Process Safety Management & Safety Culture

- An Overview -

John Thomas
Joint Director FICCI
Date: Nov. 22-23, 2007 Technical Seminar on Industrial Process Safety Management FICCI, New Delhi

history

Process Safety was born on the banks of the Brandywine River in the early days of the 19th century at the E. I. du Pont black powder works. Recognizing that even a small incident could precipitate considerable damage and loss of life, du Pont directed the works to be built and operated under very specific safety conditions.

history

Process Safety evolved as industry progressed through the 19th and 20th centuries, but really emerged as a industry-wide discipline following the major industrial accident at Union Carbide, Bhopal, India, in which a catastrophic release of methyl isocyanate killed more than 3,000 people. In the twenty years since Bhopal:

process safety has gained corporate importance, process safety expertise has extended into the general skill set of chemical and petroleum engineers and operators, and many industry-wide guidelines for process safety have been developed.

What is Process Safety Management ?

The proactive and systematic

identification, evaluation, and mitigation or prevention of chemical releases

that could occur as a result of

failures in process, procedures, or equipment.

Process Safety Management (PSM)

Integral part of OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Standards since 1992 Known formally as: Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (29 CFR 1910.119) PSM applies to most industrial processes containing 10,000+ pounds of hazardous material

OSHAs PSM vs. EPAs RMP

Process Safety Mgmts concern: - potential hazard and protection of employees inside a regulated area
Employer Highly Hazardous Chemicals Facility Standard Workplace Impact

Risk Mgmt Programs concern: - potential incidents that may cause environmental and health hazards outside facility boundaries
Owner or Operator Regulated Substances Stationary Source Rule Off-Site Consequences

The 14 Components of PSM?

1.
2. 3.

4.
5. 6. 7.

Process Safety Information Employee Involvement Process Hazard Analysis Operating Procedures Training Contractors Pre-Startup Safety Review

8. 9. 10. 11.

12.
13. 14.

Mechanical Integrity Hot Work Management of Change Incident Investigation Emergency Planning and Response Compliance Audits Trade Secrets

DuPonts PSM wheel

PSM: The 4 Critical Success Factors

The Safety culture Management commitment & leadership The right programs & systems Operational Discipline

Safety Culture

Date: Nov. 22-23, 2007

Technical Seminar on Industrial Process Safety Management FICCI, New Delhi

Safety Culture
1. What Is it & How do we have one?

The Way It Is Around in your organization and you already have one . Still evolving !!!!

Historical Perspective

The term Safety Culture appears to have arisen out of the report on the 1986 Chernobyl disaster
High capital investment In HIGH reliability industries, Highbeen operating there has an risks increasing Exa Highof public recognition thevisibility importance ofmples : the cultural and public behavioural aspects Fragile image Nuclear, space, of safety management. offshore operations Cutting-edge technologies
Aviation Shipping

Adopted increasingly by industries characterized by:

Safety Culture

Investigations into major disasters such as Piper Alpha, Zeebrugge, Flixborough, Clapham Junction, and Chernobyl have revealed

that complex systems broke down disastrously, despite the adoption of the full range of engineering and technical safeguards,

because people failed to do what they were supposed to do.

These were not simple, individual errors, but malpractices that corrupted large parts of the social system that makes organisations function.

Safety Culture

The focus over the past 150 years was:

Improving Technical aspects of engg systems to improve safety

These efforts have been very successful resulting in

low accident rates in the majority of safety critical industries

As the frequency of technological failures in industry However, it does appear has that diminished, a plateau has now been reached . of human behaviour has become the role more apparent, Safety experts estimate: 8090% of all industrial accidents are attributable to human factors.

Corporate Safety Culture

The product of individual and groups values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organisations health and safety management.
The Advisory Committee for Safety in Nuclear Installations

However, Commerciality must be balanced against safety for both to have a positive effect on the bottom line.

Corporate Safety Culture

The ultimate goal of the safety culture is to eliminate accidents.

The Board must be actively involved, or work to improve safety performance will die on the vine.
Top managements drive and commitment must be unwavering and demonstrable. The Companys safety performance is the product of the Safety Culture of the organisation plus its Luck Factor

Safety Culture and Performance

The Companys safety culture is perhaps the most significant influencing factor on safety performance. It is primarily evidenced by its effect on human behaviours and attitudes in the workplace. The performance of the staff together with the influences of their supervisors and managers determines the level of human error suffered by the Company.

Styles of Safety Culture

Management are able to determine the style of safety culture of the organisation, their actions not words have a significant effect on that culture.

Styles of Safety Culture

Blame Just and Learning No Blame

Safety Culture is not only about the managements commitment to safety, Its also about the subsequent approach the staff take to safety in the workplace.

Styles of Culture Question the Board should ask about its culture?
What is the safety culture in the company? Is it Robust enough to support the safety performance we require? Does it need to change and if so what do we need to do? Ideally Management should seek to develop be a Just and Leaning Culture, that is capable of supporting the Companys business principles and safety objectives

Styles of Culture
A Just and Learning Culture should:

be supportive of the staff and management.

engender honest participation. seek to learn from its mistakes and errors. accept that mistakes will happen. encourage open reporting.

treat those involved in the errors justly.

consider the implications of management and their systems in all incidents.

A Road Map to Safety Culture?

Uninformed Culture
Symptoms Gaps in knowledge, & skills needed for safe operations Poor emergency preparedness Lack of training Absence of exercises

Evasion Culture
Symptoms Perfunctory approach Focus on paperwork Appearances are most important Inadequate training Poor emergency response

Compliance Culture
Symptoms Focus on compliance

Safety Culture
Symptoms Safety awareness visible throughout Collective approach Proactive risk identification High degrees of preparedness Cohesive team

Conversant with rules

Flawless records Safe practices a routine Extensive checklists Inability to deal with unforeseen emergencies

Culturally driven beliefs Fatalism Safety measures increase accident risk No matter what you do, accidents will still occur

Culturally driven beliefs Excessive safety is bookish Smart operations involve cutting corners The chief objective is not to get into trouble with authorities

Behaviour pattern

Behaviour pattern Clarity of objectives Positive group dynamics Professionalism Sure of support Confident in emergencies

Discipline Obedience to rules Clear role definition Pride in doing things right Group commitment Clean record matters most

Cultural maturity model

Continually Improving Level 5 Cooperating Level 4
Ensure consistency

Involving Level 3
Managing Level 2 Emerging Level 1
Develop management commitment

Develop cooperation between management and frontline workers

Involve frontline staff and develop personal responsibility

Source: Kiel Centre, UK

Date: Nov. 22-23, 2007

Technical Seminar on Industrial Process Safety Management FICCI, New Delhi

Safety Culture Assessment

Diagnostic tools

Safety climate surveys Structured workshops Combination of the above

Results assist in selection of appropriate behaviour modification program and planning in how to implement

Tools to Improve Safety

Diagnostic

Used to identify issues, which require improvement

Intervention

Improve safety by addressing specific safety behaviours

Establishing where an organizations safety culture maturity lies is key to selecting appropriate behaviour modification programs and implementing them effectively

Safety Culture Improvement Process

Assess current level Develop plan to improve Implement plan Monitor implementation Re-assess to evaluate success and identify further actions

NNSA Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Lessons Learned Review

Brig Gen Ron Haeckel Facility Representative Workshop 18 May 04

Management and Safety Culture Lessons Learned

Oversimplification of technical information could mislead decision-making Proving operations are safe instead of unsafe Management must guard against being conditioned by success Willingness to accept criticism and diversity of views is essential Re-evaluate decision-maker qualifications and technical development for key decision-makers and encourage continued technical growth of key NNSA decision-makers. Communicate the cultural and organizational lessons learned for NNSA from the NASA CAIB report. Change the safety behavior of NNSA to be more open to alternate views and minority opinions. Develop and publish a safety culture policy statement that clearly defines NNSAs commitment and expectations regarding the role of safety within NNSA.

Recommendations

Beyond Safety Culture

It is structural dimensions of business organisation, the interlinkages and discontinuities of accountability, rather than deficiencies in normative safety cultures which need to be addressed in examining safety failures.

Risk transfer mechanisms accompanying precarious forms of employment in the offshore industry are characteristic of modern business organisation as a whole. This provides an explanation of underlying causation which goes beneath the surface of purely culturalist approaches to safety systems or indeed human factors approaches.

Poor Safety Culture

Accidents that result in severe injuries may not be random events, rather their causal factors may derive from an accumulation, over time, of deficiencies in an organizations safety culture

We are convinced that the management practices overseeing the Shuttle program were as much a cause of the accident as the foam that struck the left wing CAIB Report

A Good Example of Safety Culture

E. I. Dupont starting manufacturing explosives in the early 1800s Developed concept of separation distances for the powder mills and designed buildings so that explosions would go upwards or away from occupied buildings Built his house inside the plant and insisted managers also live inside the plant Developed plant rules and procedures

Definitions
Safety

Culture

The collective values and attitudes of people in the organization Step Change Behavioural
Issues Task Group

The knowledge, values, norms, ideas and attitudes which characterize a group of people Seldom a unified or homogenous quantity, usually diversified, fragmented and split into sub-cultures

Definitions

Safety Climate

Surface snapshot of the state of safety providing an indicator of the underlying safety culture Step Change Behavioural Issues Task Group

Behavioural Aspects of Safety

The way organizations act out their safety management systems and how systems operate in reality. Includes safety culture, safety leadership and behaviour modification

Safety Culture What is it?

The product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to and style and proficiency of an organizations health and safety management ACSNI 1993 The way we do things around here CBI 1990

Safety Culture What is it?

As the Board investigated the Columbia accident, it expected to find a vigorous safety organiztion, process and culture at NASA, bearing little resemblance to the ineffective silent safety system identified during Challenger Disaster (86) NASAs initial briefings to the Board on its safety programs espoused a risk averse philosophy that empowered any employee to stop an operation at the mere glimmer of a problem Unfortunately, NASAs views of its safety culture, did not reflect reality CAIB Report Imagine the difference if a Shuttle Program Manager had simply asked Prove to me that Columbia has not been harmed by the foam strike

Frequently Asked Questions

What does a good safety culture look like? How do you know if the safety culture is improving? What are the key issues to focus upon first? When to stop working on a specific safety culture issue and move onto the next Is it always necessary to survey staff to measure safety culture? How does behaviour modification link to safety culture improvement?

Improvements in Safety Performance

Road to QHSE Culture

- Warning signs - Training - Inspections / Maintenance plans - Regulatory compliance - Incident reporting / - Performance Analysis investigations - Refresher training - Auditing and Management Review - Change Management process - Human Behavioural Implications - Procedural compliance - Obligation to intervene - Empowerment to stop the job

Incident Frequency

Reduction through TRADITIONAL QHSE PROGRAMS Reduction through addition of ADVANCED APPROACHES WITH SUPPORTING SYSTEMS

Time - Maturity of QHSE Approach

Reduction through further addition of MODERN APPROACHES

Safety Culture Change

Peoples attitudes and opinions have been formed over decades of life and cannot be changed by having a few meetings or giving a few lectures

(Mao Tse Tung)

Sound Safety Culture

A sound safety culture is INFORMED

Good reporting systems Just and fair Learning from experiences Flexible and adaptable
James Reason 2001

What Influences Safety Culture?

Interaction between:

The person The job Organizational factors

Unsafe behaviour may have been the final act in an accident sequence, but worker behaviour will have been influenced by the job, work environment and the organization

What Influences Safety Culture?

Person

Safety

Safety

Climate

Culture

Organization

Job

What Influences Safety Culture?

Safety performance is improved when all factors job, environment and organization are considered Requires behavioural changes at all levels in the organization, not just at workplace People behave the way they do because of the consequences that result for themselves after doing it.

Who Influences Safety Culture?

If there are safety problems, it is because the behaviours producing the problems are being reinforced Managers and supervisors change worker behaviours by their own action or inaction Focusing only on the front line worker will not result in positive changes

Who Influences Safety Culture?

Management has the most influence How do they walk the talk and demonstrate safety leadership?

Field visits to talk knowledgeably about safety e.g. accident stats and near misses Safety manager is a full member of the senior management team

Safety Culture Continuum

Date: Nov. 22-23, 2007

Technical Seminar on Industrial Process Safety Management FICCI, New Delhi

Safety Culture: Evolution Stages

 Encourage Educate Them and Do It WITH Them Engage EVERYONE Does Safety Activities And Is Held Accountable

Evolve Change With Your Needs Over Time

Evidence- Based Leading Indicators vs Trailing IndicatorsDo What WORKS!

Active Caring

Measure your willingness to actively care about coworkers: 1. You are willing to observe others to help guard them against doing things that are hazardous 2. You are willing to coach and inspire other people in safe behaviour 3. You are willing to intervene, and caution or challenge others who are working unsafely 4. You are willing to receive the same kind of Active Caring and respond in a positive way

Leading Indicators Of Safety

- Safe Behaviours Observed

Time To Resolve Safety Issues Processes Reviewed Management Of Change Completed Safety Meetings & Discussions Recommendations Implemented Workplace Observations Completed Cultural Analysis Employee Perception

Behaviour Basics

Antecedents or Activators

What happens to motivate the Behaviour

Behaviour

The action(s) taken by the person

Consequences

What results from the Behaviour

Safety Culture Maturity Model

Source: Dr Mark Fleming, Chartered Psychologist, The Keil Centre, UK

Topics in the Paper

What is the Corporate Safety Culture.
How does that effect the Business.

Human Factors, where it fits with Culture.

Professional Sub-Cultures.

Defining the current Engineering Culture.

Making changes to the Safety Culture.

Human Error
Controlling human error within the maintenance environment is the most significant challenge we face today in the aviation industry. The provision of adequate resources, human factors considerations, technical and development training, and the maintenance functions perceived importance to safety have been minimised .

The impact of the safety culture in a Maintenance Organisation is significant in todays environment.

Human Error
In March 2000 a board member of the NTSB announced that of the 14 FAR-121 carrier hull losses that had occurred in the last 5 years to US registered aircraft, 7 were caused by maintenance shortfalls. This is a far worse figure than previously considered. Accident studies have shown that attitudes to safety by the Engineers and their Maintenance Managers can result in a weak safety culture within the many companies.

Human Error The vast majority (80%+) of our incidents and

accidents are caused by human error.

To Err is Human! We are all error prone, even the most experienced engineers and managers!
Error is a natural condition of being human! It is a primary function of development. Management should not be surprised when Human Error occurs! But they should be surprised if their systems of work are not robust enough to contain that error!

Common Incident Features An AAIB assessment of key features of three major

Maintenance Incidents concluded that there was : Inadequate pre-planning, equipment or spares Time pressures Work being done at night. A Handover of work Supervisors were doing hands on tasks Staff shortages Frequent interruptions during the task Confusion in the text of the manuals A failure to use approved data or procedures An element of can-do attitude

Common Incident Features Almost all of those common features that appeared
in the incidents reviewed are organisational system related. They are of the company not the person . Those that were not are: Failure to work to the procedures - which flaunts the stated organisational systems.
Can-do attitude - which undermines organisational systems. Regrettably, these two shortfalls are often condoned by management in normal operations.

Professional Sub-Cultures

Studies into company cultures in many industries have identified that beneath the corporate culture, there may also be Professional Sub-cultures. This means that the approach taken to work by a specific grouping may differ to that which the company desire and envisage. There is no malice or ill intent in such sub-cultures, it just relates to the beliefs, attitudes and understanding of that group, and it affects the way they work. One such professional sub-culture lies within the Maintenance Arena.

Maintenance Sub-Culture This could be generalised as being:

Engineers are trained problem solvers and trouble shooters. They are committed to their own safety standards, they often doubt the need for all the procedures, rules and especially auditing. They see adversity as a challenge. They work in teams, but as Individuals not as Team Players, nor do they use the teams strength. As with most people, engineers also enjoy a little risk taking, although rewarding, it is error prone.

Maintenance Sub-Culture Engineers have a macho attitude, evidenced by:

They have great faith in the ability to get the job done! They dont like to be seen as not knowing something about the aircraft! They are highly reliant on their ability to memorise tasks, even down to such things as part numbers! Related to work, they are poor communicators! They tend to resist being monitored, or supervised! They are prone to believing they know better than the company, or manufacturers procedures?

Management's Approach to the Maintenance Sub-Culture

Maintenance Managers are often happy to condone issues, such as working from memory, whilst everything is going right, but may be quick to criticise if it goes wrong! Commercial pressure frequently allows safety controls to be eroded!

Although, it is known that engineers face adversity in the workplace every day, little is done to identify what, or indeed fix the problems.

Management's Approach to the Maintenance Sub-Culture

Compliance Monitoring would aid managers in identifying what was happening in the workplace. Compliance Monitoring is a requirement in JAR 145.65b, this states:

the JAR-145 approved maintenance organisation must establish a quality system to monitor product standards and compliance with and adequacy of the procedures to ensure good maintenance practices and airworthy aircraft.
However, this is largely under achieved or ignored?

Management's Approach to the Maintenance Sub-Culture

The Senior and Middle Managers of our Maintenance Organisations have an awareness of what is happening in the workplace, However, perhaps through pressures on them, they rarely use such controls as compliance monitoring or line supervision to identify workplace shortfalls. It certainly is going to be problematical resolving some of the issues maintenance departments face today.

Management's Approach to the Maintenance Sub-Culture

However, if top management are serious about reducing human error and having a more robust safety culture in their companies. They must first recognise the perceptions and real problems faced in the workplace and then begin address them. They dont stand alone in this as the regulators also need to support such initiatives.

Making the Changes

The culture of an organisation is extremely slow to change, and it is more easily eroded than improved. First we must recognise the need to change, Then we must define the changes required, Then communicate those changes to everybody involved, Get buy-in from the regulators and staff, and Then make it happen.

Making the Changes

It will take time and a lot of commitment from managers, the staff and contractors within the maintenance organisation. However, these are steps that must to be taken if we are to make a difference in our industry.

Indeed we must reverse the trend of increasing numbers of maintenance induced incidents.

Developing the Right Safety Culture

Establish your Corporate Principles Define your Safety Objectives Establish your Safety Plan Lead by example, Live Your Word (do what you say, say what you do). Use the Substitution Test when things go wrong. Motivate

Communicate.
Manage Change, confusion is the enemy.

Motivation Motivation is a management issue:

Motivated staff perform better than those that are de-motivated. Empowerment of the staff at appropriate levels gets commitment and involvement from the staff. Some Self Determination is a great motivator. A feeling of having a view that is sought after, considered and sometimes used motivates people. Money and fear are poor motivators, they dont have a lasting effect and are not the answer.

Communication Communication involves staff & builds on the culture:

Be open in your communications where possible and as practicable in the business. Remember that unsaid communications (actions and attitudes) say more that verbal communications.

Communication requires a transmitter & a receiver.

Rumours are destructive, but are addictive, they are the natural by-product of not enough information. Communication should be open, frequent and two-way (up and down or peer to peer). Develop the Team Briefing approach (leadership/followship)

 What are the implications of the Change?

Managing Change

How will the change be effected in practice? It is not enough to issue a note or amendment and expect the changes to take place in practice. Safety Significant change has to be managed into place and is a line management responsibility If the change is important, so is the effort that needs to be put in to make it work. Most people are resistant to change, they believe that they do things safely, and it is not them that the accident will happen to!

Changing Cultures
Safety Is No Accident!
The Safety Culture of your Maintenance Organisation is of your making and can be used to reduce the risks to your business The Choice is Yours

Why is Culture Important? Culture affects the way we feel, act, think and make decisions!

Characteristics of Organizations Who Get It

Organizational Accountability

Value for Safety

Teamwork

Characteristics of Organizations Who Get It

Trust Support

What Can YOU Do as a Leader to influence a Safety Culture?

Components For A Successful Safety Culture

Regulatory Money Ethics

Compliance

Ethical Approach
Control

Cooperation
Communication Competence Change

Factors leading to an Accident: TheSwiss Cheese Model

Top Management Latent Unsafe Conditions Line Latent Unsafe Conditions Management Latent Unsafe Conditions PreConditions Operational Activities Active Failures Active Failures and Latent Unsafe Conditions

Safety Features

ACCIDENT
[Based on: Reason, J. (1997)]
Accident & Injury

Risk, Safety and Culture

Risk = Probability of occurrence of an undesired event x Consequences Safety:

Measures and practices undertaken to prevent and minimise the risk of loss of life, injury and damage to property and environment Way of life; the customs, beliefs and attitudes that people in a particular group or organisation share Is a subset of the organisational culture organisational culture is the product of multiple interactions between people (Psychological), jobs (Behavioural) and the organisation (Situational)

Culture:

Safety Culture:

A Model for Understanding Safety Culture

[Source: Bandura (1986), Cooper (2000)]

Key Issues

What is safety culture and how does it manifest? What are the factors that influence safety culture?

How to measure or benchmark safety culture?

How can we achieve global minimum standards of

safety culture?

What has been the impact of the ISM Code?

Shipboard Safety Culture

Shipboard safety manifests in terms of:

Ability to appreciate the risks associated with routine actions

Preparedness to deal with emergency situations

Clearly communicated safe practices and procedures Reporting and reviewing mechanism Perceptions about top managements commitment to safety Confidence in self and others to respond to emergencies

A Road Map to Safety Culture?

Uninformed Culture
Symptoms Gaps in knowledge, & skills needed for safe operations Poor emergency preparedness Lack of training Absence of exercises

Evasion Culture
Symptoms Perfunctory approach

Compliance Culture
Symptoms Focus on compliance Conversant with rules Flawless records Safe practices a routine Extensive checklists Inability to deal with unforeseen emergencies

Safety Culture
Symptoms Safety awareness visible throughout Collective approach Proactive risk identification High degrees of preparedness Cohesive team

Focus on paperwork
Appearances are most important Inadequate training Poor emergency response

Culturally driven beliefs Fatalism Safety measures increase accident risk No matter what you do, accidents will still occur

Culturally driven beliefs Excessive safety is bookish Smart operations involve cutting corners The chief objective is not to get into trouble with authorities

Behaviour pattern Discipline Obedience to rules Clear role definition Pride in doing things right Group commitment Clean record matters most

Behaviour pattern Clarity of objectives Positive group dynamics Professionalism Sure of support Confident in emergencies

Two Approaches
1. Top-down approach
Safety culture as a sub-set of organisational culture

Observation: Safety culture is market driven

2. Bottom-up approach
Safety culture as learned behaviour

Observation - MET institutions in developing countries (main

suppliers of seafarers) are hampered by:
financial constraints poor infrastructure non-availability of qualified faculty and research capabilities

Proposed Strategy

Combine top-down and bottom-up approaches Shipowners and MET institutions to interact closely in

matters of pre-sea and in-service training

HRD policies and practices to come under the scrutiny of ISM audits Benchmark safety culture in terms of risk (probability x consequences) using exercises and simulations Link HRD practices and onboard safety with risk management

Summary & Conclusion

Banduras triangular model (Person, Organisation and Job) offers a dynamic perspective of safety culture. Top-down strategic HRD measures interfacing with a bottom-up approach in close association with MET institutions will help in fostering of safety culture. Since top-down approach is the primary intervention strategy, the HRD practices come under scrutiny. Integration of HRD practices and risk management tools lead to effective promotion of safety culture in shipping. can

Sound Culture

Reporting Culture

Organizations with little trust often find it difficult to get people to admit to their own mistakes
Reaction to the reporting of events should be proportionate to the intentions behind and the consequences of an action Organizations which apply sanctions in a fair and just manner will build trust and creativity

Just and Fair

Sound Culture

Flexible and adaptable

Organizations which want creative contributions from its employees must have a degree of tolerance. E.g. value a verbal exchange of experience and creativity if it means work will be safer.

Sound Safety Culture

Learning

The ability to share knowledge across organizational boundaries is a key aspect of a sound safety culture e.g. are employees fully involved in decisions affecting their safety and health? Conflicting objectives are a way of life i.e. do the job quickly and efficiently, but do it safely without getting hurt

Management and Culture

The significance of the way managers speak and behave is often underestimated Managers who only get involved after the event e.g. an accident will not enjoy the same credibility as those who were involved all the time

Behavioural Issues

Behavioural issues are extremely important

Behaviour turns systems and procedures into reality Good safety performance is determined by the way an organization lives its systems and processes Fly similar aeroplanes Similar standards of pilot training Risk to passengers varies by a factor of 42

Example of airlines

Demonstrate Management Commitment

Senior managers meet to discuss safety performance against objectives and targets Time off provided for safety training. Managers safety leadership appraisal and self assessment questionnaire Managers lead Safety Orientation training Adequate # of safety professionals are available to assist operational and field staff. (Not to take over!!)

Behaviour Modification Preconditions

Is a significant proportion of accidents primarily caused by the behaviour of front line workers? Do a majority of managers and supervisors want to reduce the current accident rate? Will management be comfortable with empowering and delegating some authority for safety to workers? Is management willing to trust the results produced by the workers? Are the workers willing to trust management?

Behaviour Modification Preconditions

Is there a high level of management involvement in safety? Is management willing to provide the necessary time and resources for workers to be trained and to carry out observations? Has a program champion or champions been identified? Are the existing communication processes adequate for the increased communication and feedback between management and workers?

Behavioural Change Conclusions

Any behavioural modification program needs a strongly implemented and robust HSE MS as a foundation Research and practical evidence shows significant improvements can be achieved by implementing appropriate behaviour interventions Behavioural modification initiatives unlikely to be successful unless job environment and organization factors also considered

Behavioural Change Conclusions

Intervention tools which work at one location, may not work at another Suitability of behavioural tools is influenced by the existing safety culture A Safety Culture model provides a framework to identify current level and identify appropriate action to improve and move to next level

The Journey

Questionnaires Pros and Cons

Wide coverage Can ask for yes/no or sliding scale responses Flexible timing for respondents Standard format easy to summarize

Limited explanation, understanding of responses No discussion of remedies, improvements No commitment to change

Regular Meetings Pros and Cons

Regular, frequent opportunities Real players are in the room Decisions can be made Commitment to act

Regular agenda items intrude No fresh perspectives Unequal status of participants Internal problems go unchallenged

Self Assessment
Carefully considered evaluation resulting in a judgment of the effectiveness and efficiency of the organization and the maturity of its HSE Management System Self Assessment provides fact based guidance on where to invest resources for optimum improvement

Self Assessment and Audit

Self Assessment

those who have the knowledge and expertise perform the evaluation

Audit

auditee provides information to auditor who performs the evaluation

ModuSpec Self Assessment Process

Combination of Survey Questionnaire and Facilitated workshop Complements the audit process by focusing resources on prioritized areas Where to use?

Need to measure status of HSE MS performance and the safety culture

Self Assessment Deliverables

Comprehensive review of HSE MS to provide status of:

Compliance, performance and effectiveness

Reliable identification of HSE Culture and all major concerns and strengths Full understanding of underlying factors Prioritized action plan for continual improvement Commitment and support from all levels

Facilitated Workshop Pros and Cons

Brainstorming plus standard questions Key players in room Focus and equality Deep discussion New benchmarks Electronic voting = speed, anonymity

Time consuming for participants Limited coverage Participants all come to location Is there adequate time to develop action plans?

Workshop principles
Open, frank communication Trust Everyone's input is important The person who performs the task understands it better than anyone else Group comments may be shared externally but individual anonymity is preserved

Combination HSE Self Assessment Process

Preliminary Analysis Employee Questionnaire Analyze Mixed Team Workshops

Management Workshop(s) No Action Decisions Audit Key Risks

Prioritized Action Plan

Combination Advantages
Wide coverage to gather data Deep discussion to understand Managers/staff collaborative effort Accurate final analysis Graphic + Qualitative reporting Save audit for key risk areas Management workshop takes decisions and feeds into business (action) plan

This Company Walks the Talk on Safety

7 Strongly agree 4

1 Strongly disagree

Just What Were Looking For

This company walks the talk on safety.
Votes 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 Disagree 2 3 4 5 Agree 6 7
2 4 6

A Specific Problem Known Only to a Few

This company walks the talk on safety.
Votes 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 Disagree
2 1 1 3 5

5 Agree

Abandon Ship!!
This company walks the talk on safety.
Votes 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 Disagree 2 3 4 5 Agree 6 7
6

HSE Corporate Profile

5 4 3 2 1 0
ip isk ce ing ure ms rity cy ss ion ion rds ing its ew h s R lian nn ct ra eg en ene ct at co tor ud evi r A R de ess p Pla tru rog Int erg ar r re nic Re oni a m o S u w P ps C m M Le Ass Co Em A E O m S o H C

BU Comparisons
5 4 3 2 1 0
g s s n n re ip ce ss its ity ncy n sk d ng o o ew i i i r m i i u h r e i n d r t t t a n s g R u ia ev co en ge ec ca te s ito A er uc ogr r i an e r r pl r R l s d n n t a r I e R e a P o o S un w s Pr m om C M ss A m Le p E C E A O S om H C

North

South

Central

Workshop Output

Conclusions
The need to understand Safety Culture or Human Factors is the way of the future if we are to improve safety performance Everyones doing it!

UK - Culture Maturity Model and Climate Questionnaires Canada Safety Stand Down Week Perception Survey, Imperial, CPC, Shell Hearts and Minds US Dan Petersen Perception Surveys started in the early 90s on railroads

Conclusions

In the 80s, there was UPITFOS, which initiated the Basic Safety Program (BSP) and Certificate of Recognition (COR) Is Safety Culture the step change needed for the beginning of the 21st century? Should we draw closer parallels to Quality Management and use Six Sigma Safety Culture approach? Statistical information from the UK offshore and North America would suggest that significant improvements are resulting from Safety Culture initiatives

framework: Two approaches to

managing uncertainties* (Grote, 2004)

* Uncertainties may stem from the system environment and/or from the transformation processes within the system.

Sociotechnical model of safety culture

Aim: & Linking (Grote Knzler,safety 2000) culture to overall organizational culture as well as to characteristics of the material organization beyond directly safety-related activities
Proactiveness Integration of safety in organizational structures and processes

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Material characteristics of the organization visible, but difficult to decipher

Sociotechnical integration

Joint optimization of technology and work organization aiming at the control of disturbances at their source Values and beliefs that further integration of safety in all work processes Norms related to socio-technical design principles like automation philosophy and beliefs concerning trust/control

Immaterial characteristic of the organization hidden, taken for granted

Valueconsciousness

Assessing safety culture by comparing judgements of employees in different departments/hierarchical positions

(as complement to observations and interviews)

Assessing safety measures (=Proactiveness re: safety) Formal Safety: e.g. There are sufficient written
procedures, checklists etc. to ensure process safety. meetings are swiftly implemented.

Enacted Safety: e.g. Proposals developed during safety

Assessing system design strategies (=Socio-technical integration) Example: Plant personnel can intervene in automated processes to ensure quality and safety of production.

How to include organizational change in safety management?

Organizations may need evolutionary, but also radical change in order to respond to internal and external demands
Limitations of organizational development.

Radical organizational change can harm process and work safety. Structural level: Reduced resources for safety; unsafe work processes etc. Individual level: "objective" indicators like absenteeism; "subjective" indicators like anxiety Which effects are caused by organizational change depends also on the way the change process is carried out.