Climate change due to global warming is but one of many issues confronting countries that they cannot successfully deal with on their own. The purpose of this paper is to ascertain why international attempts by governments and institutions to forestall climate change by regulating and reducing greenhouse gas emissions have not been successful. The question is answered through an empirical study of the international politics of regulating chemicals which lead to ozone depletion and comparing this with the politics surrounding CO2 emissions. Part I reviews the world’s growing awareness of global environmental issues and the relatively successful attempts which have been made to govern the production of chlorofluorocarbons. Part II examines he growing influence of environmental NGOs on government’s response to concerns about environmental degradation and the unsuccessful attempts by states to prevent climate change by reducing their carbon gas emissions. Part III compares and contrasts the politics of
ozone depletion with the political complexity of the problem of climate change brought on by global warming and analyzes alternative strategies for regulating the production of greenhouse gas emissions and reducing deforestation. The Conclusions section then offers suggestions on how greenhouse gas emissions might be regulated by governments in the near term (utilizing existing laws and treaties), and even more effectively in the future, by developing new international environmental governance and regulation regimes.
Climate change due to global warming is but one of many issues confronting countries that they cannot successfully deal with on their own. The purpose of this paper is to ascertain why international attempts by governments and institutions to forestall climate change by regulating and reducing greenhouse gas emissions have not been successful. The question is answered through an empirical study of the international politics of regulating chemicals which lead to ozone depletion and comparing this with the politics surrounding CO2 emissions. Part I reviews the world’s growing awareness of global environmental issues and the relatively successful attempts which have been made to govern the production of chlorofluorocarbons. Part II examines he growing influence of environmental NGOs on government’s response to concerns about environmental degradation and the unsuccessful attempts by states to prevent climate change by reducing their carbon gas emissions. Part III compares and contrasts the politics of
ozone depletion with the political complexity of the problem of climate change brought on by global warming and analyzes alternative strategies for regulating the production of greenhouse gas emissions and reducing deforestation. The Conclusions section then offers suggestions on how greenhouse gas emissions might be regulated by governments in the near term (utilizing existing laws and treaties), and even more effectively in the future, by developing new international environmental governance and regulation regimes.
Climate change due to global warming is but one of many issues confronting countries that they cannot successfully deal with on their own. The purpose of this paper is to ascertain why international attempts by governments and institutions to forestall climate change by regulating and reducing greenhouse gas emissions have not been successful. The question is answered through an empirical study of the international politics of regulating chemicals which lead to ozone depletion and comparing this with the politics surrounding CO2 emissions. Part I reviews the world’s growing awareness of global environmental issues and the relatively successful attempts which have been made to govern the production of chlorofluorocarbons. Part II examines he growing influence of environmental NGOs on government’s response to concerns about environmental degradation and the unsuccessful attempts by states to prevent climate change by reducing their carbon gas emissions. Part III compares and contrasts the politics of
ozone depletion with the political complexity of the problem of climate change brought on by global warming and analyzes alternative strategies for regulating the production of greenhouse gas emissions and reducing deforestation. The Conclusions section then offers suggestions on how greenhouse gas emissions might be regulated by governments in the near term (utilizing existing laws and treaties), and even more effectively in the future, by developing new international environmental governance and regulation regimes.
Chlorofluorocarbons Not Been Duplicated in Other Areas of Global Environmental Protection? Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics
ISA 2009 New York City
Charles Laffiteau University of Texas at Dallas & Dublin City University Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics The issues surrounding the need to protect our global environment have only recently come to light over the last fifty years, dating to the 1962 publication of biologist Rachel Carsons groundbreaking book, Silent Spring. Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics While govt. officials are aware of the problems caused by environmental degradation and abuse, they are often reluctant to take the steps needed to curb such abuses lest they offend special interest groups i.e businesses and multi-national corporations (MNCs) Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics As governments and consumers in (wealthier nations of) the global North have restricted or banned a number of tobacco products, pharmaceuticals and pesticides; global marketing (by MNCs) has created new outlets for these goods in (developing countries of) the global South and Far East. [1]
[1] Jan Aart Scholte Globalization. A critical introduction, (New York: St. Martins Press, 2000):213-214 Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics Environment NGOs have been moderately successful raising overall global public awareness and in one particular instance, pressuring most countries to sign an international agreement to deal with the environmental issue of CFCs and ozone depletion. Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics The ozone regime established through the 1985 Vienna Convention and the 1987 Montreal Protocol was particularly successful initially, but less so more recently.
By 1997 world production of most ozone-depleting substances had fallen to 76 percent of the 1988 level. Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics 1. The limited number of uses for CFCs also werent considered essential in much of the world 2. DuPont scientists were able to develop an economically suitable replacement chemical (HFCs) 3. Only a few MNCs, operating mainly in the developed world, were producers of CFCs Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics Unfortunately, progress on other environmental issues, such as cutting the CO2 emissions that contribute to climate change, has been slow to non-existent in most countries around the world. Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics These factors add to the political complexities of regulating fossil fuel greenhouse gas emissions
1. Many essential uses (heat, plastics, transport fuel, electricity, fertilizer) 2. Few if any economical substitutes 3. Many national & MNC producers Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics CFCs-few essential uses-refrigeration and air conditioning systems Fossil fuels-many essential uses-electricity, heat, jet & auto fuel, ag fertilizer, plastics
CFCs-economical substitutes-HFCs Fossil fuels-substitutes are much more costly
CFCs-few multinational corporate producers Fossil fuels-many nations as well as many multinational corporate producers Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics
In the classical economics model, the search for and development of economical substitutes for any product is driven by a need or a desire by consumers and producers for lower cost alternatives. Figure 1: Inflation adjusted price of imported oil for past ten years vs 1981 peak Figure 2: Inflation adjusted real vs. nominal price of imported oil past 30 years Imported Crude Oil Prices: Nominal and Real 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 J a n - 8 0 J a n - 8 2 J a n - 8 4 J a n - 8 6 J a n - 8 8 J a n - 9 0 J a n - 9 2 J a n - 9 4 J a n - 9 6 J a n - 9 8 J a n - 0 0 J a n - 0 2 J a n - 0 4 J a n - 0 6 J a n - 0 8 J a n - 1 0 Short Term Energy Outlook-January 2009 Dollars per barrel Real Price Nominal Price Projections Figure 3: Inflation adjusted real vs. nominal price of gasoline for past 90 years Real Gasoline Pump Price: Annual Average 1919- 2010 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 1 9 1 9 1 9 2 4 1 9 2 9 1 9 3 4 1 9 3 9 1 9 4 4 1 9 4 9 1 9 5 4 1 9 5 9 1 9 6 4 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 4 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 9 Short Term Energy Outlook January 2009 Cents per Gallon Projections Real Price Nominal Price Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics It is therefore hard to envision any international agreement to regulate the use of fossil fuels and reduce greenhouse gas emissions being as achievable or successful as the agreement on ozone depletion, especially since the world's two biggest emitters, the US and China, have still not cut their outputs under Kyoto. Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics Many countries in the EU have signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol but have actually made less progress cutting their rate of growth in green house gas emissions than the oft-criticized US which, under President Bush, has refused to ratify Kyoto. Figure 4: Total EU greenhouse gas emissions in relation to the Kyoto target Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics Given this lack of progress, some environmentalists have now come to the conclusion that a more expeditious way to address their environmental concerns might be through the use of existing international agreements and public international law. Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics Currently, the only existing international institution within the framework of public international law that is in a position to mediate and adjudicate environmental issues and global trade disputes, is the WTO. Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics The WTO Appellate Body decision in the Shrimp-Turtles dispute actually strengthens the right of the state to adopt conservation measures (sympathetic to environmental NGO concerns) by a liberal interpretation of exhaustible natural resources [1]
[1]Tanyarat Mungkalarungsi The Trade and Environment Debate Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 10 (2002): 381 Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics My analysis of the WTO Appellate Bodys decision in Shrimp- Turtles suggests that best allies for NGOs would be sympathetic WTO member states that are both willing to implement trade related environmental restrictions and also apply these policies fairly. Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics How do you persuade governments to be more sympathetic to environmental concerns and to implement trade related environmental restrictions? Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics Environmentalists should also concentrate on developing relationships with their native countrys business and social elites.
If business and social elites can be convinced that there is an urgent need for action, then they will make sure government officials cooperate. Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics What is ultimately needed?
An international institution such as a World Environment Organization (WEO), with enough regulatory and governance powers to protect society and the environment from the negative impacts of climate change.