government of a nation to contain or quell an insurgency taken up against it. In the main, the insurgents seek to destroy or erase the political authority of the defending authorities in a population they seek to control, and the counter-insurgent forces seek to protect that authority and reduce or eliminate the supplanting authority of the insurgents.

MODELS
The guerrilla must swim in the people as the fish swims in the sea. Aphorism based on the writing of Mao Zedong

 Counter-insurgency is normally conducted as a combination of conventional military operations and other means, such as propaganda, psy-ops, and assassinations. Counter-insurgency operations include many different facets: military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency.

Robert Thompson
Robert Grainger Ker Thompson wrote Defeating Communist Insurgency in 1966, Thompson outlines five basic principles for a successful counter-insurgency: 1. The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable; 2. The government must function in accordance with the law; 3. The government must have an overall plan; 4. The government must give priority to defeating political subversion, not the guerrillas; 5. In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first.

Dr. David Kilcullen

Malayan Emergency: A Brief History

The Emergency 1948 CPM had taken the period of uncertainty and transition to launch their attack in an attempt to take over the country. British declared a state of emergency on 16 June 1948 Developed counter-insurgency policies Emergency operations can be divided into three phases: 1. Counter-terror in 1948-9 2. Clear and Hold in 1950-52 3. Optimisation from 1952-60

1. Invoked Emergency Regulation 1949 2. Introduced National Registration 3. Introduced Briggs Plan 4. Formed War Executive Committee 5. The British also launched a psychological warfare against the communists By early 1950s CPM terrorist had been reduced to a minor problem. Emergency regulations were not lifted until 1960 One permanent result of the Emergency was a highly centralized federation, the states having relinquished most of their sovereign powers so that the crisis could be handled efficiently.

Men of the Malay Regiment during a jungle patrol in the Temenggor area of northern Malaya, 1953.

THE BRIGGS PLAN 1950

1. Separate the guerillas from the people 2. Formalize and strengthen the CounterInsurgency Management System 3. Strengthen intelligence as the key to antiguerilla operations- set up special branch unit in police force 4. Deploy the security forces on a primarily teritorial basis

Lytteltons six chief recommendations

1. Unified control of civil and military forces 2. Reorganization and training of police 3. Increased educational effort, especially in primary school, to help win the war of ideas 4. Impoved protection of the resettlement areas 5. Enlarged Home Guard, to include more Chinese 6. Review of the civil service to ensure the best men were recruited

Counterinsurgency Organization

General Bourne- DO (1954-1960)

Since the Briggs-Templer strategy of rolling up the insurgents from south to north had not proved too successful. Bourne modified it to one of destroying the insurgent organization in the weakest areas first, so that there could be declared white and troops could then be concentrated against the toughest black areas in western malaya.

General Bourne
Enforcing the Rule Of Law Registration of the population-ID Cards Emergency Regulations Detention and Banishment Role of Police in security and intelligence -Build up of the regular police

Conclusion
The Malayan Emergency of 1948-60 has been repeatedly cited as a source of counterinsurgency lessons, with debate over the relative importance of coercion, 'winning hearts and minds', and achieving unified and dynamic control. Both politically and militarily, the Communists could not compete, they could only lose.