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Utilitarian theory of
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Introduction 2
Jeremy Bentham was a social reformer. He felt that people often had
responses to certain actions of pleasure or disgust that did not
reflect anything morally significant at all. Indeed, in his discussions of
homosexuality, for example, he explicitly notes that antipathy is not
sufficient reason to legislate against a practice:
The circumstances from which this antipathy may have taken its
rise may be worth enquiring to. One is the physical antipathy to
the offence. The act is to the highest degree odious and
disgusting, that is, not to the man who does it, for he does it only
because it gives him pleasure, but to one who thinks [?] of it. Be it so,
but what is that to him? (Bentham OAO, v. 4, 94)
7
Bentham then notes that people are prone to use their physical
antipathy as a pretext to transition to moral antipathy, and the
attending desire to punish the persons who offend their taste. This is
illegitimate on his view for a variety of reasons, one of which is that
to punish a person for violations of taste, or on the basis of prejudice,
would result in runaway punishments, one should never know
where to stop The prejudice in question can be dealt with by
showing it to be ill-grounded. This reduces the antipathy to the act
in question. This demonstrates an optimism in Bentham. If a pain can
be demonstrated to be based on false beliefs then he believes that
it can be altered or at the very least assuaged and reduced.
8
This is distinct from the view that a pain or pleasure based on a false
belief should be discounted. Bentham does not believe the latter. Thus
Bentham's hedonism is a very straightforward hedonism. The one
intrinsic good is pleasure, the bad is pain. We are to promote pleasure
and act to reduce pain.
When called upon to make a moral decision one measures an action's
value with respect to pleasure and pain according to the following:
intensity (how strong the pleasure or pain is),
duration (how long it lasts),
certainty (how likely the pleasure or pain is to be the result of the action),
proximity (how close the sensation will be to performance of the action),
fecundity (how likely it is to lead to further pleasures or pains),
purity (how much intermixture there is with the other sensation).
9
Though Bentham did not use this terminology, the calculus he devised
commonly known as the felicific calculusdescribes the elements or
dimensions of the value of a pain or pleasure. To an individual the value
of a pain or pleasure will be more or less according to its intensity,
duration, certainty or uncertainty, and its propinquity or
remoteness. Where the object is to measure the value of a pleasure or
pain in terms of the tendency of an act, there are two additional
circumstances to be taken into account: fecundity or the chance it
has of being followed by sensations of the same kind, and purity or
the chance it has of not being followed by sensations of
the opposite kind.
Where there are a number of persons, with reference to whom the
value of a pleasure or a pain is considered, a further circumstance must
be factored into the calculus, that is the extent or the number of
persons who are affected by the pleasure or pain.
Critiques 11