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Competitive games
Following properties
1- There are finite no of competitors .Here we
assume no of players to be two.
2- Each player has available to him a list of finite no
of possible courses of actions.
3 - A play is said to be played when each of the players
chooses a single course of action from the list.
Here it is assumed that the choices are made
simultaneously so that no player knows his
opponents choice until he has decided his own
course of action.
4 - Every play determines an outcome.
1
finger
2
fingers
1 finger 2
finger -1
+1
-1
+1
Strategy
The strategy of a player is the
predetermined rule by which
a player decides his course of
action from his own list of courses of
action during the game
Solution of a game
By solving a game we mean to find
the best strategies for both the players
the value of the game.
and
v and is unique.
Player B
P 9 3 1 8 0
0
l 6 5 44 6 7
44
a 2 4 3 3 8
2
y 5 6 2 2 1
1
e 9
6 4 4
8
Col max
r
8
MAXIMIN
= MINMAX = VLUE OF
A
Row
minim
a
THE GAME = 4
In general a
pq
a rs
v minimax for B
Saddle pint
if minimax = maximin = value of the game then game
is called a game with saddle point.
Def: A saddle point of a pay off matrix is that position in
the pay off matrix where the maximum of row mins
coincides with the minimum of column s maxima.
The cell entry at that saddle point is called the
value of the game.
In a game with saddle point the players use pure
strategies i.e they choose the same course of action
through out the game
A saddle point of a matrix is an element which is both the
largest element in its column and the smallest element
in its row.
1 q 6
p 5 10
6 2 3
Q <= 5
P>= 5
2 4 5
10 7 q
4 p 6
Q >= 7
P<= 7
Meaning
If a saddle point exists then minimax
and maxmin pure strategies are
optimal strategies for players 1 and 2
resp.
Player one can expect to gain atleast
an amount v if he uses
optimal(maxmin) strategy on each
play and player 2 can expect to loose
no more than v if he uses his
minimax pure strategy on each play
= minmax vlaue
>
maxmin value =
1 4
1
3 2
2 maxmin
3 4
minmax
here v
v -
1 4
3 2
Suppose player 1 uses mixed strategy with
prob (1/3 , 2/3) and player 2 uses with prob
(3/4 , 1/4)
Expected payoff (1/3)(3/4)(1 )+(1/3)(1/4)(4)
+(2/3)(3/4)(3) +(2/3)(1/4)(2)
= 29/12
It lies in between 2 and 3
Rules of dominance
Rule 1
if all the elements in a row (say i th)of
payoff matrix are less than or equal
to the corresponding elements of
other row(say j th) then player A will
never choose the i th strategy or in
other words i th strategy is dominated
by the j th strategy.
so one can delete i th row
Rule 2
If all the elements in a column(say r
th
) of payoff matrix are greater than
or equal to the corresponding
elements of other column (say s th)
then the player B will never choose
the
r th strategy or in other words the r th
strategy is dominated by the s th
strategy.
so I th col may be deleted
Rule 3
A pure strategy may be dominated if
it is inferior to an average (convex
combination)of two or more other
pure strategies.
-1
-2
-1
12
7
12
-2
-1
0
Theorem(for Algebraic
Method)
For any zero sum two person game where
the optimum strategies are not pure and
for player A payoff matrix is A, the
optimal strategies are (x1,x2) and (y1,y2)
x1and
a 22
a 21 and are given by
for A
B resp
x2
a11 a12
and
y1
a 22 a12
y2
a11 a 21
and the value of the game to A is
a11a 22 a12 a 21
v
( a11 a 22) ( a12 a 21)
a11 x1 + a21x2 v
a12 x1 + a22x2 v
Also B expects atmost v
a11y1 +a12y2 v
a21 y1+ a22 y2 v
If
x1
a 22 a 21
x2
a11 a12
similarly
y1
a 22 a12
y2
a11 a 21
Using the eq x1 +x2 =1
a 22 a 21
x1
(a11 a 22) (a12 a 21)
a11 a12
x2
(a11 a 22) (a12 a 21)
similarly
a 22 a12
y1
(a11 a 22) (a12 a 21)
a11 a 21
y2
(a11 a 22) (a12 a 21)
a11 a 22 a12 a 21
v
(a11 a 22) (a12 a 21)
-2
-1
12
II
III
5
0
II
III
-1
12
a 22 a 21
x1
(a11 a 22) (a12 a 21)
a11 a12
x2
(a11 a 22) (a12 a 21)
X1 = 2/3
X2 = 1/3
a 22 a12
y1
(a11 a 22) (a12 a 21)
a11 a 21
y2
(a11 a 22) (a12 a 21)
Y1 = 13/18
Y2 =5/18
a11 a 22 a12 a 21
v
(a11 a 22) (a12 a 21)
Value of the game is
10/3
(a)
7
4
10
(b)
A21
Player B
B2
Bn
A12
-
a1n
A22
a2n
prob
abilit
y
P1
p2
expected
payoff
B1
a11 p1 + a21
p2
B2
-
a12 p1 +a22
p2
Bn
a11 p1 + a21 p2 v
a12 p1 +a22 p2 v a1n p1
+a2np2
a1n p1 +a2np2 v
A2
-6
B2
B3
-7
B4
9
-2
14 p1
-6 :B1
6-p1: B2
411p1:B3
11 p1
-2:B4
Player B
P
L
A
A
Y
e
r
B1
A1
8 -7
A2
-6
B3
Ii
Iii
iv
-3
II
-6
(a)
(b)
2 1 4 0
3 3 5 2
Row 1 dominates row 3 since element by element
3>2 , 5>1 4=4 2>0
Therefore row 3 can be eliminated and the payoff matrix
reduces to
3 5 4 2
5 6 2 4
3 3 5 2
3 5 4 2
5 6 2 4
3 3 5 2
With respect to columns we see that column 2 dominates
column 1, so col 2 can be eliminated therefore reduced matrix
3
5
3
4
2
5
2
4
2
4
2
2
4
2
4 2
2 4
5 2
2 4
5 2
X2
x4
x2 = 3/5
x4 = 2/5
y3 = 2/5
y4 = 3/5
x4 =