Timken is considering acquiring Torrington from ingersoll-rand. Acquisition would strengthen the market position of Timken and lead to savings estimated at $80 million annually. Transaction may weaken Timken's financial position, including a credit rating downgrade.
Timken is considering acquiring Torrington from ingersoll-rand. Acquisition would strengthen the market position of Timken and lead to savings estimated at $80 million annually. Transaction may weaken Timken's financial position, including a credit rating downgrade.
Timken is considering acquiring Torrington from ingersoll-rand. Acquisition would strengthen the market position of Timken and lead to savings estimated at $80 million annually. Transaction may weaken Timken's financial position, including a credit rating downgrade.
Piotr Korczak P.Korczak@bristol.ac.uk 2 Summary of facts Timken is considering acquiring Torrington from Ingersoll-Rand The acquisition would strengthen the market position of Timken and would lead to savings estimated at $80 million annually Analysts estimate the minimum value of Torrington at $800 million The transaction may weaken Timkens financial position, including a credit rating downgrade 3 Main problems/questions of the case Should Timken go ahead with the acquisition? If yes, how should they structure the deal? How much should they offer to pay? What method of payment should they offer?
4 Why should Timken take over Torrington? Little overlap in products, large overlap in customers Savings in sales costs Bundling a wider offer makes them more competitive and increases margins To remain a global leader To compete with foreign companies To have a stronger position in negotiations with suppliers and buyers Any other arguments? 5 Why shouldnt Timken take over Torrington? A large acquisition Financially demanding will Timken be able to afford it? Timken is already highly leveraged, the acquisition may require further borrowing impact on credit rating Issuing shares to finance the deal will dilute the control of existing shareholders Particularly problematic if shares are undervalued Risk of value destruction if overpaid Common M&A concern Any other arguments? 6 Stand alone valuation of Torrington How much is Torrington worth as a stand-alone entity? Note we are looking for the enterprise value Acquisition of all assets = Acquisition of equity and debt Methods Discounted cash flows (DCF) Market multiples 7 Stand alone valuation DCF: cash flows Operating income, capex, depreciation from Exhibit 5 Tax rate: 39.9% (assumed, equal to 2002 effective tax rate for Timken assumed to reflect industry standard, close to US statutory tax rate) Working capital needs (level): 10.4% of sales (avg 2001-2002 WC/sales for Timken, assumed to reflect industry standard) Terminal growth rate: 4% (assumed) 8 Stand alone valuation DCF: discount rate (1) We need WACC for Torrington Torrington is a part of Ingersoll-Rand and as such is unlisted (hence no direct CAPM inputs), does not borrow on its own (hence no data for cost of debt), and does not have a self-standing capital structure We have to estimate WACC from data for other firms 9 Stand alone valuation DCF: discount rate (2) Candidates Average WACC for the industry WACC for Timken but not because Timken is the acquirer but because it is likely to have a similar risk profile Note that data for Ingersoll-Rand are of little use IR is a diversified firm and hence has a deferent risk profile that does not reflect risks of Torrington IRs capital structure can also be specific to a diversified firm Here, for illustration, WACC for Timken 10 Stand alone valuation DCF: discount rate (3) K d : 7.23% (BBB debt yield, Exhibit 9) R f : 4.97% (long-term gov bond, Exhibit 9) Beta: 1.10 (Exhibit 8) Risk premium: 6.0% (assumed) K e : 11.57% Debt: $461.2 million (Exhibit 2) Equity: $1,065.1 million (no of shares * price, Exhibit 8) Tax rate: 39.9% (effective historical 2002, Exhibit 1) WACC: 9.39% 11 Stand alone valuation DCF 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Operating income 90.7 96.6 102.9 109.5 116.7 Tax 36.2 38.5 41.1 43.7 46.6 Depreciation 84.2 90.0 96.0 102.0 108.5 Capex 175.0 130.0 140.0 150.0 160.0 Change in WC 8.1 8.6 9.2 9.8 10.4 FCF -44.4 9.4 8.6 8.0 8.2 Terminal value 158.2 Total flows -44.4 9.4 8.6 8.0 166.4 PV of flows -40.6 7.9 6.6 5.6 106.2 Enterprise value 85.7 12 Stand alone valuation multiples We are valuing the enterprise, hence focus on the enterprise value multiple (EV/EBITDA) Torringtons 2002 EBITDA (operating income plus depreciation, Exhibit 5): 165.2 Average EV/EBITDA for industry (Exhibit 8): 7.15 Enterprise value: 1,181.2 13 Stand alone valuation discussion Large discrepancies between DCF and multiples valuation Some differences can be justified: fundamental vs market valuation Critically check cash flow projections There is a projection of a sharp increase in Capex why? Is it justified? DCF valuation is also way below the analysts estimate of Torringtons value 14 With-synergies valuation of Torrington How much is Torrington worth to Timken? Stand alone valuation PLUS the value of synergies Methods of valuing synergies Discounted cash flows (DCF) Market multiples 15 The value of synergies DCF: inputs Annual cost savings of $80 million by the end of 2007 You need to make an assumption what happens to savings between now (2002) and 2007; e.g. they increase gradually Note you need to deduct tax cost savings increase your taxable income Integration costs of $130 million over the first two years, i.e. $65 million annually (less tax) Discount rate as before 16 The value of synergies DCF 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Cost savings (pre-tax) 0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 Cost savings (after tax) 0.0 12.0 24.0 36.1 48.1 Perpetuity (=savings/WACC) 512.0 Integration costs (after tax) 39.1 39.1 Total effect on flows -39.1 -27.0 24.0 36.1 560.1 PV of effect on flows -35.7 -22.6 18.4 25.2 357.6 Synergy value 342.8 17 The value of synergies - multiples Note this is only an approximation Gradual increase in cost savings not considered Integration costs not considered EBITDA increases by $80 million Average EV/EBITDA (Exhibit 8) 7.15 Value of synergies: 807.15= 572 ($ million) 18 Valuation - summary Analysts estimate of $800 million seems a reasonable number Its not as high as multiples valuation (hence looks conservative) but reflects value in Torrington DCF may be misestimating The underlying forecasts in DCF have to be carefully reviewed in the process are they justified? The value of synergies available from the deal are about $340 million Possibly conservative estimate It does not take into account synergies reflected in larger sales (e.g. bundling) 19 Timkens pre-acquisition financial standing Current credit rating : BBB Inputs: data from Exhibit 1 and 2, EBIT before nonrecurring A BBB BB Timken EBIT interest coverage 6.3 3.9 2.2 3.7 EBITDA interest coverage 8.5 5.4 3.2 8.6 EBITDA/Sales (%) 18.1 15.5 15.4 10.1 Total debt/capital (%) 42.6 47.0 57.7 43.1 20 Timkens post-acquisition financial standing Assume the acquisition is financed with debt, $800 million paid Assumptions: interest rate 7.23%, 2002 EBITDAs and sales summed for both companies but no synergy effect or cost of integration A BBB BB Timken+Torrington EBIT interest coverage 6.3 3.9 2.2 2.2 EBITDA interest coverage 8.5 5.4 3.2 4.8 EBITDA/Sales (%) 18.1 15.5 15.4 11.3 Total debt/capital (%) 42.6 47.0 57.7 67.4 21 How much should Timken offer to pay? (1) Factors to consider Analysts value estimate of $800 million as a reference price Stand alone valuation bottom value It is likely that Torrington is worth that much to Ingersoll- Rand they do not have any obvious synergies Discrepancies between valuation methods With-synergies valuation ceiling value Paying that much leaves no value for Timken, paying more than that destroys value for Timken Is Ingersoll-Rand willing to sell? It seems so, so Timken is not pressed to bid high to succeed 22 How much should Timken offer to pay? (2) Factors to consider contd Is there a risk of a competing bid? Competition in the sector may increase pressures on growth through acquisitions Foreign companies may be interested in getting access to the US market to overcome anti-dumping regulations However, foreign companies may have little synergies with Torrington (they may be specific to Timken) 23 How should they pay? (1) Factors to consider Options: stock, cash or stock and cash Can Timken raise sufficient amount of cash? Will they have access to debt? Possibly will be downgraded if fully finance with debt Will they be able/willing to issue new shares? Are Timken shares correctly priced? If they are undervalued, Timken should be unwilling to use them as a method of payment From Exhibit 8: Timkens PE 20.7, average for other firms in the industry 16.9 look overvalued (but Exhibit 7 shows that the firm has been underperforming the market index, hence possibly undervalued) 24 How should they pay? (2) Factors to consider What is Ingersoll-Rand preference? They want to divest from the bearings industry hence likely to prefer cash 25 Recommendation (1) There are strategic benefits from the deal hence Timken should go ahead with the bid It is key not to overpay It looks that IR will not be negotiating hard and there is low risk of competing bidders hence Timken can offer a relatively low price Timken should bid in the region of $800-900 million it should be a good deal for IR (given analyst estimates), still leaving room for value creation for Timken (given the estimate of the synergy) 26 Recommendation (2) Timken is unlikely to be able to raise debt to finance the acquisition without losing the investment grade credit rating As IR is unlikely to be interested in Timken shares, Timken should sell shares to the public to raise cash to finance the acquisition However, there are significant uncertainties highlighted by DCF valuation (e.g. Torrington Capex projection) that need to be further investigated before the completion of the deal