PRESUMPTION AGAINST

INEFFECTIVENESS
Presumption: The lawmaking
body does not intend to adopt
laws which are unnecessary
and ineffective.
It is presumed that it intends to
impart to its enactments such a
meaning as will render them
operative and effective.

2 IMPORTANT RULES OF
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
1) Where law is susceptible of two constructions, one which will
render it unconstitutional and the other upholds it validity,
the latter must be adopted.
2) Where the language of statute is susceptible of two or more
constructions, one which will render the statute ineffective or
inefficient and another which will tend to give effect to the
evident intent of the legislature, that construction which
tends to give effect to the object for which the law was
adopted shall prevail.

Case at bar:

US V. TEN YU, 24 PHIL.

1
G.R. No. 7482, December
28,1912

Facts:
On or about the 11th day of October, 1911, a
complaint was presented against said defendants in
the municipal court of the city of Manila accusing
them of a violation of section 3 of Ordinance
No. 152 of the city of Manila. They were duly
arraigned. After hearing the evidence the Hon.
Manuel Camus, judge of said municipal court, found
each of the defendants guilty of the offense charged
and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P100.
From that sentence each of the defendants
appealed to the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila.

ORDINANCE NO. 152

SEC. 3. Visiting places where opium
is smoked or dealt in is prohibited.
No person shall visit or be present at
or in any place where opium, or any
of its derivatives or compounds, is
smoked or otherwise used in or upon
the human body, or unlawfully sold,
given away, or otherwise disposed
of.

Issue:
That the ordinance under complaint
has been presented is unreasonable,
for it punishes the presence of anyone
who may visit an opium joint or a place
where opium is kept, sold, or smoked,
without considering whether said visit
has lawful or unlawful purpose or is
with or without knowledge of the
nature of such place.

Ruling:
Contention that the ordinance in question
is unreasonable is not tenable.
Courts are slow to pronounce statutes
invalid or void. The question of the validity
of every statute is first determined by the
legislative department of the government
itself, and the courts should resolve every
presumption in favor of its validity.

Ruling:
Upon the other hand, however, if the
statute covers subjects not authorized
by the fundamental laws of the land or
its constitutions, then the courts are not
only authorized but are justified in
pronouncing the same illegal and void,
no matter how wise of beneficent such
legislature may seem to be.

2 IMPORTANT RULES OF
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION:
1) Where law is susceptible of two constructions, one which will
render it unconstitutional and the other upholds it validity,
the latter must be adopted.
2) Where the language of statute is susceptible of two or more
constructions, one which will render the statute ineffective or
inefficient and another which will tend to give effect to the
evident intent of the legislature, that construction which
tends to give effect to the object for which the law was
adopted shall prevail.

Case at bar:

BENGUET EXPLORATION,
INC. V. DENR
G.R. No. L-29534, February 23,
1977

Facts:
On June 1, 1987, Benguet and J.G. Realty
entered into a Royalty Agreement with
Option to Purchase (RAWOP), wherein J.G.
Realty was acknowledged as the owner of four
mining claims.
Thus, on August 9, 1989, the Executive VicePresident of Benguet, Antonio N. Tachuling,
issued a letter informing J.G. Realty of its
intention to develop the mining claims.
However, on February 9, 1999, J.G. Realty,
through its President, Johnny L. Tan, then sent a
letter to the President of Benguet informing the

Facts:
On June 7, 2000, J.G. Realty filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of the
RAWOP with the Legaspi City POA, Region V,
docketed as DENR Case No. 2000-01 and
entitled J.G. Realty v. Benguet.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
*POA: declared the RAWOP cancelled.
*MAB: affirmed POA.

Issue:
Should the
controversy have
first been submitted
to arbitration before
the POA took
cognizance of the
case?

Ruling:
Secs. 11.01 and 11.02 of the RAWOP pertinently provide:
11.01 Arbitration
Any disputes, differences or disagreements between BENGUET
and the OWNER with reference to anything whatsoever pertaining
to this Agreement that cannot be amicably settled by them shall
not be cause of any action of any kind whatsoever in any court or
administrative agency but shall, upon notice of one party to the
other, be referred to a Board of Arbitrators consisting of three (3)
members, one to be selected by BENGUET, another to be selected
by the OWNER and the third to be selected by the aforementioned
two arbitrators so appointed.
11.02 Court Action
No action shall be instituted in court as to any matter in dispute as
hereinabove stated, except to enforce the decision of the majority
of the Arbitrators

Ruling:
A contractual stipulation that requires prior resort to
voluntary arbitration before the parties can go directly
to court is not illegal and is in fact promoted by the
State.
In other words, in the event a case that should properly
be the subject of voluntary arbitration is erroneously
filed with the courts or quasi-judicial agencies, on
motion of the defendant, the court or quasi-judicial
agency shall determine whether such contractual
provision for arbitration is sufficient and
effective. If in affirmative, the court or quasi-judicial
agency shall then order the enforcement of said
provision.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST
UNDESIRABLE
CONSEQUENCES
There is a valid presumption that undesirable

consequences were never intended by a legislative

measure, and a construction of which a statute is
fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful,
evil and injurious consequences.

Case at bar:

CESARIO URSUA v. COURT

OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996

Facts:
In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with
bribery and dishonesty. His lawyer then asked
him to get a copy of the complaint against him
from the Office of the Ombudsman. His lawyer
asked him that because the law firms
messenger, a certain Oscar Perez, was unable
to go to the Ombudsman.
Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua talked
to Perez. He revealed to him that he feels
uncomfortable asking for a copy of the
complaint because he is the respondent in the
said case. Perez then told him than he can go
there as Oscar Perez so that he does not
have to reveal his true identity.

Facts:
At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed
the logbook there as Oscar Perez. When he
was handed a copy of the complaint, he signed
the receipt as Oscar Perez. However, a staff
of the Ombudsman was able to learn that he
was in fact Cesario Ursua. The staff then
recommended that a criminal case be filed
against Ursua. Eventually, Ursua was
sentenced to three years in prison for violating
C.A. No. 142, as amended, otherwise known
as An Act To Regulate The Use Of
Aliases.

Issue:

Whether or
not Cesario
Ursuas
conviction is
proper.

Ruling:
No. Ursua should be acquitted. The Supreme
Court ruled that a strict application of C.A. No.
142, as amended, in this case only leads to
absurdity something which could not have
been intended by the lawmakers.
Under C.A. No. 142, as amended, save for some
instances, a person is not allowed to use a
name or an alias other than his registered name
or that which he was baptized.
Under the law, what makes the use of alias
illegal is the fact that it is being used habitually
and publicly in business transactions without
prior authorization by competent authority.

Ruling:

In this case, Ursua merely used the

name Oscar Perez once, it was not
used in a business transaction, the use
of the name was with the consent of
Oscar Perez himself, and even if he
used a different name, in this instance,
he was not even required to disclose
his identity at the Office of the
Ombudsman. When he was requesting
a copy of the complaint, he need not
disclose his identity because the
complaint is a public record open to
the public.

Ruling:

In short, the evils sought to be avoided

by the C.A. No. 142 was not brought
about when Ursua used a name other
than his name. A strict application of
the law is not warranted. When Ursua
used the name of Oscar Perez, no
fraud was committed; there was no
crime committed punishable under
C.A. No. 142. The purpose of the law is
to punish evils defined therein so when
no such evil was produced by Ursuas
act, said law need not be applied.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST
IMPLIED REPEAL
Repeals by implication is not favored.
2 requirements:
1. That the statute touch the same
subject matter; and
2. That the later statute is repugnant
to the earlier one.

Case at bar:

CALDERON V. PROVINCIA
DEL SANTISIMO ROSARIO
G.R. No. L-9475, October 6, 1914
26 Phil. 164

Facts:
This is an action brought to recover a legacy bequeathed
to the defendant by the will of Maria Cristina Calderon de
la Barca which has been duly paid by the administrator of
said will and received by the defendant, an order of
Dominican friars. The basis of the action is that the
bequest was void under article 752 of the Civil Code in
that the will in which the bequest is found was made
during the last illness of the testatrix and said bequest
was in favor of the religious society to which the priest
belonged who administered the last rites to the testatrix.

Defense:
Article 752 of the Civil Code has been repealed by the
provisions of the Code of Civil procedure, especially
section 622.

Defense:
Article 752
"Testamentary provisions made by the testator during his last
illness in favor of the priest who took his confession during the
same, of the relatives of the latter within the fourth degree, or of
his church, chapter, community, or institute shall not be valid.
Section 622
"When devise or legacy to witness void. If a person attests the
execution of a will, to whom or to whose wife or husband, or
parent, or child, a beneficial devise, legacy, or interest, of or
affecting real or personal estate, is given by such will, such devise,
legacy, or interest shall, so far only as concerns such person, or
the wife or husband, or parent or child of such person, or anyone
claiming under such person, or such wife or husband, or parent or
child, be void, unless there are three other competent witnesses
to such will, and such person so attesting shall be admitted as a
witness as if such devise, legacy, or interest had not been made
or given. But mere charge on the real or personal estate of the
testator, for the payment of debts, shall not prevent his creditors

Defense:
Before a statute can be held to have repealed a prior
statute by implication, it must appear, first, that the
two statutes touch the same subject matter, and,
second, that the later statute is repugnant to the
earlier. Neither one of these conditions is present in the
case before us. The article of the Civil Code quoted
refers exclusively to testamentary dispositions
and the circumstances under which they will be
illegal and unenforceable. It has nothing to do
with the form or manner of execution of the will
or who shall not be witnesses thereto. Section 622
of the Code of Civil Procedure, on the other hand,
refers exclusively to the execution of a will. It has
nothing to do with the legality of its dispositions except
so far as they are affected by the form and manner of
its execution.

3 BASIC RULES TO REMEMBER ON

THE MATTER OF REPEAL:
1. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse,
or custom or practice to the contrary.
Article 7, New civil code
Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and
their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.

3 BASIC RULES TO REMEMBER ON

THE MATTER OF REPEAL:
2. When a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself
repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived,
unless expressly provided. When a law which repeals a prior
law by implication only, its repeal revives the prior law
unless the language of the repealing statute provides
otherwise.

Case at bar:

U.S. V. SOLIMAN
36 Phil. 5

Facts:
Soliman, testifying in his on behalf in the
course of another criminal case in which he,
with several others, was charged with estafa,
swore falsely to certain material allegations of
fact. He testified falsely that a sworn statement
offered in evidence in support of the charge of
estafa, which was in effect an extrajudicial
confession of his guilt, had not been executed
voluntarily, and that its execution had not been
procured by the police by the use of force,
intimidation and prolonged torture. The trial
judge who presided in the former case
acquitted him on the ground that there was
room for reasonable doubt

Facts:
Soliman is however, guilty of perjury as defined
and penalized in Section 3 of Act No. 1697.
However, since judgement was entered on
November 1915, section 3 of Act No. 1697 was
expressly repealed by the enactment of the
Administrative Code which was effective on july
1, 1916 and it has been suggested that the
judgement convicting and sentencing the
accused under the provisions of that statute
should not be sustained and the repeal of the
statute should be held to have the effect of
remitting and extinguishing the criminal
liability of the accused incurred under the
provisions of the repealed law prior to the
enactment of the Administrative Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the

repeal of Section 3 of
Act No. 1697 by the
enactment of the
Administrative code had
the effect of providing
new and distinct
penalties for the
commission of the crime
of perjury.

Ruling:
Section 3 of Act No. 1697, which defined and penalized
the crime of perjury, repealed the provisions of the Penal
Code defining and penalizing the crime of perjury, not
expressly, but by implication, and we are of opinion that
the repeal of Act No. 1697 revived those provisions of
the code. The old rule continues in force where a law
which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by
implication, it itself repealed; and that in such cases the
repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless
the language of the repealing statute provides
otherwise. In the case at bar, the express repeal of
section 3 of Act No. 1697 by the enactment of the
Administrative Code (Act No. 2657) revived the
provisions of the Penal Code touching perjury, which
were themselves repealed, not expressly but by
implication, by the enactment of Act No. 1697.

3 BASIC RULES TO
REMEMBER ON THE MATTER
OF REPEAL:

3. A general law does not repeal a special law unless it

is so expressly provided, or they are incompatible.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST
RETROACTIVITY
Presumption: All laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary
clearly appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocally expressed or
necessarily implied.
In case of doubt: resolved against the retroactive operation of
laws.
If statue is
susceptible of construction other than that of
retroactivity or will render it unconstitutional the statue will be
given prospective effect and operation.
Presumption is strong against substantive laws affecting pending
actions or proceedings. No substantive statute shall be so construed
retroactively as to affect pending litigations.

Case at bar:

YUN KWAN BYUNG v.

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT
AND GAMING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 163553, December 11, 2009

Facts:
PAGCOR launched a program that aims to
invite patrons from foreign countries to
play at the dollar pit of designated
PAGCOR-operated casinos under
specified terms and conditions and in
accordance with industry practice.
The Korean-based ABS Corporation was
one of the international groups that
availed of the Program.

In a letter-agreement dated 25 April 1996

(Junket Agreement), ABS Corporation
agreed to bring in foreign players to play
at the five designated gaming tables of
the Casino Filipino Silahis at the Grand
Boulevard Hotel in Manila (Casino
Filipino).

The PAGCOR charter then prevailing (PD

1869) prohibited PAGCOR from entering
into any arrangement with a third party
that would allow such party to actively
participate in the casino operations.
Subsequently, RA 9487 amended the
PAGCOR charter, granting PAGCOR the
power to enter into special
agreement with third parties to share
the privileges under its franchise for the
operation of gambling casinos.

RA 9487
Section 1. The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) franchise granted under Presidential Decree No. 1869
otherwise known as the PAGCOR Charter, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
xxx
(2) Section 3(h) is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 3. Corporate Powers. "x x x
"(h) to enter into, make, conclude, perform, and carry out
contracts of every kind and nature and for any lawful purpose
which are necessary, appropriate, proper or incidental to any
business or purpose of the PAGCOR, including but not limited to
investment agreements, joint venture agreements, management
agreements, agency agreements, whether as principal or as an
agent, manpower supply agreements, or any other similar
agreements or arrangements with any person, firm, association or

The Petitioner, a Korean national, brought

an action against PAGCOR seeking the
redemption of gambling chips valued at
US$2.1 million. Petitioner claims that he
won the gambling chips at the Casino
Filipino.
The petitioner wants to avail of the
provisions of RA 9487 which states that
the acts giving rise to the claimed
liabilities was a legal gambling activity.

Issue:

Whether RA 9487
may be applied to
the present case.

Ruling:
No. RA 9487 cannot be applied to the present
case.
The Junket Agreement was entered into
between PAGCOR and ABS Corporation on 25
April 1996 when the PAGCOR charter then
prevailing (PD 1869) prohibited PAGCOR from
entering into any arrangement with a third
party that would allow such party to actively
participate in the casino operations.
Thus, petitioner cannot avail of the provisions
of RA 9487 as this was not the law when the
acts giving rise to the claimed liabilities took
place. This makes the gambling activity

Ruling
It is a basic principle that laws should only be
applied prospectively unless the legislative
intent to give them retroactive effect is
expressly declared or is necessarily implied
from the language used.
RA 9487 does not provide for any
retroactivity of its provisions. All laws
operate prospectively absent a clear contrary
language in the text, and that in every case of
doubt, the doubt will be resolved against the
retroactive operation of laws.