Introduction to Hazardous

Evaluation Techniques
Guidelines for Hazardous Evaluation
Procedures (1992 by AIChE).
Second Edition with Worked Examples.
Center for Chemical Process Safety
(CCPS).
American Institute of Chemical
Engineers (AIChE).

Hazard Evaluation Techniques

1960 - 2001

1960 - 2001

1965 - 2001

1970 - 2001

1972 - 1974

1974 - 2001

Safety
Review

Check Lists

Relative
Ranking

PHA

What if

HAZOP

Walk
Through
Inspection

Historical
Lists

ICI Mond
Index

Yes / No

Dow FEI

Preliminary
Hazard
Analysis

Brainstorming

Hazardous Mtls
Hazardous Opns

This presentation only considers the HAZOP technique.

Hazards
Operability
Analysis
Line by Line
Deviation
Analysis

HAZOP
HAZOP was developed by Lawley (1974) of
ICI. Based on early account by Elliott & Owen
(1968).
Hazop studies are carried out by an
experienced, multidisciplanary team.
Review all physical aspects of a process
(lines, equipment, instrumentation) to
discover potential hazards.

Basis for HAZOP

The basis for a HAZOP is a critical
examination of information found in a
word model.
It includes a flowsheet, a plant layout,
equipment specification or a P&ID,
(Piping and Instrument Drawing).

Hazop Includes
1
2
3
4

Intention
Deviation
Causes
Consequences
(a) hazards
(b) operating difficulties
5 Safeguards
6 Recommendations / Actions

Hazop Guide Words

NO or NOT

Negation of intention

No Flow of A

MORE

Quantitative increase

Flow of A greater than design flow

LESS

Quantitative decrease

Flow of A less than design flow

AS WELL AS

Quantitative increase

Transfer of some component additional to A

PART OF

Quantitative decrease

Failure to transfer all components of A

REVERSE

Logical opposite of intention

Flow of A in direction opposite to design direction

OTHER THAN

Complete substitution

Transfer of some material other than A

More recent computerization techniques use a Standard Set Of Generic Deviations

For Specific Section Types. See Dev'ns tab for examples.

Common HAZOP Analysis

Process Parameters
Flow

Time

Frequency

Mixing

Pressure

Composition

Viscosity

Addition

Temperature

pH

Voltage

Separation

Level

Speed

Toxicity

Reaction

Prepare for the Review

Attitude
Preparation

Meeting Leadership
HAZOP
Review By
Team

Knowledge
Experience

Teams HAZOP
Experience

Documentation

Follow-up

Info for study

P&Ids, Layout

Table

Deviation

Causes

Consequences

Safeguards

Action

Hazop
Flow
Sheet

Select a process
section or
operating step
Explain design
intention

Repeat for all

process sections

Select a process
variable or task

Repeat for all

process variables

Apply guide word

to process variable

Repeat for all

guide words

Examine
Consequences
associated with
deviation

Develop action
items

List possible
causes of
deviation

Assess acceptability
of risk based on
consequences

Identify existing
safeguards to
prevent deviation

Hazop Pitfalls
Poor understanding by management of the HAZOP procedure
An Ethylene plant has 100 P&IDs, 625 equip't items.
Consider 5 variables, Pressure, Temperature, Flow
Composition and Function.
Consider 6 Guidewords, None, More of, Less of
Part of, More than and Other than.
Questions to be answered =
Consider 5 minutes per question =
Time for ethylene plant HAZOP study =
4 hour, 240 minutes sessions per day =
No. working of days =
Days per week =
No. of weeks to complete HAZOP for plant =

625
5
6
18750
5
93750
250
375
5
75

items
variables
guide words
questions
min./question
minutes
minutes/day
days
days/week
weeks

Other Pitfalls
Inexperienced HAZOP team.
Inadequately trained or in-experienced
leader.

Common Hazop Mistakes

Failing to establish a "safe" environment
for team members.
Consequences of events not carried to
conclusion.
Taking unwarranted credit for
safeguards.
Too little credit given for safeguards.

Hazop Mistakes Contd

Failure to make recommendations as
specific as possible.
Poor record keeping of HAZOPS.
Failure to HAZOP start-up and shutdown procedures.
P&IDs not up-dated or poorly
constructed.

Hazop Mistakes Contd

A HAZOP is performed in lieu of
properly executed design reviews.
Wrong technique for system being
reviewed (See spreadsheet titled Fig
5.3).

HAZOP Example
To Compressor Inlet
LAH
FV
1

Inlet Line

Teams tend to quickly identify alarms, shut-downs

and controls, and claim them for safeguards.
An alarm not tested may not work when called upon
to do so.

LIC
1

Nuisance alarms are frequently bypassed and are

not effective as safeguards.
Often operators are not monitoring control panel.
Valve in manual

Automatic control routines are often set in manual

mode.

Standard Set of Deviations

ID No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Deviation
High Flow
High Level
High Interface
High Pressure
High Temperature
High Concentration
Low / No Flow
Low Level
Low Interface
Low Pressure
Low Temperature
Low Concentration
Reverse / Misdirected Flow
Tube Leak
Tube Rupture
Leak
Rupture

Column

Vessel

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X

Line
X

Exchanger

Pump

Compressor

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

Typical Hazop Worksheet

Company Nova
Location Corunna
RAH
Leader
GFR
Scribe
PM
Prod'n
Node No.

Revision
Dwg No.
Proc Des
Instr'ts
Mech
Describe

JB
GH
FD

0
Cor -123-4567
Research
HH
Electrical
MN
Safety

Date
Page
Op Tech
Other
Other

02-Jun-97
1

Transfer Ethane from Deethanizer to C2 KO Pot

Intention The intent is to transfer 150,000 lb/hr of C2/C2= mix at 300 psig and at -30 F for the startup period.

Guide Wrd

High

Param

Flow

Dev'n High Flow

Possible Causes
1
FV-1 Wide open
2
Line break.
3
Consequences
1
High level in KO pot with liquid carry-over to compressor with serious damage to rotor. Potential hydrocarbons release.
2
Potential hydrocarbon release.
3
Safeguards
1
High level alarm LAH-1
2
High - High level alarm HHLA - 1 shutdown.
3
Vessel inspection yearly.
Recommendation / Actions
Respib
By
Date
JB
1
Consider limiting flow orifice, auto SD trip on High-High level, smart check valve.
1
01-Jan-99
PM
2
Determine extent of typical hydrocarbon release.
2
15-Jan-99
FD
3
Set-up vessel inspection yearly.
3
30-Jan-99

Check List Example

1 Changes In Quantity

a High Flow

b Low Flow

No Flow

d Reverse Flow

1 Pump racing, delivery vessel pressure lost,

suction pressurized, scale dislodged, leak in
heat exchanger
2 Pump failure, scaling of delivery, presence of
foreign body, poor suction condition,
cavitation, leak in heat exchanger, drain
leak, valve jammed
3 Pump failure, delivery vessel
overpressurized, gas blockage, presence of
foreign body, scale, sediment, suction vessel
empty.
4 Pump failure, pump reversed, delivery vessel
over pressurized, poor isolation, gas locking,
surging, back siphoning.

Loss of automatic
control
Operator error

Failure of joint, pipe,

valve, trap, bursting
disc, relief valve.

Check List Contd

2 Changes in physical
condition

a High or Low
pressure

b High or Low
Temperature

1 Boiling, cavitation, freezing, chemical

breakdown, flashing, condensation,
sedimentation, scaling, foaming, gas
release, priming, exploding, imploding.
Changes in viscosity, density. External Fire,
Weather conditions, Hammer.
2 same as 1

Check List Contd

3 Changes in chemical a
condition
b

High or Low
Conentration
Contaminants

1 Changes in proportion of mixture, in water or

solvent content.
2 Ingress of air, water, steam, fuel, lubricant,
corrosion products, other process materials
from high pressure system, leakage through
heat exchangers. gas entrainment, spray,
mist.

4 Startup and
a
Shutdown Condition.
b

Testing

1 Vacuum, pressure testing with with harmless

material.
2 Concentration of reactants, intermediates

5 Hazardous Pipelines

Commissioning

Maintenance

3 Purging, venting, sweetening, drying,

warming. Access, spares.

Pipeline
registration

1 Should this pipe be considered for

registration?

End of HAZOP Presentation.

Presented to ES-317y
27 Feb, 2001
By R.A. Hawrelak