System Protection

Schemes (SPS) and

Islanding
PSTI, Bengaluru
7th August 2013

Definition of System Protection

Schemes (SPS)
A System Protection Scheme (SPS) or Remedial
Action Scheme (RAS) is designed to detect
abnormal
system
conditions
and
take
predetermined, corrective action (other than the
isolation of faulted elements) to preserve system
integrity
and
provide
acceptable
system
performance.CIGRE TB 187, June 2001
Earlier known as Special Protection Schemes
What is special today may be common tomorrow.
Other than equipment protection

Now formally known as

Protection Schemes (SIPS).

System

Integrity

What is not SPS?

Normal
control
actions
using
power
electronics
Static Var Compensators or SVCs, HVDC
controls, PSS
Auto-reclosing of transmission lines
Considered as part of line protection
Equipment over-load protection
Restoration of equipment

Response-based or Event-based
SPS

Response-based: Measured variables cross

the trigger value after a contingency
Event-based: Operate based on recognition
of a combination of events
Faster than response-based but have to be
designed for all possible events

Source: CIGRE TB 187

Why System Protection

Schemes?

Improve power system operation

Operate power systems closer to their
limits
Increase power transfer limits while
maintaining the same level of system
security
Temporary installations
Increase power system security
particularly towards extreme
contingencies leading to system collapse.

SPS to counteract power

system instability

SPS design criteria

Dependability:
Security:

Operate when required to do so

Not operate when not required

Selectivity:
Ability to effect the least amount of
action when performing the action
Robustness: Ability to work over the full range of
steady state and dynamic conditions
Higher the rule complexity, lower the reliability of
performance

SPS design criteria

SPS Control Actions
Arming
Activation (detection) control
Determination of control action
Sending trip/activation command
Automatic arming or disarming is preferable
Co-ordination with other SPS or control actions
desirable
Capacitor or reactor switching vs UFLS
UFLS vs under-frequency generator tripping
UFLS vs transmission constraints
Load-shedding vs islanding

SPS Design and Reliability

Evaluation

SPS event can be classified as

Desirable operation
Undesirable operation.lesser
evil
Can either be intended or unintended
Failure to operate.serious
Hardware failure
Faulty design logic
Software error
Human error
Chapter 6 of CIGRE TB 187 covers SPS design
aspects and reliability in detail

Institutional co-ordination
SPS involves
Large number of measurements from
various points
A processing/control centre
Diverse elements affected by control
actions
So SPS is a multi-utility level problem

Institutional co-ordination

Source: CIGRE TB 187

Future SPS

Future SPS

Indian experience of SPS

A decade of experience
Nearly thirty (30) schemes in service at interstate level
Mostly generation 1 schemes (local
measurement, local control)
A few generation 2 schemes (local
measurement, remote actions)
Generation 3 schemes (Wide Area
Measurements and Wide Area Control) not yet
envisaged

Islanding Schemes
Islanding is also a category of SPS
Frequency based islanding is very common
Islanding based on wide area logic such as
angle is yet to be envisaged
Die or survive but together has been the
norm
Some re-think after 30th and 31st Jul 2012
Nuclear power stations and metro city
islanding has been the norm so far.

References on SPS
Industry
Experience
with
Special
Protection
Schemes, IEEE-CIGRE Committee Report, IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems, Vol 11, No 3, August
1996
CIGRE Technical Brochure 187: System Protection
Schemes in Power networks, June 2001
CIGRE Technical Brochure 200: Isolation and
restoration policies against system collapse, April
2002
Global Industry Experiences with System Integrity
Protection Schemes (SIPS), IEEE Power System
Relaying Committee (PSRC) Working Group C4,
October 2009.

IEEE/CIGRE survey 1996

49 utilities, 17 countries, 111 schemes

IEEE/CIGRE survey 1996

IEEE/CIGRE survey 1996

IEEE/CIGRE survey 1996

Operations between 1986-1992 analyzed
n1= number of successful operations=
1093
n2= number of failures = 36
n3 = unsuccessful operations = 20
n4 = unnecessary operations = 306
Effectiveness index = n1/(n1+n2+n3)
Dependability index = n1/(n1+n2)

IEEE/CIGRE survey 1996

IEEE/CIGRE survey 1996

IEEE/CIGRE survey 1996

IEEE/CIGRE survey 1996

IEEE Power System Relaying

Committee (PSRC)

IEEE Power System Relaying

Committee (PSRC)

SIPS purpose

Thank you