FMEA is the process of evaluation to identify where and how a design inadequacy might fail. Developed in the U.S. Military 11 / 9 / 1949. All health facilities that are accredited by JCAHO use the FMEA method.
FMEA is the process of evaluation to identify where and how a design inadequacy might fail. Developed in the U.S. Military 11 / 9 / 1949. All health facilities that are accredited by JCAHO use the FMEA method.
FMEA is the process of evaluation to identify where and how a design inadequacy might fail. Developed in the U.S. Military 11 / 9 / 1949. All health facilities that are accredited by JCAHO use the FMEA method.
April 27,2010 Understand what Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis Method is. Know the history of the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis Method. Know FMEA terms. Know how to use the FMEA method. Know when this method is used and by whom. Know the steps to use the method.
The process of evaluation to identify where and how a design inadequacy might fail by assessing the impact of difference failures, and identifying the parts of the process that are in most need of change. Developed in the U.S. Military 11/9/1949.
Titled Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects, and Critical Analysis Failures were classified according to their impact on mission success and personnel/equipment safety
Cayman Business Systems, 2004 Failure Mode The way in which a process can fail Effect The impact on the process or customer requirements as a result of the failure Severity The impact of the effect on the customer or process Root Cause The initiating source of the failure mode Occurrence (or frequency) How often the failure is likely to occur Detection The likelihood that the failure will be discovered in a timely manner, or before it can reach the customer
iSix Sigma, 2010 Steps in the process Failure Modes What could go wrong? Failure causes Why would failure happen? Failure effects What would be the consequences of each failure?
Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 2010 Analyze and evaluate processes for potential impact of considered changes Discuss and analyze steps of a process Consider changes Calculate Risk Priority Number (RPN) Obtained by multiplying values assigned to severity, occurrence, and detection. Track improvement over time calculate the total RPN for a process track the RPN over time to see if changes have lead to improvement
Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 2010 All health facilities that are accredited by JCAHO use the FMEA method. A FMEA is performed at least once a year for all accredited health facilities. The JCAHO standards are used by hospitals, physicians, nurses, pharmacists and other health care organizations, as a means to improve quality of care in the organization. The JCAHO is used to accredit and certify medical organizations. http://medicalhealthcarefmea.com/ Standard MM.2.20 Medications are properly and safely stored. Standard MM.2.30 Emergency medications and/or supplies are consistently available, controlled, and secured. Under the Code Documentation and Quality Review of Codes, there are standards like:
Standard PI.1.10 The hospital collects data to monitor the performance of potentially high- risk processes, e.g. resuscitation and its outcomes. Standard PI.2.10 Data are systematically aggregated and analyzed.
Data are analyzed and compared internally over time and externally with other sources of information when available. Comparative data are used to determine if there is excessive variability or unacceptable levels of performance when available.
Standard PI.2.20 Undesirable patterns or trends in performance are analyzed. Standard PI.3.10 Information from data analysis is used to make changes that improve performance and patient safety and reduce the risk of sentinel events. JCAHO standards are also used for medical restraints, administering medication and conscious sedation.
Leads to improved patient care Demonstrates the organization's commitment to safety and quality Offers a consultative and educational experience Supports and enhances safety and quality improvement efforts May substitute for federal certification surveys for Medicare and Medicaid Provides a competitive advantage Fulfills licensure requirements in many states Recognized by insurers and other third parties Strengthens community confidence
Step 1. Define the Scope of the HFMEA along with a clear definition of the process to be studied:
FMEA is focused on ICU Monitors and response time.
Step 2. Assemble the team and define goals:
Team Members: Management, Physicians, Nursing Staff, Respiratory Therapists, Biomedical Engineer Goal: To reduce response time to ICU Monitor Alarms
Healthcare FMEA Process Teaching Example 1 Step 3a. Graphically describe process:
Patient transferred to ICU Patient connected to monitor and equipment Provide care and monitor alarms Respond as appropriate Sub-Process Steps 1 a. Determine type of isolation & post b. Determine parameters to be monitored c. Gather and calibrate monitor and accessories Sub-Process Steps 2 a. Connect to ventilator if required b. Connect monitoring devices to patient c. Set alarm parameters d. Test alarm broadcast Sub-Process Steps 3 a. Periodically check monitor status b. Respond to alarms Sub-Process Steps 4 a. Verify validity of alarms b. Reconnect equipment as needed c. Medically intervene as needed d. Silence alarm e. Readjust alarm parameters as needed (Dunn, n.d) Healthcare FMEA Process Teaching Example 1 Step 3b. List failure modes:
Patient transferred to ICU Patient connected to monitor and equipment Provide care and monitor alarms Respond as appropriate Failure Mode 1 a. Determined wrong parameters to be monitored
Failure Mode 2 a. Incorrectly connected monitoring devices b. Did not set alarm parameters c. Did not test alarm broadcast Failure Mode 3 a. Failed to check status b. Misread or misinterpret c. Partially check d. Did not respond e. Respond slowly or late Failure Mode 4 a. Did not verify alarm b. Did not adjust parameters Identified area of failure (Dunn, n.d) Step 4. Analyze each identified failure mode: Determine probability, severity and detectability using rating scale.
Step 5. List causes, interventions and outcome: Redesign process by assigning action to eliminate or control failure mode.
S e v e r i t y P r o b a b i l i t y H a z
S c o r e S i n g l e
P o i n t
W e a k n e s s ?
E x i s t i n g
C o n t r o l
M e a s u r e
? D e t e c t a b i l i t y P r o c e e d ?
C a t a s t r o p h i c F r e q u e n t 16 N N Y 3B1a Ignored alarm (desensitized) C a t a s t r o p h i c F r e q u e n t 16 N N Y C Reduce unwanted alarms by: changing alarm parameter to fit patient physiological condition and replace electrodes with better quality that do not become detached Unwanted alarms on floor are reduced by 75% within 30 days of implementation. N u r s e
M a n a g e rYes 3B1b Didn't hear; care giver left immediate area C a t a s t r o p h i c O c c a s i o n a l 12 N N Y C Alarms will be broadcast to Central Station with retransmission to pagers provided to care staff. Alarms will be broadcast to the central station within 4 months; complete by mm/dd/yyyy B i o m e d i c a l
E n g i n e e r Yes 3B1c Didn't hear; alarm volume too low C a t a s t r o p h i c O c c a s i o n a l 12 N N Y E Set alarm volume on isolation room equipment such that the lowest volume threshold that can be adjusted by staff is always audible outside the room. Immediate; within 2 working days; complete by mm/dd/yyyy B i o m e d i c a l
E n g i n e e r Yes 3B1d Didn't hear alarm; remote location (doors closed to isolation room) C a t a s t r o p h i c F r e q u e n t 16 N N Y C See 3B1b See 3B1b 3B1e Caregiver busy; alarm does not broadcast to backup C a t a s t r o p h i c O c c a s i o n a l 12 N N Y C Enable equipment feature that will alarm in adjacent room(s) to notify caregiver or partner(s). Immediate; within 2 working days; complete by mm/dd/yyyy B i o m e d i c a l
E n g i n e e r Yes Actions or Rationale for Stopping Outcome Measure 3B1 Don't respond to alarm HFMEA Subprocess Step: 3B1 - Respond to Alarms Scoring Decision Tree Analysis HFMEA Step 5 - Identify Actions and Outcomes HFMEA Step 4 - Hazard Analysis P e r s o n
R e s p o n s i b l e M a n a g e m e n t
C o n c u r r e n c e Failure Mode: First Evaluate failure mode before determining potential causes Potential Causes A c t i o n
T y p e
( C o n t r o l ,
A c c e p t ,
E l i m i n a t e ) (Dunn, n.d) Healthcare FMEA Process Teaching Example 1 Step 1. FMEA is focused on Bar Code Medication Administration and accurate documentation of medications.
Step 2. Team Members: Management, Nursing Staff, Pharmacy staff, Information Resource Management
Goal: To accurately record dispensation of medication.
Healthcare FMEA Process Teaching Example 2 Step 3a. Graphically describe process:
Medication ordered Auto electronic Transfer to Pharmacy package Pharmacy fills script & sends to unit Nurse administers Sub-Process Steps 1 a. Order sent to pharmacy
Sub-Process Steps 2 a. Check drug allergies & interations b. Check proper dosages c. Send order to auto dispensing
Sub-Process Steps 3 a. Fills verified orders b. Loads med-cart and sends to unit
Sub-Process Steps 4 a. Logs on to laptop b. Retrieves meds from med-cart c. Scans meds and patiends ID band d. Administers medication to patient e. Patient medical records updated (VA National Center for Patient Safety, n.d) Healthcare FMEA Process Teaching Example 2 Step 3b. List failure modes:
Medication ordered Auto electronic Transfer to Pharmacy package Pharmacy fills script & sends to unit
Nurse administers Failure Mode 1 a. Order is not sent to pharmacy
Failure Mode 2 a. Allergies and interactions are not verified b. Incorrect dosages Failure Mode 3 a. Verification not complete Failure Mode 4 a. Laptop not working or unavailable b. Med-cart stocked incorrectly c. Scanner missing d. Barcode unreadable or missing e. ID Band missing or unreadable Identified area of failure (VA National Center for Patient Safety, n.d) Healthcare FMEA Process Teaching Example 2 S e v e r i t y P r o b a b i l i t y H a z
S c o r e S i n g l e
P o i n t
W e a k n e s s ?
E x i s t i n g
C o n t r o l
M e a s u r e
? D e t e c t a b i l i t y P r o c e e d ?
4A(2) No Power M o d e r a t e O c c a s i o n a l 6 Y N N Y 4A(2)a Battery failure M o d e r a t e O c c a s i o n a l 6 Y N N Y Control Backup battery Total down time is less than or equal to 15 minutes Chief IRM Y 4A(2)b Battery not charged up M o d e r a t e O c c a s i o n a l 6 Y N N Y Control Add 120v reseptacles Power available Chief ENG Y Actions or Rationale for Stopping Outcome Measure Scoring Decision Tree Analysis HFMEA Step 5 - Identify Actions and Outcomes HFMEA Step 4 - Hazard Analysis P e r s o n
R e s p o n s i b l e M a n a g e m e n t
C o n c u r r e n c e Failure Mode: First Evaluate failure mode before determining potential causes Potential Causes Action Type (Control, Accept, Eliminate) (VA National Center for Patient Safety, n.d) The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis method is a effective way to prevent medical error. The method focuses on observing an error, how it occurs, acknowledging the failure effect, followed by creating a solution to the failure. This method should be performed before techniques are put to use to prevent negative safety outcomes and negative performance outcomes. By defining the topic, assembling a team, understanding the process, and conducting a hazard analysis, medical errors can be prevented. This method insures patients and employees that health providers are highly qualified to deliver quality care and safety. The commitment that health care providers deliver is highlighted by the pre assessments taken in order to prevent any negative outcomes. Cayman Business Systems. (2004,January 28). Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis. Retrieved April 23, 2010. http://elsmar.com/FMEA/sld011.htm
Dunn, Edward J.. (n.d) Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis. Retrieved April 24, 2010 from VA National Center for Patient Safety website http://www.fmeainfocentre.com/presentations/HFMEA_FacDev.ppt#3
Institute for Healthcare Improvement. (2010) Failure Modes and Analysis Tool. Retrieved April 24, 2010. http://www.ihi.org/ihi/workspace/tools/fmea/.
iSix Sigma. (2010). FMEA Can Add Value in Various Project Stages. Retrieved April 23, 2010.http://www.isixsigma.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=1520:fmea-can- add-value-in-arious-project-stages&Itemid=203.
JCAHO AND RESUSCITATION. (2010). Retrieved April 21, 2010, from Resuscitation Central : http://www.resuscitationcentral.com/documentation/jcaho-health-care-hospital- accreditation/
VA National Center for Patient Safety. (n.d). The Basics of Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis. Retrieved April 24, 2010 from http://www.patientsafety.gov/SafetyTopics/HFMEA/FMEA2.pdf