Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Corporate Governance:
Impact of Enron
Accounting Scandal and
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Board of
Directors
CEO
Audit
Committee
100%
Enron enters
into gas
marketing and
begins energy
trading
50%
Skilling
becomes
CEO
CHEWCO
formed to buy
JEDI interests.
Enron employee
under CFO
Fastow is the
partner. Deal is
all debt with
Enron liable for
payments
Analysts
question
Enrons
books
Skilling resigns
Sherron Watson
warns that Enron
could implode
0%
Enron restates
books going
back to 1997
CalPERS and
Enron enter into
JEDI-I to invest in
energy projects
-50%
Asset Light
strategy is adopted.
Enron begins
shedding hard assets
JEDI-II is formed.
Enron needs a buyer
for CALPERS
interest in JEDI-I
-100%
Anatomy of Enron
Accounting Scandal
Enron, like many other companies, used special
purpose enterprises (SPEs) to access capital or
hedge risk
By using SPEs such as limited partnerships with
outside parties, a company is permitted to increase
leverage and ROA without having to report debt on
its balance sheet
Company contributes hard assets and related debt
to an SPE in exchange for an interest in the
partnership
Anatomy of Enron
Accounting Scandal
SPE then borrows large sums of money from a
financial institution to purchase assets or conduct
other business without debt or assets showing up
on the companys financial statements
Company can also sell leveraged assets and book a
profit
To avoid classification of SPE as a subsidiary
(thereby forcing entity to include SPEs financial
position and results of operation in its consolidated
financial statements), FASB guidelines require that
only 3% of SPE be owned by outside investor.
Anatomy of Enron
Accounting Scandal
Enron took advantage of these guidelines.
Transferred troubled assets that were falling in
value to SPEs
Losses on these assets would then be kept off
Enrons financial statements
Anatomy of Enron
Accounting Scandal
August 14, 2001
Sherron Watkins, an Enron vice-president, CPA and
auditor previously with Arthur Andersen for 8 years,
sends letter to Enron Chairman Kenneth Lay
outlining many of the misleading accounting
treatments used by Enron.
In this memo, Watkins describes her reservations
about the lack of disclosure of the substance of
related party transactions with SPEs run by the CFO
of Enron, Andrew Fastow
She states: I realize that we have had a lot of smart
people looking at this and a lot of accountants
including AA & Co. (Andersen) have blessed the
accounting treatment. None of that will protect
Enron if these transactions are ever disclosed in the
bright light of day.
Anatomy of Enron
Accounting Scandal
October 16, 2001
Enron Corporation, one of largest corporations
in the world, announced the following:
reduction in its after-tax net income by $544
million
reduction in its shareholders equity by $1.2
billion
Anatomy of Enron
Accounting Scandal
October 22, 2001
Enron announced that SEC was looking into
related party transactions between Enron
and partnerships owned by its CFO, Andrew
Fastow
Anatomy of Enron
Accounting Scandal
November 8, 2001
Enron announced restatement of its financial
statements for 1997 thru 2000 to reflect
consolidation of SPEs it had omitted as well as to
book adjustments recommended by Arthur
Andersen for those years, which Enron had
previously deemed immaterial
In addition to recognizing an additional $628 million
in liabilities, these restatements reduced previously
reported net income as follows:
Year
Reported
Restated
Decline
1997
$105
$28
73%
1998
$703
$133
81%
1999
$893
$248
72%
2000
$979
$99
90%
Anatomy of Enron
Accounting Scandal
December 2, 2001
Enron filed for bankruptcy under
Chapter 11 of US Bankruptcy Code
With assets of $63.4 billion, largest US
corporate bankruptcy in history
Texaco, Inc., which went bankrupt in
April 1977 with assets of $35.9 billion
was next largest
Anatomy of Enron
Accounting Scandal
January 17, 2002
Enron fires Arthur Andersen as its
independent auditor
Cites document destruction and lack of
guidance on accounting policy issues
Anatomy of Enron
Accounting Scandal
Enron bankruptcy of particular interest for
following reasons:
Transactions involving SPEs and related
accounting issues
Breakdown in corporate governance in
relationship between Board of Directors and
Audit Committee
Participation of Enrons independent auditor,
Arthur Andersen, in setting up SPEs
Reveals shortcomings of rule-based US GAAP
GAAP override
Anatomy of Enron
Accounting Scandal
Accounting Issues
Non-consolidation of SPEs that permitted Enron to
hide losses and debt from investors
Sales of investments to unconsolidated (though
actually controlled) SPEs as if they were arms-length
transactions
Recording as current income, fees for services
rendered in future periods
Fair-value restatements of investments that were not
based on trustworthy numbers
Accounting for Enron stock issued to and held by
SPEs
Disclosure of related party transactions and
conflicts of interest, and their costs to stockholders
Anatomy of Enron
Accounting Scandal
Breakdown of Corporate Governance
Many of related party transactions were brought
to attention of Enrons BOD and were discussed
in some detail with members of Audit and
Compliance Committee
SEC requires that exchanges (NYSE, ASE, and
NASDAQ) require financial literacy for all audit
committee members and financial expertise for
at least one member
At least 4 of 6 members had financial expertise
Robert Jaedicke, Professor of Accounting at Stanford University
Wendy Graham, PhD in Economics and former Chair of
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Lord John Wakeham, CA and British Secy of State for Energy
Paola Ferraz Pereira, President of State Bank of Rio de Janerio
Anatomy of Enron
Accounting Scandal
Breakdown of Corporate Governance
Enrons BOD reviewed and approved
creation of SPEs and assigned Audit
Committee duty to review transactions
BOD waived companys code of ethics
for SPE transactions
Audit Committee failed to adequately
understand, review, and monitor SPEs
and Enrons accounting and reporting
practices
Anatomy of Enron
Accounting Scandal
Independence of External Auditor
Arthur Andersen audited and gave unqualified
opinions on Enrons financial statements since
1985
Enron was AAs second largest client
In 2000, AA received $25 million in audit fees and $27
million in non-audit consulting fees from Enron
In 2000, AA had total worldwide revenues of $9 billion
Anatomy of Enron
Accounting Scandal
Independence of External Auditor
AA was consulted on and participated in setting up
SPEs
In conjunction with Enron employees, they set up
the SPEs to conform to the letter of the US GAAP
requirement that outside ownership, presumably
independent, must be at least 3% of the SPE assets
AA admitted it destroyed thousands of documents
and electronic files related to the Enron audits for
1997 thru 2000, in accordance with firm policy,
supposedly before SEC issued subpoena for them
On October 12, 2001, AAs lawyers issued an internal
memo reminding employees of the firms document
retention and destruction policies
Anatomy of an Accounting
Scandal Enron Corporation
Shortcomings of Rule-Based US GAAP
SEC has authority to establish GAAP and GAAS in US,
review and disapprove as inadequate financial
statements of registered companies
SEC has delegated that authority to establish GAAP to
FASB, a non-governmental agency
Many believe that US GAAP, as structured and
administered by SEC, the FASB, and the AICPA, are
substantially responsible for Enron accounting scandal
US model of specifying accounting rules that must be
followed appears to have allowed or required AA to
accept procedures that were within the letter of rule, even
though they violate basic objectives of US GAAP
US model allows corporate officers to view accounting
requirements of US GAAP as if they were specified in a
tax code
No
Capital
Lease
Yes
Yes
Is there a bargain
purchase option?
No
Yes
Yes
No
Operating
Lease
Is present value
of payments
equal to or more
than 90% FMV?
Anatomy of an Accounting
Scandal Enron Corporation
Shortcomings of Rule-Based US GAAP
Fair-value requirement of financial
instruments adopted by FASB permitted
Enron to increase its reported assets and net
income and, thereby, hide losses
AA appears to have accepted these
valuations because Enron was following
specific US GAAP rules
GAAP Override
Are auditors in US allowed to override US
GAAP?
Auditors in other countries allowed to
override GAAP
Inability of auditors in US to override US
GAAP may have been contributing factor in
Enron accounting scandal
Many believe that principles-based IAS
GAAP that requires true and fair view of an
enterprises financial condition is preferable
to highly specified rule-based US GAAP
US Audit Opinion
In our opinion, the financial statements
of XYZ Company present fairly the
financial position and results of
operations for the years ended
December 31, 20X1 and 20X2 in
accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles applied on a
basis consistent with the preceding
year.
WorldCom
Global Crossings
Tyco International
Adelphia
Critical Path
Imclone Systems
Vivendi
Aftermath of Enron
Accounting Scandal
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
New NYSE Corporate Governance
Listing Standards
New Corporate Governance Rules
adopted by SEC
New Rules and Auditing Standards
adopted or proposed by Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board
Importance of
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Last years Sarbanes-Oxley Act brought
the most sweeping changes in corporate
governance and financial disclosure for
70 years (Financial Times, December 1,
2003)
Sarbanes-Oxley will be judged as
landmark legislation. It is one of the most
sweeping reforms since the 1933
Securities Reform Legislation. (Beth
Brooke, Global Vice Chair, Ernst and
Young, September 15, 2003)
Board Composition
Two of five board members must be or
have been CPAs
Remaining three must not be and
cannot have been CPAs
Chair of Board may be held by one of
the CPAs, but he/she must not have
practiced accounting during five years
preceding his/her appointment
Inspection Authority
Empowered PCAOB to regularly
inspect registered accounting firms
operations
Investigative and Disciplinary Authority
Empowered PCAOB to investigate
potential violations of:
Securities laws
Standards
Competency and conduct
International Authority
Foreign accounting firms that prepare
or furnish an audit report involving US
registrants will be subject to authority
of PCAOB
If registered US accounting firm relies
on opinion of foreign accounting firm,
foreign firms audit work papers must
be supplied upon request to PCAOB or
SEC
Auditor Independence
Section 201
New Roles for Audit Committees and Auditors
New law prohibits independent auditors from
offering certain non-audit services to audit
clients
Prohibited services include:
Bookkeeping
Financial information systems design and implementation
Appraisals or valuation services
Actuarial services
Internal audit outsourcing services
Management and human resources services
Broker/dealer and investment banking services
Legal services
Expert services unrelated to audit services
Auditor Independence
Section 202
New Roles for Audit Committees and Auditors
- Tax services
- Other services
Auditor Independence
Section 203
New Roles for Audit Committees and Auditors
Second partner review and approval of audit reports
Lead audit partner and audit review partner must be
rotated every five years on public company engagements
An accountant is not independent if, at any point during
audit and professional engagement period, any audit
partner earns or receives compensation based on that
partner procuring engagements with audit client to
provide any services other than audit, review or attest
services
firms with fewer than five audit clients and fewer than ten
partners may be exempt from partner rotation and
compensation provisions, provided each engagement is
subject to special review by PCAOB at least every three
years
Auditor Independence
Sections 204
New Roles for Audit Committees and Auditors
Independent auditors report to companys audit
committee, not management
Independent auditor must report new
information to audit committee including:
Critical accounting policies and practices to be
used
Alternative treatments of financial information
with GAAP that have been discussed with
management
Accounting disagreements between auditor and
management
Other relevant communications between auditor
and management
Auditor Independence
Section 206
New Roles for Audit Committees and Auditors
Accounting firm will not be able to provide
audit services to public company if one of
that companys top officials (CEO, Controller,
CFO, Chief Accounting Officer, etc) was
employed by firm and
worked on companys audit during previous year
Corporate Responsibility
Section 301
Financial Reporting and Auditing Process
Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) (NYSE
and NASDAQ) must adopt listing standards
for audit committees
SROs must prohibit listing of any security
whose issuer does not have audit committee
comprised entirely of independent directors:
For a director to be deemed "independent," the board must
affirmatively determine the director has no material relationship
with the listed company (either directly or as a partner,
shareholder or officer of an organization that has a relationship
with the company)
Former employees of company or auditors of company and their
family members may not be considered independent until five
years after their employment ends.
Corporate Responsibility
Section 301
Financial Reporting and Auditing Process
Corporate Responsibility
Section 301
Corporate Responsibility
Section 302
Financial Reporting and Auditing Process
CEO and CFO of each issuer shall prepare
statement to accompany the audit report to
certify "appropriateness of the financial
statements and disclosures contained in the
periodic report, and that those financial
statements and disclosures fairly present, in
all material respects, the operations and
financial condition of the issuer." .
Corporate Responsibility
Section 303
Financial Reporting and Auditing Process
Prohibits officers and directors of an issuer
or their representatives from taking actions
to coerce, manipulate, or fraudulently
influence the independent auditor of the
financial statements if that person knew or
should have known that such action, if
successful, could result in rendering the
financial statements materially misleading
Corporate Responsibility
Sections 304 and 306
Financial Reporting and Auditing Process
Management must return bonuses or profits
from stock sales received within 12 months
of a restatement of financial results caused
by non-compliance with financial reporting
requirements as a result of misconduct
Company officers prohibited from trading
shares during pension blackout periods
Criminal Penalties
Failure to maintain work papers
SEC will establish rule covering retention of audit records
Board will issue standards that compel auditors to keep
other documentation for seven years
Document destruction
Felony to destroy documents in federal or bankruptcy
investigation
Up to 20 years in prison
Securities fraud
Penalties increased to 25 years in prison
Fraud discovery
Statutes of limitations extended to two years from date of
discovery and five years after act
Previously one year and three years
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Ramifications of Provisions of Act
Consulting services
Other non-audit services, including tax services, require preapproval by audit committee
Cascading effect
Concern is that new legislation by US Congress may become
template for parallel federal and state legislation or rules changes
that directly affect both non-public companies that are subject to
other regulations and the CPAs that provide services to them
Aftermath of Enron
Accounting Scandal
New NYSE Corporate Governance Listing Standards
On February 13, 2002, Chairman of SEC asked NYSE to review
its corporate governance listing standards
BOD of NYSE appointed Corporate Accountability and Listing
Standards Committee to review current listing standards and
make recommendations
On June 6, 2002, Committee presented NYSE BOD with report
recommending significant changes in how NYSE-listed
companies are governed
On August 1, 2002, NYSE approved Committees
recommendations
On August 16, 2002, NYSE sent recommendations to SEC for
approval
On November 4, 2003, SEC approved new rules
Current Rule
No existing requirement.
No existing requirement.
Current Rule
No existing restrictions
Current Rule
No existing requirement.
Current Rule
Current Rule
No existing requirement.
No existing requirement.
Current Rule
No existing requirement .
No existing requirement .
Contact Information
Professor J. Timothy Sale
University of Cincinnati
tim.sale@uc.edu
http://www.cba.uc.edu/faculty/sale/sale.htm