Art and ethics

Moderate, epistemic and systemic

moralism

Art and Ethics

Statements of Breton, Stockhausen, Hirst

about the supreme artwork: shooting people,
9/11.

Can these actions be considered as an

artwork

Relations between art and morality

!latonism or radical moralism "Republic,

books ##$### and %&: 'rt leads to immoral
beha(iors

)topism*: art as such is alwa+s morall+

edif+ing, and lastl+, emancipating ",arcuse
'dorno&.

-adical autonomism or aestheticism: artistic

and moral realms are completel+ separate,
e.g. .scar /ilde

Relations between art and morality

,oderate autonomism: while some artworks,

but not all, are morall+ worth+ or harmful,
their moral (alue has nothing to do with their
(alue as art "!osner, Beardsle+, 0ass&.

1thicism: a moral flaw in a work is as such an

aesthetic one "Hume, 2olsto+, 3endall
/alton, /a+ne C. Booth, Ber+s 0aut&

4ariable e5treme moralism: all artworks are

morall+ good or bad to one or another
determined degree.

Relations between art and morality

2he problem is not whether there is a relation

between artistic and moral in a work. 6rom m+ point
of (iew, there is. 2he problem, rather, is what the
nature of that relation is.

.ne of the most problematic issues about some

works is precisel+ that the+ can and actuall+ do
force us to agree to world (iews that we consider
morall+ problematic. #t is not a 7uestion of fictionall+
assenting to particular propositions, but rather to the
entire world (iew e5pressed b+ the work within
which the propositions are located. 2his is the
reason wh+ # think that moral considerations can
directl+ affect the (alue of a work as art.

Relations between art and morality
Moderate moralism

!ossible solution: moderate moralism "8o9l

Carroll&: some works, but not all, ha(e moral
(alue. Sometimes, but not alwa+s, moral
flaws and (irtues in(ol(e artistic flaws and
(irtues, that is, we cannot sharpl+ sa+ that
moral features of a work as such pla+ a direct
role in its resulting artistic (alue.

Moderate Moralism

#t might happen that we are not in disposition

to affirm the aesthetic goodness of a work,
due to our reaction to its moral character.
1.g.: :eni -iefenstahl;s Triumph of the Will. #s
it onl+ an epistemological impossibilit+ to
e(aluate the goodness of a morall+
problematic work of art

Back to Stockhausen;s claim

Moderate Moralism

're there moral constraints intrinsic to certain

artistic genres <es, e.g., traged+.

/e can e5tend this idea of the moral

constraints within traged+ to art in general .

Cognitive moderate moralism

6rom Homer;s poetr+ and #celandic sagas, which

prescribe the admiration for certain heroic (irtues at
odds with forgi(eness and merc+, up through
modern works like ,iller;s Tropic of Cancer and
=ean 0enet;s The Balcony, that al least in part show
disdain for traditional se5ual moralit+, man+
successful works, including too -obert ,usil;s The
Confusions of Young Toerless, or >. /. 0riffith;s
Birth of a Nation, lead us to imagine what we
consider is, in real life, ethicall+ undesirable. But we
consider this a sign of their success.

Cognitive moderate moralism

2hese works place us within the boundaries of that

moral outlook and, from that point of (iew, make us
more aware of those boundaries, be+ond which one
must not go.

-obert ,applethorpe;s photographical studies of

flowers, Helmut 8ewton;s nudes, >egas; portraits of
brothels; scenes, (arious works b+ 3limt, -odin,
0o+a, some Shakespearean sonnets, .(id;s Art of
Loving, !! Nights, Bu?uel;s Belle "e #our etc., are
eminentl+ erotic works. 1roticism alone does not
undermine an+ of our shared moral con(ictions.

Cognitive moderate moralism

8or is e(en pornograph+, at least some kinds of pornograph+

outside of this (aluation. 0eorge Bataille;s $tory of the %ye,
.shima;s &n the Realm of the $enses, !auline -@age;s $tory of
', 8icholson Baker;s (o), some 3ama Sutra illustrations, some
of 1gon Schiele;s nudes, the work of the last !icasso, some of
>ali;s works and Hokusai;s woodcuts, among others, are
e5plicitl+ pornographic and +et the+ are also artisticall+ worth+.
'gain, if we turn back to the 0reek$-oman world, we can find
man+ representations that are se5uall+ e5plicit and still (aluable
as art. #n m+ opinion, an+ allegedl+ immoral character of these
works is more supposed than real. Some of them, like those of
Bataille or .shima, show us a fictional moral uni(erse that does
not contradict the hard core of human rights, or what we can call
a minimal ethics. 1(en more, the+ ha(e (er+ great epistemic
(alue, since the+ show a commitment to truth, of re$interpreting
good, and so, a (er+ great heuristic (alue, insofar as the+ offer
moral proposals that allow us either to accept or to reAect them.

Cognitive moderate moralism

Here remains 3endall :. /alton;s well$known notion of the ma*e+

believe "the background for children;s games, and within the
artistic field, of mimesis, understood in a wide sense&. Had it
disappeared, the actual ethical sphere would ha(e dissol(ed as
well, since what would disappear would be the possibilit+ of
belie(ing something a fictionall+ true in a fictional world. 2his is
so gi(en that the e(ents of 9/11 broke the tacit con(ention of
fiction: that the fictional world is a replica of the e5tra$fictional
world, without an+ possibilit+ of their identification. 'nd moreo(er,
gi(en that these erotic and pornographic works demand such a
deep affecti(e$cogniti(e e5ercise, # reall+ doubt that the+ are
e5perienced or treated as pornograph+, in the popular sense of
the word.

Cognitive moderate moralism

Can immoral works be (aluable as art ">. =acobson&: we can

get from them the benefit of understanding moral (iews different
to ours: epistemic (alue.

Christopher Hamilton: we can oursel(es be enriched as

indi(iduals if we learn to li(e with the tension between our
imagination being captured b+ a work of art and our moral sense
being repelled b+ it

Cogniti(e immoralism ",. 3ieran&: the (alue of a work as art can

be highlighted in (irtue of its immoral character, because
imaginati(el+ e5periencing morall+ defecti(e and problematic
cogniti(e$affecti(e responses and attitudes can deepen one;s
understanding and appreciation.

8ot h+pothetical imagination, but dramatic imagination.

Cognitive moderate moralism

se(eral sorts of positions on artworks concerning

their relation to a moral point of (iew "8o9l Carroll&:

Conse,uentialism: the belief that artworks ha(e causal,

predictable conse7uences in the moral beha(ior of the
spectators.

-ropositionalism: the work of art can contain certain

propositions e5plicitl+ or implicitl+, which can be of a moral
nature, in such a wa+ that artworks are educational, insofar
as the+ pro(ide new moral "among others& propositions "or
in the weaker (ersion, beliefs&, that can be false. /hen the
false propositions showed b+ the artworks affect to moral
truths, those works are morall+ wrong.

Cognitive moderate moralism

&"entificationism. readers and the public in general assume the emotions of

the fictional characters. 2his is properl+ the !latonic position. So if the
emotion showed b+ the work is morall+ suspicious, the conse7uentialist will
predict that it will result in an immoral beha(ior. But the identificationist, if he
is conse7uentialist, will criticiBe the work, because in all probabilit+, it will
produce immoral beha(iors.

Clarificationism. it consists not of affirming that we can ac7uire new

propositional knowledge from artworks, but rather, of holding that these can
deepen our moral understanding, encouraging us to appl+ the moral
knowledge and emotions we alread+ ha(e to specific cases, in order to
re(iew and increase our moral knowledge. B+ practicing our pre$e5isting
moral capacit+ in response to a work, this work can become an occasion to
increase that pre$e5isting moral understanding. 2he direction of moral
education is not from the work to the world, as suggested b+ porpositionalist,
but from the world to the te5t. 2his thesis, though treated as original in
Carroll, is in fact one of the interpretations that has historicall+ been gi(en of
'ristotle;s ancient and famous but contro(ersial notion of the nature of
catharsis.

Systemic moderate moralism

's the #talian philosopher 1(andro 'gaBBi shows in

his account of the relation between science and
ethics, when we stud+ the relation between art and
moralit+ it is also (er+ suitable to adopt what he
labels a s+stemic point of (iew.

2he creation and displa+ of art are e5ercised within

a particular social s+stem, the Cartistic s+stem*,
which is accompanied b+ (arious other s+stems,
whether of social nature or not "economic, religious,
political, ecological, moral, etc.&. 'll of these
together gi(e rise to what 'gaBBi calls a Cglobal
en(ironment*.

Systemic moderate moralism

the artistic s+stem recei(es from the surrounding

comple5 en(ironment different influences in the face
of which it manifests a reaction. Some influences
are Cpressures* that tend to menace the s+stem;s
e5istence, and so it reacts b+ attempting to re$
establish its own inner balance and modif+ing the
en(ironment in a creati(e wa+. 2he artistic s+stem
must respond to the demanding inputs from the
en(ironment, gaining support and remo(ing
obstacles. #n other words, the art s+stem is open
and adapti(e, subAected to a feed$back loop within
its en(ironment.

Systemic moderate moralism

1(er+ important change taking place inside the artistic s+stem

produces a series of outputs that modif+ the en(ironment, which
appear a series of feed$backs. 2hese in turn determine changes
in the contents of the artistic s+stem, which, we need to see, is
not an isolated s+stem. ,embers of the artistic s+stem must
negotiate inputs coming from the en(ironment, attempting to
recei(e the highest support from the en(ironment and a(oiding, if
possible, obstacles that the en(ironment puts in placed for
artistic acti(it+. #n this sense, the outputs of the artistic s+stem
must be ad(antageous to the surrounding en(ironment, and, as a
conse7uence, the art s+stem will itself recei(e support and
remo(al of obstacles from the en(ironment. So, the s+stem
should pre(ent an+ form of opposition to this beneficial acti(it+.
2hat is, the artistic s+stem tries to get its own targets, but, in
order to get them, it must produce outputs which will become
inputs for an+ other s+stem that is capable of offering support or
remo(ing en(ironmental opposition.

Systemic moderate moralism

2his s+stem approach from 'gaBBi leads us to see

the problem of moral responsibilit+ in art in terms of
optimi/ation: e(er+ social s+stem tends to ma5imiBe
its own essential (ariables. But such action, for
s+stemic reasons, since there art operates in an
open s+stem, must be compatible with the
functioning of the other s+stems. 2his in(ol(es a
process of optimiBation that can be considered to be
optimiBing the global target of the general s+stem.

Systemic moderate moralism

/hene(er (arious social s+stems are interconnected as sub$

s+stems of a wider general s+stem, we encounter the problem of
optimiBation. 1(er+ particular s+stem tends naturall+ to ma5imiBe
its own essential (ariables, but such ma5imiBation is
incompatible with the satisfactor+ functioning of other sub$
s+stems, hence, with ade7uate functioning of the entire s+stem.
2he 7uestion, then, is how to optimiBe the whole s+stem. #n this
sort of framework, basic respect for the e5igencies of the other
s+stems alwa+s constitute, in 'gaBBi;s terms, a moral obligation
for the members of an+ sub$s+stem. ,oralit+ is thus at one and
the same time, an e5igenc+ of the o(erall s+stem that matches
the indi(idual interest of the artistic sub$s+stem.

Systemic moderate moralism

1thics pla+s a part of this process, because the

Cmoral s+stem* of art is also a part of the global
en(ironment. 6or s+stemic e5igencies, the artistic
s+stem must take into account broader moral
imperati(es, for, if it does not, it will reduce its
supports and will pro(oke opposition to itself from
the global en(ironment. 2he relations between these
two s+stems, thus, is alwa+s subAect to a process of
optimiBation that is generall+ (alid. 2his is true
without there being a dominant position of an+ one
s+stem abo(e anotherD the+ are all in a situation of
reciprocal feed$back.

Systemic moderate moralism

#f, for e5ample, we consider that art attacks some

basic moral con(ictions, like the right to life, societ+
will turn awa+ from art and such art will end up
destro+ing itself. #f we accept the 9/11 e(ents as art,
art will be, without a doubt, submitted to a process of
re(iew which can lead to its social e5tinction as a
result of basic subsistence needs of the global
s+stem. #t is worthwhile to note that this s+stemic
approach is (er+ different from the idea of the
Cartworld*, which is what is used b+ >ickie and
>anto. 2he artworld alone might allow in 9/11 to
count as art, but not this broader s+stem.

Systemic moderate moralism

B+ sa+ing all this, # mean to argue that in order for

the global s+stem of our ci(iliBation to e5ist, art must
be compatible with minimal moral principles of
mankind. But moralit+ is subAected as well to an
e(olutionar+ d+namics of s+stems. ,oralit+ then
depends on a great number of factors, among which
are some particularl+ rele(ant to our discussion,
namel+, the inputs and feed$backs coming from the
artistic s+stem. 2hese will ha(e an important and
legitimate role, without impl+ing that the+ can force
ethics to renounce to its essential elements, sa+,
determining certain more or less general
imperati(es for the human beha(ior.

Systemic epistemic moderate
moralism

Something is not art if it contra(enes moralit+ E

understanding this in a wide sense, not in the
restricted sense of indi(idual moralit+, but the
broader moralit+ b+ which societies are ruled, and
which all ha(e agreed to go(ern o(er our common
life, the minimal moral code in which all our creeds
can ha(e a place, namel+ what we can name
minimal aesthetics, meaning that minimal
agreement to define art through a free and rational
dialogue

Systemic epistemic moderate
moralism

2he position of s+stemic$epistemic moderate moralism can also

e5plain wh+ art must be censored. 2o put it another wa+, and
against >anto, art has to be open to public censorship, but not in
an+ usual sense, rather, in the same wa+ in which a scientific
theor+ is open to scientific censorship or a law to so(ereign
people;s censorship. /ith all this, we don;t intend to
disenfranchise art b+ t+ing art to philosoph+, as >anto
announces in his work The -hilosophical 0isenfranchisement of
Art, nor must we tie art to moralit+. .n the contrar+, # ha(e
argued here for a necessar+ s+stemic consideration of art.
Something claimed to be art but which functions to e5acerbate its
status within the o(erall s+stem, perhaps b+ (iolating core
standards of moralit+ as # think 9/11 and some other Cartistic*
works, will lead straight it to its own e5tinction.