DESIGN FAILURE MODE EFFECTS ANALYSIS

(DFMEA)


PURPOSE OF DFMEA

Identify, quantify, and reduce design risk
(especially for critical systems)
Provide a traceable document for making design decisions
Prioritize which design activities to pursue next
NOTE: A DFMEA is not a one meeting activity
(It needs to evolve with the product)
DFMEA INPUTS
Product Design Requirements
List of Specifications
Legal and technical regulations
Bill of Materials (BOM) and Specific Hardware
List of components
Components and/or samples as supplied by the customer
Product Definition
Drawings, sketches, animations, and simulations
Description of systems and components
Previous Experience
Experience with similar concepts, designs, and DFMEA
Customer and supplier inputs
Design guides and design standards (for example ASME codes)
DFMEA OUTPUTS
Risk Priority Number (RPN)
RPN = (Severity) x (Occurrence)
Systems/components with high RPNs represent high risk items.

Select/Define Remedial Actions based on design risk
(where to focus additional development/implementation work)
DFMEA METHODOLOGY
(1.) List components, subsystems, and/or functions
Start with the system, then subsystems, and finally components

(2.) Document symptoms of failure
How could the design potentially fail to meet the design intent
Consider all types of failure (normal operation, start up, shut down,
maintenance, user experience)

(3.) Document the potential effects of failure
How would the design potentially fail to meet the design intent.
Some symptoms may have multiple effects (make an entry for each)


DFMEA METHODOLOGY: (CONTINUED)
(4.) Document potential causes and mechanisms of failure
Failure causes and mechanisms are an indication of design weaknesses
Potential failure modes are the consequences of the failure causes
A single failure mode may have multiple failure mechanisms
Dont be afraid to identify as many potential causes as you can

(5.) Rate the severity of the failure effect (linked to the effects)
4 = Catastropic failure causes substantial damage to the product itself
or related items (including people), requiring remanufacturing
3 = Critical failure causes significant damage to the product itself or
related items, requiring repair of existing components
2 = Marginal failure causes some damage to the product itself or related
items, but limited operation is still possible
1 = Negligible failure causes no significant damage but could be a
nuisance to the operator/user
DFMEA METHODOLOGY: (CONTINUED)
(6.) Rate the occurrence of the failure
5 = Very Probable observed every time
4 = Probable observed most times
3 = Occasional observed multiple times during the project
2 = Remote observed once or twice during the project
1 = Improbable could be predicted to occur after hand-off

(7.) Calculate the RPN of each potential failure effect
RPN = (Severity) x (Occurrence)
What are the highest RPN items?

(8.) Classify failures by RPN

(9.) Select and describe remedial actions
These could be design changes, tests, or revised operation procedures


DFMEA METHODOLOGY: (CONTINUED)
(10.) Assign remedial actions

(11.) Reassess severity/occurrence of anticipated failures
and update RPN values


Notes:
Revise your DFMEA frequently!
Make your DFMEA an ongoing instructor/team meeting item.
Document your design changes and the rationale behind them.