LOCAL GOVERNMENT

ADMINISTRATION
 LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
-A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF A NATION OR STATE WHICH IS CONSTITUTED BY LAW AND HAS
SUBSTANTIAL CONTROL OF LOCAL AFFAIRS.
-A BODY POLITIC AND CORPORATE ENDOWED WITH POWERS TO BE EXERCISED BY IT IN
CONFORMITY WITH LAW- SEC. 15, LGC OF 1991.
THE TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROVINCES
CITIES
MUNICIPALITIES
BARANGAYS
AUTONOMOUS REGIONS-CORDILLERAS AND MUSLIM MINDANAO
-SEC. 1 OF ART. X OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION:
 POLITICAL LAW
POLITICAL LAWIS THAT BRANCH OF PUBLIC LAW WHICH DEALS WITH THE ORGANIZATION
AND OPERATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANS OF THE STATE AND DEFINES THE
RELATIONS OF THE STATE WITH THE INHABITANTS OF ITS TERRITORY. (PEOPLE VS. PERFECTO, 43
PHIL. 887)
A. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
B. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
C. LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
D. LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
E. ELECTION LAWS
 CORPORATIONS
CORPORATION IS AN ARTIFICIAL BEING CREATED BY OPERATION OF LAW, HAVING THE RIGHT
OF SUCCESSION AND THE POWERS, ATTRIBUTES AND PROPERTIES EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY
LAW OR INCIDENT TO ITS EXISTENCE.
ATTRIBUTES:
1. ARTIFICIAL BEING;
2. CREATED BY OPERATION OF LAW;
3. RIGHT OF SUCCESSION; AND
4. POWERS, ATTRIBUTES AND PROPERTIES EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY LAW OR INCIDENT TO ITS
EXISTENCE
 CLASSIFICATIONS
CLASSIFICATION OF CORPORATIONS ACCORDING TO PURPOSE:
A. PUBLIC IS A CORPORATION THAT IS CREATED BY THE STATE, EITHER BY GENERAL OR
SPECIAL ACT, FOR PURPOSES OF ADMINISTRATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OR
RENDERING OF SERVICE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
B. PRIVATE FORMED FOR SOME PRIVATE PURPOSE, BENEFIT, AIM OR END

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, DISTINGUISHED

PUBLICORGANIZED FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF A PORTION OF THE STATE

PRIVATE FORMED FOR SOME PRIVATE PURPOSE, BENEFIT, AIM OR END
 PUBLIC CORPORATION, CLASSIFIED
I. QUASI-PUBLIC CORPORATIONCREATED BY THE STATE FOR A NARROW OR
LIMITED PURPOSE; A PRIVATE CORPORATION CREATED PURSUANT TO THE
CORPORATION CODE THAT RENDERS PUBLIC SERVICE OR SUPPLIES PUBLIC
WANTS; EXAMPLES: PUBLIC UTILITY COMPANIES, ELECTRIC COMPANIES, WATER
DISTRICTS, TELECOMMUNICATION COMPANIES

II. REAL PUBLIC CORPORATION/MUNICIPAL CORPORATION A BODY POLITIC

AND CORPORATE CONSTITUTED BY THE INCORPORATION OF THE INHABITANTS
FOR THE PURPOSE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
 5. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, DEFINED
PERCEPTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: A LOCAL GOVERNMENT IS NOT ONLY A MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION, MEANING WE DONT LOOK AT IT AS AN ENTITY OR A CORPORATION THAT IS
CLOTHED WITH A PERSONALITY. ITS ALSO PERCEIVED AS EITHER POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OR A
TERRITORIAL SUBDIVISION.
IF WE TALK ABOUT POLITICAL SUBDIVISION, THEN WE LOOK AT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AS
AGENTS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND THEREFORE, TASKED TO PERFORM CERTAIN
GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS.
IF WE TALK ABOUT TERRITORIAL SUBDIVISION, WE LOOK AT IT AS A PLACE.
BASIS-SEC. 1 ART. 10 CONSTI - THE TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE THE PROVINCES, CITIES, MUNICIPALITIES, AND BARANGAYS. THERE SHALL
BE AUTONOMOUS REGIONS IN MUSLIM MINDANAO AND THE CORDILLERAS AS HEREINAFTER
PROVIDED.
 LIMBONA VS. MANGELIN
AUTONOMY IS EITHER DECENTRALIZATION OF ADMINISTRATION OR DECENTRALIZATION
OF POWER.
DECENTRALIZATION OF ADMINISTRATION IS THE DELEGATION BY THE CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS TO POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS IN ORDER TO
BROADEN THE BASE OF GOVERNMENT POWER AND, IN THE PROCESS, TO MAKE LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS MORE RESPONSIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE AND ENSURE THEIR DEVELOPMENT
AS SELF-RELIANT COMMUNITIES AND MAKE THEM MORE EFFECTIVE PARTNERS IN THE
PURSUIT OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND PROGRESS.
IT ALSO RELIEVES THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF THE BURDEN OF MANAGING LOCAL
AFFAIRS AND ENABLES IT TO CONCENTRATE ON NATIONAL CONCERNS. AN AUTONOMOUS
GOVERNMENT UNDER THIS CATEGORY IS UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE PRESIDENT. THE PRESIDENT EXERCISES SUPERVISION BUT
HAS NO CONTROL OVER THEM AND DOES SO ONLY TO ENSURE LOCAL AFFAIRS ARE
ADMINISTERED ACCORDING TO LAW.
 DECENTRALIZATION OF POWER, ON THE OTHER HAND, INVOLVES THE ABDICATION OF POWER
IN FAVOR OF AUTONOMOUS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. THE AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT IS
FREE TO MANAGE ITS AFFAIRS WITH MINIMUM INTERVENTION FROM CENTRAL
AUTHORITIES. AN AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT ENJOYING AUTONOMY UNDER THIS
CATEGORY IS ONLY SUBJECT TO THE ORGANIC ACT CREATING IT AND ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES ON
THE EFFECTS & LIMITS OF AUTONOMY.
PD 1618 MANDATES THAT THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE THE POWER OF GENERAL
SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OVER AUTONOMOUS REGIONS. HENCE, COURTS OF LAW CAN
ASSUME JURISDICTION. THE COURTS CAN VALIDLY REVIEW THE REMOVAL OF LIMBONA AS
SPEAKER.
 LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS CA

FACTS:
THE LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LLDA) WAS CREATED THROUGH REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 4850. IT WAS GRANTED, INTER ALIA, EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO ISSUE PERMITS FOR THE
USE OF ALL SURFACE WATER FOR ANY PROJECT OR ACTIVITY IN OR AFFECTING THE SAID
REGION INCLUDING NAVIGATION, CONSTRUCTION, AND OPERATION OF FISHPENS, FISH
ENCLOSURES, FISH CORRALS AND THE LIKE.
THEN CAME RA 7160, THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991. THE MUNICIPALITIES IN THE
LAGUNA LAKE REGION INTERPRETED ITS PROVISIONS TO MEAN THAT THE NEWLY PASSED LAW
GAVE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO ISSUE FISHING PRIVILEGES
WITHIN THEIR MUNICIPAL WATERS.
 ISSUE: WHO SHOULD EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER THE LAGUNA LAKE AND ITS ENVIRONS
INSOFAR AS THE ISSUANCE OF PERMITS FOR FISHING PRIVILEGES IS CONCERNED, THE LLDA OR THE
TOWNS AND MUNICIPALITIES COMPRISING THE REGION?
HELD: LLDA HAS JURISDICTION OVER SUCH MATTERS BECAUSE THE CHARTER OF THE LLDA PREVAILS
OVER THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991. THE SAID CHARTER CONSTITUTES A SPECIAL LAW,
WHILE THE LATTER IS A GENERAL LAW. IT IS BASIC IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION THAT THE
ENACTMENT OF A LATER LEGISLATION WHICH IS A GENERAL LAW, CANNOT BE CONSTRUED TO
HAVE REPEALED A SPECIAL LAW. THE SPECIAL LAW IS TO BE TAKEN AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE
GENERAL LAW IN THE ABSENCE OF SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES FORCING A CONTRARY
CONCLUSION.
IN ADDITION, THE CHARTER OF THE LLDA EMBODIES A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER FOR THE
PURPOSE OF PROTECTING AND DEVELOPING THE LAGUNA LAKE REGION, AS OPPOSED TO THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, WHICH GRANTS POWERS TO MUNICIPALITIES TO ISSUE FISHING
PERMITS FOR REVENUE PURPOSES.
THUS IT HAS TO BE CONCLUDED THAT THE CHARTER OF THE LLDA SHOULD PREVAIL OVER THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 ON MATTERS AFFECTING LAGUNA DE BAY.
DE JURE AND DE FACTO MUN. CORPORATIONS
 DE JURE VS. DE FACTO MUN. CORPORATIONS
DE JURE- ITS CREATION PERFECTLY COMPLIES WITH ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF
AN INCORPORATION
DE FACTO- WHEN NOT ALL OF THE REQUIREMENTS ARE COMPLIED WITH

DE FACTO MUN. CORPORATION-IS ONE SO DEFECTIVELY CREATED AS NOT TO

BE A DE JURE CORPORATION, BUT NEVERTHELESS THE RESULT OF A BONAFIDE
ATTEMPT TO INCORPORATE UNDER EXISTING STATUTORY AUTHORITY, COUPLED
WITH THE EXERCISE OF CORPORATE POWERS AND RECOGNIZED BY THE
COURTS.
ELEMENTS OF A DE FACTO MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

1. VALID LAW AUTHORIZING INCORPORATION

2. ATTEMPT IN GOOD FAITH TO ORGANIZE IT
3. COLORABLE COMPLIANCE WITH LAW
4. ASSUMPTION OF CORPORATE POWERS
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (LGU) MAY EXIST BY:
1. LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT- DE JURE STATUS
2. BY PRESCRIPTION
3. BY LONG USE OF CORPORATE POWERS
4. SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE RECOGNITION
5. VALIDATION BY THE STATE
 PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL
FACTS
1. IN 1964, THE PRESIDENT ISSUE AN EXECUTIVE ORDER NOS. 93 TO 121,124 AND 126 TO 129 FOR
THE CREATION OF 33 MUNICIPALITIES.
2. VICE PRESIDENT PELAEZ INSTITUTED A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION WITH
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO RESTRAINT THE AUDITOR GENERAL AS WELL AS HIS REPRESENTATIVES
AND AGENTS FROM PASSING IN AUDIT ANY EXPENDITURE OF PUBLIC FUNDS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE EXECUTIVE ORDER AND OR ANY DISBURSEMENT BY SAID MUNICIPALITY BY ALLEGING THAT THE
EXECUTIVE ORDER IS NULL AND VOID FOR IT WAS IMPLIEDLY REPEALED BY RA 2370 AND CONSTITUTE
UNDUE DELEGATION OF POWER.
3. THE PETITIONER ARGUE THAT IF THE PRESIDENT CANNOT CREATE A BARRIO, HOW CAN HE CREATE A
MUNICIPALITY WHICH IS COMPOSED OF SEVERAL BARRIOS SINCE BARRIOS ARE UNITS OF
MUNICIPALITY.
4. RESPONDENT ON THE OTHERHAND ARGUES THAT A MUNICIPALITY CAN BE CREATED WITHOUT
CREATING A NEW BARRIOS BY PLACING OLD BARRIOS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF MUNICIPALITY.
 PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT, THE EXECUTIVE ORDERS ARE VALID.
HELD: ACCORDING TO THE SUPREME COURT, UNDER RA 2370, BARRIOS MAY NOT BE CREATED OR
THERE BOUNDARIES ALTERED NOR THERE NAMES BE CHANGED EXCEPT BY ACT OF CONGRESS OR
OF THE CORRESPONDING PROVINCIAL BOARD UPON PETITION OF A MAJORITY OF THE VOTERS IN
THE AREAS AFFECTED AND THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE MUNICIPALITY OR
MUNICIPALITIES IN WHICH THE PROPOSED BARRIO IS SITUATED.
THE SUPREME COURT FURTHER SAID THAT THE AUTHORITY TO CREATE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION IS
LEGISLATIVE IN NATURE.
WHEREFORE, THE EXECUTIVE ORDERS IN QUESTION ARE DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND
THE RESPONDENT PERMANENTLY RESTRAINED FROM PASSING IN AUDIT
ANY EXPENDITURE OF PUBLIC FUNDS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF SAID EXECUTIVE ORDERS OR ANY
DISBURSEMENT BY THE MUNICIPALITIES ABOVE REFERRED TO.
 SULTAN OSOP CAMID VS. OP
FACTS:
THE MUNICIPALITY OF ANDONG, LANAO DEL SUR, IS A TOWN THAT
IS NOT SUPPOSED TO EXIST YET IS ACTUALLY INSISTED BY SOME AS
ALIVE AND THRIVING. THE CREATION OF THE PUTATIVE
MUNICIPALITY WAS DECLARED VOID AB INITIO BY THE SUPREME
COURT FOUR DECADES AGO, BUT THE PRESENT PETITION INSISTS
THAT ANDONG THRIVES ON AND, HENCE, ITS LEGAL PERSONALITY
SHOULD BE GIVEN JUDICIAL AFFIRMATION.
 ISSUE: WHETHER THE JUDICIAL ANNULMENT OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF
ANDONG CONTINUES DESPITE THE PETITIONERS ALLEGATION THAT
ANDONG HAS THRIVED INTO A FULL-BLOWN MUNICIPALITY.
HELD: MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS MAY EXIST BY PRESCRIPTION WHERE IT IS
SHOWN THAT THE COMMUNITY HAS CLAIMED AND EXERCISED CORPORATE
FUNCTIONS WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND ACQUIESCENCE OF THE
LEGISLATURE, AND WITHOUT INTERRUPTION OR OBJECTION FOR PERIOD
LONG ENOUGH TO AFFORD TITLE BY PRESCRIPTION. WHAT IS CLEARLY
ESSENTIAL IS A FACTUAL DEMONSTRATION OF THE CONTINUOUS EXERCISE
BY THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF ITS CORPORATE POWERS, AS WELL
AS THE ACQUIESCENCE THERETO BY INSTRUMENTALITIES OF THE STATE.
 MUN. OF SAN NARCISO VS. MENDEZ
FACTS: PRESIDENT CARLOS P. GARCIA, ISSUED AN EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 353 CREATING THE MUNICIPAL DISTRICT
OF SAN ANDRES, QUEZON, BY SEGREGATING FROM THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO OF THE SAME
PROVINCE.
BY VIRTUE OF EO NO. 174, DATED 05 OCTOBER 1965, ISSUED BY PRESIDENT DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, THE
MUNICIPAL DISTRICT OF SAN ANDRES WAS LATER OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED TO HAVE GAINED THE STATUS OF A
FIFTH CLASS MUNICIPALITY BEGINNING 01 JULY 1963 BY OPERATION OF SECTION 2 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1515.
2 THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ADDED THAT (T)HE CONVERSION OF THIS MUNICIPAL DISTRICT INTO (A) MUNICIPALITY
AS PROPOSED IN HOUSE BILL NO. 4864 WAS APPROVED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
PETITIONER MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO: FILED A PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO WITH RTC WHICH
PETITION SOUGHT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF EO NO. 353 INVOKING THE RULING OF THIS COURT IN
PELAEZ V. AUDITOR GENERAL.
RESPONDENT SAN ANDRES: SAN NARCISO IS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE CREATION OF THE NEW
MUNICIPALITY AND THAT THE CASE HAD BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC WITH THE ENACTMENT OF REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 7160 (SEC. 442. REQUISITES FOR CREATION. . . .(D) MUNICIPALITIES EXISTING AS OF THE DATE OF THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THIS CODE SHALL CONTINUE TO EXIST AND OPERATE AS SUCH.)
PETITIONER: THE ABOVE PROVISION OF LAW WAS INAPPLICABLE TO THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN ANDRES SINCE
THE ENACTMENT REFERRED TO LEGALLY EXISTING MUNICIPALITIES AND NOT TO THOSE WHOSE MODE OF
CREATION HAD BEEN VOID AB INITIO.
ISSUE: W/N MUNICIPALITY OF SAN ANDRES IS A DE JURE OR DE FACTO MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

HELD: EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 353 CREATING THE MUNICIPAL DISTRICT OF SAN ANDRES WAS ISSUED ON 20 AUGUST
1959 BUT IT WAS ONLY AFTER ALMOST THIRTY (30) YEARS, OR ON 05 JUNE 1989, THAT THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN
NARCISO FINALLY DECIDED TO CHALLENGE THE LEGALITY OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER.

GRANTING THE EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 353 WAS A COMPLETE NULLITY FOR BEING THE RESULT OF AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER, THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OBTAINING IN THIS CASE
HARDLY COULD OFFER A CHOICE OTHER THAN TO CONSIDER THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN ANDRES TO HAVE AT LEAST
ATTAINED A STATUS UNIQUELY OF ITS OWN CLOSELY APPROXIMATING, IF NOT IN FACT ATTAINING, THAT OF A DE
FACTO MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. CONVENTIONAL WISDOM CANNOT ALLOW IT TO BE OTHERWISE. CREATED IN 1959
BY VIRTUE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 353, THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN ANDRES HAD BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR MORE THAN
SIX YEARS WHEN, ON 24 DECEMBER 1965, PELAEZ V. AUDITOR GENERAL WAS PROMULGATED. THE RULING COULD HAVE
SOUNDED THE CALL FOR A SIMILAR DECLARATION OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 353 BUT IT
WAS NOT TO BE THE CASE. ON THE CONTRARY, CERTAIN GOVERNMENTAL ACTS ALL POINTED TO THE STATES
RECOGNITION OF THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN ANDRES. THUS, AFTER MORE THAN FIVE
YEARS AS A MUNICIPAL DISTRICT, EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 174 CLASSIFIED THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN ANDRES AS A FIFTH
CLASS MUNICIPALITY AFTER HAVING SURPASSED THE INCOME REQUIREMENT LAID OUT IN REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1515.
AT THE PRESENT TIME, ALL DOUBTS ON THE DE JURE STANDING OF THE MUNICIPALITY MUST BE
DISPELLED. UNDER THE ORDINANCE (ADOPTED ON 15 OCTOBER 1986) APPORTIONING THE
SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, APPENDED TO THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, THE
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN ANDRES HAS BEEN CONSIDERED TO BE ONE OF THE TWELVE (12)
MUNICIPALITIES COMPOSING THE THIRD DISTRICT OF THE PROVINCE OF QUEZON. EQUALLY
SIGNIFICANT IS SECTION 442(D) OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE TO THE EFFECT THAT
MUNICIPAL DISTRICTS ORGANIZED PURSUANT TO PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES OR EXECUTIVE
ORDERS AND WHICH HAVE THEIR RESPECTIVE SETS OF ELECTIVE MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS HOLDING
OFFICE AT THE TIME OF THE EFFECTIVITY OF (THE) CODE SHALL HENCEFORTH BE CONSIDERED AS
REGULAR MUNICIPALITIES.
ALL CONSIDERED, THE DE JURE STATUS OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN ANDRES IN THE PROVINCE
OF QUEZON MUST NOW BE CONCEDED.
 MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY VS. CA
RESPONDENT MUNICIPALITY'S SITUATION IN THE INSTANT CASE IS STRIKINGLY SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN ANDRES. RESPONDENT MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIA WAS CREATED BY VIRTUE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 265 IN 1949, OR TEN YEARS AHEAD OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN ANDRES, AND
THEREFORE HAD BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR ALL OF SIXTEEN YEARS WHEN PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL WAS
PROMULGATED. AND VARIOUS GOVERNMENTAL ACTS THROUGHOUT THE YEARS ALL INDICATE THE STATE'S
RECOGNITION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE EXISTENCE THEREOF. FOR INSTANCE, UNDER
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 33 ABOVE-MENTIONED, THE MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIA WAS COVERED BY THE
7TH MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT COURT OF ALICIA-MABINI FOR THE PROVINCE OF BOHOL. LIKEWISE, UNDER THE
ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, THE MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIA IS ONE OF TWENTY
MUNICIPALITIES COMPRISING THE THIRD DISTRICT OF BOHOL.
INASMUCH AS RESPONDENT MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIA IS SIMILARLY SITUATED AS THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN
ANDRES, IT SHOULD LIKEWISE BENEFIT FROM THE EFFECTS OF SECTION 442 (D) OF THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE, AND SHOULD HENCEFORTH BE CONSIDERED AS A REGULAR, DE JURE MUNICIPALITY.
 SEC. 442 OF RA 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE)

(D) MUNICIPALITIES EXISTING AS OF THE DATE OF THE EFFECTIVITY OF

THIS CODE SHALL CONTINUE TO EXIST AND OPERATE AS SUCH.
EXISTING MUNICIPAL DISTRICTS ORGANIZED PURSUANT TO
PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES OR EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND WHICH HAVE
THEIR RESPECTIVE SET OF ELECTIVE MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS HOLDING
OFFICE AT THE TIME OF THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS CODE SHALL
HENCEFORTH BE CONSIDERED AS REGULAR MUNICIPALITIES.
 MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ VS. BAZ
FACTS:
THE MUNICIPALITY OF SINACABAN WAS CREATED BY E.O. 258 BY THEN PRES. ELPIDIO QUIRINO, PURSUANT TO
SEC. 68 OF THE REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917.
BY VIRTUE OF MUNICIPAL COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO. 171, SINACABAN LAID CLAIM TO A PORTION OF BARRIO
TABO-O AND TO BARRIOS MACABAYAO, ADORABLE, SINARA, BAJA, AND SINARA ALTO, BASED ON THE
TECHNICAL DEDCRIPTION IN E.O. NO. 258. THE CLAIM WAS FILED WITH THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MISAMIS
OCCIDENTAL AGAINST THE MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ.
WHILE CONCEDING THAT THE DISPUTED AREA IS PART OF SINACABAN, THE MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ, IN ITS
ANSWER, NONETHELESS ASSERTED JURISDICTION ON THE BASIS OF AN AGREEMENT IT HAD WITH THE
MUNICIPALITY OF SINACABAN. THIS AGREEMENT, WHICH WAS APPROVED BY THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL IN ITS RESOLUTION NO. 77 DATED FEBRUARY 18, 1950, FIXED THE COMMON
BOUNDARY OF SINACABAN AND JIMENEZ.
ON OCTOBER 11, 1989, THE PROVINCIAL BOARD DECLARED THE DISPUTED AREA TO BE PART OF SINACABAN. IT
HELD THAT THE PREVIOUS RESOLUTION APPROVING THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS VOID SINCE
THE BOARD HAD NO POWER TO ALTER THE BOUNDARIES OF SINACABAN AS FIXED IN E.O. 258, THAT POWER
BEING VESTED IN CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LGC OF 1983 (BP 337), SEC. 134.
 ISSUE: WHETHER SINACABAN HAS LEGAL PERSONALITY TO FILE A CLAIM
HELD:
1. THE PRINCIPAL BASIS FOR THE VIEW THAT SINACABAN WAS NOT VALIDLY CREATED AS A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
IS THE RULING IN PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL THAT THE CREATION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS IS ESSENTIALLY A
LEGISLATIVE MATTER AND THEREFORE THE PRESIDENT WAS WITHOUT POWER TO CREATE BY EXECUTIVE ORDER THE
MUNICIPALITY OF SINACABAN. HOWEVER, WHERE A MUNICIPALITY CREATED AS SUCH BY EXECUTIVE ORDER IS
LATER IMPLIEDLY RECOGNIZED AND ITS ACTS ARE ACCORDED LEGAL VALIDITY, ITS CREATION CAN NO LONGER BE
QUESTIONED.
A MUNICIPALITY HAS BEEN CONFERRED THE STATUS OF AT LEAST A DE FACTO MUNICIPAL CORPORATION WHERE ITS
LEGAL EXISTENCE HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED AND ACQUIESCED PUBLICLY AND OFFICIALLY.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF SINACABAN ATTAINED A DE JURE STATUS BY VIRTUE OF THE ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, APPORTIONING LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, WHICH CONSIDERED
SINACABAN PART OF THE SECOND DISTRICT OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL. SEC. 442(D) OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CODE OF 1991 MUST BE DEEMED TO HAVE CURED ANY DEFECT IN THE CREATION OF SINACABAN SINCE IT STATES
THAT:
MUNICIPALITIES EXISTING AS OF THE DATE OF THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS CODE SHALL CONTINUE TO EXIST AND
OPERATE AS SUCH. EXISTING MUNICIPAL DISTRICTS ORGANIZED PURSUANT TO PRESIDENTIAL
ISSUANCES/EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND WHICH HAVE THEIR RESPECTIVE SET OF MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS HOLDING
OFFICE AT THE TIME OF THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS CODE SHALL HENCEFORTH BE REGULAR MUNICIPALITIES.