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Slide 1
Bab 9
Oligopoli dan Bentuk Perusahaan */
Slide 2
Oligopoly
Few sellers of a homogeneous (= pure
oligopoly) or differentiated product
Nonprice competition > based on advertising,
services, product differentiation
Barriers to entry
Duopoly: Two sellers only
Pure oligopoly : Homogeneous product
Differentiated oligopoly : Differentiated product
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.
Slide 3
Oligopoli
Sedikit penjual dari satu produk yang sama
atau berbeda (terdiferensiasi)
Persaingan non-harga > berdasarkan iklan,
pelayanan, pembedaan produk
Slide 4
Sources of Oligopoly
Economies of scale
Large capital investment required
(automobiles,
Slide 5
baja)
Slide 6
Measures of Oligopoly
Concentration Ratios: percentage of total sales
(4, 8, or 12 largest firms in an industry) p.367
p. 368
Slide 7
Pengukuran Oligopoli
Rasio Konsentrasi: persentase dari total penjualan
(4, 8, atau 12 perus. terbesar di dalam industri) p.367
p. 368
Slide 8
Cournot Model
Proposed by Augustin Cournot
Behavioral assumption
Bertrand Model
Firms assume that their market rivals will not
change their prices.
Slide 9
Model Cournot
Diusulkan oleh Augustin Cournot
Asumsi Tingkah-laku
Model Bertrand
Perus. mengasumsikan bahwa pesaing tidak
merobah harganya.
Slide 10
Cournot Model
Example
Two firms (duopoly)
Identical products
Marginal cost is zero
Initially Firm A has a monopoly and then
Firm B enters the market
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Model Cournot
Contoh
Dua perusahaan (duopoli)
Produk sama
Marginal cost sama dengan nol
Awalnya Perusahaan A memonopoli dan
kemudian Perusahaan B masuk ke pasar.
Slide 12
Cournot Model
Adjustment process
Entry by Firm B reduces the demand for
Firm As product
Firm A reacts by reducing output, which
increases demand for Firm Bs product
Firm B reacts by increasing output, which
reduces demand for Firm As product
Firm A then reduces output further
This continues until equilibrium is attained
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.
Slide 13
Model Cournot
Proses Penyesuaian
Masuknya Perus. B mengurangi permintaan produk
perus. A
Perus. A bertindak dengan mengurangi output, yang
menaikkan permintaan produk perus. B
Perus. B bertindak dengan manaikkan produksi,
yang mengurangi permintaan produk perus. A
Perus. A kemudian terus mengurangi output
Keadaaan ini berlanjut sampai tercapainya
keseimbangan.
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.
Slide 14
Figure 9-1
Cournot Model
p. 369
MC = 0
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.
Slide 15
Figure 9-1
Model Cournot
p. 369
MC = 0
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.
Slide 16
Cournot Model
Equilibrium
Firms are maximizing profits
simultaneously
The market is shared equally among the
firms
Price is above the competitive equilibrium
($0) and below the monopoly equilibrium
($6) see Figure 9.1
Slide 17
Model Cournot
Keseimbangan
Perus. Secara bersamaan memaksimumkan
laba
Pasar terbagi sama diantara perus.
Harga diatas keseimbangan bersaing ($0)
dan dibawah keseimbangan monopoli ($6)
see Figure 9.1
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Figure 9-2
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Figure 9-2
Slide 22
Cartels
Collusion
Market-Sharing Cartel
Collusion to divide up markets: geograph. area
Centralized Cartel
OPEC
Slide 23
Kartel
Kolusi
Kartel Terpusat
OPEC
Slide 24
Centralized Cartel
D = total mkt demand curve; MR = for two firms; E MC = sum of two
MC centralized authority set P = $8 and Q = 50 1
see profit of Firm 1 and 2.
2a
Slide 25
Kartel Terpusat
D = kurva total permintaan pasar, MR = utk kedua perus.; E MC = jumlah
Dari dua MC otoritas terpusat menetapkan P = $8 and Q = 50
Lihat laba perus.1 and 2.
1
2a
Slide 26
Price Leadership
Implicit Collusion
Price Leader (Barometric Firm)
Largest, dominant, or lowest cost firm in
the industry
Demand curve is defined as the market
demand curve less supply by the followers
Followers
Take market price as given and behave as
perfect competitors
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.
Slide 27
Pemimpin Harga
Kolusi Implisit
Pemimpin Harga (Barometer Perus.)
Terbesar, dominan, atau biaya perus. terendah
dalam industri
Permintaan pasar ditentukan saat kurva
permintaan pasar rendahnya supply oleh
pengikut
Pengikut
Mengambil harga pasar apa adanya dan
bertindak sebagai pesaing sempurna.
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.
Slide 28
Price Leadership
Slide 29
Pemimpin Harga
Slide 30
Efficiency of Oligopoly
Price is usually greater then long-run
average cost (LAC)
Quantity produced usually does
correspond to minimum LAC
Price is usually greater than long-run
marginal cost (LMC)
When a differentiated product is
produced, too much may be spent on
advertising and model changes
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.
Slide 31
Efisiensi Oligopoli
Har ga lebih besar dari biaya rata-rata
LR (LAC)
Jumlah diproduksi umumnya
berhubungan dengan LAC terendah
Harga biasanya lebih besar dpd biaya
marginal LR (LMC)
Jika satu produk berbeda diproduksi,
terlalu banyak akan dikeluarkan untuk
iklan dan perobahan model .
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.
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Global Oligopolists
Impetus toward globalization
Advances in telecommunications and
transportation
Globalization of tastes
Reduction of barriers to international trade
Slide 37
Oligopolis Global
Penggerak ke globalisasi
Majunya telekomunikasi dan transportasi
Globalisai selera
Pengurangan hambatan dalam
perdagangan internasional
Slide 38
Core Competencies
Outsourcing of Non-Core Tasks
Learning Organization
Efficient and Flexible
Integrates Physical and Virtual
Real-Time Enterprise
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Relationship Enterprise
Strategic alliances
Complementary capabilities and resources
Stable longer-term relationships
Prepared by Robert F. Brooker, Ph.D.
Slide 41
Perluasan Perusahaan
Perusahaan Maya
Jaringan kerja sementara dari perusahaan yang
tidak ada hubungan, kemudian bekerja sama untuk
mengambil keuntungan dari kesempatan yang ada
Perusahaan Saling-terkait
Aliansi Strategis dari perus independent utk
mengembangkan kemampuan
Saling melengkapi kemampuan & resources
Hubungan yang stabil dalam jangka pajang
Slide 42