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Introduction
I will present two models that determine nominal exchange rates:
The monetary model: Cagan model
Lucas Model
Even though the first one is an ad-hoc model, many of its
predictions are implied by models with solid microfoundations, and
it is the basis for work in other topics. The Lucas model is one of
those solid microfoundations exchange rate determination
models.
Cagan Model
Let M denote a countrys money supply and P its price level,
Cagans model for the demand of real money balances M/P is:
mtd pt Et ( pt 1 pt )
where m log of nominalmoney balances held at the end of period t,
p log P and is the semielasticity of demand for real balances with
respect to expected inflation.
Cagan justifies the exclusion of real variables such as output and
interest rate from the money demand function, arguing that during
hyperinflation the expected future inflation swamps all other
influences on money demand.
(1)
pt
1 s t 1
s t
pt T
ms lim
T 1
pt
1 s t 1
s t
ms
(3)
Simple Cases
1. Constant money supply: mt m t
mt pt ( pt 1 pt ) pt m
and also,
pt
1 s t 1
s t
ms pt m
Simple Cases
2. Constant percentage growth rate: mt m t
Guessing that the price level is also growing at rate , and
substituting this guess in equations (2) and (3), we get again
the same answer from both:
pt mt
3. Solution (3) also covers more general money supply
processes.
pt
1 s t 1
s t
Et (ms )
(4)
mt pt p t
using differential equations methods we get that :
1
pt exp[( s t ) / ]ms ds b0 exp(t / )
t
where the no bubble assumption implies b0 0
Seignorage
Definition: represents the real revenues a government acquires
by using newly issued money to buy goods and nonmoney
assets:
M t M t 1
Seignorage
Pt
Most hyperinflations stem from the governments need for
seignorage revenues. What is the seignorage-revenue-maximizing
rate of inflation? Rewriting seignorage as:
Seignorage
M t M t 1 M t
Mt
Pt
Seignorage
Finding the seignorage-revenue-maximizing rate of inflation is
easy if we look only at constant rates of money growth:
1
Mt
P
t
M t 1 Pt 1
M t Pt 1
Pt Pt
(1 ) (1 ) 1
1
Seignorage
Thus, the FOC with respect to is :
(1 )
( 1)(1 )
max
(2)
t 1
and UIP 1 it 1 (1 i ) Et
t
(3)
*
t 1
(4)
(5)
et
1 s t 1
s t
(6)
mt et ( Et et 1 et )
(1)
mt m e
Thus, money supply becomes an endogenous variable,
implying that exchange rate targets implicitly entail decisions
about monetary policy.
Some observations
Can the exchange rate be fixed and the government still have
some monetary independence?
Adjusting government spending can relieve monetary policy of
some of the burden of fixing the exchange rate. But in practice,
fiscal policy is not a useful tool for exchange rate management,
because it takes too long to be implemented.
Financial policies can help also through sterilized interventions:
to keep the exchange rate fix, the government may have to buy
foreign currency denominated bonds with domestic currency. To
sterilize this, the government reverses its expansive impact by
selling home currency denominated bonds for home cash.
xt j , c yt j , wxt j , w yt j
j 0
to solve:
Max Et
j 0
u ( c xt j , c y t j )
st. (1)
c yt :
qt u1 (c xt , c yt ) u 2 (c xt , c y y )
(2)
wxt : et u1 (c xt , c y y ) Et [u1 (c xt 1 , c yt 1 )( xt 1 et 1 )]
(3)
(4)
t j
t j
t j
wxt w*xt 1
(5)
wyt w*yt 1
(6)
c xt c *xt xt
(7)
c yt c *yt yt
(8)
1
1
*
*
u1 (c xt , c yt ) u1 (c xt , c yt )
xt
yt
2
2
*
*
FOC :
c yt c yt
c xt c xt
1
1
2
2
*
*
u2 (c xt , c yt ) u 2 (c xt , c yt )
2
2
1
wxt w wyt w
2
*
xt
*
yt
Ct cxt c1yt
Ct1
and u (c xt , c yt )
1
1 xt
qt
yt
C
et
Et t 1
xt
Ct
C
e
Et t 1
qt yt
Ct
*
t
et 1
1
xt 1
et*1
1
qt yt 1
M t
(t 1)( M t 1 / 2)
2
M t
Wt
wxt1 et wyt 1 e
P
2 Pt
t
ex dividend share value
dividends
*
t
money transfer
And in the security market, the agent allocate his wealth between:
Wt
mt
wxt et wyt et*
Pt
mt Pt (c xt qt c yt )
Max Et
j 0
u (c xt j , c yt j )
Pt 1
M t
st.
( wxt 1 xt 1 wyt 1 qt 1 yt 1 )
wxt 1 et wyt 1 et*
Pt
2 Pt
c xt qt c y t wx et wy et*
c yt :
qt u1 (c xt , c yt ) u2 (c xt , c y y )
Pt
wxt : et u1 (c xt , c y y ) Et [u1 (c xt 1 , c yt 1 )(
xt 1 et 1 )]
Pt 1
(1)
(3)
Pt
wyt : e u (c xt , c y y ) Et [u1 (c xt 1 , c yt 1 )(
qt 1 yt 1 et*1 )] (4)
Pt 1
*
t 1
The foreign agent has the same problem and Euler equations
but with an * over the variables that he chooses (consumption,
shares w and money holdings m).
wxt w*xt 1
wyt w*yt 1
c xt c*xt xt
c yt c*yt yt
and
M t mt mt*
The equilibrium of the barter economy is still the perfect riskpooling equilibrium:
1
xt
yt
*
*
*
*
wxt wxt wyt wyt
c xt c xt
c yt c yt
and
2
2
2
The only thing that has changed is the equity pricing formulae,
which now include the inflation premium.
1 xt
qt
yt
Pt
M t xt 1
Pt 1 M t 1 xt
1
et
et 1
Ct 1 M t
Et
xt
Ct M t 1 xt 1
1
*
Ct 1 M t
et
et*1
Et
qt yt
Ct M t 1 qt yt 1
If
it
bt (1 it ) 1
Thus, using the usual utility function, nominal interest rate will be
positive in all states if the endowment growth rate and monetary
growth rates are positive.
dollar : M t t M t 1
euro : N t *t N t _ 1
Now we will have a new product: claims to future dollar and euro
transfers. It will be assumed that initially the home agent is
endowed with the whole stream of dollars and the foreign, with the
hole stream of euros. Then they can trade.
P
P
P
P
t t
t t
dividends
money transfers
mt nt St
Wt wxt et wyt e M t rt N t rt
Pt
Pt
*
t
S t Pt *
u1 (c xt , c yt ) u 2 (c xt , c y y )
Pt
wxt :
et u1 (c xt , c y y ) Et [u1 (c xt 1 , c yt 1 )(
w yt :
S t 1 Pt *
e u (c xt , c y y ) Et [u1 (c xt 1 , c yt 1 )(
yt 1 et*1 )]
Pt 1
*
t 1
M t
: rt u1 (c xt , c yt ) Et [u1 (c xt 1 , c yt 1 )(
rt 1 )]
Pt 1
N :
t
Pt
xt 1 et 1 )]
Pt 1
N t 1S t 1
rt u1 (c xt , c y y ) Et [u1 (c xt 1 , c yt 1 )(
rt*1 )]
Pt 1
*
And again the foreign agent have a symmetric set of Euler eqs.
wyt w*yt 1
c xt c*xt xt
c yt c*yt yt
M t mt mt*
N t nt nt*
wxt w wyt w M t
*
xt
and
*
yt
*
Mt
Nt
xt
yt
*
c xt c
c yt c y t
2
2
*
xt
*
Nt
u2 (c xt , c yt ) M t yt
St
u1 (c xt , c yt ) N t xt
Conclusion: as in the monetary approach, the determinants of the
nominal exchange rate are relative money supply and relative
GDPs. Two major differences are that in the Lucas model:
S depends on preferences
S does not depend explicitly on expectations