AUCTION BASED

RESOURCE
ALLOCATION IN
COGNITIVE RADIO
SYSTEMS

SUBMITTED BY :
SHAPHALI GUPTA (14462)

SUBMITTED TO :
DR. KRISHAN KUMAR
 MOTIVATION

The survey of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in

2002, shows that spectrum access is more significant problem
than physical scarcity of spectrum.

With many technological advances in the field of wireless

communication the demand for radio spectrum has
tremendously increased and with the standardization of
MBMS (multimedia broadcast and multicast services) it has
gained significant interest in the market unused spectrum.

Cognitive radio has attracted an increasing amount of interest

over the past few years as an effective method of alleviating
the spectrum scarcity problem in wireless communications.
 CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
BRIEF LITERATURE SURVEY
FUNDAMENTALS OF AUCTION THEORY
ALGORITHMS AND MODES
ISSUES IN DESIGNING AUCTION
SPECTRUM AUCTION FOR SUB CHANNELS
SPECIFIC DESIGN ISSUES
STIMULATIONS TO EVALUATE TERA & UERA
TERA VS UERA
EXPECTED RESULTS
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
 INTRODUCTION

The conventional fixed spectrum allocation approach is

unsuitable for flexible and efficient use of the scarce radio
spectrum.

Cognitive radio systems are designed to provide flexibility

and efficiency in spectrum usage by allowing unlicensed
users (i.e., secondary users) to access the spectrum
allocated to licensed users (i.e., primary users).

A cognitive radio system : single hop or multihop.

only one hop between the source and the destination.

 COMPONENTS
spectrum authorities : ultimate spectrum rights owners, such as
governments, who officially lease out spectrum licenses to primary
networks for long-term use.

primary networks: primary base stations and primary end users.

secondary networks: secondary base stations dynamically request

and access available spectrum from the primary base stations, and
use the spectrum to serve their secondary end users.
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
 BRIEF LITERATURE SURVEY

Different auction mechanisms used in the literature for the

design of cognitive radio systems are :

Single-Sided Auction and Double-Sided Auction :

Depending on the system model and assumption, an auction
can be single-sided or double-sided. If there is only a single
primary user or single secondary user, a single-sided auction
can be applied (i.e., forward or reverse auctions.

Centralized Process and Distributed Process :

Traditionally, auctions are held in a centralized fashion. In
particular, buyers and sellers submit bids and asks to the
central auctioneer, respectively.
 Periodic Auction and Continuous Auction :
Radio resource auctions can be either periodic or
continuous. In a periodic auction, primary and secondary
users submit asks and bids during a certain period. A market
is cleared at the end of each period.

Bidding Strategy Adaptation for Dynamic Auction

Mechanisms :
Cognitive radio users can adapt their bidding strategies
dynamically to be competitive and achieve the highest utility.
The strategy adaptation could be due to a change of
environment (e.g., time-varying channel quality) and/or a
change of other users' strategies
 FUNDAMENTALS OF AUCTION THEORY

Auction mechanisms can be categorized based on different

criteria.

1) opencry or sealed-bid:
open-cry auction, the buyers and sellers, respectively,
publicly reveal information about their bids and asks during
the auction process.

2) single-sided or double-sided:
single-sided auction, either buyers or sellers submit their bids
or asks, respectively.
doublesided auction, both buyers and sellers submit their
bids and asks.
3) forward or reverse:
forward auction, the buyers bid for commodities from
seller(s).

Sellers ask to sell commodities to buyer(s) in a reverse

auction.

4) static or dynamic:
static auction mechanism (e.g., a sealed-bid auction),
participants generally do not update their strategies based
on external information over time.

dynamic mechanism, the buyers and sellers have a chance

to update their strategies by collecting information from other
participants and the revealed past results.

5) single-unit or multi-unit : where only one or multiple

commodities are involved, respectively.
Different auction types, where arrows indicate commodities and money
transfers among entities in an auction: a) a forward auction with a single
seller; b) a reverse auction with a single buyer; c) a double auction; d) a
double auction in a complex market with multiple trading agents
AUCTION MODEL
Procedure for applying an auction to
allocate radio resources in a
cognitive radio system
ALGORITHM 1
Primary Notations
Algorithm 2
Mode for implementing algorithm
 ISSUES IN DESIGNING AUCTION BASED
APROACHES

Spectrum allocation in cognitive radio systems is more often referred

to as dynamic spectrum access (DSA) or opportunistic spectrum
access (OSA).

The different types of radio resources for auction are as follows:

Sub channel: The frequency bands unused by the primary

networks can be divided into sub channels. The secondary users
can bid for sub channels for their data transmission without
interfering with the transmission by primary users.

Time slot: Spectrum can also be divided in the time domain. An

available time period to access a channel is divided into time slots
as auction commodities .
 Transmit power or signal-to-interference plus- noise ratio
(SINR) level : The transmission by secondary users may
cause interference to the primary users.

Network service : In a heterogeneous network with multiple

radio transmission technologies, different wireless access
networks (e.g., wideband code-division multiple access
[WCDMA] can be seen as commodities for an auction .
A spectrum auction for sub channels; b) a spectrum auction for time slots; c)
a spectrum auction for levels of transmit power; d) an area covered by
different types of network service (e.g., the buyer in the middle is covered by
Bluetooth, 802.11b, and WCDMA simultaneously).
 SPECIFIC DESIGN ISSUES
Currency and Payment Design
Currency, generally referred to as money, is an incentive for the
radio resource sellers (e.g., primary users) to participate in an
auction.

In a cognitive radio system, through auction, the sellers sell the radio
resources to buyers (e.g., secondary users).

Once the radio resources are allocated to the buyers, they make a
payment to the sellers using conducted by spectrum authorities.

In such auctions, the currency can be real cash.

Therefore, in the secondary spectrum auction, fictitious currency

may be used which is designed as a signal representative of some
amount of real currency.
 OPEN ISSUES

The auction theory provides rich tools to model and analyze the
incentivized interactions among the primary and secondary users
and would be useful to analyze the economics of cognitive radio
systems. The issues are :

Joint resource auction.

Complex market and brokerage design.

Design of auction-based practical resource sharing methods and

protocol framework.

Payment and settlement security .

STIMULATIONS TO EVALUATE
TERA AND UERA
TERA Vs UERA
EXPECTED RESULTS
RND : TRUTHFUL SCHEME THAT CHOOSES
WINNER RANDOMLY
 CONCLUSION
We present a survey on auction theory and its
applications in cognitive radio systems.

We first provide an overview of the fundamental

concepts, theories and objectives of general auctions.

Then we introduce the techniques to map the resource

allocation problems onto auction models, and provide
some examples on auctions in cognitive radio systems
with different characteristics.

Afterward, we present some specific design issues.

Finally, several open issues on auction- based design

of cognitive radio systems are outlined.
 REFERENCES
[1] E. Hossain, D. Niyato, and Z. Han, Dynamic Spectrum
Access and Management in Cognitive Radio Networks,
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009.

[2] I. F. Akyildiz et al., NeXt Generation/Dynamic Spectrum

Access/Cognitive Radio Wireless Networks: A Survey,
Computer Networks, vol. 50, no. 13, 2006, pp. 212759.

[3] V. Krishna, Auction Theory, Academic Press, 2002, Ch. 1,

pp. 45.

[4] S. Parsons, J. A. Rodriguez-Aguilar, and M. Klein, Auctions

and Bidding: A Guide for Computer Scientists, ACM
Computing Surveys, vol. 43, Feb. 2011, pp. 10:159.