Saturday, December 23, 2017 1 munim010@gmail.com Thomas Acquinas • Ancient Natural Law Theory of Thomas Acquinas: Aquinas married Aristotle’s natural law theory with the Christian tradition to develop the most refined theory of natural law before the twentieth century, and his work is a fundamental reference point for all natural law theorists. Acquinas’s natural law theory shows man, because of his reason, to be a participant in divine wisdom, whose purpose is to live in a flourishing Christian community. Law is a necessary institution in such a community, and just laws will reflect directly (specificatio) or indirectly (determinatio) the universal morality of natural law.
Barrister MTH Munim @ 01943699187 &
Saturday, December 23, 2017 2 munim010@gmail.com Lon Fuller • Modern natural law theory II: Lon Fuller: Unlike Finnis, Fuller did not aim to produce a morality of law on the basis of a general moral theory in keeping with the ancient natural law traditions; rather, he sought to explain the moral content in the idea of ‘the rule of law’, i.e. governance by rules and judicial institutions as opposed to other sorts of political decision-making or ordering, such as military command or bureaucratic administration. The morality he describes is morality as ‘legality’, meaning morally sound aspects of governing by rules. For this reason, Fuller is often credited with devising a ‘procedural’ natural law theory, in that he does not focus on the substantive content of legal rules and assess them as to whether they are moral or not, but rather concerns himself with the requirements of just law-making and administration.
Barrister MTH Munim @ 01943699187 &
Saturday, December 23, 2017 3 munim010@gmail.com Hart-Fuller Debate: The Nazi Grudge Informer Case • Legal Positivism: HLA Hart: Hart’s defences against natural law theory: The Nazi Grudge Informer Case: Hart-Fuller Debate: The grudge informer case arises in well-known debate between Professor Hart and Professor Lon Fuller of the Harvard Law School in 1958. The debate is a classic of modern jurisprudence, Hart taking the positivist line and Fuller the anti-positivist natural law line. The facts were that in 1944 the defendant denounced her husband to the Gestapo for having said something insulting about Hitler when the husband was home on leave from the German army. She had a ‘grudge’ against him – something such cases were not uncommon at the time. The husband was arrested and sentenced to death in accordance with a Nazi statute that made it illegal to make statements detrimental to the German government. In 1949, the wife was charged, in a West German Court, with having committed the offence of unlawfully depriving a person of his freedom which was a crime under the German Criminal Code of 1871, which had remained in force continuously since its enactment. (The Nazi statute that had made it illegal to make disparaging statements about the German government had been repealed by 1949.) The wife pleaded in defence that what she had done was lawful when she did it in 1944. That is, she had not unlawfully deprived her husband of freedom, because it was made lawful by the Nazi statutes in force then. When the case came to the appeal court, although the woman was allowed her appeal on other grounds, the court accepted the argument that the Nazi statute would not have been valid if it were so contrary to the sound conscience and sense of justice of all decent human beings. If so, it would have followed that this statute did not make it lawful to deprive people of their freedom when they denounced Hitler, so that, at the time the defendant informed the Gestapo about her husband’s remarks, she could have committed an offence under the German Criminal Code of 1871. According to positivism, the grudge informer acted legally but immorally. According to natural law, her immoral action did not afford her a legal defence. Hart says the positivist way of understanding the position is better because it rightly allows the grudge informer a defence. This argument suggests that Hart thinks positivism must be justified by reference to its producing in practice morally better results than natural law. If so, that implies that there is a moral basis to his theory of positivism.