Kenneth Waltzs

Neorealism in
International Relations

By: Jo Jakobsen

What is Neorealism?
also known as Structural Realism
introduced by Kenneth N. Waltz in his
book Theory of International Politics
it seeks to explain how states, in
particular the most powerful ones,
behave, and how they interact with
each other on the international arena.
In Waltzs conception of structure,
we need to note 2 things:
Anarchy as the ordering principle in
international system
there is no higher authority above the states
results to a self-help system; consists of
states that are autonomous and functionally
undifferentiated actors who must be
prepared to fend for themselves.
In Waltzs conception of structure,
we need to note 2 things:
Distribution of capabilities across the
units/states inhabiting the international
system.
power vary significantly
differentiated according to the amount of
power they possess
variations in power yield variations in the
types and magnitudes of structural constraints
hence variation in how states behave
Pool Table as International Politics
Cold War
What did the old powers do?
due to the threat from the Soviet Union,
they had to rely for American protection
through an alliance
Europe became consumers of security
and as a result accept US influence in
European affairs
as an effect, they became economically
and militarily weakened (Paris & London
had no longer a stronghold on resources)
Main Points
Structural constraints that arise from
distribution of powers force states to act
according to the means that would best
help realize their objectives (survival or
security)
powerful states can and indeed should or
must do more than less powerful states
but shouldnt get too excited about the
power-projection opportunities that arise
simply from having great capabilities.
Nazi Germany
acknowledging and abiding by the
structural constraints of the system is
vital for any state that seeks successfully
to fulfil its objectives, key among which is
security.
United States
superpower post WW2
expanded greatly starting in Western
Europe and assumed greater
responsibilities
it had the capabilities to do so
perceived to be in the interest of national
security to do so
as relative power increases, interests
expand- and they also expand geographically

Checks and Balances
US and Soviet Union could not expand
(militarily, economically and ideologically)
into Western Europe due to the check
each does to the other.
structural constraint on the achievement
of hegemony
as states arise that have the means or
capabilities to expand, others need to
react lest they face the risk of extinction or,
in any case, a loss of sovereignty,
autonomy, or control over their own fate.
The peculiar thing about bipolarity, Waltz
has famously and rightly stated, is that, on
a global scale at least, only the two
superpowers possess the means required
to balance each other (having allies helps,
but for purposes of balancing, they are all
disposable under bipolarity).
states are normally and
gradually socialized into accepting the
view that power needs to be balanced but
are not automatically socialized.
Ex. France and Great Britain as great
powers ended due to ignorance to
balancing Nazi Germanys power
War
states do not wish to fight wars; indeed,
they tend to fear war more than anything
else, and that fear generally works as a
significant constraint on state behavior,
instilling some degree of prudence into
leaders.
The basic sources of war and peace
the permissive causes of war and peace
are exactly the two fundamental elements
of the structure of the international system:
anarchy and the distribution of power.

misconception about anarchy that
because there is no one to stop war, it will
happen
conflict of interest sometimes escalate to
war
war occurs because there is an imbalance
in power
war becomes a conquest with potential
fruitful result

The basic cause of armed conflict is the
lack of a global sovereign (a world govt
with a police force) to stop war from
occurring.

Anarchy causes war and sometimes it
stops war from occurring, the key variable
is distribution of power.

What happens in an anarchic world where
neither bipolarity and multipolarity
characterizes the distribution of power?

What happens under unipolarity?
Unipolarity
occurred when Cold War ended and
Soviet Union collapsed leaving US as the
only superpower.
relative power based on the possession of
material resources rather than use
The world is unipolar because the United
States commands aggregate material
resources (especially but not exclusively
military capabilities) of a magnitude that no
other state in the world is remotely close to
matching.

US stands alone in terms of power
resources and capacity to act
US does not have to act globally even if
its absolute and relative power allows it to.
If US decides to stay home to protect its
security and prosperity they would still
remain to be the unipole due to the actual
distribution of resources.
A sudden reversal to isolationism would
spell the end of American hegemony but
not of unipolarity.
US will unlikely resort to isolationism
Power shapes interest: the more power
the more extensive the interests.
US behaves like a hegemon because it
has the power to behave like one.
no peer competitors
owns a military machinery that takes up 40%
of world military spending
economy twice as large as the next one
unmatched technological and academic
prowess
Dangers of Unchecked Power
once the countervailing power
disappears, the temptation to do a lot is
present, hence expansion of influence
- attempts to institutionalize (and,
where possible, expand) the world order of
which the U.S. itself has been the key
shaper.
the response of other major states to
unipolarity
How will the other major powers respond to
U.S. unipolarity and U.S. hegemony?
Specifically, will the other major powers
attempt to balance the mighty American
power?

90s to early 2000s
Unipolarity and American hegemony
have as yet not been seriously challenged.
U.S. power has been and still is so
overwhelming that balancing is largely
rendered impossible, ineffective, and
indeed also quite risky considering that it
might lead to serious confrontations with
the superpower at a time where no other
state can confidently expect to pose a real
military challenge against it.

What about now?
the picture has changed somewhat in the
last few years partly in the form of the
resurgence and assertiveness of Russia,
but in particular with the rise of China and
its conscious translation of speedy
economic growth into military
capacity specifically aimed at countering
U.S. military power in East Asia.

In an anarchic world, where interests
collide, where survival and security
constitute the basic goals of states, where
the distribution of power largely shapes
what states can and cannot do and whom
they have reasons to fear and not fear, the
biggest gamble one takes is to remain
oblivious to the risk posed by unchecked
power.