Capacity Building Programme on

New Techniques and Strategies in Prevention and Management of Industrial Disasters

to the Karnataka Factory Inspectorate
23-24 Oct 2010

SITING OF HAZARDOUS INDUSTRIES

ROLE OF RISK ANALYSIS
Dr. A. Koshy
23 Oct 2010, Bengaluru, Karnataka

ORGANIZERS
Karnataka State Safety Institute
Department of Factories, Boilers, Industrial Safety & Health, Bengaluru
SPONSORS

Disaster Management Institute

Concerns and issues in Siting/

Layout

Strategic Principles in the

determination of safe location
and layout for a new or a
expansion project
Key information to be
considered before selecting a
site location
How are siting issues managed
when limited space is
available?
How are security concerns in a
new site addressed ?

An Ideal Situation

A site location and

layout that will minimize
risk to the surrounding
and community/
personnel and property
while maximizing the
ease of safe operation
and maintenance.
Appropriate siting and
layout establishes a
foundation for a safe
and secure operation.

Hazard Management in
Life Cycle of an Engineering Project
PRODUCTION

COMMISSIONING

INSTALLATION

Sit
e

La
y-

ou
t

of
ins
t al
lat

CONCEPT

ion
FRONT-END
ENGINEERING

CONSTRUCTION
DETAIL
ENGINEERING

Hazard Techniques for Site

evaluation
Techniques of Fire Explosion Index and Toxicity
Index

Dows Index
Monds Index
Codes ( OISD)

Allowing objective spacing distances to be

taken into account at all stages

Major Accident Hazard Group

Major accident means an incident involving
loss of life inside or outside the site or 10 or
more injuries inside and / or one or more
injuries outside or
release of toxic chemical or explosion or fire
or spillage of hazardous chemicals resulting
in on-site or
off-site emergencies or damage to
equipment leading to stoppage of process or
adverse effects to the environment.

THE MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARD CONTROL RULES, 1997

Features of Well Laid out Site

The potential for toxic impacts, fire escalation,
and explosion damage will be low.
The risk to personnel and the surrounding
community will be reduced.
Maintenance will be easier and safer to perform.

However, these benefits do not come without

associated costs.

Separation distances translate to real estate that

costs money.

Some key industrial accidents

Flixborough (6/74)

28 fatalities - $167MM

Seveso (7/76)

Contaminated countryside

Mex. City (11/84)

550+ fatalities - $26MM

Bhopal (12/84)

3M+ fatalities - 200M affected

Chernob. Nuc. Plt. (4/86)

31 fatalities - 300 mi2 evacuated

Piper Alpha Plat. (7/88)

165 fatalities

Pasadena, Tx. (11/89)

23 fatalities - $797MM

Channelview, Tx. (7/90)

17 fatalities - $14MM

Pemex, Mexico (7/96)

Multiple fatalities - $253MM, $8MMM loss to economy

Petrobras, Brasil (6/2001)

10 fatalities - $300MM

Toulouse, France (9/01)

29 fatalities, 20,000 homes damaged

* Large property damage losses (17th edition); M&M Protection Consultants; 1166 Avenue of the Americas, NY, NY

10036

Explosion at Chemical facility

Flixborough, England, 1974

Explosion at Chemical facility

Flixborough, England, 1974

A large quantity of cyclohexane

vapor was released when a 20
makeshift bypass pipe
ruptured

The cyclohexane formed a

flammable mixture and
subsequently found a source of
ignition.

The resulting massive vapor

cloud explosion killed 28
workers, injured 36. (Minimized
as the office block was
unoccupied)

Damages ( Onsite and Offsite)

18 fatalities occurred in the

control room as a result of
the windows shattering and
the collapse of the roof.

No one escaped from the

control room.
Fires burned for several days
and after ten days those that
still raged were hampering the
rescue work.

Offsite consequences -- 53
reported injuries.
Property in the surrounding
area was damaged to a
varying degree.

Contributing Factors

Not following codes & operating

procedures while introducing
modifications

design codes, management of

change procedures, maintenance
procedures during
recommissioning

Plant layout - position of

occupied buildings
Control Room not designed for
withstanding major hazards
Emergency plan not updated
following modifications

UK COMAH regulation was

introduced

Explosion at Refinery,
Pasadena, Texas 23 Oct 1989

Explosion at Refinery,
Pasadena, Texas 23 Oct 1989

During maintenance work

on a reactor settling leg, a
large release of flammable
vapor occurred at the
Phillips 66 chemical
complex.

The result -- a massive

vapor cloud explosion,
followed by a series of
further explosions and fires.

23 fatalities and 300 people

injured. Extensive damage
to the plant facilities

Metal & Debris as far as

Km

Contributing Factors

Site and industry

standards for
maintenance not
followed
Training and
competence
Work permit system
- contractors
Positioning of
occupied buildings

Risk Factors in Site

Selection

Risk to Population density

around the site

( from choice hazardous

material, equipment ,
activites)

Risk from Natural disaster

occurrence (earthquake,
flood, etc.)
Risk of non-availability of
power, steam and water

Plant Siting Safety

Considerations

Buffer zone
Location of other
hazardous installations in
vicinity
Inventory of toxic and
hazardous materials
Adequacy of firefighting
water supply
Access to Emergency
equipment
Availability of emergency
response support from
adjacent industries and the
community

Weather extremes and

prevailing winds
Location of highways,
waterways, railroad and
airplane corridors
Environmental and waste
disposal restrictions
during emergencies
Draining and grade slope
Maintenance and
inspection

Layers of Safety in Industrial

Project

Critical Radiation Levels

Damage Criteria for Explosion

Over pressure
(bar)

Type of damage

0.30
Heavy
0.20 to 0.27 Rupture of Oil storage tanks
Possibility of damage to eardrums
(Human)
0.20
Steel frame constructions distorted
and pulled away from foundations
0.10
Repairable damage
0.03
Large & small windows usually
shattered
0.02
10% window glass broken
0.01
Crack of windows

Damage Contours from Pool fire at manifold

Damage Contours from Jetfire at tank farm

Radiation Level
Ellipse @ 4 kW/m2
Effect Zone @ 4 kW/m2
Ellipse @ 12.5 kW/m2
Effect Zone @ 12.5 kW/m2

Damage Contours from VCE

Toxic Dispersion & Effects

Vapor clouds may give rise to large fires,

explosions or toxic effects.
Other things being equal, toxic gas clouds
are likely to be dangerous at much greater
distances from the point of release than
their flammable counterparts.
Dispersion is the process through which
gases can travel long distances.
Two types of dispersion occur in industrial
situations.

Types of Dispersion
Dispersions
Dense

Neutral

A distinction between different types of dispersion

is made for the use of suitable models.
It is based on the type of material

Consequences from
Toxic Gas Dispersion

A large toxic release may give rise to the

following effects on human beings:

lethal injury
non-lethal injury
Irritation

Toxic gas releases may cause domino effects by

rendering adjacent plants inoperable and
injuring operators.

Prevention/mitigation by provision of automatic

control systems using inherently safer principles
and a suitable control room

Large Toxic Release

The main mode of exposure is inhalation

The effects of a toxic release are estimated
knowing the relationship between the
concentration-time profile and the degree of
injury
The product C of concentration and the time
of exposure t, is called dosage and is directly
calculated from the dispersion equation

Exposure Limits

Three agencies provide information regarding

exposure limits, specifying safe levels of air
borne contaminants

OSHA
The National Institute of Occupational Safety
(NIOSH) and
The American Conference of Governmental
Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH)

These 3 agencies have established guidelines

and specific exposure levels of various
contaminants

Protection from
Domino/ Cascade Effects
Arranging separation distances such that damage
to adjacent plants will not occur even in the worst
case;
Provision of barriers e.g. blast walls, location in
strong buildings;
Protecting plant against damage; e.g. provision of
thicker walls on vessels;
Directing explosion relief vents away from
vulnerable areas; e.g. other plants or buildings,
roadways near site boundaries.
However, these measures may not provide practical
solutions against missiles, and risk analysis may be
required to prove adequate safety.

LPG Terminal
Mexico City, Mexico 1984

A major fire and a

series of
catastrophic
explosions occurred
at the PEMEX LPG
Terminal.

After the intial

release, the first
BLEVE occurred.

For the next 90

minutes, a series of
BLEVEs followed as
other LPG vessels
violently exploded.

Approximetly 500
people were killed
and the facility was
destroyed.

Contributing Factors

Plant layout the positioning

of vessels
Emergency
isolation
Survivability of
critical systems
Emergency
plan and site
access

Guidance values for

safe separation distances
For prevention of Domino Effects
Thermal radiation from fire (Jet/ Flash/ Pool/
Fireball)

12.5 kW/m2 1% Fatality level

4.5 kW/m2 Safe for firefighters

Overpressure from Explosion (UVCE/ VCE/

BLEVE)

0.1 bar 1% Fatality level

Site Factors to be considered where

Risks of release of flammable/ toxic materials
exists

Plants/Flammable storages should be sited in the

open air
Locating all high-volume storage of flammable /
toxic material well outside process areas;
Hazardous area classification (HAC) to designate
areas for elimination of ignition sources .
Locating hazardous plant away from main roadways
through the site;
Fitting remote-actuated isolation valves where high
inventories of hazardous materials may be released
into vulnerable areas;
Provision of ditches, dykes, embankments, sloping
terrain to contain and control releases & limit safety
& environmental effects;

Incident at POL Depot, Jaipur,

th Motor Spirit had gushed out, when
29Liquid
Oct 2009, 6:10 pm

the tank was being lined up (made ready

for pumping to BPCL) because MOV
connecting to the tank was also open
when the Hammer Blind was in the
changeover position

Product leaked for 75 minutes- 1000 tons

of MS= 20 tons TNT before explosion took

After explosion, fire occurred in 9 of the

11 tanks and the fire continued till the
fuel contents were totally burnt.

60000KL product burned out in 11 day

11 fatalities, many injured and 280 cr loss

LOSS OF SECONDARY
CONTAINMENT

Open condition of dyke valve in tank

dyke
drainage system is connected to
storm water drain also which is open
to atmosphere, Hydrocarbon entering
this allows vapor to spread throughout
installation.

INADEQUATE MITIGATION
MEASURES

MOV closure from control room was

malfunction
Non availability of SCBA
No emergency plan for the scenario
No emergency responder

Critical factors to be
Location of control room
considered
in
plant
layout
/Protection

Fire water tank and fire water pump

house

Congestion in the plant site

because of buildings, structures,
pipelines, trees etc.

The emergency exit gate shall be

away from the main gate and
always be available for use for
personnel evacuation during
emergency.

Evacuation routes should not be

blocked by poor plant layout

Extract from IOC Fire Accident Report 10.5

Plant Layout

Positioning of occupied
buildings

The distance between occupied

buildings and plant buildings( w.r.t
dangers of explosion, fire and toxicity).
Locate buildings and structures in the
upwind direction
Congestion in the plant site because of
buildings, structures, pipelines, trees
etc.
All buildings which are not related to
terminal operation shall be located
outside the plant area. (eg. canteen,
ignition sources)
Personnel with more general site
responsibilities should usually be
housed in buildings sited in a nonhazard area near the main entrance.
In all cases occupied buildings should
not be sited downwind of hazardous

HPCL-Vizag refinery explosion

14th September 1997

Fire broke out at 6:15 am, following a

suspected leak in the LPG pipeline from the
Vizag port to the storage farm.
It caused a series of explosions, and soon
spread to at least six other naphtha and
petrol tanks.

Damages ( HPCL Refinery Fire )

Affected the entire product
terminal area, including 11
storage tanks containing
naptha, petrol, diesel, kerosene
and furnace oil, besides the six
''Horton spheres'' containing
LPG.
The refinery's administrative
building, its canteen and some
other buildings came crashing
down like a pack of cards
Even an earthquake measuring
eight on the Richter scale
would not have caused so
much damage.

What to do in case of Restricted SpaceCase study of Fire at IOC filling station (petrol bunk)

Gas tanker filling underground

tanks of the LPG outlet suddenly
caught fire, Caused by leakage of
LPG from a nozzle of a gas tanker
3 persons were killed and a dozen
others injured
The fire engulfed a gas tanker, an
electricity transformer and three
cars and spread to a nearby
multi-storey apartment building.
Ignition followed by Fire - spread
to nearby houses and burnt trees
and damaged electricity poles
and wires.
Estimate about 12 to 15 tonnes of
fuel went up in flames with the
fire raging for six hours

IOC LPG Explosion Jaipur - Oct

12 ,2008

Entire gas station was engulfed

in flames
Explosion took place in the
tanker itself, destroying it
completely. , the impact of
which was felt in the entire
Shastri Nagar residential area
up to a distance of three
kilometres
After 15 minutes of the gas
that had leaked , the tanker
blew off.
The rear shell of the tanker had
been thrown 250 feet and made
a big hole into an building
tanker exploded at that time
and huge flames that were
thrown out of it 350 feet away

Risk Analysis Need to Be

Applied

Helps in

Forecasting any
unwanted situation
Estimating damage
potential of such
situation
Decision making to
assess the suitability of
sites
Evaluating
effectiveness of control
measures

IOC LPG Explosion Jaipur - Oct 12

,2008

Risk
The probability of suffering a harm or
loss.
A combination of hazard and
Probability

Risk = Probability of occurrence of

hazard X magnitude of hazard

Measurement of Risk

Individual Risk
Societal Risk

Risk Representation

Individual Risk Contour

1.0E-04
2.0E-05
5.0E-06

ALARP
As Low As Reasonable Practicable

Tolerable only if risk reduction

Is impracticable or cost is
grossly disproportionate to
the improvement gained

Summary & Conclusion

Poorly laid out site increases risk of an accident

especially in MAH group of Industries

Site layout factors should be considered during Plant

Layout design phase

Risk and Damage contours (based on

consequence Analysis) helps to demarcate
hazardous areas
Risk analysis may be required to decide the
project when there is restriction of space.

Risk levels criteria as stipulated in IS 15646 2006

should be employed to decide the case