Neuroscienze e Libero Arbitrio: Giuseppe Sartori

Giuseppe Sartori
Universit di Padova
Neuroscienze e Libero Arbitrio
Free will and science
Free
will
Intentions
Decision-making
Agency
Executive control
Internally vs. externally generated actions
Philosophy
Theology
Genetics
Brain or mind sciences
Physics
Free will and conscious intentions
Conscious or purposeful
plan for a future action,
that exists prior to and
independently of action
execution
Subjectively, is the proximal
cause of movement (also called
motor intention)

Intention is crucial for the experience of free will. Searle (1983)
distinguishes two types of intentions:
The Libet task
Used to measure
when a person
forms the motor
intention to
execute an action
From Haggard, 2008, Nat Rev Neuro
Intention reported
~200 ms before
movement onset
(will judgment, W)

RP starts up to 2 s
before movement
Inferential processes in conscious
intentions
Theoretical background
intentions
Reconstruction hypothesis of intention (e.g. Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992; Wegner, 2002)
Based on inference
Intention is retrospectively built as the cause of the movement
Empirical evidence
Action consequences affect intention attribution (Kuhn & Brass, 2009)
TMS after movement shifts the W-judgment (Lau et al., 2007)
W-judgment is inferred from apparent time of response, rather than actual movement
(Banks & Isham, 2009)
-
+
Movement
onset
0 -2 s V
o
l
t
a
g
e

(
V
)

Most studies focus on pre-
movement brain processes
(e.g. Libet et al., 1983;
Haggard & Eimer, 1999;
Soon et al., 2008)

?
intentions
Post-action events
modulate the
experience of
intention
Reported time of intention is based
not only on pre-action processes (i.e.
motor preparation)
W-judgment related to the apparent
time of response
Role of action
monitoring
processes
Action-effect negativity (Nae) (Band
et al., 2009). Reflects the linkage
between action and action-effects
Associated with changes in the W-
judgments
intentions
Delayed auditory feedback signaling a response later than the
actual one was delivered (5, 20, 40, or 60 ms)
16 participants (7 females, 19-24 years) performed a variant of the Libet task
(Banks & Isham, 2009)
EEG activity was recorded (64 channels, ref mast)
Responding
hand not
visible
Methods and procedure
intentions
W-judgment varied as a
function of feedback delays
Results
Nae amplitude was
larger for later
feedbacks and
associated with
shifts in the W-
judgment
Reported time of intention (W-judgment) is partially
based on inferential processes (i.e. external
feedback signaling response)
Action monitoring is involved in the experience of
intention (Nae may reflect action-effect binding)
However, results cast doubts on the Libet procedure
as measure of conscious intentions
Can we exclude that participants respond as that the
intention must have taken place sometime before the
external feedback?
intentions
Conclusions
Free will and science: a novel approach
Free
will
Theology
Philosophy
Physics
Genetics
Intentions
Decision-making
Agency
Executive control
Internally vs. externally generated actions
Free will and science: a novel approach
Free
will
Theology
Philosophy
Physics
Genetics
Behaviour
Free will beliefs and motor preparation
The experience of free will is tightly
connected with the idea of control
(e.g. choices)
Human societies are ruled on the idea that
we have free will (e.g. personal
responsibility, punishment, reward)
Neuroscientific findings challenge the nature of free will
What would happen if people
are induced to disbelieve in
free will?
Social psychology demonstrates that it has
important behavioural consequences
Increases cheating (Vohs & Schooler, 2008)
Reduces altruistic behaviour and promotes
antisocial tendencies (Baumeister et al., 2009)
Deterministic
perspective (i.e. free will
is an illusion)
Ego depletion
Less intentional effort
into behaviour
Less responsibility for
own actions
Hypotheses
-
+
Movement
onset
0 -2 s V
o
l
t
a
g
e

(
V
)

Readiness Potential (RP)
Slow negative wave
preceding voluntary
movements
Modulated by level of
intentionality and mental effort.
Absent or greatly reduced in
automatic movements
Does disbelieving in free
will alter neurophysiological
processes of motor
preparation?
Free will manipulation
(deterministic worldview)
Ego depletion
(1) Disbelief in free will
(2) Reduced RP (EEG
activity reflecting voluntary
motor preparation)
(3) Effect already in the
earlier stages of motor
preparation
Hypotheses
Three hypotheses
Free will belief manipulation
Participants read one of 2 texts taken from Cricks book The
Astonishing Hypothesis and were asked to read it carefully (10) for a
comprehension test
no-free will group (n=14)
control group (n=15)
General concepts on
consciousness. Free will
was not mentioned
Key concepts conveyed by the text:
*+ Free will is an illusion *+ Although we
feel like we are free, our choices are pre-
determined and we cannot change them
*+ We are nothing else than a pack of
neurons
Material and methods
2 groups
Auditory feedback signaling key press was delivered
simultaneously or later than the actual response (20, 40, or 60 ms)
EEG activity was recorded (32 channels)
Free Will and Determinism scale (22 items, Likert 1-5)
In addition, Self-Control (Tangney Self-Control scale) and Social Desirability
(Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability scale) were measured
Personal free will (8 items)

e.g. I have free will even
when my choices are limited
by external circumstances
General free will (14 items)

e.g. Lifes experiences
cannot eliminate a persons
free will
No-free will group reported
weaker free will beliefs
(personal FW scale) [t(27)=-
2.86, p<.01]
Free will manpilation was effective in reducing free will
belief in the no-free will group
Results
Reduced RP amplitude in the no-
free will group [F(1,28) = 4.43, p <
.05,
p
2
= .136]
Main effect in frontal-
central regions (max FCz)
Results
W-judgment did not
differ between the 2
groups
Significant effect
already at-1300 ms
(i.e. early stages of
motor preparation)
controls

no-free will
Results
Significant correlation
between RP and scores on
the personal FWD scale
Basic motor preparation processes are influenced by
whether people believe in free will
The effect is clear before people become aware of
the intention: pre-conscious level
The manipulation does not affect intention at a
conscious level (i.e. no differences in the W-
judgments)
Conclusions
Conclusions
Dismissing free
will belief
Less intentional effort and
reduced sense of agency
Reduced feeling of
responsibility
Careless and
irresponsible behaviour
Speculative interpretation
Low self-efficacy/control belief Negative emotions?
Experience of intention is not only based on
pre-action processes
Action-effect binding does not involve only motor
preparation, but also action monitoring
Whether or not free will is an illusion, it is
much better to believe in it!
Effects on very basic brain processes
General conclusions
Reato dimpeto
Reazione a corto circuito

Le intenzioni distali non sono soggette a questi
effetti (premedidazione-deliberazione distale)

Psichiatria Forense
Imputabilit
Capacit di intendere e di volere
Nesso di causa fra stato mentale patologico e
reato
Infermit di mente
Alterazione patologica
Come si documenta?
Approccio tassononimico - convenzionalista
Infermit di mente
PRESENZA
ASSENZA
CONFINE
Schizofrenia Disturbo di personalit
Alterazioni cerebrali
VBM, DTI,ERP, fMRI

Alterazioni genetiche
Genetica molecolare
Assenza di correlati neurali e genetici
Infermit di mente
Imaging VBM + DTI

1.Il ricordo autobiografico

2.Lintenzione nellazione criminosa

3.Ambiti di applicazione peritali:
- Idoneit a rendere testimonianza
- Vizio di mente

Due problemi centrali nel processo
penale
Autobiographical memory: personal experiences, specific, long-lasting and
(usually) of significance to the self-system

Most studies on autobiographical memory investigate how easy the
information is retrieved (e.g., Crovitz & Schiffman, 1974; Kopelman, 1989).

No studies have been conducted in order to evaluate the truthfulness of an
autobiographical event.
Autobiographical memory: methods

Autobiographical IAT
Computerizzato
Richiede due memorie autobiografiche
alternative (es. porta aperta vs porta chiusa)
Accuratezza diagnostica circa 92%
Criteri DAUBERT

Caratteristcihe dello IAT per memory-
detection
The Autobiographical-
IAT
The aIAT has been validated in a series of experiments:

Card aIAT
Mock Crime aIAT
Holiday aIAT
Suspension of driving license aIAT

TRUE FALSE
I'm in front of a computer I'm in front of a television
CARD 4 CARD 7
I chose card 4 I chose card 7
TRUE FALSE
CARD 7 CARD 4
I saw the card 7 I saw the card 4
Congruent Block for Card 4 choosers
Incongruent Block for card 7 choosers
Incongruent Block for Card 4 choosers
Congruent Block for card 7 choosers
Card IAT
Card
experiment
Mock Crime experiment
Driving license experiment
700
900
1100
1300
1500
1700
Card selected "4 of
diamonds"
Card selected "7 of
clubs"
R
e
a
c
t
i
o
n

T
i
m
e

(
m
s
)
TRUE/Card 4 TRUE/Card 7
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
Guilty suspects Innocent suspects
R
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
T
i
m
e

(
m
s
e
c
)
TRUE/I stole the CD-rom
TRUE/I did not steal the CD-rom
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
2200
2400
2600
Drivers with
suspended license
Control group
R
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
T
i
m
e

(
m
s
e
c
)
TRUE/My driving license was suspended
TRUE/My driving license was not
suspended
Facilitating effect due to pairing of associated concepts
Card IAT: results
Accuratezza IAT
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
Relazione fra il valore del D-IAT e accuratezza diagnostica
Dati di 5 esperimenti per un totale di 320 soggetti
Caratteristiche IAT per
memory detection
1. Probabilit di diagnosi corretta
2. Accuratezza media= 92%

Holiday aIAT
2 Card aIAT
10 Card aIAT
non-faking group: standard IAT instructions;
nave-faking group: beat the memory detector, and to hide their true
autobiographical memory to the experimenter;
instructed-faking group: slow down on the congruent block and speed
up in the incongruent block (Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005) .
Non-f aking group Nave-f aking group Instructed-f aking group
500
700
900
1100
1300
1500
1700
1900
2100
2 Card experiment
Congruent
Incongruent
M
e
a
n

R
T
s

(
m
s
e
c
)
Non-f aking group Naive-f aking group Instructed f aking group
500
700
900
1100
1300
1500
1700
1900
2100
10 Cards experiment
Congruent
I ncongruent
m
e
a
n

R
T
s

(
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
)
Non-f aking group Naive-f aking group Instructed-f aking group
500
700
900
1100
1300
1500
1700
1900
2100
Holiday experiment
Congruent
Incongruent
M
e
a
n

R
T
s

(
m
s
e
c
)
Results:
Nave fakers cannot fake the
aIAT

Instructed fakers are faster in
the Incongruent block than
the Congruent block.
Detecting fakers
AUC: 0.88

Conclusion: it is possible to
identify subjects that tried to fake
the aIAT from non fakers.
Difference between single blocks (1, 2, and 4) and double
blocks (3, 5) is larger in fakers than in non-fakers
Algorithm for detecting fakers
Method Results
TRUE FALSE

True Intention False Intention
I will sleep in Padua I will sleep in Milan
TRUE FALSE

False Intention True Intention
I will sleep in Milan I will sleep in Padua
It is possible to identify the participants real intentions
Intention detection
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 2011
Collocazione temporale dellevento
Programmato
Casuale
Detecting prior intentions
Esempio di incontro intenzionale
Soggetto 6: incontro intenzionale con Franco per ritrovarsi dopo tanto
tempo.

Frasi a-IAT

Incontro intenzionale:
1. Ho telefonato a Franco per vederci
2. Ho organizzato un incontro con Franco
3. Volevo riprendere i contatti con Franco
4. Volevo incontrare Franco da tempo
5. Ho fissato lincontro a casa sua

Incontro casuale:
1. Ho incontrato casualmente Franco
2. Ho incrociato Franco facendo la spesa
3. Senza volerlo ho incontrato Franco
4. Per caso mi sono imbattuto in Franco
5. Ho inaspettatamente visto Franco
Esempio di incontro casuale
Soggetto 1: incontro casuale con Patrizia al supermercato.

Incontro casuale:
1. Ho incrociato per caso Patrizia
2. Al supermercato ho visto per caso Patrizia
3. Venerd allimprovviso ho trovato Patrizia
4. Inaspettatamente ho incontrato Patrizia
5. Mi si avvicinata casualmente Patrizia

Incontro intenzionale:
1. Volevo vedere Patrizia
2. Ho inviato un sms a Patrizia
3. Ho chiesto a Patrizia di incontrarci
4. Ho fissato un appuntamento con Patrizia
5. Alle 18 dovevo vedere Patrizia
INCONTRO INTENZIONALE
CONGRUENT= VERO/INTENZIONALE

INCONGRUENT= VERO/CASUALE
Incontro intenzionale
Numero soggetti con incontro intenzionale classificati correttamente: 12/12
(1/12 appena sopra soglia)
Incontro intenzionale
INCONTRO CASUALE
CONGRUENT= VERO/INTENZIONALE

INCONGRUENT= VERO/CASUALE
congruent
incongruent
Incontro casuale
Problematiche forensi
E lamentata molto di frequente
Se provata dar luogo a incapacit di partecipare
coscientemente al processo
Difficile da distinguere dalla amnesia simulata

Amnesia lacunare psicogena per il
crimine

Ricordo Spontaneo
vs
Ricordo Appreso
Valutazione del ricordo
Tema Ricordo SPONTANEO Ricordo APPRESO
1.Ho acquisito da altri dellaccoltellamento 1. Ho un ricordo personale delle coltellate
2.Ho saputo in seguito dell'accoltellamento 2. Ricordo in modo distinto laccoltellamento
3. So tramite altri delle coltellate inferte 3. Ho chiare in mente le coltellate inferte
4. Ho solo notizie indirette delle coltellate 4. Ho un ricordo diretto delle coltellate
5. Ho saputo da altri della mia azione 5. Ricordo in modo nitido la mia azione
Tentato
Omicidio
Esempio di frasi
True/
London
False/
Paris
Caso 1
ha ucciso la moglie con un cuscino
Buco amnesico che inizia il giorno prima e finisce il giorno dopo
Conosce il fatto nei dettagli perch ha letto la documentazione

Ho una memoria vivida e genuina per il fatto VS
Conosco perch ho letto nelle carte

RISULTATO: Ha una memoria vivida e genuina Amnesia simulata
crimine
True/
London
False/
Paris
Caso 2
accoltellato padre e madre
tentato suicidio
amnesia post-crimine
Conosce i fatti perch ha letto la
documentazione

Ho una memoria vivida e genuina per il fatto VS
Conosco perch ho letto nelle carte

RISULTATO: Ha una memoria indiretta
amnesia dissociativa genuina

crimine
Reato dimpeto
Reazione a corto circuito

Le intenzioni distali non sono soggette a questi
effetti (premedidazione-deliberazione distale)

Psichiatria Forense

Neuroscienze e Libero Arbitrio: Giuseppe Sartori

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Neuroscienze e Libero Arbitrio: Giuseppe Sartori

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Giuseppe Sartori

You might also like