Scepticism

Scepticism

Beliefs (in a certain area) are

Unjustified
Unreliable

(target: internalism)
(target: externalism)

So, (a certain kind of) knowledge is

impossible
Extreme form: all beliefs are unjustified or
unreliable; all knowledge is impossible

Thesis and Recommendation

Thesis: Knowledge (of a certain kind) is

impossible
Recommendation: So, one ought to _____.
Problem: How can the extreme skeptic get
from the thesis to the recommendation?
It seems that it requires an inference
Extreme skepticism undercuts such
inferences

Daoism: Zhuangzi (c. -350)

Intellectual distinctions
correspond to nothing
in reality
Theres no point to
doing anything
Zhu Xi: Laozi still
wanted to do
something, but
Zhuangzi didnt want to
do anything at all.

Identity of Contraries
Can we be completely objective?
No the objective and subjective are
intertwined
Objective > subjective: you can reach
objective knowledge only by depending on
your own subjective mental states
Subjective > objective: your being in a
mental state depends on and gives rise to
objective facts about you

Three in the Morning

A keeper of monkeys said with regard to their

rations of chestnuts that each monkey was to have
three in the morning and four at night. But at this
the monkeys were very angry, so the keeper said
they might have four in the morning and three at
night, with which arrangement they were all well
pleased. The actual number of the chestnuts
remained the same, but there was an adaptation
to the likes and dislikes of those concerned. Such
is the principle of putting oneself into subjective
relation with externals.

Identity of All Things

We draw distinctions
But things arent distinct in the world
Everything is Dao
Everything is in the eye of the beholder
There is no objectivity
There is no knowledge

Variability

Variability: Things are perceived differently

by different beings at different times

Undecidability: There is no neutral way to

determine which perceptions are trustworthy

Sceptical thesis: Therefore, knowledge is

impossible

Problem of the Criterion

Undecidability: There is no neutral way to

tell which perceptions ought to be trusted

We need a criterion for determining this

But where could we get it? Even if we could

get one, we couldnt justify it

Possibility of Dreaming

Those who dream of the banquet, wake to

lamentation and sorrow. Those who dream
of lamentation and sorrow wake to join the
hunt. While they dream, they do not know
that they dream. Some will even interpret
the very dream they are dreaming: and only
when they awake do they know it was a
dream.

Possibility of Dreaming

Once upon a time, I, Zhuangzi, dreamt I was

a butterfly, fluttering hither and thither, to all
intents and purposes a butterfly. I was
conscious only of following my fancies as a
butterfly, and was unconscious of my
individuality as a man. Suddenly, I awaked,
and there I lay, myself again. Now I do not
know whether I was then a man dreaming I
was a butterfly, or whether I am now a
butterfly, dreaming I am a man.

Zhuangzis Recommendation
The true sage rejects all distinctions of this
and that. He takes his refuge in Dao and
places himself in subjective relation with all
things.
But how can he justify his recommendation?
Does it follow from his thesis?
Does he know it?

Philo of Alexandria (-20 - 40)

First to attempt project

of reconciling Jewish
scriptures with Greek
philosophy
Tries to construct
sceptical arguments
without metaphysical
presuppositions in On
Drunkenness

Variability

Variation in perception
among different
species, different
people, even same
person on different
occasions
How do we know
which portray reality
accurately?

Argument from Illusion

We often misperceive things

There is no way to tell when

were misperceiving things

So, on any given occasion,

we might be misperceiving
things

Comparison

We know, not things in

themselves, but things
in relation to other
things including us
We know things only
as they relate to us
We cant distinguish
whats really in the
object from what we
are contributing

Zenos Paradoxes

Arguments against
possibility of motion
Runner: one must first
go halfway. . . .
Achilles and the
Tortoise: The tortoise
gets a head start;
Achilles must first get
to its starting point, but
by then it has moved
on

Sextus Empiricus (c. 200)

We cant tell whats in

the object and what we
contribute
Knowledge of external
underlying objects is
impossible
Recommendation:
suspend judgment

Problem of the Criterion, 2

Is there a criterion of
truth?
To settle this, we need
a criterion
But thats whats at
issue!
Dogmatist must argue
in a circle,
Or face infinite regress

Suspension & Ataraxia

Suspension of
judgment > peace of
mind (ataraxia)
But the sceptic cant
know this, or even
assert it
It just happens

Peace of Mind

The Skeptic, in fact, had the same experience which is

said to have befallen the painter Apelles. Once, they say,
when he was painting a horse and wished to represent in
the painting the horses foam, he was so unsuccessful that
he gave up the attempt and flung at the picture the sponge
on which he used to wipe the paints off his brush, and the
mar of the sponge produced the effect of a horses foam.
So, too, the Skeptics were in hopes of gaining quietude by
means of a decision regarding the disparity of the objects
of sense and of thought, and being unable to effect this
they suspended judgment; and they found that quietude,
as if by chance, followed upon their suspense, even as a
shadow follows its substance.

Nagarjuna (c. 1000)

Mahayana Buddhist, 14th

Indian Zen patriarch
Founder of Madhyamika
Buddhism
Destroy theorizing
Leave ordinary life alone:
For we do not speak without
accepting, for practical
purposes, the work-a-day
world

Attack on pramanas

I know something
because it arises from a
reliable source of
knowledge
But how do I know that
source of knowledge is
reliable?
Need a pramana of
pramanas, etc. infinite
regress

Nagarjunas Regress Argument

And if, for you, there is a source [of

knowledge] of each and every object of
proof,
Then tell how, in turn, for you there is proof
of those sources.
If by other sources [of knowledge] there
would be the proof of a source-- that would
be an infinite regress;
in that case neither a beginning, middle, or
and end is proved.

Pramana of pramanas

Sources of knowledge:
perception, analogy,
testimony, inference
Knowledge is justified only
if we know were using the
appropriate source
What could be source of
knowledge for that?

Quietism

If knowledge is impossible,
how can we know the truth
of scepticism?
Isnt scepticism unreliable
or unjustified?
If I would make any
proposition whatever, then
by that I would have a
logical error; But I do not
make a proposition,
therefore I am not in error.

Nyaya Response

We dont need a pramana for

pramanas
Means of knowledge
(pramanas) and objects of
knowledge (prameyas) support
each other
Sutra 16: Just as the
'measuring instrument' (which
usually has the status of a
pramana) can be a prameya as
well (i.e. when its own accuracy
is subject to investigation).

Scales

Analogy: scales
How do we test the
reliability of a scale?
We compare weights it
gives for objects with
known weights by
other scales
We dont need a scale
of scales

Nyaya Coherentism

No foundation, no
given
One thing may be
justifier or justified,
depending on
circumstances
Epistemic role
depends on context

Luminosity

Sutra 19: . . . these

(i.e. perception etc.)
are apprehended in
the same way as the
light of a lamp.
Light can be both
means of seeing and
the thing seen

Gangesa (c. 1350)

Local doubt (e.g.,

eyes, scale): we doubt
when something
anomalous happens,
and resolve as in the
Nyaya-sutra
Global doubt: we have
no reason to entertain;
makes no sense to say
everything is anomaly

Pragmatic Inconsistency

Thus it has been said (by

Udayana): "That is doubted
concerning which as doubted
there occurs no contradiction
with the doubter's action." For it
is not possible at once to resort
regularly to fire and the like for
smoke and the like and to doubt
that fire causes it (it would be
meaningless behavior). This is
how we should understand
Udayana's saying. . . . It is the
doubter's own behavior that
proves the lie to the doubt, i.e.,
that blocks it.

Augustine (354-430)

Logical and mathematical truths

can be known, even if sceptical
arguments succeed
I am certain that either there is
only one world or there are more
worlds than one. I am likewise
certain that if there are more
worlds than one, their number is
either finite or infinite.

Augustine: Perception

In fact, I believe that the

senses are not untrustworthy
either because deranged
persons suffer illusions, or
because we see things
wrongly when we are asleep. If
the senses correctly intimate
things to the vigilant and the
sane, it is no affair of theirs
what the mind of a sleeping or
insane person may fancy for
itself.

Augustine: Appearances

Restrict your assent to the mere

fact of your being convinced that it
appears thus to you. Then there is
no deception, for I do not see how
even an Academic [Skeptic] can
refute a man who says: I know that
this appears white to me. I know
that I am delighted by what I am
hearing. I know that this smells
pleasant to me. I know that this
tastes sweet to me. I know that this
feels cold to me.

Self-knowledge

I am most certain that I am, and

that I know and delight in this. In
respect of these truths, I am not
at all afraid of the arguments of
the Academicians, who say,
What if you are deceived? For if
I am deceived, I am. . . .
[C]ertainly I am not deceived in
this knowledge that I am. And,
consequently, neither am I
deceived in knowing that I know.
For, as I know that I am, so I
know this also, that I know.