Bab

4
Process Safety

Prof. Yulianto S Nugroho dan Tim

Faculty of Engineering University of Indonesia

Yulianto S Nugroho dan Tim

 Outline of talk
Introduction : what is process safety ?
Inherently safer and more user-friendly design
Incident investigation and human error
Institutional memory
Process safety analysis
Hazard analysis
Risk analysis
Project review and audit process
Safety devices
Hazardous material and conditions

Reference :
Perrys Chemical Engineering Handbook, 1999
2
Charles A. Wentz, Safety, Health and Environmental Protection, MGH, 1998.
Dr. Ir. Yulianto S Nugroho, MSc
 Introduction
In recent years there has been an increased emphasis on
process safety as a result of a number of serious accidents.
This is due in part to the worldwide attention to issues in the
chemical industry brought on by several dramatic accidents
involving gas releases, major explosions, and environmental
incidents. Public awareness of these and other accidents has
provided a driving force for industry to improve its safety
record.
Hazards from combustion and runaway reactions play a
leading role in many chemical process accidents. Knowledge
of these reactions is essential for control of process hazards. It
is important that loss of containment be avoided.

3 Dr. Ir. Yulianto S Nugroho, MSc

 Introduction (cont)

Process safety differs from the traditional approach to accident

prevention in a number of ways.
There is more concern with accidents that arise out of the
technology.
There is more emphasis on foreseeing hazards and taking
action before accidents occur.
There is more emphasis on a systematic rather than a trial-and
error approach.
Traditional practices and standards are looked at more
critically.

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 Inherently safer and more user-friendly
design

For many years the usual procedure in plant design was to

identify the hazards, by one of the systematic techniques or by
waiting until an accident occurred, and then add on protective
equipment to control future accidents or protect people from
their consequences. This protective equipment is often
complex and expensive and requires regular testing and
maintenance. It often interferes with the smooth operation of
the plant and is sometimes bypassed. Gradually the industry
came to realize that, whenever possible, one should design
user-friendly plants which can withstand human error and
equipment failure without serious effects on safety (and output
and efficiency).

5 Dr. Ir. Yulianto S Nugroho, MSc

 Inherently safer and more user-friendly
design (cont)
Rather than add on equipment to control hazards or to protect
people from their consequences, it is better to design user-
friendly plants which can withstand human error and
equipment failure without serious effects on safety, the
environment, output, and efficiency.
The most effective way of designing user-friendly plants is to
avoid, when possible, large inventories of hazardous materials
in process or storage.
What you dont have, cant leak.
Plants in which we avoid a hazard, by reducing inventories or
avoiding hazardous reactions, are usually called inherently
safer.

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 Inherently safer and more user-friendly
design (cont)
The principle ways of designing inherently safer
plants:
Intensification
This involves using so little hazardous material that it does not
matter if it all leaks out.
Substitution If intensification is not possible, then an alternative is
to consider using a safer material in place of a hazardous one. Thus
it may be possible to replace flammable solvents, refrigerants, and
heat-transfer media by non-flammable or less flammable.
Attenuation Another alternative to intensification is attenuation,
using a hazardous material under the least hazardous conditions.

7 Dr. Ir. Yulianto S Nugroho, MSc

 Inherently safer and more user-friendly
design (cont)
Limitation of Effects of Failures Limitation can be done by
equipment design or change in reaction conditions, rather than by
adding on protective equipment.
Simplification Simpler plants are friendlier than complex ones, as
they provide fewer opportunities for error and less equipment which
can fail.
Knock-on Effects Plants should be designed so that those
incidents better
that do occur do not produce knock-on or domino effects.
Avoiding Incorrect Assembly Plants should be designed so that
incorrect assembly is difficult or impossible.

8 Dr. Ir. Yulianto S Nugroho, MSc

 Inherently safer and more user-friendly
design (cont)
Status Clear It should be possible to see at a glance if equipment
has been assembled or installed incorrectly or whether a valve is in
the open or shut position.
Tolerance Whenever possible, equipment should tolerate poor
installation or operation without failure.
Low Leak Rate If friendly equipment does leak, it does so at a low
rate, which is easy to stop or control.
Ease of Control Processes with a flat response to change are
obviously friendlier than those with a steep response.
Software In some programmable electronic systems (PES), errors
are much easier to detect and correct than in others.

9 Dr. Ir. Yulianto S Nugroho, MSc

 Incident investigation

Although most companies investigate accidents (and

many investigate dangerous incidents in which no one
was injured), these investigations are often superficial,
and we fail to learn all the lessons for which we have paid
the high price of an accident. The facts are usually
recorded correctly, but often only superficial conclusions
are drawn from them.

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 Institutional memory

Most accidents do not occur because we do not

know how to prevent them but because we do
not use the information that is available. The
recommendations made after an accident are
forgotten when the people involved have left the
plant; the procedures they introduced are
allowed to lapse, the equipment they installed is
no longer used, and the accident happens again.

11 Dr. Ir. Yulianto S Nugroho, MSc

 Institutional memory (cont)
Many accidents have occurred because the two procedures
below were unsatisfactory or were not followed.
Preparation of Equipment for Maintenance :
Isolation of the equipment under maintenance, Identification of the
equipment, Freeing from hazardous materials, Jobs which raise
special problems, Handover, Change of intent, .
Control of Plant and Process Modifications
Many accidents have occurred because plant or process
modifications had unforeseen and unsafe side effects. No such
modifications should therefore be made until they have been
authorized by a professionally qualified person who has made a
systematic attempt to identify and assess the consequences of
the proposal, by hazard and operability study or a similar
technique.
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 Process safety analysis
Hazard analysis :

The meaning of hazard is often confused with risk. Hazard is

defined as the inherent potential of a material or activity to harm
people, property, or the environment. Hazard does not have a
probability component.
Process Hazard Analysis Methods Listed in the OSHA Process Safety
Management Rule

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 Process safety analysis (cont)
System for hazard identification :

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 Risk analysis

Risk is a measure of economic loss or human injury in terms

of both incident likelihood (frequency) and the magnitude of the
loss or injury (consequence).
Risk analysis The development of an estimate of risk based
on engineering evaluation and mathematical techniques for
combining estimates of incident consequences and
frequencies. Incidents in the context of the discussion in this
chapter are acute events which involve loss of containment of
material or energy.

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 Risk analysis (cont)
The components of a risk analysis involve the estimation of the
frequency of an event, an estimation of the consequences (the
extent of the material or energy release and its impact on
population, property, or environment), and the selection and
generation of the estimate of risk itself.
A risk analysis can have a variety of potential goals:
1. To screen or bracket a number of risks in order to prioritise them
for possible future study
2. To estimate risk to employees
3. To estimate risk to the public
4. To estimate financial risk
5. To evaluate a range of risk reduction measures
6. To meet legal or regulatory requirements
7. To assist in emergency planning
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 HAZOP example

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