Session 7:

Right to Privacy and

Security
Vincent Pepito F. Yambao, Jr.

I. THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY

A. Definition
right to be free from

unwarranted government
intrusion

right to be let alone

B. Natural Law Theory

Any person whose intellect is in a normal condition
recognizes at once that as to each individual
member of society there are matters private, and
there are matters public so far as the individual is
concerned.
Each individual as instinctively resents any
encroachment by the public upon his rights which
are of a private nature as he does the withdrawal of
those of his rights which are of public nature.

Natural Law Theory

It may be said to arise out of those laws
sometimes characterized as immutable,
because they are natural, and so just at all
times, and in all places, that no authority can
either change or abolish them. It is one of
those rights referred to by some writers as
absolute-such as would belong to persons
merely in a state of nature, and which every
man is entitled to enjoy whether out of society
or in it

C. Constitutional Basis
Article III, section 1
Article III, section 2
Article III, section 3
Article III, section 6
Article III, section 8
Article III, section 17

Ople vs. Torres, G.R.

No. 127685, July 23,
1998

D. Zones of Privacy
Without
Expectation
of Privacy

With Limited
Expectation of
Privacy

With Expectation
of Privacy

E. Expectation of Privacy

Subjective Test: The person actually expects

privacy

Objective Test: The expectation of privacy is

one that society as a whole would think is

legitimate.

Pollo v. Constantino-David
G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011, 659 SCRA 189, 204-205

F. Privacy Issues

II. INFORMATIONAL
PRIVACY

Disini vs. Secretary of Justice

G.R. No. 203335, February 11,
2014

Infor
mati
onal
Priv
acy

Morfe vs. Mutuc

G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968

Issue:
Whether or not Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar
as it required periodical submittal of sworn statements of
financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official or
employee of the government after he had once submitted
such a sworn statement upon assuming office is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Ople vs. Torres

G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998

Issues:

Whether or not Administrative Order

No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference
System is a usurpation of the power of
Congress to legislate; and
2. WON it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
1.

Vivares vs. St. Theresas

College
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014

Issues:

1. Is there informational privacy

in the internet?
2. Did the STC violate the right of
the students to informational
privacy?

III. BODILY
PRIVACY
S

A. In General
Bodily privacy concerns the protection of

peoples physical selves against invasive

procedures such as drug testing, pregnancy
tests, blood tests, DNA tests and cavity searches.

B. Levels of Analysis

D. Examination of the Body to

Determine Pregnancy

Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due process of law clause of
the Constitution every person has a natural and inherent right to the possession and control
of his own body. It is extremely abhorrent to ones sense of decency and propriety to have to
decide that such inviolability of the person, particularly of a woman, can be invaded by
exposure to anothers gaze.... To compel anyone, and especially a woman, to lay bare the
body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an
assault, and a trespass. Conceded and yet, as well as suggested by the same court, even
superior to the complete immunity of a person to be let alone is the interest which the public
has in the orderly administration of justice.

Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil 62 (1920)

E. Examination of substance from

accused's genitalia

The examination of the substance was made by competent medical

authority and the result showed that the defendant was suffering from
said disease. Such evidence was clearly admissible. The prohibition
against compelling a man in a criminal cause to be a witness against
himself is a prohibition against physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence,
when it may be material. The prohibition contained in the Philippine
Bill (sec. 5) that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against
himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the
defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.

US v. Tan Teng 23 Phil 145 (1912)

F. Undergoing an ultraviolet
ray examination

What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee against self-

incrimination is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort

communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his body in
evidence, when it may be material. Stated otherwise, it is simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's
own lips, against his will, an admission of guilt. Nor can the
subjection of the accused's body to ultraviolet radiation, in order
to determine the presence of ultraviolet powder, be considered a
custodial investigation so as to warrant the presence of counsel.
People v. Tranca,235 SCRA 455 (1994)

G. Photographing and measuring, removal

or replacement of garments and shoes

Measuring or photographing the party is not within the

privilege" against self-incrimination. Nor is the removal

or replacement of his garments or shoes. Nor is the
requirement that the party move his body to enable the
foregoing things to be done.

People v. Otadora,86 Phil 244(1950)

H. DNA Sample
Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides

that no person shall be compelled to be a witness

against himself. Petitioner asserts that obtaining
samples from him for DNA testing violates his right
against self-incrimination. Petitioner ignores our
earlier pronouncements that the privilege is applicable
only to testimonial evidence.

Herrera vs. Alba, G.R. no. 148220, June 25, 2005

I. Requiring accused to
undress/ put on garment

This should be distinguished, parenthetically, from mechanical

acts the accused is made to execute which are not meant to
unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes
determinable by simple observation, like requiring him to take
part in a police line-up. In fact, it has been held that to require a
person to remove his garments would not be violative of the right
against self-incrimination. To require the accused to put on a pair
of pants and a hat to determine whether they fitted him for
measuring or photographing of a party, or the removal or
replacement of garments or shoes, are not within the privilege
against self-incrimination too.
People v. Codilla 224 SCRA 104 (1992)

J. Inducing the accused to

vomit
conviction of petitioner was reversed after it was

found out that the two capsules containing

morphine which was used as evidence for his
conviction were obtained only after a violent
struggle, with the police forcing an emetic into
the stomach to induce him to vomit.

Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)

K. Mandatory Drug Testing:

For Students and Employees
In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students
emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their
right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from
their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental
authority of school authorities.
In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional
soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy
and requirement.
Law questioned: Rep. Act No. 9165

L. Mandatory Drug Testing:

Accused
We find the situation entirely different in the
case of persons charged before the public
prosecutors office with criminal offenses
punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the
mandatory drug testing are randomness and
suspicionless. In the case of persons
charged with a crime before the prosecutors
office, a mandatory drug testing can never be
SJS vs.
Drugs Board,
G.R. No. 157878,
random
or Dangerous
suspicionless.

November 3, 2008

III. DECISIONAL
PRIVACY

A. Dimensions of Decisional
Privacy
Education/rearing of children
Procreation/ use of contraceptives
Sexual Conduct
Abortion

A. Procreation and
Contraceptives

U.S. Supreme Court struck down a New York statute

making it a crime for anyone to sell or distribute
contraceptives to a minor under 16 or for anyone but a
licensed pharmacist to distribute contraceptives to
anyone over 16 as unconstitutional. The Court reasoned
that the right to privacy in connection with decisions
affecting procreation extends to minors, as well as, adults.
Restricting sales of non- prescription contraceptives to
those by pharmacists unjustifiably burdens the right of
individuals to use contraceptives if they choose to do so.
Carey v. Population Services
International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)

B. Abortion
We therefore conclude that the right of personal

privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this

right is not unqualified and must be considered
against important state interests in regulation.
Roe vs. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)

C. Sexual Conduct

It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the

ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts
before this Court that the subject establishments have gained
notoriety as venue of prostitution, adultery and fornications in
Manila since they provide the necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ideal
haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.Whether or not this
depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied
that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or
consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected will be
curtailed as well
Whitelight Corporation vs. City of
Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20,

D. Sodomy
The Court struck down the sodomy laws in Texas and

by extension, invalidated sodomy laws in 13 other

states, making same-sex sexual activity legal in every
US State and territory.

The Court held that intimate consensual sexual

conduct was part of the liberty protected by

substantive due process.
Lawrence vs. Texas, 539 US 558 (2003)

E. Euthanasia

The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the decision of the

Missouri Supreme Court prohibiting the removal of
life-support on a terminally-ill patient.

The states policy strongly favoring the preservation

of life. In upholding the Missouri Supreme Court,
the U.S. Supreme Court found it reasonable for the
state to impose the clear and convincing evidence
standard as a means of guarding against potential
abuse of the substituted judgment doctrine.
Cruzan v. Missouri Health Department, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)

F. Suicide

The Court upheld a Washington statute providing that promoting

a suicide attempt is a felony. In this case, the federal judge ruled
that the statute was unconstitutional.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that the law was unconstitutional as

applied to terminally ill competent adults who wish to hasten
their death with medication prescribed by their physicians.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court

pointing out that in almost every state it is a crime to assist in
suicide and the statutes banning assisted suicide are longstanding expressions of the states commitment to the
preservation and protection of all human life.

Washington v. Glucksberg, 138 L.Ed.2d (1997) 697

H. Co-habitation
The Court struck down an ordinance limiting

the occupancy of residence to members of single

families where family is defined in such a way
that it prohibited a grandmother from
cohabiting with her grandsons.

The Court emphasized the freedom of choice in

matters of marriage and family life.

In Moore v. City of 20East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (197

IV. PRIVACY OF
COMMUNICATIONS
S

A. Constitutional Basis
Article III, Section 3
(1)
The
privacy
of
communication
and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law;
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose for any proceeding.

B. Dimensions of Privacy of
Communications

C. Right not absolute

The right to privacy of communication and correspondence

is not absolute.

The right may be derogated in two instances (1) upon

lawful order of the court; or (2) when public safety and

order requires as provided by law.

D. Communication between
husband and wife
The constitutional injunction declaring the
privacy of communication and
correspondence inviolable is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife, who
thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
infidelity, who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced.
Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383, Feb. 20, 1996

E. Detainees and prisoners

The constitutional requirement for either a search

warrant or for a law limiting the right to communication

or correspondence, however, is not applicable to both pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners.

there was no constitutional violation when the prison

officials opened and read the folded letters of the detained

Marine officers intended to be sent to mail.
(Alejano v. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005 )

Prisoners and Detainees

Prison officials may open mails and read the contents of

letters coming from or intended to the detainees without
running afoul with the constitutional right to privacy of
communication and correspondence.

However, if the letters are marked confidential

communication between the detainees and their lawyers,
the detention officials should not read the letters but only
open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the
detainees.

F. Wire-Tapping

Rep. Act No. 4200

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable,
or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as
dictaphone or dictagraph of dectectaphone or walkietalkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described;

 It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in

the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly

possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured
either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner
prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or
persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or
partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or
any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial
of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.

 Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the

existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or

meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained obtained or secured by
any person in violation of the preceding sections of this
Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial,
quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.

Gaanan vs. Intermediate

Appellate Court
G.R. No. L-69809, Oct. 16, 1986

The use of a telephone extension for the purpose of

overhearing a private conversation without

authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a
telephone extension device was neither among those
devices enumerated in Section 1 of the law nor was it
similar to those device(s) or arrangement(s)
enumerated therein, following the principle that penal
statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused

Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 93833, Sept. 28, 1995

Even party to the conversation may not record and

thereafter divulge the contents of the communication
without the consent of all the parties to the conversation.
The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized
to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any." Consequently, as respondent Court of
Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation
with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator under this provision of R.A. 4200.

The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare,

meaning "to share or to Impart." In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a
conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a common
system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)." These
definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal,
written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts"
which are likely to include the emotionally- charged exchange, on
February 22,1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in
the privacy of the latter's office.

Navarro vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 121087, 26 August 1999

Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting,

or recording of private communications. Since the

exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was
not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

G. Privacy and the Workplace

(1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of

privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2) Was

the search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of
the contents of the hard drive on petitioners computer
reasonable in its inception and scope?

Pollo vs. David., G.R. No. 181881,October 28, 2011

 In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding

circumstances to consider include (1) the employees

relationship to the item seized; (2) whether the item
was in the immediate control of the employee when it
was seized; and (3) whether the employee took actions
to maintain his privacy in the item.

Pollo vs. David., G.R. No. 181881,October 28, 2011

V. SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES

A. Constitutional Basis
ARTICLE III BILL OF RIGHTS

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.

Art. III, sec. 2

B. Availability of the
Protection
Available to all persons,

including aliens, whether

accused or a crime or not.

C. Who may invoke the right?

The right is considered purely personal and the legality of the search
or seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby.

Any objection to admission of unlawfully obtained evidence through

an illegal search and seizure cannot be availed of by third persons.

Even corporate officers, in their personal capacities, cannot object to

admission in evidence when the subject of the alleged search and
seizure are papers belonging to a corporation which has a separate
and distinct personality from that of the said corporate officers.

D. Search in the
Constitutional Sense
In the constitutional sense, a search is one conducted by a

law enforcement agency who intends to discover that

which is concealed from view or hearing.

The element of concealment is the threshold issue. What a

person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home

or office is not subject of the constitutional protection.

Search, as it is commonly understood, is prying into hidden

places for that which is concealed.

(Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, 12 March 1997, 269 SCRA 402)

E. Search by Private Persons

A search conducted by private individuals who are

not agents of government law enforcement does make

the constitutional guarantee operational

F. Constitutional Protection
Against Unreasonable Searches
Open Skies Doctrine
curtilage

house

Open Field Doctrine

Sense
Enhancement

Concept of Seizure
Seizure may refer to persons or property.
There is seizure of a person if the surrounding

circumstances indicate to a reasonable person that he

was not free to leave.

This involves situation whenever a police accost an

individual and restrains his freedom to walk away.

On the other hand, there is seizure of property when

there is some meaningful interference with an

individuals possessory interest in that property.

Seizure of Persons different

from Arrest

An arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in

order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense. It is made by the actual restraint of the person to be
arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making
the arrest

To constitute a seizure of person, a formal arrest is not necessary.

There is seizure of a person if the surrounding circumstances
indicate to a reasonable person that he is not free to leave. Thus,
even when the person did not attempt to leave, there is seizure
due to the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of a person, or the
use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with
the officers request might be compelled

Seizure of Property

There is seizure of property when the owner thereof is

denied the possessory interest in the property and his
right to liberty is infringed.

Detention of a travelers luggage for 90 minutes was an

unreasonable seizure as it constituted a deprivation of
the defendants possessory interest in his luggage and
his liberty interest in proceeding with his itinerary.

A policeman in merely writing down the serial numbers

found on an item of property is not seizure even of this
led to the identification of the item as stolen property
and its subsequent confiscation.

Seizure of Property

Abandonment Doctrine

Open access doctrine

Requirement for Warrant

Search Warrant

Warrant of Arrest

Probable Cause Determination by Same

the Judge
Examination Under Oath or
Affirmation of the Complainant
and Witnesses

Same

Specificity of Offense

Same

Particularity of the the

Description of the Place to be
searched and the things to be
seized

Particularity of the description of

the person to be arrested

Probable Cause
Search Warrant

Warrant of Arrest

such facts and circumstances

which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to
be searched.

such facts and circumstances that

would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested.

Personal Determination of
Probable Cause by the Judge
Search Warrant

Warrant of Arrest

In determining the existence of

probable cause for the issuance of
a search warrant, it is required
that: (1) the judge must examine
the witnesses personally; (2) the
examination must be under oath;
and (3) the examination must be
reduced to writing in the form of
searching questions and answers

probable cause finding for the

issuance of a warrant of arrest
does not require that the judge
personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses.
Personal determination of
probable cause is satisfied when
the judge personally evaluates the
report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal

Singularity of Offense
The issuance of either a search warrant or a warrant of

arrest must be in connection with a single offense. A

search warrant or a warrant of arrest is invalid when
no specific offense was averred therein, or when more
than one offense is cited. The requirement of
singularity of offense is predicated on the abhorrence
of a general warrant.

Particularity of Persons
Search Warrant

Warrant of Arrest

Not Required
- when there is a mistake in the
name of the person to be searched
does not invalidate the warrant, and
a mistake in the identification of the
owner of the place does not
invalidate the search warrant
provided the place to be searched is
properly described

Required
- the warrant for the apprehension
of an unnamed party is void, except
in those cases where it contains a
description personae such as will
enable the officer to identify the
accused

Particularity of Things
Description is required to be specific only in so far as

the circumstances will ordinarily allow and where by

the nature of the goods to be seized, their description
must be rather general, it is not required that a
technical description be given, as this would mean that
no warrant could issue.

Particularity of the Place

The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is

sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. The
constitutional requirement is a description which particularly
points to a definitely ascertainable place, so as to exclude all
others. It was also ruled that the place to be searched, as set out
in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the police
officers own personal knowledge of the premises or the evidence
they adduced in support of the application for the warrant. The
particularization of the description of the place must be done by
the judge only and in the warrant itself

Warrantless Searches

Reason

Extent of Search

Search Incident
of Lawful Arrest

Protect arresting officer

from being harmed by the
person being arrested and
to prevent the latter from
destroying evidence

Person of the person

arrested and the
premises under his
immediate control

Stop and Frisk

a police officer approaches

a person who is acting
suspiciously, for purposes
of investigating possibly
criminal behavior in line
with the general interest
of effective crime
prevention and detection.

carefully limited
search of the outer
clothing of such
person to discover
weapons which might
be used to assault
him

Plainview

Object is exposed to
sight

Plainview Doctrine
(1) the law enforcement officer in search of the

evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is

in a position from which he can view a particular area;

(2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is

inadvertent;

(3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the

item he observes may be evidence of a crime,

contraband or otherwise subject to seizure; and

(4) plain view justified the mere seizure of evidence

without further search.

Checkpoint:

A mere routine inspection conducted at a check point is

deemed not violative of the an individuals right
against unreasonable search in the following instances:
(1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of
a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a
light therein without opening the car's doors; (4) where
the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body
search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is
limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (6)
where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.

Extensive search of motor

vehicles

When the vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, whether

at a check point or some other place, the twin requirement of probable
cause and impracticability of securing a warrant must be satisfied.

The probable cause that justifies the search of the interior of the vehicle
and of the person of driving it signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is
in the place to be searched.

Warrantless Arrest

Sec.5. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,

arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
Rule 113, section 5, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In flagrante Delicto Arrest

This happens when the accused is apprehended at the very

moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just
committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer.

There are two elements that must concur before any police
officer or a private person may effect an in flagrante delicto
arrest, viz: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.

Hot Pursuit Arrest

In this instance, a warrantless arrest may be had

provided that the following elements concur: (1) an
offense has in fact just been committed, and (2) the
arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested committed the
offense

fact that an offense has been committed must be

undisputed. It is not enough that a reasonable ground
exists that a crime has been committed.

Hot Pursuit Arrest

While the law enforcers may not actually witness the execution

of acts constituting the offense, they must have direct

knowledge or view of the crime right after its commission.

They should know for a fact that a crime was committed. The

test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the

perpetrator .

Thus, an officer who learns about the recent commission of a

crime from a report does not possess the personal knowledge
need to justify warrantless arrest.

Proximity between the

offense and the arrest
Also important is the immediacy between the commission of the offense

and the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse between the
arrest and the commission of a crime, a warrant must be secured.

The rule requires that the arrest immediately follows the commission of
the offense. The immediacy contemplated is the time of the commission
of the crime, and not the time the arresting person learned or was
informed of such commission. Thus, where the accused was arrested
some six (6) days after the alleged killing occurred, or even a day after
the incident complained of, or nineteen (19) hours after the commission
of the crime, a hot pursuit arrest cannot be sustained.