This project is funded by the European

Union
Projekat finansira Evropska Unija

INTERNAL EMERGENCY
PLAN CASE 1
EXAMPLE SLOVENIA

IKE VAN DER PUTTE

This Project is funded Project implemented by

by the European Union Human Dynamics Consortium
Project implemented by Human Dynamics
Consortium

Projekat realizuje Human Dynamics

INTERNAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN FOR
BUTAN PLIN

SEE SESSION 22 FOR GUIDELINE AND CONTENTS

IERP

This Project is funded Project implemented by

by the European Union Human Dynamics Consortium
The establishment Butan Plin d.d. is situated in
the industrial zone ika in northern part of Ljubljana

Vertical LPG Storage Vessels (250m3) Railway Car unloading Station

View of Site from Top of Vertical Storage Vessels Cylinder Filling Station

This Project is funded Project implemented by

by the European Union Human Dynamics Consortium
1. SCOPE OF THE PLAN (1)
This plan provides details of the emergency response measures for a
release of LPG in Butan Plin d.d. which may give rise to:

Jet fire at ruptured hose during loading/unloading activities;

Pool fire after spill during loading/unloading activities;
Explosion of the vapour cloud (UVCE).

The maximum quantity of released LPG is either:

50 or 90 m3, depending on the size of the railway car (full railway car
release scenario)
6 m3 (one minute release scenario).

This Project is funded Project implemented by

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1. SCOPE OF THE PLAN (2)

Potential knock-on effects of a vapour cloud explosion and a pool

fire are also considered.

A vapour cloud of LPG formed in a major-accident scenario could

explode either inside or outside the Butan Plin site. This may
cause injuries to personnel, damage to buildings and infrastructure
and additional fires in Butan Plin and/or surroundings.

In the case of a pool fire, the first knock-on effect is a BLEVE

(Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) of the neighbouring
railway car, which may then cause further events as follows:
A pool fire engulfs an adjacent railway car leading to a BLEVE. A
missile or the thermal radiation generated by the BLEVE damages
another LPG storage vessel.
The resultant damage is such that a further release of LPG occurs
and a vapour cloud is formed. This vapour cloud would give rise to
similar effects as that formed in the case of the full railway car
release.
This Project is funded Project implemented by
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 2. Extent of Planning

The extent of on-site emergency planning is defined by an LPG

release scenario which leads to a:
Jet fire
Pool fire
BLEVE
UVCE.
Geographically, the extent of this plan is defined as the site
boundary of Butan Plin.

The extent of off-site emergency planning (municipal planning) is

defined by an LPG release scenario which leads to a:
BLEVE
UVCE.
Geographically, the extent of municipal planning is defined by the
maximum radius of effect, i.e. 700m, see next slide

This Project is funded Project implemented by

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Summary of the worst case results of the
modelling exercise (1)

Summary of Results for 90 m3 Car Release

This Project is funded Project implemented by

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 Overpressure damage effects

The overpressures required to directly injure humans are significantly higher

than those required to damage buildings. Injuries resulting from secondary
impacts, such as building damage/collapse or flying debris, are more likely to
occur and therefore the distances to the following overpressures are usually
determined for each scenario modelled:

0.207 bar Steel frame building distorted and pulled away from
foundations; Rupture of storage tanks. Serious damage to
buildings and equipment.
0.138 bar Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses.
0.021 bar Safe distance 95% probability of no serious damage
beyond this point; 10% of glass windows broken.

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Heat Radiation Effects

37.5 kW/m2 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment

12.5 kW/m2 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of
wood,
melting plastic tubing, etc
4.5 kW/m2 Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to
reach
cover within 20 seconds, however, blistering of skin
(first degree burns) is unlikely

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Summary of the worst case results of the
modelling exercise (2)
Results for 6m3 1 minute release scenario

This Project is funded Project implemented by

by the European Union Human Dynamics Consortium
 The estimated duration of the full railway car release
scenario is around 20-30 minutes. After the railway car has
emptied, the explosion hazard will be significantly reduced.
It is difficult to predict the length of time required to evaporate the spilled
liquid. However, it may take an additional 30 minutes for the remaining
pool to evaporate after the tanker has emptied.

erefore, it is estimated that the explosion hazard is unlikely to persist for

nger than 60 minutes following commencement of the release.
sed on this estimation, it is considered that in the case of vapour cloud formation
period 15 to 30 minutes, after an alert is raised, should be an appropriate
sponse time for the implementation of protective measures at the municipality le

In the case of the 6m3 (one minute release) scenario, the

explosion hazard is likely to persist for less than 5 minutes.
After this time, the liquid remaining on the ground may pose
a risk though not significant.

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 Co-ordination

Close co-ordination of internal (Butan Plin) and external (municipal MOL)

planning is particularly important for the cases which lead to an UVCE.
Monitoring of the situation,
measurement of explosive concentrations and
the movement of the cloud,
prompt evaluation of possible developments and
avoidance of ignition sources in the cloud's path
will be the focus of the activities at this stage.

Based on these, recommendations and decisions about

implementation of protective measures will be given

This Project is funded Project implemented by

by the European Union Human Dynamics Consortium
Geographic Extent of Municipal Protection and Rescue Plan

This Project is funded Project implemented by

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 Basis for classification of an incident

If re-activation of the excess flow valve on the railway car is not successful,
the expected consequence is the full car release scenario.
The maximum released quantity is 90 m3 of LPG.
This is MAJOR ACCIDENT potential.

If re-activation of the excess flow valve on the railway car succeeds, it is the
released quantity which determines major accident potential and further
emergency actions. The quantity of released gas is evaluated based on
duration of release and visual control of the cloud (white fog, heavier than air,
is formed). Based on the following figures an incident should be classified:
less than 30 seconds release duration NOT MAJOR INCIDENT
more than 30 seconds release duration MAJOR INCIDENT

This Project is funded Project implemented by

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 Timeframes for
implementing tasks
in the case of
emergency

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by the European Union Human Dynamics Consortium
3. IMPLEMENTATION AND USE OF THE PLAN (1)
.

ECC=Emergency Control Centre

MCT=Main Control Team
Investigate and report
FCT= Forward Control Team
Remediate

End

This Project is funded Project implemented by

by the European Union Human Dynamics Consortium
IMPLEMENTATION AND USE OF THE PLAN (2)

he implementation of the plan is dependent on the evaluation of whether the

Operators/Forward Control Team (FCT) are capable of:
topping the release of LPG in less than 30 seconds, or
Control the fire before it eventually causes a BLEVE of an adjacent railway car.

f so, it means that the incident is brought under control by the FCT and that its
evelopment into an off-site major-accident is prevented.
f the FCT response is not successful and the situation indicates that there is a
otential for a vapour cloud to cross the site boundary or that a BLEVE could occu
he alarm is raised and the Notification Centre (Regional Centre for Communicatio
jubljana) is alerted. The person responsible for implementing the
MPRP at MOL is notified by the Notification Centre and implementation of the
MPRP is requested/ recommended.

The Notification Centre alerts the necessary external emergency services.

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Specification of actions and tasks when implementing PRP

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This Project is funded Project implemented by
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This Project is funded Project implemented by
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This Project is funded Project implemented by
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 Site incident Controller

Concept of Communication in case of Emergency

This Project is funded Project implemented by

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 4. Resources

The following resources are available at the site:

Six professional and nine voluntary firemen
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
- Breathing Apparatus 2 pieces
- Fireproof trousers and jackets 7 sets
- Helmets - 9
- Firemen belts - 9
Hoses
- Type B, 200 m
- Type C, 375 m
Fire extinguishers
- S9, 90 pieces
- S100, 6 pieces
- S50, 3 pieces
Rescue ropes
These resources enable effective implementation of the PRP.

This Project is funded Project implemented by

by the European Union Human Dynamics Consortium
 5. Monitoring, Notification and Warning (1)

Monitoring, notification and warning of the on-site personnel, off-site personne

neighbouring industry and the public is split between Butan Plin, the Notificatio
Centre and the MOL.

Butan Plin is responsible for on-site monitoring, notification and warning, as we

as first notification, i.e. raising alarm in the case of major incident.

In the event that the incident is classified as major, the first external call is to
the Notification Centre. The responsible person at MOL is also alerted.
After activation of the on-site ECC, the Main Control Team acts according to
Figure given in terms of communication.

This Project is funded Project implemented by

by the European Union Human Dynamics Consortium
 5. Monitoring, Notification and Warning (2)

eneral monitoring of the facility, and particularly the LPG

orage vessels, during an incident is performed by the Communicator between
CT and MCT and/or voluntary firemen who are at stand-by alert and are back-up
or the professional firemen who carry out the fire-fighting.

the case of vapour cloud formation, four voluntary firemen take positions
pproximately 20m inside the site from the boundary/fence, on the north, south, e
nd west side. They measure the concentration of gas in the air with handheld
evices (explosion meters) and notify the Communicator between FCT and MCT
nd the Site Incident Controller about movement of the cloud inside Butan Plin.
he communication is performed by Ex rated radios.
On the side(s) where the vapour cloud crosses the Butan Plin boundary members
f the EES firefighting unit take over further measurements and notification abou
movement of the cloud.
ff-site notification and warning to adjacent establishments is the responsibility o
utan Plin. Off-site notification and warning to the public is the responsibility of
he Notification Centre and MOL. This is specified in the MPRP

This Project is funded Project implemented by

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 6. Mobilisation of Resources

First Level
Operators and members of the FCT/Site Personnel 1 do
not need any mobilisation approval but react immediately after an
incident occurs
Second Level
The Site Incident Controller and Communicator between FCT and MCT
classify the incident and assess the situation in terms of potential
major-accident development.
They also assess the capability of the FCT to control the event and prevent
escalation. If the incident is classified as a Major Incident, the Site Inciden
Controller of Butan Plin notifies the Notification Centre and the responsible
person/authority at MOL for approving implementation of the MPRP
Third Level
The third level covers mobilisation of resources according to the MPRP.
The responsible person for approval is specified by the MPRP.

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 7. Management and Administration

e on-site Emergency Response Team (ERT), i.e. team of respondents to

ergency situation, is made up of two basic groups:

n Control Team - in the event of an emergency, the Main Control Team (MCT)
nages the overall emergency. It ensures that a proper evacuation is taking place
t emergency services have been called and that other essential tasks, including
ffic control and site access control, are carried out. MCT informs SHV
resentative about the incident.

ward Control Team - the Forward Control Team (FCT) responds to the location of
incident, in fire gear or other protective clothing as appropriate, with the object
achieving control of the source of the emergency in a safe manner.

This Project is funded Project implemented by

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 8. PROTECTION, RESCUE AND RELIEF
According to the Act on protection against natural and other hazards, the
following protection measures are envisaged:
evacuation
partial sheltering
technical.
Partial sheltering and technical measures apply for the whole endangered area,
while within this plan, evacuation is planned for Butan Plin facilities only.
The protective measures depend on the incident
Due to physical properties of LPG (heavier than air, an aphyxiant) immersion
in vapour cloud should be avoided. Besides fire/explosion, lack of oxygen is
the main hazard associated with immersion in vapour cloud.

In general, the site Main Incident Controller will take responsibility for protection
measures

For Evacuation paths from buildings and assembly point see nest slide

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Evacuation Paths

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by the European Union Human Dynamics Consortium
Protection Measures

Protection measures depend on the incident. There are two main incidents
which require implementation of protection measures:
BLEVE
UVCE

In the case of a BLEVE protection measures apply particularly for those direc
responding to the incident, residents and others within a radius of 400m of
the site.

In the case of UVCE protection measures apply to the area with a radius
of 700m of the site.

This Project is funded Project implemented by

by the European Union Human Dynamics Consortium
In the event of BLEVE
Evacuation of Butan Plin industrial facilities. This applies for non-members
of the FCT. Evacuation paths are depicted (see slide).

Open the windows to prevent glass break due to explosion

Partial sheltering which is aimed at avoiding exposure to overpresuure and
thermal radiation. Recommendations are:
take position in the upper floors of buildings;
find shelter behind solid wall;
avoid buildings of light constructions and windows;
cover skin;
use helmet if available.

This Project is funded Project implemented by

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 the event of UVCE
DO NOT USE OPEN FIRE! DO NOT START ENGINES/CARS! DO NOT USE AN
DEVICE WHICH MAY CAUSE EXPLOSION!
Evacuation of Butan Plin industrial facilities. This applies for non-members of the
FCT. Evacuation paths are depicted .
Close windows at ground level and on the first floor (preventing gas access into t
building) and open the windows in the upper floors to prevent glass break due t
eventual explosion
Partial sheltering which is aimed at avoiding exposure to overpressure and
ermal radiation. Recommendations are:
leave risk area
cover skin
do not enter (or re-enter) risk area
use helmet if available.
avoid immersion in vapour cloud
keep away from sewage coverings
take position in the upper floors of buildings
find shelter behind solid wall
avoid buildings of light constructions and windows

This Project is funded Project implemented by

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In the case of release without ignition

Turn off valves in order to prevent leaking

Stop operations in the Filling Plant and workshops
Turn off gas stoves in the offices
Switch the electricity off
Cover all drains in the Filling Plant area in order to prevent gas
flowing through drains.

In the case of jet fire/pool fire

Turn on deluge system
Perform cooling of the surroundings to prevent secondary fires
Remove other railway cars if possible

This Project is funded Project implemented by

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TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR BUTAN PLIN PERSONNEL

This Project is funded Project implemented by

by the European Union Human Dynamics Consortium
This Project is funded Project implemented by
by the European Union Human Dynamics Consortium
 REFERENCES
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 96/82/EC
of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving
dangerous substances(OJ L 10, 14.1.1997, p. 13) consolidated version

DIRECTIVE 2012/18/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE

COUNCIL of 4 July 2012
on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances,
amending and subsequently repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC

Planning for Emergencies Involving Dangerous Substances for Slovenia.

Final Report. Contract no: SL-0081.0011.01. 28 February 2002.
I.van der Putte: Regional Environment Accession Project (REAP).
Nethconsult/BKH Consulting Engineers/RPS.
Subcontractors: AEA Technology, URS/Dames & Moore, EPCE, Project Management Grou
REC Hungary

This Project is funded Project implemented by

by the European Union Human Dynamics Consortium