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OVERVIEW

Why should we care about liberal multiculturalism?

Three views for liberal multiculturalists.

Group rights

Group differentiated rights

The right to culture

Some concluding remarks

METHODOLOGY
Analytical political philosophy.
Case studies will only be used to the extent that they can be
successfully employed as thought experiments (eg, Sikhs and
motorcycle helmets).

LIBERAL MULTICULTURALISM
Kymlicka has argued that our culture is part of our identity, and
we risk unjust inequalities if we do not accommodate for
inequalities of culture.
Immigrants, refugees and national minorities (Kymlicka).
Many different conceptions of culture (societal? religious?
national?) makes it a difficult concept to analyse.
But if we think there may be something about culture that
is valuable to individuals, the liberal must be concerned.

LIBERAL MULTICULTURALISM
Liberal multiculturalists can be interpreted as making two
related, but distinct, claims:
1.Culture has value which ought to be preserved
2.Different cultures require different treatment (this, I think,
is more open to interpretation than has currently been
acknowledged).

THE PROBLEM
Widely recognised as the politics of difference (Taylor, 1992),
one worry with multiculturalism is its possible capacity to
undermine liberal equality. This idea motivates Barrys criticisms
in Culture and Equality.

So on one hand, culture may be of necessary value for all

individuals
but on the other, it may undermine the equality of
individuals, which is the basis of liberal concerns in the first
place. A correct approach is not obvious.

CULTURE AND RIGHTS

Liberals, concerned as they are with rights, have made arguments
regarding the rights afforded to certain cultural groups (most
notably Kymlicka). Three views which might be taken:
1. Cultural groups should be granted certain rights.
2. Individuals within cultural groups should be granted certain
rights.
3. All individuals should have an equal right to culture.

(My thesis structure is, so far, a little confused. Feel free to make
suggestions!)

GROUP RIGHTS / CORPORATE RIGHTS

Rights are held and exercised by groups. Thus, the liberal state ought
not to interfere with the actions of these groups. (Chandran Kukathas
can be interpreted as falling into this category, but his theory is slightly
more complex (though still problematic for the reasons discussed here.)
Main reason to reject this claim: odious consequences. Consider a
conflict between individual and group rights.
If the individual always triumphs, then what sort of rights does the
group actually have?
If the group sometimes trumps the individual, this appears terribly
illiberal (e.g., confining women to subservient roles to protect
culture).

GROUP DIFFERENTIATED RIGHTS

Kymlicka (GDRs most notable proponent) argues that
individuals within groups can hold certain rights by virtue of
being a group member. So, for example, we grant Sikhs the
right not to wear motorcycle helmets.
Kymlickas theory avoids the odious consequence of corporate
rights: individuals are free to choose whether or not to exercise
the rights they possess in virtue of being group members
Theres a lot to talk about with Kymlicka, but here I will focus on
1 main claim:

GROUP DIFFERENTIATED RIGHTS

Consider a rights-claim R (e.g., the right to refrain from
wearing a motorcycle helmet, or the right to perform FGM on
young girls). In such cases, the liberal must ask, Is this claim
consistent with liberalism?
If NO, then the claim should be rejected: we should not practice
FGM on young girls.
If YES, then we can formulate this into a right: it is permissible
for agents to not wear motorcycle helmets (assuming that this
does not harm others (which is contentious)).

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GROUP DIFFERENTIATED RIGHTS

But if it is permissible, then surely it is permissible for everyone.
My claim (also made by Barry, but with a different argument to
get to the conclusion): To properly adhere to liberalism, that
which is impermissible must be impermissible for all, and that
which is permissible must be permissible for all.
This argument works only insofar as we construe rights as
negative. Positive rights are more tricky.

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RIGHT TO CULTURE
Why not argue that all agents in a liberal society have an equal
right to culture?
Right to culture = positive right. States must intervene.
Such a right would require agents to be treated differently, but
this is not unprecedented.

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RIGHT TO CULTURE
Is the right to culture coherent? Should we agree with Kymlicka
that only societal culture matters? If not, what counts?
This is as far as my project has come so far. I suspect
this position can be successfully argued against, but
cannot formulate such an argument yet.

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STRUCTURE (STILL VERY MUCH IN FLUX)

1. Identify why multiculturalism may important and necessary
to liberals
2. Identify the strongest candidates for accommodating cultural
difference:
Group rights
Group differentiated rights
Right to culture (positive).
3.Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of a right to culture
approach, and evaluate how well such a right can be
accommodated while respecting other liberal values.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barry, Brian. Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2001.
Colburn, Ben. Autonomy and Liberalism. New York: Routledge, 2010.
Crowder, George. Theories of Multiculturalism: An Introduction. London: Polity, 2013.
Galston, William A. "Two Concepts of Liberalism." Ethics 105.3 (1995): 516.
Kelly, P. J. Multiculturalism Reconsidered: 'Culture and Equality' and Its Critics.
Cambridge: Polity, 2002.
Kukathas, C. "Are There Any Cultural Rights?" Political Theory 20.1 (1992): 105-39.
Kukathas, C. "Cultural Rights Again: A Rejoinder to Kymlicka." Political Theory 20.4
(1992): 674-80.
Kukathas, C. "Equality and Diversity." Politics, Philosophy & Economics 1.2 (2002):
185-212.
Kukathas, C. "Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference." Political
Theory 26.5 (1998): 686-99.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Kymlicka, W. "The Rights of Minority Cultures: Reply to Kukathas." Political Theory
20.1 (1992): 140-46.
Kymlicka, Will. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. Oxford:
Clarendon, 1990.
Kymlicka, Will. Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford:
Clarendon, 1995.
Lovett, Frank. "Multiculturalism Without Culture and Justice, Gender, and the Politics of
Multiculturalism." Perspectives on Politics 6.01 (2008): n. pag.
Phillips, Anne. Multiculturalism without Culture. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007.
Song, Sarah. "Multiculturalism." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford
University, 24 Sept. 2010. Web. 27 Feb. 2014. <
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiculturalism/>.

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