Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Executive
Secretary
Gr No. 208566
Nov 19, 2013
Pork Barrel
Pork Barrel
Controversies
Pork Barrel
Controversies
Pork Barrel
Controversies
Pork Barrel
Controversies
Pork Barrel
Controversies
Pork Barrel
Controversies
Pork Barrel
Controversies
Significant
amounts
were
released
to
implementing agencies without the latters
endorsement and without considering their
mandated functions, administrative and
technical capabilities to implement projects.
Implementation of most livelihood projects
was not undertaken by the implementing
agencies themselves but by NGOs endorsed
by the proponent legislators to which the
Funds were transferred.
Pork Barrel
Controversies
Pork Barrel
Controversies
Pork Barrel
Controversies
As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistleblowers alleged that" at leastP900 Million
from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province
intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has
gone into a dummy NGO."
I. Procedural
Issues
Whether or not
Substantive Issues
in General
Petitioners
contention
Petitioners
contention
Petitioners
contention
Courts Definition
Courts Definition
Courts Definition
2. Presidential Pork Barrel - a kind of lumpsum, discretionary fund which allows the
President to determine the manner of its
utilization.
Substantive
Issues:
Congressional
Pork Barrel
I. Separation of Powers
a. Principle
- It refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three
fundamental powers of government.
To the legislative branch of government, through Congress,
the power to make laws;
To the executive branch of government, through the
President, belongs the power to enforce laws;
To the judicial branch of government, through the Court,
belongs the power to interpret laws.
I. Separation of Powers
I. Separation of Powers
I. Separation of Powers
I. Separation of Powers
I. Separation of Powers
I. Separation of Powers
I. Separation of Powers
Congress Oversight
Function
Congress Oversight
Function
Congress Oversight
Function
I. Separation of Powers
b. Application
Petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork
Barrel among others, the 2013 PDAF Article
"wrecks the assignment of responsibilities
between the political branches" as it is designed
to allow individual legislators to interfere way
past the time it should have ceased or,
particularly, after the GAA is passed.
I. Separation of Powers
Respondents
counter
that
the
separations of powers principle has not
been violated since the President
maintains ultimate authority to control
the execution of the GAA and that he
retains the final discretion to reject" the
legislators proposals.
Courts Ruling
Rationale
Post-enactment
the legislators:
measures
Project identification
Fund release
Fund realignment
of
Project
Identification
Project
Identification
Special Provision 1
embodies the program menu feature which,
as evinced from past PDAF Articles, allows
individual legislators to identify PDAF
projects for as long as the identified project
falls under a general program listed in the
said menu.
Project
Identification
Special Provision 2
provides that the implementing agencies shall,
within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit
to Congress a more detailed priority list,
standard or design prepared and submitted by
implementing
agencies
from
which
the
legislator may make his choice.
Project
Identification
Special Provision 3
clarifies that PDAF projects refer to "projects to
be identified by legislators"and thereunder
provides the allocation limit for the total
amount of projects identified by each legislator.
Project
Identification
Special Provision 4
requires that any modification and revision of
the project identification "shall be submitted to
the House Committee on Appropriations and the
Senate Committee on Finance for favorable
endorsement to the DBM or the implementing
agency, as the case may be."
Fund Release
Special Provision 5
Explicitly stating that "all request for release of
funds shall be supported by the documents
prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and
favorably endorsed by House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be."
Fund Realignment
Special Provision 4
Separation of Powers
Ruling
unconstitutional.
Non-Delegability of
Legislative Power
Non-Delegability of
Legislative Power
Non-Delegability of
Legislative Power
Non-Delegability of
Legislative Power
Non-Delegability of
Legislative Power
Thus, keeping with the principle of nondelegability of legislative power, the Court
hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well
as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel
which
contain
the
similar
legislative
identification feature as herein discussed, as
unconstitutional.
Checks and
Balances
Checks and
Balances
Checks and
Balances
Checks and
Balances
Checks and
Balances
Checks and
Balances
Calamity Fund
Contingence Fund
Intelligence Fund
Checks and
Balances
Checks and
Balances
Petitioners Claim
"in the current system where the PDAF is a lumpsum appropriation, the legislators identification of
the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the
President the chance to veto that item later on.
Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power
of the President mandates that appropriations bills
adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress
cannot choose a mode of budgeting which
effectively renders the constitutionally-given power
of the President useless."
Respondents
Claim
Courts Ruling
Courts Ruling
Courts Ruling
Courts Ruling
Substantive
Issues:
Presidential Pork
Barrel
Validity of Appropriation
Validity of Appropriation
Validity of Appropriation
Validity of Appropriation
Section 8. Appropriations
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all
sources including receipts from service contracts and
agreements such as application and processing fees, signature
bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all money collected
from concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations,
fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as
the government share representing royalties, rentals, production
share on service contracts and similar payments on the
exploration, development and exploitation of energy resources,
shall form part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy
resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President.
Section 12 of PD
1869
Undue Delegation
Undue Delegation
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners
that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD
910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard
to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents
authority with respect to the purpose for which the
Malampaya Funds may be used.
As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide
latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose
he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
Conclusion
Conclusion
Conclusion
UNCONSTITUTIONAL