Bulker, general view along the

breakwater at Viana do Castello

Local authorities skimming oil in area
between ship and breakwater.
Aft of ship, view from Breakwater
Bulker, bow in swell.
Bulker, small crane to prepare road
Before a road was made to the casualty
Result of heavy swell on deck cargo.
Removal of bunkers into tank wagon
 CASE STUDY
Grounding of BULKER off Viana do Castelo
December 2000
Note : Entries in red denote findings that resulted from the incident investigation.
➪ Vessel arrived off disport Viana do Castelo on 24 Dec 2000 from Tallin,
fully laden with sawdust & woodchips (in holds) and logs/sawn timber (on
deck). Draft was 9.00 metres, even keel.

➪ Vessel instructed to anchor by Port Control, with berthing instructions to

follow later. Anchored within designated anchorage area (shown on Chart
BA 3254) at 1520 hrs LT on 24 Dec 2000 (port anchor, 7 shackles in the
water). As per Master, distance to nearest land ( harbour entrance
breakwater) was 7 cables. In actual fact, distance to breakwater was only
around 5.5 cables, after taking into account vessel’s swinging circle.

➪ Weather conditions at this time were described by Master to be – SW’ly

wind, Beaufort Force 4. However, logbook entries showed wind force to
have been logged as Force 7 at this time, and weather forecasts for the area
indicated wind speeds corresponding to Force 7-8, for that period.
➪ The Master did not question instructions from Port Control to anchor this
close to the breakwater, as the position was within the designated anchoring
area on Chart BA 3254. He also failed to pay attention to the soundings on
the Chart for the area – the 10 metre contour extended upto 2 cables
outward from the breakwater, with the sounding line only 3 to 4 cables
away from the vessel, when her stern faced the breakwater. From just
within this sounding line, depths reduced sharply in an Easterly direction,
with numerous shallow patches of 7.1 – 7.5 metres and below.

➪ The S’ly-SW wind ensured that the stern kept facing the breakwater, but
the Master was satisfied that his vessel was safely anchored, and ordered
FWE at 1410 hrs LT. Weather conditions at the time were – Wind S’ly
Force 6/7. He later departed from the bridge, having satisfied himself that
all was well. The weather forecast for the region indicated a further
deterioration, and increase in wind speeds later that day, and the next.
 On, at 2230 hrs LT (25 Dec 2000), the 3/O called Master to say that the wind
speed had suddenly increased up to Force 9 (SW’ly) and the vessel was
dragging anchor towards the breakwater. The Master immediately went to
the bridge, despatched C/O and anchoring crew forward to heave anchor,
and asked C/E to prepare engines asap. M/E was ready in 4 minutes, and put
to DS Ahead. The anchoring crew, meanwhile, could only heave in 1.5
shackles of chain, after which it became impossible to heave it in further, due
to excessive weight. M/E was put to Slow & Half Ahead, with hard over helm,
but it remained impossible to heave in the anchor. The cable could not be
slipped, as the vessel had no “bitter end” arrangement. The vessel continued
to drag, and the Master surmised that they ran aground at 2318 hrs LT. No
attempt was made to use the starboard anchor, to reduce the vessel’s drag.
Shortly thereafter, the E/R began flooding, and the vessel came to rest just
alongside the breakwater, hard aground, heading in a NNW direction. She
was abandoned (crew were airlifted off by helicopter) early during the
morning of 26 December 2000. The vessel sustained extensive damage, and
was later declared a CTL (Constructive Total Loss).
Serious Non-Conformities identified during the period that the vessel was
reported to have started dragging:
 The vessel had already commenced dragging anchor, when first noticed by
3/O. The Master was therefore not aware of dragging until a later stage.
 Drift calculations clearly showed that the vessel had already touched
bottom when the 3/O called the Master at 2230 hrs on 25 December. The
position at this point was very close to the 10 metre contour, and the vessel
was expected to be lying in approximately 7.5 metres of water.
Consequently, engine movements were of no use.

 Dropping the starboard anchor as early as possible might have arrested the
vessel’s drift, and minimised bottom damage. Failure to use this allowed the
vessel to run aground alongside the breakwater, causing extensive damage
to holds, E/R and fuel oil D/Bs, which resulted in oil pollution.
 No clear instructions could be found on board, where the Master required
OOW to keep a vigilant anchor watch at this port, in view of the weather
forecast and proximity to land/shallow water. In fact, the shallow water off
the breakwater was never identified as a danger.
  The vessel’s Inmarsat A was operational until the final evacuation. When
called on the bridge, the Master tried to contact office, but wasted valuable
time in dialling the office switchboard number which was not manned (it
was 0630 hrs on a holiday). This was in spite of having posted the important
tel nos on the wheelhouse bulkhead. It was obvious that no serious
Casualty Response drills ,incl communications drills had been practised in
the past.
Immediate Cause :
 Grounding due to dragging of anchor in heavy weather. Proximity of
shallow water to designated anchorage area.
Basic Cause :
 Poor knowledge and application of basic seamanship. Incorrect selection of
anchorage area and disregard for safe anchor watch procedures.
 Lack of identification of clear hazards to the vessel, while anchored.
 Lack of Contingency Planning.
 Lack of familiarity with contents of Bridge Procedures Manual.

PLEASE REFER TO CHART BA 3254 FOR DETAILS OF

GROUNDING
BA CHART NO. 3254