The Philosophical

Problem of Evil
The only effective argument against the existence of
a maximally perfect God is rooted in the existence
of evil.
The existence of evil is thought by some to:
Be logically inconsistent with the existence of a
maximally perfect God. (The Logical Problem of
Evil)
Constitute conclusive evidence against the
existence of a maximally perfect God. (The
Evidential Problem of Evil)

Logical Problem of Evil

Some believe the claims A maximally
perfect God exists and Evil exists
canNOT both be true in the same reality.
Some believe these two claims cannot
both be true in the same reality just as
the claims All the students in Mrs.
Smiths class are girls and The best
student is Mrs. Smiths class is a boy
cannot both be true in the same reality.

 The reason some believe these two claims

cannot both be true in the same reality is
succinctly stated by St. Thomas Aquinas:
It seems that God does not exist;
because if one of two contraries be infinite,
the other would be altogether destroyed.
But, the word God means that He is
infinite goodness. If, therefore, God
existed, there would be no evil
discoverable, but there is evil in the world.
Therefore, God does not exist.
Summa Theologica, I, 3, iii (obj. 1)

Rebutting the Logical Problem of Evil

How to show that the two claims are not
logically inconsistent:
Show there is a possible reality in which
both claims are true.
This reality need not be actual, nor even
plausible.
The reality need only be possible and be
one in which both A maximally perfect
God exists and Evil exists are both
true.

 The Absorption Principle

Since God is the Highest Good, He
would not allow any evil to exist in His
works, unless His Omnipotence and
Goodness were such as to bring
good even out of evil.
Saint Augustine of Hippo, Enchiridion

Any evil that exists is the logically

unavoidable side-effect(s) of the
production of greater good(s).

 Plantagina
A possible reality in which A
maximally perfect God exists and Evil
exists are both true.
All the evil that exits in Plantagina
results from the free, but immoral,
choices of moral creatures.
Evils such as murders, thefts, and
rapes result from the free, but immoral,
choices of creatures like you and me.

 Evils such as sickness, earthquakes,

and hurricanes result from the free, but
immoral, choices of fallen angels
(demons).
God cannot force any of the free
creatures in Plantagina to choose good.
A forced, free choice is a logical
impossibility, just like a square
circle. Thus, Gods inability to
bring either about is not a blow
against His omnipotence.

 In Plantagina, all the evil produced by the

free, but immoral, choices of moral
creatures is outweighed by the goodness of
the creatures ability to make free and
moral choices.
The moral creatures in Plantagina cannot
make free and moral choices unless they
can also make free, but immoral,
choices.
Plantagina is a possible reality and, in it, A
maximally perfect God exists and Evil
exists are both true.

 Thus, these two claims are NOT

logically inconsistent.
What is the upshot of all this?
The Logical Problem of Evil is easily
rebutted because it overreaches.
It tries, as it were, to hit a grand slam
against theism.
As a result it can be struck out by a
story as facile as Plantagina.

Evidential Problem of Evil

Given the amount and type of evil that
exists in the actual world, it is highly
unlikely (and, therefore, irrational to
believe) that a maximally perfect God
exists.
The existence of evil counts as
conclusive evidence against the
existence of a maximally perfect God.

Responses to the Evidential Problem

of Evil
Direct Theodicy
A plausible explanation for all the evil
that actually exists.
Evil is the Privation of Goodness
At root, goodness and being are the
same.
To lack goodness is, to some
degree, to lack being.

 To be evil is NOT to BE as one

ought.
For example, a hammer without a
head is a bad hammer because it
lacks (suffers from a privation) of
what it should have.
All created beings, by the very
fact they are created, lack some
degree goodness and, therefore,
being.

 All things that exist, therefore,

seeing that the Creator of them
all is supremely good, are
themselves good. But, because
they are not, like their Creator,
supremely and unchangeably
good, their good may be
diminished and increased.
St. Augustine of Hippo, Enchiridion

 [St. Augustine] did hold broadly to the

Platonic idea that the world is
necessarily a mixture, as it were, of
being and non-being: It is becoming.
And, one of the hallmarks of [the world]
. . . is its multiplicity and change, [i.e]
the absence of full being . . . . But this
multiplicity and change give rise to
natural processes, and these in turn
give rise to famines, disease, plagues,
etc., and these in turn give rise to
suffering . . . .

 Moral evil, or sin, likewise may be

traced to an absence of goodness. It
results when something goes wrong
with the will; when it breaks down;
when it falls short; when it fails to will
the good; when it is derailed and turns
aside from the the good; when it is
corrupted. As disease is the absence
of health in the body, so sin is the
absence of health in the will.
Miller and Jensen, Questions that Matter, pp.
354-55

 From the very fact that creatures are

creatures, they are limited in both being
and goodness.
In other words, by their very natures,
creatures are incomplete.
The fulfillment and completion of creatures
lie outside themselves
St. Augustine, like all theists, maintained
that the fulfillment and completion of
creatures lie in God.
Our hearts, O Lord, are restless until
they rest in Thee. (The Confessions)

 Given their limitations in knowledge,

creatures may seek fulfillment and
completion in something other than their
true fulfillment and completion God.
Take as an extreme example Satan.
In Christian theology, Satan started
out as the archangel Lucifer.
But, instead of seeking his fulfillment
and completion in serving God,
Satan chose to seek his fulfillment
and completion in attaining power.

 In the words that John Milton put

on the lips of Satan in Paradise
Lost, Better to reign in Hell than
serve in Heaven.
Despite what Satan might have
thought (or thinks), says St.
Augustine, he cannot find
fulfillment and completion by ruling
in Hell.
He could only find fulfillment and
completion by serving in Heaven.

 It is not Satans bare existence which

is evil, but the bareness of his
existence . . . . Instead of fulfilling the
being God had given him, he, in a
sense, vacated that being, emptied it of
all of its once scintillating possibilities.
There is an enormous emptiness
residing at the very core of Satans
being, a huge and tragic lack of whatcould-have-been, of what should-havebeen. He is evil, not for what he is, but
for what he is not.
Professor D. Q. McInerny

 In Christian theology, it is this

tragic lack of what should-havebeen at the core of Satan that
causes him to inflict suffering on
others.
As with Satan, so with all other
who inflict suffering on others.
What is the upshot of all this?
As a Direct Theodicy, Evil as a
Privation of Good is reasonable, but
not conclusive.

 Since it is reasonable, however,

despite the existence of evil in the
actual world, it is not irrational to
believe in a maximally perfect God.
Indirect Theodicy (The G. E. Moore
Shift)
G. E. Moore was a 19th Century
British Philosopher whose work with
Ethics has inspired a response to the
Evidential Problem of Evil.

 How it works.
Gratuitous Evil: Evil that is not the
logically unavoidable side effects of
greater goods.
Both theists and atheists agree that
this material implication is true:
If gratuitous evil exists, then a
maximally perfect God does not
exist.
Atheists maintain that its more
reasonable to argue this way.

 If gratuitous evil exists, then a

maximally perfect God does not exist.
Gratuitous evil exists. Therefore, a
maximally perfect God does not exist.
Theists maintain its more reasonable to
argue this way:
If gratuitous evil exists, then a
maximally perfect God does not exist.
A maximally perfect God does exist.
Therefore, gratuitous evil does not
exist.

 Both of these arguments are valid, but

only one can be sound.
Atheists say its more reasonable to
believe in the existence of gratuitous evil
than it is to believe in the existence of a
maximally perfect God.
Theists say, given all the evidence (for
example, the theistic proofs weve
looked at) its more reasonable to
believe in the existence of a maximally
perfect God than to believe in the
existence of gratuitous evil.

 Both the atheistic and theistic views

seem reasonable.
It, therefore, in the end, becomes a
matter of faith.
This leads us to the Existential
Problem of Evil.