TAMS PAR

META-SKEPTICISM,
EXPERIMENTALISM,
CARTOGRAPHY:
THE DEAD-ENDS OF PHILOSOPHY
 Glossary

Cartography =
The proper aim of philosophy is to draw maps of views
Experimentalism =
The radical stream of experimental philosophy
Meta-Skepticism =
Meta-philosophical Skepticism
Dead-End =
The point where you have to stop and go back to
where you have come from
 Template of Meta-
Skepticism
Gist: Believing in any philosophical theory is
blameworthy/irresponsible/unjustified/
unwarranted/irrational/etc.
Main motivation (cf. Tzsr):
The Argument from Disagreement (AD)
1. Philosophers disagree about every philosophical questions.
2. Philosophers are epistemic peers.
3. If disagreements prevail among epistemic peers they
should suspend judgment.
4. Philosophers should suspend judgment.
The Self-Refutation Objection
(SR)

5. Meta-skeptics suspend judment about

philosophical questions because they find
AD sound.
6. Philosophers disagree about the
soundness of AD.
7. Philosophers should suspend judgment
about the soundness of AD.
 Theses

Cartography and Experimentalism lead to

Meta-Skepticism
Probably because they deny that intuitions
could play the role of evidence
But Meta-Skepticism is vulnerable to SR
Therefore these views are dead-ends for
philosophy
 Structure

I. Meta-Skepticism
Defending the Self-Refutation Objection

II. Cartography and Experimentalism

How Cartography leads to the Argument from Disagreement

How Experimentalism is vulnerable to the Self-Refutation

objection
DEFENDING SR
 Self-Refutation:
Objections and Replies I.
Jnos Tzsr:
Meta-Skepticism is not a philosophical theory: it
does not rest on the clash of fundamental
intuitions
Rather it is an outcome of the meeting of
common sense and our everyday experience or
empirical knowledge (about others)

Couldnt one use the same defense for first-

order theories?
The problem is not (only) that Meta-
Skepticism is philosophy: rather that it is
disagreed
 Skeptics and Humility

Meta-Skeptics often argue that

skepticism is the only (epistemically)
humble or respectful position

But
if you can be an epistemic
superior in the question of the AD
why cant you be one in others?
 Self-Refutation:
Objections and Replies II.
Jason Brennan:
Even if [SR] works, it is embarrassing if this is the best defence
philosophy has.
Even more embarrassing for the skeptic. But why would it be
embarrassing? Because it is too simple?
However, it may just be [] that philosophical methodology works
reliably on a small set of issues, i.e., just in the areas needed to
make the sceptics argument. For instance, perhaps the sceptic
needs probability, an account of the notion of an epistemic peer,
some notion of reliability, and not much else.
So it is simple And why those only? Still, notions of reliability are
objects of disagreement, as well as the importance of reliability
He too considers only the this is philosophy version of SR
Verdict: Too confusing and arbitrary.
 Suspend Judment?

Not very explicit terminology:

Disbelieve everything, have no beliefs
Be agnostic, believe in the alternation of
the disagreed views
etc.

Meta-Skeptics seem to go for the

second sense
Similar problems arise both ways
 excursion
Caricature of foreign policy
Are they skeptics?

Ifyou agree with everyone you actually agree with

noone.
The reason: Because they do not agree with each other.
 The Point to Keep in
Mind
Agnosticism: Meta-skeptics suspend judgment and
come to believe in the alternation of philosophical
views:
A v B v C v etc.
They do this to avoid the problems coming from
disagreement
This is agreed by everyone
But they are still disagreeing: so they cant avoid
them.
The reason: Because the skeptic gains and retains
beliefs/attitudes that are subjects to disagreement.
 Self-Refutation:
Objections and Replies III.

Bryan Frances:
SR is serious, meta-skeptics have to
suspend judgment about the conclusion
of AD.
Yet they may remain meta-skeptics
anyway: they can organize their
epistemic practices like the skeptic.

Verdict:Not enough. He still

disagrees with peers
 Reply to Frances I.
Frances suspends judment about the
epistemic principle in AD.
He does that because he follows another
principle:
If you are inclined to agree with a philosophical
principle, but then you realize that its pretty
ambitious, worrisomely self-applying, and
confusing (for you), then you should suspend
judgment on it.
But even that is an object of disagreement:
so what determines when can you keep your
belief when it faces the AD?
Frances has no answers.
 Isntthat principle dissent-proof?
pretty ambitious
Philosophers have no problems endorsing ambitious claims
worrisomely self-applying
Meta-skeptics endorse the principle in question (3), and
philosophers believe other worrisomely self-applying views
confusing
Philosophers endorse claims that they find the least confusing
(for you)
Two interpretations: for Frances or for the reader philosophers
dont accept the principle in the first interpretation, for the second,
see the last point
The moral of the story: Philosophers admit the problems
of their theories but they dont stop endorsing them if they
find them the least problematic candidate.
 Reply to Frances II.
Inwhat other issues does Frences have to disagree with
philosophers in order to act like a meta-skeptic?
I dont go so far as to believe 3. I withhold judgment. Not
only do I answer I dont know to Is 3. true? but also to
How much credence do you put in 3.?
Even if he does not know, there is an objective answer to the
question. Lets say he puts .5 credence in 3. But others do not,
so no agreement was reached.
What I base my decision on, and have confidence in, is
the idea that 3. is in the vicinity of an important truth.
Others dont have confidence in that, that is, they do not agree.
I think 3. is a good rule of thumb [but] endorsing a
rule of thumb doesnt mean endorsing its truth
Others dont agree that 3. is a good rule of thumb.
 Reply to Frances III.
A General Reply to Meta-Skepticism
Theskeptic believes A v B v C v . to avoid
the problems coming from disagreement

Butwhile believing that, the skeptic is committed

to think that on the grounds of our evidence, any
philosophical theory could just as well be true

Butthat is disagreed by the philosophers who

believe A & ~B & ~C or ~A & B & ~C or
~A & ~B & C

They cant get rid of disagreements

HOW CARTOGRAPHY
LEADS TO AD
 Popular in analytic philosophy
Description:
The proper aim of philosophy is to draw
maps
Which theory leads to what other beliefs
Make sign-posts (If then)
Have to check the coherence of belief-
systems
 Lewisian Cartography

Once the map of well-worked-out

theories is before us
Dubious but granted
ourphilosophical position depends
on our intuitions.
 Ourintuitions are simply opinions;
our theories are the same
simply i.e. they are not evidence for
our thories, they are of the same kind

van Inwagen: intuitions are simply

beliefs, they are called intuitions to
sound more persuasive
 Coherence is the only requirement of
theories
Pricing views for yourself:
Which intuitions you want to keep or

discard?
Which theories are too counterintuitive?
 Relative Outsiders on
Cartography
Rorty:
the ideal of philosophical ability is to see the
entire universe of possible assertions in all their
inferential relationships , and thus to be able to
construct, or criticize, any argument.
Alasdair MacIntyre:
analytic philosophy has become a discipline
whose competence has been restricted to the
study of inferences
it can never establish the rational acceptability if
the otherwise coherent adherents are willing to
pay the price
 Implications

all coherent philosophers are peers

there are lots of coherent

philosophies

none of them has any evidence

 Cartography and AD
The Argument from Disagreement:
1. Philosophers disagree about every philosophical
questions.
2. Philosophers are epistemic peers.
3. If disagreements prevail among epistemic peers
they should suspend judgment.
4. Philosophers should suspend judgment.

Cartography gives force to premise 2. and 3.:

2.: All philosophers have the same amount of
evidence for their theories
3.: You have no epistemic reason to believe what
peers disbelieve: your beliefs are epistemically
arbitrary
HOW EXPERIMENTALISM IS
VULNERABLE TO SR
The Experimentalists AD
Experimentalism :
the radical stream of experimental philosophy
philosophers should not rely on any intuitions
The Template of the Argument:
1. Intuitions diverge significantly
(they vary from culture to culture).
2. A philosophical method that has significantly
different input produces significantly different output.
3. Philosophers should not rely on methods that
produce significantly different output.
4. Philosophers should not rely on intuitions.
 The Anti-Experimentalist SR
Problems for the argument:
Reasoning and argumentation also varies from culture
to culture
rules of inference, logic, contradictory beliefs (cf. Nisbett)
Anti-Argument Argument from Disagreement?

Their claims depend on intuitions (Forrai, Bealer)

spontaneous judgment about diverging intuitions
Might all arguments depend on intuitions? (BonJour)

Upshot:

the experimentalist argument defeats itself
We can play the same game as in part I.
 Intuitionist
Experimentalism?
This interpretation of experimentalism
is influential
here it comes from Nnay (for) and
Forrai (against)

Buteven quite radical experimental

philosophers like Weinberg, Nichols
& Stich are aware that we cannot
question all of our intuitions, they do
rely on them
SUMMARY AND
CONCLUSION
 Criticism
of Cartography and
Experimentalism through AD and SR

Sign-post: Dead-Ends

Diagnosis:their problems come

from denying an evidentiary role for
intuitions
 The Only Way Out?
Alternative interpretation: Some of our intuitions
might defeat the evidence-view of intuitions i.e.
they turn against themselves

We should not trust these

SR and other arguments
Intuitions can overpower and outnumber each
other
Autobiography: struggle?

Conclusion: We have to give intuitions some

kind of a justificatory/evidentiary/entitling role
 Van Inwagens Answer to
Meta-Skepticism

In contrast to his previous quote:

Well, as with philosophy, I am inclined
to think that I must enjoy some sort of
incommunicable insight that the others
[like Lewis], for all their merits, lack. I
am inclined to think that the evidence
and arguments I can adduce in support
of my beliefs do not constitute the
totality of my justification...
Thank you for your
attention!