2015 Judicial Review

Judicial Review
(Statutory Construction)
EVERY STATUTE IS PRESUMED VALID.
An act of the legislature, approved by the President, is

presumed to be within the constitutional limitations. For the
responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the
courts alone but on the legislature and executive as well.
- The function of the legislature is to legislate law.
- presumption of right and legality
To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and

unequivocal breach of the Constitution (not merely doubtful
and argumentative implication)
In case of doubt: resolved in favor of the constitutionality of

law.
JUDICIAL POWER
Vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts

as may be established by law.
Includes
the duty of the courts to settle actual

controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Taada v. Angara
The court ruled, where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute.
The court en banc unanimously stressed that in taking jurisdiction over petitions questioning
an act of the political departments of government, it will not review the wisdom, merits or
propriety of such action, and will strike it down only on either of two grounds:
(1) unconstitutionality or illegality and
(2) grave abuse of discretion.
The courts of justice determine the limits of the power of the agencies
and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other
words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on question whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.
Tanada vs. Cuenco,
It held that although under the constitution, the legislative power is vested
exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to
pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
ANGARA vs. Electoral Commission
(cited in the case of Francisco vs. HRep)
judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and
balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the
bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are
utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It

obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.The Constitution has provided
for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings
of the various departments of the government.x x xAndthe judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.32
Principles of Constitutional Construction:
1. VERBA LEGIS, (PLAIN MEANING RULE/LITERAL INTERPRETATION) that is, wherever

possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given theirordinary meaningexcept
where technical terms are employed. Thus, inJ.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration,36this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of
course stop there, but that is where we begin.It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are
to be given theirordinary meaningexcept where technical terms are employed in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails.As the Constitution isnot primarily a
lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
present in the people's consciousness,its language as much as possible should be understood in
the sense they have in common use.What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptanceand negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where
the need for construction is reduced to a minimum. 37(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
When the language of the law is clear, it should be given its natural meaning.
2. ratiolegis est anima (the reason of the law is the soul of the law), where there
is ambiguity.
The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent
of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle inCivil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary38in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision

under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution
should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if
any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light
of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the
Constitution was framed.The object is to ascertain thereason which induced the
framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to
be accomplished thereby,in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.39(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
3. ut magis valeat quam pereat (Such a construction is to be made that the thing may
have effect rather than it should fail.).
The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, inChiongbian v. De Leon,42this

Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision
of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could
also affect others.When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said
provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone,
but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. 43(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that not one provision of

the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but
that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view
and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can
be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor
of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may
make the words idle and nugatory.45(Emphasis supplied)
Essential requisites for JUDICIAL REVIEW:

1.
Existence of an APPROPRIATE CASE: Actual case or controversy

calling for the exercise of judicial power
2.
LOCUS STANDI ( LEGAL STANDING): An interest personal and

substantial by the party raising the constitutional question.
The person challenging the act must have standing to challenge
it.
3. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity (RIPENESS)
4. The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case:
(JUSTICIABILITY: necessity of deciding constitutionality)
APPROPRIATE CASE (actual case or controversy)
- must be a bona fide case: justiciable controversy, the resolution of which the court will have to
choose between the Constitution and the challenged statute (or susceptible of being decided on
grounds recognized by law).
Refers to matter which is appropriate for court review.
Necessity in the determination of real, actual, earnest and vital controversy between the litigants.
An actual case or controversy is one that involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claimssusceptible of judicial resolution;
the case must not bemoot or academic orbased on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.
Stated otherwise, it is not the mere existence of a conflict or controversy that will authorize the
exercise by the courts of its power of review; more importantly, the issue involved must be susceptible
of judicial determination
POLITICAL vs. JUSTICIABLE QUESTION

"political question", as this Court has previously defined, refers to those questions which,
under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government.
It
is concerned with the issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Connotes
a question of policy
justiciable
question
Where
the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that
matter is definitely justiciable or non-political.
test: Whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies? If YES= JUSTICIABLE (courts are duty-bound to examine whther the branch or
instrumentality of the government acted within such limits. (FRANCISCO vs. HREP)
What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in
proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or
to assume the power of a constituent assembly. ( Sanidad vs. COMELEC)
POLITICAL vs. JUDICIABLE QUESTION

the
judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,

justice or expediency of legislation. More than that,
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution
but also because the judiciary in the determination of
actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government. 68
ActualCaseorControversy: ripeness
a conflict of legal rights, an assertion ofopposite legal claims

susceptible of judicial determination.
CASES
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or

controversy
thatisappropriateorripefordetermination,notconjecturalor
anticipatory.
It
cannot be disputed that there is yet no actual case or

controversy involving all or any of the private respondents on
one hand, and all or any of the petitioners on the other, with
respect to rights or obligations under R.A. No. 8050. (Board of
Optometry vs. Colet,GR 122241, July 30, 1996)
We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in
the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the
valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the
fundamental law.Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts
jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the accused in a criminal
action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a
law he is charge with violating and of the proceedings taken against
him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights.Moreover, Article
X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases
in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the
utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of
separation of powers.As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the
legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such
courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of
this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after
a thorough deliberation of a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the
majority of those who participated in its discussion.
It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the
duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on
the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and
legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally approved.To doubt is to sustain.The
presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest
showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only
when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court
pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged
act be struck down.
premised on a contingent event: no actual case or controversy:
Petitionershavefarfromcompliedwiththeserequirements (requisites
of judicial review).The petition is premised on the occurrence of many
contingent
events,
i.e.,thatMayorBinaywillrunagaininthiscomingmayoralty elections;
that he would be re-elected in said elections; and

that
he
inthe1998elections.
wouldseekre-electionforthesamepost
Consideringthatthesecontingenciesmayormaynothappen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to
an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents ofTaguig
(except Mariano) arenot alsothe proper parties toraise this abstract
issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction
(Mariano vs.COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211).
In actions involving constitutional issues, the firmly settled rule is that a constitutional question will
not be heard and resolved by the courts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry are met:
(1)the existence of an actual case or controversy;
(2)thepartyraisingtheconstitutionalissuemusthavea personal and substantial interest in the

resolution thereof;
(3)the controversymustbe raisedat the earliest reasonable opportunity; and
(4)thattheresolutionoftheconstitutionalissuemust,be indispensable for the final determination

ofthe controversy.
Appraisingthepresentproceedingintermsoftheforegoing requirements, the Solicitor General urges that the

petition at bar does not present a justiciable for having been filed prematurely:
"...petitioners,whoclaimtobeperformingartists,hadnot previously applied with the Secretary of Labor for

exemption from the coverage of the Circular in line with the afore quoted provision. Said provision connotes
that the prohibition is not at all permanent or absolute. It admits of exception . . . But to repeat, there is no
allegationinthepetitionthatpetitionershadpreviouslysought exemption from the Secretary of Labor, from
the coverage of the Circular, before filing the instant petition. Obviously,thepetition must fail for
prematurity.
(Fernandez vs. Torres, 215SCRA 489)
Anactualcaseorcontroversy
meansanexistingcaseor
controversythatisappropriateorripefordetermination,not
conjecturaloranticipatory,lestthedecisionofthecourtwould
amounttoanadvisoryopinion.Thepowerdoesnotextendto hypothetical
questions since any attempt at abstraction could only
leadtodialecticsandbarrenlegalquestionsandtosterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities.
An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of

ripeness.
the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff.
a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. (LAMP vs. Secretary of
Budget and Mgt.)
In this case (LAMP vs. Exec. Sec),
the petitioner contested theimplementationof an alleged

unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers.According
to LAMP, the practice ofdirect allocation and release of funds
to the Members of Congress and the authority given to them to
propose and select projects is the core of the laws flawed
execution resulting in a serious constitutional transgression
involving the expenditure of public funds.Undeniably, as
taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by
this.A finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be
tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn,
cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords ripeness to
the present controversy.
The possibility of constitutional violations in the

implementation of PDAF surely involves the interplay of
legal rights susceptible of judicial resolution. For LAMP, this
is the right torecover public funds possibly misapplied by no
less than the Members of Congress.Hence, without
prejudice to other recourse against erringpublic officials,
allegations of illegal expenditure of public funds reflect a
concrete injury that may have been committed by other
branches of government before the court intervenes.The
possibility that this injury was indeed committed cannot be
discounted. The petition complains of illegal disbursement
of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient
reason to say that there indeed exists adefinite, concrete,
real or substantial controversy before the Court.
Legal standing or locus standi

has
been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the

case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance.
The
gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges

such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation ofissues
uponwhichthecourtdependsforilluminationofdifficult
constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected
in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or
ordinance, he has no standing.
(LaBugalB'laa,TribalAssn.vs.DENRSecretary, GR 127882, Jan.
27, 2004)
LAMP vs. Sec.

Anentlocus
standi, the rule is that the person who impugns the

validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.[18]
In
public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public,

asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official
action.
The
plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently

from any other person, and could be suing as a stranger, or as a
citizen or taxpayer.[20]
LAMP vs. Sec.

Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue
* where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or
* that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or
* that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or

unconstitutional law.[21]
Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of

public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by
the enforcement of an invalid statute.[22]
Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised
by taxation required in taxpayers suits is established.Thus, in the claim that
PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement
of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
In allowing the direct allocation and release of PDAF funds to the Members of
Congress based on their own list of proposed projects, did the implementation of the
PDAF provision under the GAA of 2004 violate the Constitution or the laws?
NO.
In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose
sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. In Farias
v. The Executive Secretary,[26] the Court held that:
Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature

intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates
no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of
the law. Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the
constitutionality and the burden of proof is on the party alleging that
there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
LOCUS
STANDI/ LEGAL STANDING
Personal
and substantial interest in the case such that the party

has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. (Francisco vs. Hrep)
INTEREST: material interest, an interest in issue affected by the

decree
Test: Whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional question. (Lozano vs.
Nograles)
LOCUS
I.
PRIVATE SUITS = REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST
STANDI/ LEGAL STANDING
-the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit

or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
EVERY ACTION MUST BE PROSECUTED OR DEFENDED IN THE NAME OF THE REAL

PARTY IN INTEREST.
II. PUBLIC SUITS

plaintiff asserts a public right in assailing an alleged illegal official action, does
so as a representative of the general public.
he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection.
he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and
the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
Legal standing or locus standi
Right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.
Proper Party
Constitutional question must be raised by the proper party
one who has sustained or in imminent danger of sustaining an injury

as a result ofthe act complained of.
i)Conventional standing (citizen)
Ii) Representative standing

A.
taxpayers suit
D. Voters
B.
Legislators
C.
Transcendental Importance to the public
E. Concerned Citizens
LOCUS STANDI/ LEGAL STANDING

CITIZEN:
(plaintiff is a mere instrument of the public concern)
A.
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the

allegedly illegal conduct of government
B.
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action
C.
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action
TAXPAYER: plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds or the tax

measure is unconstitutional.
PUBLIC FUNDS have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or

the constitution.
A taxpayers suit is properly brought only when there is an exercise by

Congress of its taxing or spending power.
a. Must show that he has sustained, or is in immediate danger of sustaining,

some direct injury as a result of its enforcement. (concrete injury,
whether actual or threatened, is the indispensable element of a dispute
which serves in part to cast in in form traditionally capable of judicial
resolution)
b. He must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the enforcement of the law has caused him or will cause him direct injury.
LAMP vs. Sec.

Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue
* where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or
* that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or
* that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or

unconstitutional law.[21]
Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of

public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by
the enforcement of an invalid statute.[22]
Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised
by taxation required in taxpayers suits is established.Thus, in the claim that
PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement
of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
GENERAL RULE: (TAXPAYERS SUIT)
taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys

raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement
of the questioned statute or contract
may therefore question the validity of laws requiring expenditure of public

moneys.
failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth
inDumlao v. Comelec,93towit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public

moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is
"being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against
abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose.
Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94(Citations omitted)
A taxpayer has not standing in one case

involving a penal statute which does not even
provide for any appropriation from Congress
for its implementation. (Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism
Council)
Petitioners have not presented anypersonal
stake in the outcome of the
controversy.None of them faces any charge
under RA 9372.
(cont. SHEN vs. Anti-Terrorism Council)

KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR,
petitioners in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have been subjected to close security
surveillance by state security forces, their members followed by suspicious persons
and vehicles with dark windshields, and their offices monitored by men with military
build. They likewise claim that they have been branded as enemies of the [S]tate.[14]
Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show any connection between the
purported surveillance and the implementation of RA 9372.
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan,

PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham,
petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial
notice of respondents alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting
for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National
Peoples Army (NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the
effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged tagging of

petitioners.
No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of

judicial notice. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate
their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has
been filed against them, three years after its effectivity, belies any claim
of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called
tagging.
there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to declare the

CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations
under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now.
From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have
conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much
less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive

Secretary[12] summarized the rule on locus standi, (as cited
in Southern Hemisphere case) thus:
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of
the question on standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a

statute must have a direct and personal interest.
It must show not only that the law or any
governmental act is invalid, but also that it
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement,
and not merely that it suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is
about to be denied some right or privilege to
which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to
be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of.
For
a concerned party to be allowed to raise a

constitutional question, it must show that
(1)
it has personally suffered some actual or

threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government,
(2)
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged

action, and
(3)
the injury is likely to be redressed by a

favorable action. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
VOTERS
There
must be a showing of obvious interest in the

validity of the election law in question.
LEGISLATORS
There must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators.
BIRAOGO VS. Philippine Truth Commission
Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any

personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order
No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his
clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over
presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution.
LEGISLATORS
eg. Southern Hemisphere case
Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to
have been the subject of political surveillance, also lacks
locus standi. Prescinding from the veracity, let alone legal
basis, of the claim of political surveillance, the Court
finds that she has not shown even the slightest threat of
being charged under RA 9372. Similarly lacking in locus
standi are former Senator Wigberto Taada and Senator
Sergio Osmea III, who cite their being respectively a
human rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage of
RA 9372. Outside these gratuitous statements, no
concrete injury to them has been pinpointed.
As
members of IBP
Petitioners
IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their

claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the
Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372
directing it to render assistance to those arrested or
detained under the law.
The
mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law

does not, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its
members with standing.[27] The IBP failed to sufficiently
demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute
revolts against its constitutional rights and duties.
Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even
a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.
Standingofmembers
of Congress
In
Philippine Constitution Association v. Hon. Salvador

Enriquez, G.R.No. 113105, August 19, 1994,
the
members
of
Congress
havethelegalstandingtoquestionthevalidityofactsof
the Executive which injures them in their person or the
institution ofCongress to which they belong.
An
act of the Executive which injures the institution of

Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial
injury which can be questioned by a member of Congress
(Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F.Supp.353 [1976].
Standingofmembers of Congress
In the absence of a claim that the contract in question violated the rights of
petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature,
petitioners
have
no
legal
standing
toinstitutetheinstantactionintheircapacityasmembersofCongress.
However,petitionerscanbringtheactionintheircapacityas
taxpayersunderthedoctrinelaiddownin Kilosbayan,Inc.v.Guingona, 232 SCRA
110 (1994).
Under
said
ruling
(KILOSBAYAN),
taxpayers
may
questioncontractsenteredintobythenationalgovernmentor
governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsallegedtobein contravention of the law. As
long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no
choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers
to institute the present action (Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privatization, GR
112399, July 14, 1995).
StandingofIntegratedBar of the Philippines
TheIBPhasnotsufficientlycompliedwiththerequisitesofstandin
g in this case.
"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and

substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The term interest" means a material interest,
an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest.
The
gistofthequestionofstandingiswhetherapartyallegessuch
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concreteadversenesswhichsharpensthepresentationofissues
uponwhichthecourtdependsforilluminationofdifficult
constitutional questions.
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to
uphold
the
rule
of
law
and
theConstitution.Apartfromthisdeclaration,however,theIBP
assertsnootherbasisinsupportofitslocusstandi. Themere invocation by the IBP of its
duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not
sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is
shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Having stated the foregoing, it must be
emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does
not satisfy therequirementoflegalstandingwhenparamountinterestis involved.
xxxxThus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the
Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a reading of the
petition
shows
that
the
IBP
has
advanced
constitutionalissueswhichdeservetheattentionofthisCourtin
viewoftheirseriousness,noveltyandweightasprecedents.
Moreover,
because
peace
and
order
are
under
constant
threat
and
lawlessviolenceoccursinincreasingtempo,undoubtedly
aggravatedbytheMindanaoinsurgencyproblem,thelegal controversy raised in the
petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It,
therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue
now, rather than later
(IBP vs Zamora, GR 141284, Aug. 15, 2000)
TRANSCENDENTAL SIGNIFICANCE TO THE PEOPLE

issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.
OPOSA vs. Factoran G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
: intergenerational responsibility (filed in behalf of the succeeding generations of
Filipinos
TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE: determinants
1. the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case
2. the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the

public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government
3. the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions
being raised. ( Philippine Bar Association, GR NO. 160403)
CLASS SUITS: must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned to
enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit
=it must be binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the court.
Transcendental importance
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN
44 children, through their parents, sought to make the DENR Secretary stop
issuing licenses to cut timber, invoking their right to a healthful
environment. They brought the case in the name of all the children in the
Philippines and in the name of the generations yet unborn!
FACTS:
The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to order the
respondent, then Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License
Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. They alleged that the
massive commercial logging in the country is causing vast abuses onrainforest.They further asserted that the rights of their generation and the rights
of the generations yet unborn to a balanced and healthful ecology.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi.
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN
HELD: The SC decided in the affirmative.
Locus standi means the right of the litigant to act or to be heard.
Under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it states that: The state shall
protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Petitioners, minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generation yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to
sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned.
xxxx
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
the minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come. This landmark case has been ruled as a class suit because the
subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest, not just for
several but for ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
(lifted from Oposa case on political question)
the political question doctrine is no longer, the

insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power
or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The
second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the (I)duty of the courts of justice

to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable,
and (2) to determine whether or not there has been a

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book,Philippine Political

Law,22Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this
Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of

judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review
what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the
political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly

the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their
acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of
"grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can
expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
C. Transcendental Importance to the public
petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various litigants
have.
Petitioners
assert
aninterestastaxpayers,buttheydonotmeetthestanding requirement for
bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.Comelec, 95 SCRA 392, 403
(1980), to wit: While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the
expenditure of public moneys, nowhere intheir Petition do saidpetitioners
allege that their tax money is being extracted and spent in violation
ofspecificconstitutionalprotectionsagainstabusesoflegislativepower",
or
that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC , or that
public
money
is
being
deflected
to
any
improper
purpose.Neitherdopetitionersseektorestrainrespondentfrom
wastingpublicfundsthroughtheenforcementofaninvalidor unconstitutional
law. Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit,per se, is no assurance of
judicial review. As held by this Court in Tanvs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]),
speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion
as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.Petitioners' suit
does not fall under any of these categories of taxpayers' suits
(Kilosbayanvs.Morato (Recon), GR 118910, Nov. 16,
Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty.

Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that
the issues they raise are of transcendental importance, which must
be settled early and are of far-reaching implications, without
mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which they have
been charged, or may be charged.
Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has nowhere been held

sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi. Petitioners must show
an actual, or immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a
result of the laws enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to
corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is
an interest shared by the general public. (Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network vs. Anti-Terrorism Council et. Al)
LOCUS STANDI
The case of David v. Arroyo[24] explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus:
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.
In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Accordingly, the
real-party-in interest-> is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the
relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in
assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a
person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the
category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek
judicial protection.
he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a
citizen or taxpayer.
LOCUS STANDI
cont. David v. Arroyo
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing in
public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was
held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a
citizens suit.
Taxpayer: plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds,
With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that the right of a citizen and a
taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his
injury cannot be denied.
Citizen: plaintiff is but the mere instrument of the public concern.
As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: In matter of
mere public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right,
if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offense be properly
pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied.
LOCUS STANDI
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official
policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental
agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more
stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The
same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the
validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct
injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest
common to all members of the public.
This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held
that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.
(VERA DOCTRINE)
The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse
Trainers Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the
Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted]
c.Question mustbe raisedat theearliest possible opportunity.
General Rule
:mustberaisedinthepleadings.
Exceptions
:a. criminalcasesatanytimeatthediscretionofthe court
b. civil cases at anystage of the proceedings ifnecessary for the

determination of the case itself;
c. everycase(exceptwherethereisestoppelat any stage if it involves the

jurisdiction of the court.
(ESTOPPEL: principle which precludes "a person from denying, or asserting

anything to the contrary of, that which has, in contemplation of law, been
established as the truth, either by the acts of judicial or legislative officers,
or by his own deed, acts, or representations, either express or implied")
RIPENESS AND PREMATURITY ( it must be raised at the earliest opportunity)
Tan v. Macapagal,95this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that

for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite
that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture."96Only then may the
courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is
challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
that people should await the implementing evil to befall on them before they can question acts that are
illegal or unconstitutional.
In the unanimous en banc case Taada v. Angara,[33]
this Court held that when an act of the legislative department is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes
the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a
judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
Said the Court:
"In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 'The question thus posed is judicial
rather than political.
The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. (Pimentel vs. Aguirre,
RIPENESS AND PREMATURITY
Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy:[37]
"x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also
the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of government.
The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine
whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the
fundamental law. Where the statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right
but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act unconstitutional and void."
d.
Constitutionalquestionmustthevery"lis mota" ofthe case
Determination of constitutionality of the statute must be

necessary to a final determination of the case (People vs. Vera, 65
Phil. 56).Therefore, the following must be avoided:
Political
questions;
Advisory
opinions;
Moot
No
and academic issues;
standing.
LIS MOTA (crux
of controversy)
means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although properly
presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the
statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be legally
resolved unless the constitutional question raised is determined.[30] This requirement is based on
the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; [31] to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is
doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. (Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 157584, April 2,
2009)
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a

governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case ofSotto v.
Commission on Elections,115this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question
and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties
and that when it is raised,if the record also presents some other ground upon which the
court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted andthe constitutional question
will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will
be unavoidable.116[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial
review as summarized inAshwander v. TVAfrom different decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of
the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the
statute
5. that the parties are not inestoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as
settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the
judgment has not only juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political
consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify
an act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way
or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least quasivalidation, follows."138
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under
the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within
which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless.
A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those
acting under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and
ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments,
political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs. ( P vs. Veneracion)
FRANCISCO vs. House of Representatives
FACTS:
on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide and 7 Associate
Justices for culpable violation of the constitution, betrayal of public trust or other high crimes
. Endorsed by Rep. Suplico, Zamora and Dilangalen.
August 5, 2003, the complaint was referred to the House Committee on Justice
October 13, 2003 : Committee ruled that it was sufficient in form but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
(Four months and three weeks after the filing of the first complaint)
on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the
second impeachment complaintwas filed with the Secretary General of the House12by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella
(Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This
second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House
of Representatives.13
ISSUE: W/N THE FILING OF THE 2ND IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT FALLS WITHIN THE 1 YR. BAR
PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONSTITUTION.
Constitution provides that:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
RULE V of the House Impeachment Rules provides that:
Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. In cases where a Member of

the House files a verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a verified complaint
that is endorsed by a Member of the House through a resolution of endorsement against an
impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed initiated
on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution
against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in substance, or on the date the
House votes to overturn or affirm the finding of the said Committee that the verified
complaint and/or resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in substance.
In cases where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as

the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members of the House,impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of the filing of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General.
Section 17.Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings. Within a period of

one (1) year from the date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in
Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the
same official. (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
RULING:
considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2,
2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee
on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once
the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified
complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement
before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene
Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
RULING:
the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following
Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
Judicial Review
the powerof the courtsto test thevalidity ofexecutive and

legislative acts in light of their conformity with the
Constitution.
CASES
ThiscaseestablishestheSupremeCourt'spowerofjudicial
review.That means that the Court has the right to review acts
ofCongress and, by extension, actions of the President.If the
Court finds that the law is unconstitutional, it can overrule
thelaw. Marshall argued that the Constitution is the supreme
law of the land and that the Supreme Court has the final say
over the meaning of the Constitution.He wrote, it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is (Marbury vs.Madison, 5 US 137, 2 L.Ed.
60).
Judicial Review
In
this
country
the
judicial
supremacyisestablished,withtheSupremeCourtasthe
final arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, not only in
justiceable but political questions as well. (DefensorSantiagovs.Guingona,GR134577,Nov.18,1998)
JUDICIAL SUPREMACYVS.CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY
Doctrine of JudicialSupremacy
Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as

theweakestofthethreedepartmentsofthegovernment,theJudiciary is nonetheless
vested with the power to annul the acts ofeither the Legislative or the Executive
department or both when not conformable to the fundamental law
(Asso. Of Small Landowners ofthe Philippines vs. Sec. ofAgrarian Reform, 175 SCRA
343).
When the judiciary allocates constitutional boundaries, it neither asserts superiority,

non-nullifies an act of the legislative, it only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under
theConstitutionandtoestablishforthepartiesinanactual
controversytherightswhichthatinstrumentsecuresand guarantees to them
(Laurel, Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139).
JUDICIAL SUPREMACYVS.CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY
Doctrine
ofConstitutionalSupremacy
If a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution, that law

orcontractwhetherpromulgatedbythelegislative,orbythe executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purpose is null and void and without any force or effect.
CASES
That judicial supremacy isbut thepowerofjudicial review inactual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends
the
Constitution,
which
is
the
source
of
all
authority.Thepowerofthecourtstotestthevalidityofexecutiveand legislative actsin light of
their
conformitywith
theConstitution.This
isnotanassertionofsuperioritybythecourtsovertheother
departments,butmerelyanexpressionofthesupremacyofthe Constitution
(Angara vs. Electroral Commission, 63 Phil.139)
Political Question -
has two (2) aspects:
1.Those questions which, under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or
2.In regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislature or
executive branches of government (Tanada v. Cuenco,100 Phil 1101).
Justiciable Question
a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal interest which may be resolved by
a court of law through the application of a law
(Cataran v. DENR, GR No. 134958, January 3, 2001)
PRESUMPTIONOFCONSTITUTIONALITY
Laws are presumed constitutional.To nullify a law, there must be aclear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution.The theory is that, as the joint act of the legislative and executive authorities, a
law issupposedtohavebeencarefullystudiedanddeterminedtobe constitutional before it was
finally enacted.
CASES
The time-honored doctrine is thatall laws (PD No.771 included) are presumed valid and constitutional
until or unless otherwise ruled by this Court.
Not only this; Article XVIII Section 3 of the Constitution states:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.
There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or amended by
any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative powers
(Lim vs Pacquing, GR 115044, Jan. 27, 1995)
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION:
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[61]Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.It must
begrave abuse of discretion as :
when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and
must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual

refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[62]
Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of
the petition.[63] (TAADA VS. ANGARA)
Whereanactionofthelegislative branchis seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it

becomes not onlytherightbutinfactthedutyofthejudiciarytosettlethe dispute. "The question
thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld."
Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is

raised before this Court(as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court
is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
Thejurisdictionofthis Court to adjudicate the matters raised in the petition is clearly

set out in the 1987 Constitution which emphasized the judicial departments duty and
power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch
orinstrumentalityofgovernment including Congress.
As theCourt has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk,
digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution
in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it inappropriate
cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department
ofthegovernment. (Tanada, et. al.vs. Angara, et. al., GR 118295, May 2, 1997)
d.
Constitutionalquestionmustthevery"lis mota" ofthe case
Determination of constitutionality of the statute must be

necessary to a final determination of the case (People vs. Vera, 65
Phil. 56).Therefore, the following must be avoided:
Political
questions;
Advisory
opinions;
Moot
No
and academic issues;
standing.
Mootness
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereonwould beofno practicaluse
orvalue.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of
mootness. The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of
PP1021didnotrenderthepresentpetitionsmootandacademic. During the eight (8)
days that PP 1017 was operative, the police
officers,accordingtopetitioners,committedillegalactsin implementing it.Are PP1017
and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts?
These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions.It must be
stressed that an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it
imposesnoduties,itaffordsnoprotection;itisinlegal contemplation, inoperative.
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade
the courts in resolving a case.Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if
IS QUESTIONING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PDAF Moot and Academic (as to the reforms
undertaken by the respondents?
NO.
A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or
no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.
the Court observes that respondents proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not
terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution
since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF
Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective
and existing. Neither will the Presidents declaration that he had already
abolished the PDAF render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because
the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to
nullify or annul its legal existence.
Mootness
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case.Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if:
first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
second,theexceptionalcharacterofthesituationandthe paramount public interest is

involved;
third,whenconstitutionalissueraisedrequiresformulationofcontrolling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
fourth, the case is capableof repetition yet evading review
(David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR 171396, May 03, 2006)
Mootness
IS QUESTIONING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PDAF Moot and Academic (as to the reforms
undertaken by the respondents?
NO.
A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no
useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.
the Court observes that respondents proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not
terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution
since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF
Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective
and existing. Neither will the Presidents declaration that he had already
abolished the PDAF render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because
the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to
nullify or annul its legal existence. (Belciga vs. Hon. Exec. Secretary Paquito Ochoa et. Al., GR
208566, 208493 & 209251, November 19, 2013)
DOCTRINE OF PURPOSEFUL HESITATION
This is about the Symbolic function of the court. It means that the court would not decide on
matters which are considered political questions. This focus on the necessity of resolving
Judicial Review. Furthermore, in questions of constitutionality, Supreme Court will not rule right
away because the Supreme Court assumes that the Law passed the two departments already,
thus, it went through process of determining its constitutionality
G.R. No. 122241 July 30, 1996, BOARD OF OPTOMETRY v. HON. ANGEL B. COLETthe
Supreme Court decided Concluded that: It is also emphasized that every court, including this
Supreme Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law
unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive
and legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental
law before it was finally approved.
The presumption of constitutionality can be surpassed by the clear showing that there was
an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required
majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the
challenged act be struck down.
G.R. No. 122241 July 30, 1996, BOARD OF OPTOMETRY v. HON. ANGEL B. COLET
R.A. No. 8050,[1]entitled An Act Regulating the Practice of Optometry Education, Integrating
Optometrists, and for Other Purposes, otherwise known as the Revised Optometry Law of
1995, was a consolidation of House Bill (HB) No. 14100 [2]and Senate Bill (SB) No. 1998,[3]which
were respectively approved by both Houses and, thereafter, reconciled by the Bicameral
Conference Committee.[4]The Reconciled Bill[5]was then separately ratified by both the Senate
and the House of Representatives[6]and approved into law by the President on 7 June 1995.
RTC RULING: 25 August 1995, the trial court issued the challenged order,[12]the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court grants the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for until further
orders of the Court, respondents and their officials, agents and employees, are restrained, enjoined,
and prohibited from undertaking in any form or manner, the enforcement or implementation of the
Revised Optometry Law [R.A. 8050] or any regulation or Code of Ethics issued thereunder.
Let the writ issue upon filing with this Court a bond in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
[P100,000.00] PESOS in favor of respondents, conditioned upon payment of damages sustained by
respondents in case the writ is later adjudged to have been improvidently or improperly issued.
On 1 September 1995, respondent Judge Colet issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, [14]the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned that, until further orders, you, the said defendants, and
all your attorneys, representatives, agents, and any other person assisting you refrain from
enforcing and/or implementing R.A. No. 8050 or its Code of Ethics.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS MAINTAIN THAT THEY HAVE locus standiunder the rule of Public Right
pursuant to Tanada vs. Tuver and as taxpayers and citizens, under the concept of Public Right, to bar
the enforcement of the law because it endangers the publics health, a danger clearly seen from the
oppositions to the law filed before both houses of Congress and therefore considered as a class suit.
ISSUE: W/N the private respondents have the locus standito question the constitutionality
of R.A. No. 8050.
W/N the JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND/OR ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
DECREEING THATPRIMA FACIEEVIDENCE OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY/INVALIDITY OF R.A. 8050 EXISTS
WHICH WARRANT THE ENJOINMENT OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION
RULING:
The petitioners maintain that for a party to havelocus standito question the validity of a statute,
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.[15]
private respondents do not have the requisite personal and substantial interest to assail the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050 for, per the certifications of the SEC, private respondents
COA(Cenevis Optometrist Association) and ACMO(Association of Christian-Muslin Optometrist) are not
registered associations; and two of the alleged presidents of the respondent associations are not
duly registered optometrists as certified to by the PRC.Finally, the petitioners aver, the private
respondents did not allege in their petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770, and in their Rejoinder to the
Opposition therein, their capacity to bring suit as required by Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 8 Sec. 4. Capacity.
Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a
representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, must
be averred. A party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party
to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, shall do so by specific denial, which shall include such supporting
particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge.
RULING:
1.
There is serious doubt as to the existence of private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and
SMOAP.For one, the body of the petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770 makes no mention of
these associations nor states their addresses.Further, nowhere is it claimed therein that
they are juridical entities.
2.
not even in the sworn statements[19]of the alleged presidents representing the
associations, which were offered in evidence in support of the application for a writ of
preliminary injunction, were such associations mentioned or named.Finally, in their
Comment on the instant petition, the private respondents chose to remain silent on the
issue of the juridical personality of their associations.
For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, private respondents
OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP must then be deemed to be devoid of legal
personality to bring an action, such as Civil Case No. 95-74770.
they cannot, for obvious reasons, be deemed real parties in interest.
RULING:
NOT CONSIDERED AS A CLASS SUIT.
As a class suit, Civil Case No. 95-74770 must fail.Not only did the private respondents fail
to allege this in their petition, they likewise failed to allege the existence and prove the
requisites of a class suit,viz., the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or
general interest to many persons, and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to
bring them all before the court
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is

appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory.[29]It cannot be
disputed that there is yet no actual case or controversy involving all or any of the
private respondents on one hand, and all or any of the petitioners on the other, with
respect to rights or obligations under R.A. No. 8050.This is plain because Civil Case
No. 95-74770 is fordeclaratory relief.Then, too, as adverted to earlier, the private
respondents have not sufficiently established theirlocus standito question the validity
of R.A. No. 8050.
Presumption of Constitutionality:
Courts
accord the presumption of constitutionality of

legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because
the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the government.
Supremacy of Judicial Review
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government.Who is to

determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution
itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
Andwhen the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, itdoes
not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify
or invalidate an act of the legislature, butonly asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitutionand to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
This is in truth all that is involved inwhat is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properlyis the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties,
and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the verylis
motapresented.
BASIC
GUIDELINES IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF
LAWS
Legislative
intent (the vital part, the essence of the law)
The
object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is

to ascertain the meaning and intention of the legislature, to
the end that the same may be enforced.
The
meaning and intention must be sought first of all in the

language of the statute. For it must be presumed that the
means employed by the legislature to express its will are
adequate to the purposes and do expresses that will correctly.
Legislative
intent is determined principally from the language of

the statute.
RAMIREZ
VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GR No. 93833, September
25, 1995
Legislative
intent is determined principally from the language

of the statute. Where the language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous, the law is applied according to its terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would either be impossible or absurd or would
lead to an injustice.
Section 1.It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:xxx
Section
1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocably makes it illegal for

any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication, to secretly record such communication by means
of tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party
other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statutes intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of
qualifier any.
Even a persons privy to a communication who records his private conversation

with another without the knowledge of the latter will qualify as a violator under
this provision.
The provisions seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications.
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
II. The nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute.

What RA 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein.
The mere allegations that an individual made a secret recording of a private

communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an
offense under Section 1 of RA 4200.
Private communications include private conversation. In its ordinary

signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting which
is broad enough to include to include verbal or non-verbal, written or
expressive communications of meanings or thoughts which are likely to
include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1998, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latters office.
FIRST AND FUNDAMENTAL DUTY OF THE COURT IS TO APPLY THE LAW.
Pp vs. Mario Mapa
Pp vs. Patricio Amigo
COURT MAY NOT CONSTRUE A STATUTE THAT IS CLEAR AND FREE FROM DOUBT.
WHERE THE LAW SPEAK IN CLEAR AND CATEGORICAL LANGUAGE, THERE IS NO

ROOM FOR INTERPRETATION. THERE IS ONLY ROOM FOR APPLICATION.
VERBA LEGIS derived from the maxim INDES ANIMI SERMO EST (speech is the
index of intention)
Rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly
expresses its intention or will and preclude the court from construing it differently.
PLAIN MEANING RULE/VERBA LEGIS:
If the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and
sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning which the legislature
intended to convey.
The statute must be interpreted literally.
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Communications vs. NLRC, GR No. 82511, March 3, 1992
The wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: An employee who is unjustly dismissed
from work shall be entitled to reinstatement and to his full backwages.
If the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This plain meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim
index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly expresses its intent or will and preclude the court
from construing it differently.
The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to
have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute.
VERBA LEGIS NON EST RECEDENDUM, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
Neither does the court admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the court, there may be a
ground or grounds for non-application of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of
exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations
between the employer and the employee.
Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, GR NO. 109445, November 7, 1994
When the languare of the law is clear, it should be given its natural meaning.
Under R.A. 7309, the following may ask for compensation with the DOJ Board of Claims:
victims of violent crimes; a person unjustly detained and released without being
charged; any victim of arbitrary or illegal detention; any person who was unjustly
accused, convicted and imprisoned but subsequently acquitted and released.
The fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof
that the previous conviction was unjust. An accused may be acquitted for a number of
reasons and his conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons be set aside.
Section 3 (a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the
accused is unjustly imprisoned but in addition, to an unjust accusation.
/The accused must have been unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is

unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It is important to note this because if from
its inception the prosecution of the accused has been wrongful, his conviction by
the court is , in all probability, also wrongful.
If the prosecution is not malicious, any conviction even though based on less than
the required quantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not
necessarily unjust.
STATUTE AS A WHOLE:
A
cardinal rule in statutory construction is that legislative

intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the
statute as a whole and not merely of a particular provision.
For, taken
in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily

convey a meaning which is different from the one actually
intended. A general provision may actually have a limited
application if read together with other provisions. Hence,
a consideration of the law itself in its entirety and the
proceedings of both Houses of Congress is in order. (PLDT,
Inc. vs. City of Davao, GR NO. 143867, August 22, 2001)
provision or section, which is unclear by itself, may be

clarified by reading and construing it in relation to the
whole statute.
STATUTE AS A WHOLE:
JMM Promotions and Management, Inc. vs. NLRC, GR NO.

109835, November 22, 1993
In
interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every

party be given effect.
Ut
res magis valeat quam pereat. (Every part thereof should

be given effect/ construction of the statute as a whole)
In
addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas

recruiter prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the
POEA Rules and escrow agreement under Section 17 f the
same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond
required under Section 6 Rule V Book VIII of the POEA
Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal form a
decision of the POEA.
STATUTE AS A WHOLE:
In construing a statute, courts should adopt a construction that will

give effect to every part of the statute, if at all possible.
Ut res magis valeat quam pereat, that construction is to be

sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute-its every
word.
Court
should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will

render the provision thereof, operative and effective and harmonious
with each other.
SPIRIT AND PURPOSE OF THE LAW
When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal

import of its words would lead to absurd or mischievous consequences, or
would thwart or contravene the manifest purpose of the legislature in its
enactment, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding or modifying, so far as may be necessary, the strict letter of
the law.
The courts have the power to declare that a case which falls within the letter
of a statute is governed by the statute, because it is not within the spirit and
reason of the law and the plain intention of the legislature.
SALENILLAS vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the

purpose of the law should prevail.
ISSUE: w/n pet. Have the right to repurch. ase the contested property
under Sec. 119 of the Public Land Act (if yes, w/5 their right of repurchase
had already prescribed.
RULING:
Sec.
119 of Public Land Act provides that every conveyance of land acquired
under free patent or homestead provisions, when proper shall be subject to
repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of 5
years from the date of the conveyance.
It is explicit that 3 classes of persons are bestowed the right of repurchase : the
applicant-patentees, his widow, or other legal heirs.
Ellen Salenillas is a legal heir of Encisos, thus, she may validly repurchase.
Sec. 119 makes no distinction as to who are the legal heirs.
UBE LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUERE DEBEMOS, where the law does
not distinguish, the court should distinguish.
The purpose of Sec. 119 of the PLA is to give the

homesteader or patentee every chance to
preserve for himself and his family the land that
the state gratuitously had given him as a reward
for his labor in clearing and cultivating it.
In allowing Elena and her husband to repurchase
the property would be more in keeping with the
spirit of the law.
Between two statutory interpretations, that which
serves the purpose of the law should prevail.
The 5 year period for the petitioners to
repurchase their property had not yet prescribed.
TEST OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
What the Constitution provides in relation to what can or may
be done under the statute ( not by what it has been done
under it)
-not within the legislative power to enact
-it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe
constitutional principles
-it allows something to be done which the fundamental law
condemns or prohibits
-it validates a course of conduct the effect of which the
Constitution specifically forbids.
Pdaf: Greco Antonios Belgica et.al vs. Hon Exec. Secretary Paquito Ochoa et. Al, GR 208566, 208493 & 209251, November 19, 2013
Pork Barrel refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized

projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district.7
Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control of local
appropriations.8
Pork Barrel has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members
of the Legislature,9 although, (it would evolve in reference to certain funds of the
Executive).
Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).
Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest form of
Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines since the utilization of the funds
appropriated therein were subjected to postenactment legislator approval.
(area of fund release,)
Section 312 provides that the sums appropriated for certain public works
projects shall be distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint
committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives
[T]he committee from each House may [also] authorize one of its members
to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications.
(area of fund realignment), the same section provides that
the said secretary, with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members
thereof, may, for the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of
appropriation under this Act to any other item hereunder.
1950
the pork barrel process commenced with local government councils, civil groups, and
individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that were
accommodated formed part of a legislators allocation, and the amount each legislator
would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the majority.
The amount was then integrated into the administration bill prepared by the Department of
Public Works and Communications.
The Senate and the House of Representatives added their own provisions to the bill until it
was signed into law by the President the Public Works Act.17
1960s, pork barrel legislation reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the
House of Representatives and the Senate.
B.
Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
Congressional
Pork Barrel was apparently discontinued in

1972 after Martial Law was declared, an era when one
man
controlled
the legislature.
1982,
the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new

item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the
Support for Local Development Projects (SLDP) under the
article on National Aid to Local Government Unit.
it
under the SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum

allocations to individual legislators began, with each
assemblyman receiving P500,000.00.
PROCEDURE:
>
assemblymen - communicate their project preferences to the

Ministry of Budget and Management for approval.
>
Ministry of Budget and Management : release the allocation

papers to the Ministry of Local Governments,
>
Min. LG: turn, issue the checks to the city or municipal

treasurers in the assemblymans locality.
Congressional Pork Barrel projects under the SLDP also began to

cover not only public
works projects, or so-called hard projects, but also soft projects, or

non-public works projects such as those which would fall under the
categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood.
Post-Martial Law Era: Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).
Congressional
Pork Barrel
revived in the form of
Mindanao Development Fund ( P480 Million)
Visayas
Development Fund (P240 Million)
created
with lump-sum appropriations for the funding of

development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989.
the
clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon legislators for a

similar funding, prompted the creation of the Countrywide
Development Fund (CDF) which was integrated into the 1990 GAA
with an initial funding of P2.3 Billion to cover small local
infrastructure and other priority community projects.
GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992, CDF funds were, with the approval of the President, to be
released directly to the implementing agencies but subject to the submission of the required
list of projects and activities.
1992, Representatives were receiving P12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while Senators were
receiving P18 Million each, without any limitation or qualification, and that they could identify
any kind of project, from hard or infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings
to soft projects such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.
Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).
1993 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to be made upon the
submission of the list of projects and activities identified by, among others, individual
legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the VicePresident.29 As such, Representatives were allocated P12.5 Million each in CDF funds, Senators,
P18 Million each, and the Vice-President, P20 Million.
In 1994 1996, the GAAs contained the same provisions on project identification and fund release as found
in the 1993 CDF Article.
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the
House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from the funds.
1997 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice- President, in consultation with the implementing
agency concerned, were directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be funded from their
respective CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed by
(a) the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the Senate, and
(b) the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in
the case of the House of Representatives;
the list for the remaining 50% was to be submitted within six (6) months thereafter.
The same article also stated that the project list, which would be published by the DBM, 35 shall be the basis for the
release of funds and that [n]o funds appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects not included in the list
herein required.
1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and endorsements were reproduced, except that
the publication of the project list was no longer required as the list itself sufficed for the release of CDF
Funds.
Other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel were reportedly fashioned and inserted
into the GAA (called Congressional Insertions or CIs) in order to perpetuate the
administrations political agenda.
CIs formed part and parcel of the budgets of executive departments, they were not
easily identifiable and were thus harder to monitor. Nonetheless, the lawmakers
themselves as well as the finance and budget officials of the implementing agencies, as
well as the DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions.
The legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these appropriations
were to be spent.
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).
1999, the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of
CIs, namely, the Food Security Program Fund,
the Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,and t
the Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund,
all of which contained a special provision requiring prior consultation with the Members of
Congress for the release of the funds.
2000 that the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) appeared in the GAA.
The requirement of prior consultation with the respective Representative of the
District before
Procedural Issues.
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy;
(b) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to
judicial review;
(c) petitioners have legal standing to sue; and
(d) the Courts Decision dated August 19, 1994 inG.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and
113888, entitled Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez114
(Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled Lawyers
Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management115 (LAMP) bar the
relitigation of the issue of constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System under the
principles of res judicata and stare decisis.
Existence
of an Actual Case or Controversy.

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an
actual case or controversy.
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently
states that
[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable x x x.
an actual case or controversy -involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.
[t]here must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced
on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.
- ripeness, meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already
ripe for adjudication.
A
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that
something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence
of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged
action.
Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory
opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions.
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases.
RULING: there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by
the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the Pork
Barrel System.
the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds
and the provisions allowing for their utilization such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for
the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund
are currently existing and operational;
hence,
there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the
unconstitutional use of these public funds.
Moot and academic issue:
PDAF:
the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered
moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot
when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose
can be served in passing upon the merits.125
Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents
proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the
useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not
the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and
existing.
Neither will the Presidents declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the
issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no
constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence.
By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by

Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of
unconstitutionality.
Even
on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence,

nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic
principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case."
The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:
first,
there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
second,
the exceptional character of the situation and

the paramount public interest is involved;
third,
when the constitutional issue raised requires

formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and
fourth,
the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.129
Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.
the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within its province to resolve. A
political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive
branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure."141The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the
political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act
upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of
government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the
present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a
duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. It includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto, 142the expanded concept of judicial
power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the political question doctrine was explained as follows: 143
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded
the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the
judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With
the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)
Verba legis the words used in the Constitution must be given

theirordinary meaningexcept where technical terms are
employed
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, this Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of
course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the
people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they
have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for
construction is reduced to a minimum.
where there is ambiguity, ratiolegis est

The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
anima
framers.
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the
reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose
Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue, the court ruled:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should
be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.
ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution

is to be interpreted as a whole.
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court affirmed that:
It
is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that

no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all
the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions
bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view
and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of
the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should
be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the
whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction,
the two can be made to stand together.
APPROPRIATE CASE
Must be a justiciable controversy, the resolution of which the court will have to choose
between the Constitution and the challenged statute.
JUDICIAL POWER is limited only to actual controversies, as a last resort and a
necessity in the determination of real, actual, earnest, and vital controversy between
litigants.
- it is appropriate for court review (issues which are inherently susceptible of
being decided on grounds recognized by law.
(justiciable question vs. a political question)
The
political question being a function

of the separation of powers, the courts
will not normally interfere with the
workings of another co-equal branch
unless the case shows a clear need for
the courts to step in to uphold the law
and the constitution.
Board of Optometry VS. Colet
Only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action,
and every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. [18]
Under Article 44 of the Civil Code, an association is considered a juridical person if the law
grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members.
A real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court is a party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050,[1]entitled An Act

Regulating the Practice of Optometry Education,
Integrating Optometrists, and for Other Purposes,
otherwise known as the Revised Optometry Law of 1995
every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a
law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and
legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before
it was finally approved.To doubt is to sustain.The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome
only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when
such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the
duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act be struck down.
Mariano vs. COMELEC
To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in
the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the
master serving the slave, instead of the other way around. This could not be the intendment of
the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not
be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the
statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise
yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil.,
141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active
instrument of government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to
achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case
at bar.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No.
7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of
Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and
functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have
already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate
existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising
their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of
the City of Makati.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before
a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper
party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4)
the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself.5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events,i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming
mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek reelection for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or
may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual
case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the
proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
Fernandez vs. Torres
Petitioners Adelpha Fernandez, Marissa Domingo, Eunice Ofrecia, Roselyn Mendoza, Arlene Caballero,
Almira Miranda and Mary Christine Valenton seek certiorari and prohibition to prohibit and restrain the
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment ("DOLE") and the Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration ("POEA") from enforcing and implementing Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular
No. 01-91 dated 20 November 1991 entitled "Prescribing Additional Requirements, Conditions and
Procedures for the Deployment of Performing Artists."
Item No. 1 of the assailed DOLE Circular provides as follows:
1. No Filipino entertainer shall be deployed outside the Philippines except for legitimate performing
artists consisting of musicians, singers and members of dance troupes. In all cases, the performing artists
must have a track record of legitimate and reputable performance in the Philippines for at least one year.
In no case shall the performing artists be below 23 years old.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment may, for justifiable reasons, exempt performing artists from
coverage hereof.
the Solicitor General urges that the Petition at bar does not present a justiciable controversy for having
been filed prematurely:
. . . petitioners, who claim to be performing artists, had not previously applied with the Secretary of Labor
for exemption from the coverage of the Circular in line with the aforequoted provision. Said provision
connotes that the prohibition is not at all permanent or absolute. It admits of exception. . . . But to repeat,
there is no allegation in the petition that petitioners had previously sought exemption from the Secretary of
Labor, from the coverage of the Circular, before filing the instant petition. Obviously, the petition must fail
for prematurity. 4
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General. We note in the first place, that Item No. 1 of the challenged
DOLE Circular does not establish an absolute and comprehensive prohibition of deployment abroad of
entertainers below twenty-three (23) years of age. Item No. 1 itself provides that "the Secretary of Labor
and Employment may, for justifiable reasons, exempt from performing artists from coverage hereof." The
discretionary authority here asserted by the DOLE Secretary does not purport to be unlimited and arbitrary
in nature. To the contrary, fairly explicit and precisely drawn grounds for exempting particular performing
artists from the coverage of Item No. 1 are set out in a set of "Administrative Guidelines Implementing
Department Circular No. 01-91.
petitioners have failed to allege or have refrained from alleging, that they had previously
applied to public respondent officials for exemption from the minimum age restriction imposed
by Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91. Necessarily, therefore, petitioners also do not allege
that public respondent officials have arbitrarily denied their applications for exemption from
the minimum age requirement or from any other requirement establishment by Item No. 1.
Neither have petitioners alleged that public respondents have continually threatened to deny all
and sundry applications for exemption, so as to create a reasonable expectation that their
applications would be immediately and arbitrarily denied, should they in fact file them.
Petitioners do assert that the exemption clause of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 is "practically useless
and [constitutes] empty verbiage." They have not, however, attempted to support this assertion.
The Court is not compelled to indulge in speculation that public respondent would deny any and
all applications for exemption from coverage of DOLE Circular No. 01-91. Two (2) important
presumptions are here applicable. The first is that administrative orders and regulations are
entitled to the presumption of constitutionality.6The second is that official duty has been or
will be regularly performed.
To engage in judicial review, under the facts and circumstances here obtained, in advance of
official efforts to apply the provisions of the challenged circular, upon the supposition that
petitioners' legal rights in the premises might be denied by public respondent officials, is too
close to rendering an advisory opinion in a hypothetical case an undertaking clearly beyond
the jurisdiction of this Court.10
We consider, therefore, that petitioners have failed to show the first requisite of a judicial
inquiry,i.e., the existance of actual case or controversy. This failure renders unnecessary
consideration of the other requisites of constitutional litigation.

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Judicial Review

EVERY STATUTE IS PRESUMED VALID.

An act of the legislature, approved by the President, is

- The function of the legislature is to legislate law.

- presumption of right and legality

To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and

In case of doubt: resolved in favor of the constitutionality of

in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts

the duty of the courts to settle actual

Tanada vs. Cuenco,

ANGARA vs. Electoral Commission

(cited in the case of Francisco vs. HRep)

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It

Principles of Constitutional Construction:

1. VERBA LEGIS, (PLAIN MEANING RULE/LITERAL INTERPRETATION) that is, wherever

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision

The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, inChiongbian v. De Leon,42this

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that not one provision of

Essential requisites for JUDICIAL REVIEW:

Existence of an APPROPRIATE CASE: Actual case or controversy

LOCUS STANDI ( LEGAL STANDING): An interest personal and

APPROPRIATE CASE (actual case or controversy)

Refers to matter which is appropriate for court review.

POLITICAL vs. JUSTICIABLE QUESTION

POLITICAL vs. JUDICIABLE QUESTION

judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,

a conflict of legal rights, an assertion ofopposite legal claims

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or

cannot be disputed that there is yet no actual case or

premised on a contingent event: no actual case or controversy:

that he would be re-elected in said elections; and

(Mariano vs.COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211).

(1)the existence of an actual case or controversy;

(2)thepartyraisingtheconstitutionalissuemusthavea personal and substantial interest in the

(3)the controversymustbe raisedat the earliest reasonable opportunity; and

(4)thattheresolutionoftheconstitutionalissuemust,be indispensable for the final determination

Appraisingthepresentproceedingintermsoftheforegoing requirements, the Solicitor General urges that the

"...petitioners,whoclaimtobeperformingartists,hadnot previously applied with the Secretary of Labor for

(Fernandez vs. Torres, 215SCRA 489)

An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of

In this case (LAMP vs. Exec. Sec),

the petitioner contested theimplementationof an alleged

The possibility of constitutional violations in the

Legal standing or locus standi

been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the

gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges

LAMP vs. Sec.

standi, the rule is that the person who impugns the

public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public,

plaintiff may be a person who is affected no differently

LAMP vs. Sec.

* where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or

* that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or

* that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or

Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of

Every statute is presumed valid. The presumption is that the legislature

STANDI/ LEGAL STANDING

and substantial interest in the case such that the party

INTEREST: material interest, an interest in issue affected by the

PRIVATE SUITS = REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST

STANDI/ LEGAL STANDING

party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit