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Track II diplomacy
Track II diplomacy is a specific kind of informal diplomacy, in which non-officials (academic scholars, retired civil and military officials, public figures, and social activists) engage in dialogue, with the aim of conflict resolution, or confidence-building.[1] This sort of diplomacy is especially useful after events which can be interpreted in a number of different ways, both parties recognize this fact, and neither side wants to escalate or involve third parties for fear of the situation spiraling out of control.
For example, suppose that a People's Republic of China (PRC) general comments that atomic bombs are not out of the question if the PRC and the United States should engage in low-level conflict over the Taiwan question. If the US immediately responded with heavy press coverage and speeches by major officials, the PRC would then be forced to take either of two stances: (1) admission that the general was incorrect, which would inflame the Chinese population and cause grassroots ire and anti-American feeling, or (2) claim that the general was correct, which would be detrimental to world peace and diplomatic relations.
Instead, the US might engage in Track II diplomacy to try to understand whether the initial threat was as serious as it seemed to be. Dialogue would be deliberately invited in order to determine the stance of the PRC without creating a confrontational atmosphere. The informal nature of Track II diplomacy allows serious and potentially dangerous issues to be discussed in an open, non-official forum.
Multi-track Diplomacy
The term multi-track diplomacy is based on the original distinction made by Joseph Montville in 1981 between official, governmental actions to resolve conflicts (track one) and unofficial efforts by non-governmental professionals to resolve conflicts within and between states (track two). Later, Louise Diamond coined the phrase "multi-track diplomacy," recognizing that to lump all track two activities under one label did not capture the complexity or breadth of unofficial diplomacy. Ambassador John W. McDonald then wrote an article expanding track two into four separate tracks: conflict resolution professionals, business, private citizens, and the media. This framework, however, still had the four unofficial tracks operating with the exclusive purpose to affect or change the direction of track one.
The Arlington County, Virginia-based Institute for MultiTrack Diplomacy uses a multi-track approach in its work by involving as many different tracks as possible when implementing projects. This way, even when doing social peace building work, we involve people from government, media, or other social institutions which provide a link between the structural peace building and political peace building processes. Just as conflict transformation and peace building are understood in terms of systems change, multi-track diplomacy takes a systems approach to understanding the nature of international peace building. This systems approach, inherent in the three concepts of conflict transformation (1), peace building (2) and multitrack diplomacy (3), describes (a) what needs to change about a conflict (conflict transformation), (b) how that change is effected (peace building), and (c) the actors involved and the environment in which such change takes place (multi-track diplomacy).
Scientific and cultural exchanges are examples of track two diplomacy. The problem most political liberals fail to recognize is that reasonable and altruistic interaction with foreign countries cannot be an alternative to traditional track one diplomacy, with its official posturing and its underlying threat of the use of force. Both tracks are necessary for psychological reasons and both need each other. (Montville & Davidson, 1981, p. 155) Montville (Montville & Davidson, 1981) maintains that there are two basic processes in track two diplomacy:
The first consists of facilitated workshops that bring members of conflicting groups together to develop personal relationships, understand the conflict from the perspective of others, and develop joint strategies for solving the conflict. The second process involves working to shift public opinion: Here the task is a psychological one which consists of reducing the sense of victimhood of the parties and rehumanizing the image of the adversary
Methods for conducting these activities are still evolving as is the thinking around which individualsrepresenting various roles and functions in society and governmentshould be included. Montville points out that there is no evidence that conflict resolution workshops would work for the principal political leaders themselvesperhaps because they are too tough or even impervious to the humanizing process Ambassador McDonald (Sep 2003 - Aug 2004) seconds this assumption but feels that it is merely because the leaders are stuck in rigid roles and politically have less access to fluidity than individuals further removed from the top echelon of government(McDonald, Sep 2003 - Aug 2004).
In 1986 Ambassador John McDonald and Diane Bendahmane (1987) produced Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy, a book that compiled the thoughts of several Track One and Track Two professionals confirming the need for government to support, encourage, and work with Track Two.
The Department of State refused to print the book for eighteen months because the Department has a strong defensiveness regarding its right, ability, and authority to conduct conflict resolution. The book was finally published in 1987 and states that . . . the official government apparatus for analyzing international security issues and designing foreign policy has to equip itself to support and benefit from track two diplomacy. As part of the process, government analysts must improve their capabilities to understand how history, society, culture, and psychology interact.
At a special briefing for representatives of nongovernmental organizations, the U.S. Department of States Deputy Director for Political Affairs in the Office of Iraq presented a plea for help from NGOs (Paul Sutphin, 2004).
Acting under Secretary Colin Powells initiative and authority, the State Departments Iraqi analysts explained their frustrations in conducting dialogue, developing grassroots relationships, and rebuilding infrastructure. Far from admitting that the State Department was limited in its right, ability, and authority to conduct conflict resolution, they admitted that they couldnt build relationships or spend money fast enough to rebuild Iraq in time to appease the Iraqis and needed help to do it. This may not be the ideal situation in terms of NGO and State Department cooperation.
Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy was published in 1991 as an Occasional Paper (McDonald), and as a chapter in Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts (Kriesberg & Thorson, 1991). In 1996 Dr. Louise Diamond and Ambassador McDonald published Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace. Since then the model has been more robustly developed and the original second track has been expanded into nine tracks as illustrated in the logo. The Multi-Track concept is meant to convey the idea that all sectors of society are important and need to be involved, supported, listened to, and trained in a shared language of dialogue, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding in order to prevent or end violent conflict.
Ambassador McDonald and the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy developed the following principles of multi-track diplomacy: [edit] Twelve principles of multi-track diplomacy RelationshipBuilding strong interpersonal and intergroup relations throughout the fabric of society. Long-term commitmentMaking an ongoing commitment to people and to processes that may take years to come to fruition. Cultural synergyRespecting the cultural wisdom of all the parties and welcoming the creative interaction of different cultural ways. PartnershipModeling collaborative process by partnering with local parties and with other institutions and coalitions. Multiple technologiesUtilizing a variety of technologies, as appropriate, and creating new methods, as needed, to meet the unique needs of each situation. FacilitationAssisting parties in taking responsibility for their own dreams and destiny.
Stone, Diane. (2004) Private Authority, Scholarly Legitimacy and Political Credibility: Think Tanks and Informal Diplomacy, in Timothy J. Sinclair (ed Paul Sutphin. (2004). Deputy Director for Political Affairs, Office of Iraq, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs briefing on: The Transition of Power in Iraq.
conclusion
Multi-Track Diplomacy is essentially a step in the same direction as the evolution of Deep Democracy. While Multi-Track Diplomacy focuses on functional social roles in each of its tracks, Deep Democracy uses concepts and methodologies from Process Oriented Psychology to further extends the discrete tracks to a broad range of roles, psychological figures, and experiences and explores the tensions and chaos that exist between them. [edit] External links Multi-Track Diplomacy Study Group Consensus: Hamas and Kadima, (University of Maryland, January 2007) [edit] References Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy. (2004). Principles of Multi-Track Diplomacy. Retrieved 7 Dec 2003 from www.imtd.org Kriesberg, L., & Thorson, S. J. (1991). Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts (1st ed.). Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. McDonald, J. W. (1991). Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy. In Kriesberg & Thorson (Eds.), Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts. Syracuse: Syracuse Press.
Stone, Diane. (2004) Private Authority, Scholarly Legitimacy and Political Credibility: Think Tanks and Informal Diplomacy, in Timothy J. Sinclair (ed.) Global Governance: Critical Concepts in Political Science. London and New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-27661-6 Paul Sutphin. (2004). Deputy Director for Political Affairs, Office of Iraq, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs briefing on: The Transition of Power in Iraq. 29 Jul 2004. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State,.