PRODUCTION OPERATORS – II

OIL PRODUCTION SAFETY

1. INTRODUCTION
Safety is everybody's business. Safe operating practices and procedures of
personnel and equipment are important to prevent the loss of life and the
loss of production.
• From the proceeding operating training manuals you should now be aware of
the basic safety guidelines and practices.
• This module of training has been designed to acquaint you with the hazards
and most likely points of failure from an operational viewpoint of an oil
production facility.
• The content of this module describes the design and operation of equipment,
equipment weak points, operating conditions that can be hazardous and how
the operator tackles them.
• This is the last module in oil plant operation training, but remember safety
comes first.
 ATTITUDE
• Safety is an attitude that the operator adopts and shows when planning his work
to include the following:
a the protective equipment required,
b the special precautions and procedures to be followed,
c knowledge of the plant and equipment, its operational parameters and
limitations,
d preparation for the unknown factors,
e asking for help.
• Accidents occur when the operator attempts to correct a situation or malfunction
without waiting for assistance or preparing for the worst.
• If the operator sustains an injury, or worse, the company probably loses two or
three times the production they would have lost while waiting for assistance to
arrive.
• The operator may lose his job or even his life.
THE PROPERTIES OF FIRE
• To the operator, the most hazardous aspect of working with petroleum fluids is
the possibility of fire.
• Most oil plant hydrocarbons will readily ignite from a spark, or if they are heated
by contacting a hot surface such as a heater exhaust stack or engine.
• A fire only occurs if three basic components are present at the same time:
1 Fuel - hydrocarbon gas or crude oil and lubricating oil for example.
2 Air - oxygen.
3 Heat - to ignite the fuel/air mixture.
• Generally, eliminating any one of the three basic components prevents fire. In
the oil field specifically, eliminating the last two components; air and heat
prevents fire.
• All oil field equipment contains only hydrocarbons (there is no air present) and
operates at temperatures below the combustion point.
• There is no danger from fire or explosion as long as air and heat can be
excluded from the equipment - at all times.
FLASH POINT TEMPERATURE OF HYDROCARBONS
• Liquid hydrocarbons will not burn, only their vapours burn when mixed with the
correct quantity of air.
• All hydrocarbon liquids produce vapours, it is these vapours that burn.
• In a vessel hydrocarbon liquid is continually vaporising and filling the space
above the liquid with vapours.
• Ignition takes place in the vapour space; the heat from the resulting fire
increases the rate of vaporisation of the liquid and the fire continues to burn.
• The flash point of a hydrocarbon liquid is the temperature at which sufficient
vapours are present for ignition to occur.
• The flash point of common hydrocarbons such as crude oil, kerosene, diesel
fuel, and lubricating oil varies from 100OF to 250OF.
• If a lighted match were thrown into a bucket of kerosene, which was at a
temperature below its flash point, no fire would occur; there would not be
sufficient vapours present to support combustion.
• If hydrocarbon liquids can be stored at temperatures below their flash point
temperature the risk of fire is reduced.
FLAMMABILITY LIMITS OF HYDROCARBONS
• Hydrocarbons must be in vapour phase in order to burn, also, these vapours
must be mixed with air before ignition and combustion can occur.
• Hydrocarbon vapours must be in a specific % mixture with air for burning to
start. This % mixture is known as the ‘flammability limit' and is shown in Table
14.01.
• In order for natural gas (methane) to burn in air, the concentration of natural gas
must be at least 5% and no greater than 15%.
• This means that if the gas and air mixture has less than 5% gas, it is too lean to
burn; if it has more than 15%, it is too rich to burn.
• The concentration of hydrocarbon vapour in air must be within the flammability
limits before burning will take place.
• The difficulty in lighting gas burners or flame front generators is often due to
insufficient air so that the mixture is too rich (with gas) to ignite. Increasing the
primary air register on the burner usually corrects the mixture and solves the
problem.
• When venting and purging vessels the possibility of `pockets' of a combustible
mixture somewhere inside the vessel exists, always gas test after purging.
• Fire tubes should be air purged before firing starts to remove pockets of
combustible gas to prevent fire tube explosions
IGNITION TEMPERATURE OF HYDROCARBONS
• A combustible hydrocarbon vapour and air mixture will not burn until it is heated
to its ignition temperature and sufficient heat is generated to keep the
temperature above the ignition point temperature.
• Different hydrocarbons and hydrocarbon mixtures have different ignition
temperatures, refer to Table 14.01.
• Notice that the ignition temperature is higher for the lighter and more volatile
hydrocarbons, than for the heavier liquid mixtures such as kerosene and crude oil.
• It is not necessary for a spark or flame to be present for a hydrocarbon vapour to
ignite.
• If the vapour is mixed with air within its flammability limits, ignition will take place
as soon as the mixture reaches the ignition temperature.
• This could be caused by a hot surface such as a heater exhaust stack. All
hydrocarbon leaks on oil plants must be considered hazardous and corrective
action taken to stop the leak immediately.
• When a hydrocarbon burns a chemical reaction takes place, in which the hydrogen
and carbon atoms combine with oxygen in the air to form water and carbon
dioxide.
• This chemical reaction will only occur when the temperature of the mixture reaches
the ignition point.
• Fire is actually the result of the heat that is released when the reaction occurs.
• The chemical reaction for the combustion of methane can be written like this:,
CH4 202 CO2 2H2O
Methane + Oxygen --> Carbon Dioxide + Water
• The above burning reaction will stop if the temperature at the point of
combustion decreases below the ignition temperature, which for Ch. is 1,200OF.
• However, once a hydrocarbon fire starts, the flame temperature is about
3,500OF, which is well above the ignition temperature.
• The fire will continue to burn until the fuel source is depleted, or the fire is
extinguished by removing one of the three components of fire.
• NOTE: When you blow out a match, you are simply cooling the
combustible material below its ignition temperature, and the flame is
extinguished.
OPERATIONAL EXAMPLE:
• A flange leak develops on a gas compressor and a mixture of 8% propane and
92% air contacts the hot surface of a gas turbine exhaust stack (940OF). What
will happen?
 CONCLUSION:
• From Table 14.01, the concentration of propane gas in air is within the
flammability limits of 2.1 - 9.5% and the temperature of the exhaust stack is
above the ignition temperature of 915OF. The mixture will burn or most probably
explode.
PREPARATION OF OIL PLANT EQUIPMENT FOR MAINTENANCE
• This section on oil plant safety discusses the procedures involved when vessels
and equipment containing hydrocarbons require shutting down, and opening to
the atmosphere to make repairs or perform other maintenance work. These
procedures are conducted by the oil plant operator after a shutdown and make
equipment safe to work for the maintenance crew.
REMOVAL OF HYDROCARBONS
• The two main hazards from opening equipment to the air are:
• 1 Hydrocarbons leaking from the equipment, and creating a dangerous
atmosphere.
• 2 Hydrocarbons leaking into equipment when personnel are present.
• All hydrocarbons, liquid and vapour, must be removed safely and replaced with
air before equipment can be safely entered or worked on.
• In addition, each hydrocarbon connecting line must be isolated to prevent the
possibility of leakage into the equipment.
VESSEL ISOLATION
• A closed valve is not a positive means of stopping or isolating flow into a vessel.
Valves can pass or leak.
• The double block and bleed valve arrangement shown in Figure 14.01 can
safely isolate flow, when the block valves are both closed and the bleed valve is
open to the atmosphere.
• A leak through the upstream block valve will flow out of the bleed valve and not
enter the vessel or equipment.
• Lines frequently only have one block valve. Installing a metal plate into a
downstream flange or the downstream valve flange makes correct isolation.
• The metal plate is called a spade or blind and must be of sufficient thickness to
withstand the full upstream pressure on the line, or it may rupture if the block
valve fails. See Figure 14.02.
• On high-pressure lines a safer arrangement is to install a spacer between the
blind and the downstream side flange face.
• This allows valve leakage to flow out of the flange at the spacer. See Figure
14.03.
• The double block or bleed or spacer can be used when little or no leakage is
expected from the upstream blockage.
• If leakage is expected to create a hazard, a full thickness blind must be
installed.
PROCEDURE TO PREPARE VESSELS FOR ENTRY
• The general procedure for preparing vessels for personnel entry is as follows:
Use Figure 14.04.
1 Stop the process flow into the vessel.
2 Stop the flow of all streams entering and leaving the vessel by closing valves.
Valve isolation.
• 3 Drain liquid hydrocarbons.
4 Depressure the vessel through the PSV bypass and/or vent to 0 pressure.
5 Install blinds in every vessel nozzle that does not have double block and
bleed valves
6 Displace the remaining hydrocarbon vapours in the vessel by filling with
water.
7 Drain the water with vent valves open to allow the vessel to fill with air as it
drains.
8 In some vessels it may be necessary to chemically clean to remove heavier
hydrocarbon deposits that adhere to the vessel walls and internal devices.
9 After the vessel is isolated and hydrocarbons displaced, remove the manway
and sample the internal atmosphere using a gas tester instrument. The gas
tester ensures that no hydrocarbon vapours are present. If the gas test fails
steps 6 - 9 must be repeated until the gas test shows negative hydrocarbons.
10 Before entry into the vessel an oxygen content test must be carried out to
show that the internal atmosphere is at least 20% O2 . Personnel working
inside the vessel are usually provided with an air hose mask or self-
contained breathing apparatus, plus a lifeline for rescue purposes. Two men
should be outside the vessel at all times to attend and assist the man
working inside the vessel.
• One of the outside attendants should also have breathing apparatus available to
effect a rescue if required. The vessel should be adequately ventilated at all
times.
PROCEDURE TO PREPARE VESSELS AND EQUIPMENT FOR START-UP
• Before vessels and equipment can be placed into service after maintenance two
important safety procedures must be carried out by the operator:
• The air must be displaced or purged out.
• The vessel or equipment must be pressure tested to ensure that there are no
leaks.
• 1 Remove blinds from flanges that were installed at shutdown.
• 2 Ensure vent valve open. Displace or purge air from the vessel by filling with
water.
• 3 Pressurise the vessel to its normal operating pressure while it is filled with
water. Check every flange and fitting that was open during the shutdown for
leaks. Flange leaks are detected by sealing the mating flanges with tape
(masking tape) and punching a hole in the tape at a low point.
• Water will drip out of the hole if the flange leaks. See Figure 14.06.
• 4 After leak testing, displace the water with nitrogen. Introduce nitrogen into the
top of the vessel, and allow water to flow out of the bottom.
• 5 If the vessel requires drying, allow nitrogen to flow for long enough to remove
the moisture. After displacing water, or drying the vessel, pressurize the
vessel to 2 psig with nitrogen to prevent air from re-entering. Maintain a
positive nitrogen pressure.
• 6 Displace nitrogen by opening the vent valve and crack open the vessel inlet
valve. Allow the inlet stream to flow into the vessel long enough to displace
the nitrogen completely.
• 7 Now, the vessel can be put in service by opening all the inlet and outlet valves.
PRESSURING AND DEPRESSURING VESSELS
• During pressuring and depressuring operations of gas plant equipment
consideration must be given to the high operating pressures and high velocities of
gas.
• Caution must be taken to prevent damage to vessel internal devices from excessive
flowrates.
• For example, the mist extractor in a separator can be distorted from a rapid flow
of gas; or the bubble caps or trays in a glycol contactor can blow off.
• A repressuring and depressuring rate of 50 p.s.i.g. per minute will not result in
damage to internal devices in vessels.
VENTING
• When venting a vessel or item of process equipment to atmosphere all the
components for fire are present.
• Fuel and air are present, and heat for ignition is possible from static
electricity or a spark that may come from a metal tool striking the vent line.
• The safest way to vent equipment is into a flare or burn-pit system that is lit.
• Vent lines sometimes discharge directly to the atmosphere at a safe distance
above or away from the vessel or equipment.
• Venting vessels directly to the atmosphere can be hazardous when the vapours
are heavier than air.
• Heavy gas falls to the ground and accumulates in clouds, if a heat source is
present nearby the vapour cloud will ignite and the fire will flash back to the vent
on the vessel.
• Heavy vapours should always be vented to a flare or burnpit and burnt off safely
MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT SAFETY PRACTICES
• 1 When a pump, compressor or generator is shut down for repair, ensure that
the driver cannot be started during maintenance.
• Electric motors should be electrically isolated by locking off at the master
power supply switch and attaching a 'Do Not Operate' warning tag. If the
driver is an engine, lock the fuel valves in the closed' position and attach
warning tags.
• 2 Process instruments must be checked for correct operation before start-up.
An instrument control loop is functionally checked by imposing a process
input signal to the controller, and observing the movement of the control
valve.
• 3 Before vessels are closed after repair, the operator should visually inspect
inside them, to ensure that all tools and maintenance equipment have been
removed.
• 4 If electric motors have been disconnected during repair, the motor should be
checked for correct direction of rotation before start-up.
 SAFETY FACTORS IN PROCESS EQUIPMENT
• Safety factors are built into all oil field equipment to prevent failure under the
severest operating conditions.
• All pressure vessels and equipment, such as separators and towers, pumps
and compressors, are built to strict specifications.
• They are designed to operate at a pressure at least 10% above normal
operating pressure, and at temperatures much higher than normal operating
temperatures.
PRESSURE VESSELS
• During the design stage, the construction specification for process vessels
usually requires a safety factor of 4.
• The safety factor represents 4 times the minimum thickness of metal required to
contain the design pressure of the vessel.
• Most pressure vessels are designed with a safety factor of 4, at a standard
operating temperature of 650OF, this is much higher than most oil field operating
temperatures.
PRESSURE SAFETY VALVES
• All pressure vessels are equipped with pressure safety valves (PSV) or rupture
discs that are designed to open and relieve the pressure if it reaches 10%
above the design pressures
• PSVs are also sized to release the total fluid inlet flow to the vessel to prevent
pressure continuing to increase after the PSV has opened.
1. METAL FATIGUE
• Vessel failure is usually due to metal fatigue caused by one or snore of the
following:
• a heating,
• b cooling,
• c corrosion,
• d vibration from pumps and compressors,
• e wind action.
• Metal fatigue failure usually occurs around a nozzle connection where corrosion
frequently occurs, or vibration is concentrated.
• Small cracks appear long before a major rupture occurs.
PIPING
• The safety factor for piping depends on location. Oil plant piping, where there is
continual exposure to personnel, has the same safety factor as pressure vessels.
• Piping in wellhead areas and flowlines because of less exposure to personnel,
usually has a safety factor rating of 2.
 ROTATING EQUIPMENT
• Process pump and compressor casings are made of cast-iron which has a high
resistance to corrosion and wear, but it is not ductile and will therefore break if
subjected to piping strain or continuous vibrations.
• Excessive operating conditions of pressure and temperature will damage
rotating equipment packing, seals, valves and pistons.
• The casing will not be damaged by excessive pressure or temperature as long
as correct lubrication is maintained.
GENERAL
• The maximum limit of pressure and temperature that can safely be tolerated by
oil plant process vessels and equipment is generally 10% above the design
parameter.
• The design parameter is usually stated on Process Piping and Instrument
Diagrams (P&IDs) which the operator uses as a reference and guidance.
• If an operating condition increases above the 10% point the operator should
report it immediately to his supervisor for operational and engineering advice.
The design pressure and temperature are stamped on the name-plate on the
individual item of equipment.
 FIRED HEATERS
GENERAL
• A fired heater has the potential for being the most hazardous item of equipment
on an oil plant, it is also the most heavily protected with safety shutdown
systems.
• The main hazard from a heater is ‘flame failure', and the subsequent explosion
of fuel which enters the fire tube and is ignited by a premature restart or a hot
stack.
• If a flame failure occurs, block in the fuel gas immediately, and allow the heater
to purge and cool for at least 5 minutes before trying to restart.
• Every heater has its own distinctive operating noise.
• Often, a change in the noise pattern is a better indication of a malfunction than
instruments on the heater.
• An alert operator familiarizes himself with the sounds of each heater so that he
can detect an abnormal condition and take the required corrective action.
 FIRE TUBE TYPE HEATERS
• Fire tube heaters are used on both Laghari and Mazari oil production facilities,
listed below are the principal hazardous conditions to check and be aware of:
1 Overfiring.
2 Low liquid level around the fire tube.
3 High temperature of liquid surrounding the fire tube.
4 Fuel gas quality.
5 Leaking fire tube.
Overfiring
Overfiring the burner can result in a fire tube failure, and is caused by incorrect
air adjustment or high fuel gas pressure on the burner.
Low Liquid Level
The fire tube must be totally immersed in liquid at all times. If a section of
the tube is not covered by liquid, it will quickly melt. The liquid level should be
monitored frequently, and corrective action taken if the level drops close to the
top of the tube.
• High Liquid Temperature
• The temperature of the liquid surrounding the fire tube should be within a few
degrees of the set point on the temperature controller, which controls the supply of
fuel gas to the burner.
• Increasing the temperature of the surrounding liquid above the required process
parameter will not damage the heater as long as the burner does not over fire.
But, increasing the liquid temperature above the specified set point may cause the
liquid to decompose.
• Other hydrocarbons may form tar compounds and coke if the specified set point
temperature is increased. In any event fuel gas will be wasted.
• The temperature of the liquid surrounding the fire tube must be monitored
frequently and the temperature controller adjusted to maintain the liquid
temperature at its set point.
• Fuel Gas Quality
• The major impurity in the fuel gas is liquid hydrocarbon. A fuel gas liquid scrubber
is usually installed in the fuel gas supply line to remove liquid from the gas before it
enters the burner.
• If a slug of liquid enters the burner it will cause a momentary flame failure, and on
relighting possible explosion from burning liquid in the bottom of the fire tube.
• A fuel gas preheat coil located in the bottom of the heater and immersed in the hot
liquid is a proven method of reducing the possibility of liquid entering the burner.
• The hot liquid heats the fuel gas to vaporise any hydrocarbon liquid that may have
condensed in the supply line.
• Frequently check the fuel gas scrubber to ensure that it is functioning correctly.
• Leaking Fire Tube
• A leaking f ire tube is an indirect fired heater, such as the Mazari electrostatic
heater-treater and
• the production separator fire tube at Laghari, is a common hazard.
• The liquid that surrounds the fire tube is crude oil which is highly flammable, can
ignite and burn the unit down. See Figure 14.07.
A leaking fire tube is usually caused by one of the following:
a overfiring,
b flame impingement on the tube,
 c scale on the tube which causes a hot spot that melts the tube,
d corrosion of the tube caused by salt and acidic compounds,
e exposure of the tube caused by low liquid level, which results in melting the
exposed section of the tube.
Overfiring and Flame Impingement
• The flame pattern should be observed, and if flame impingement is occurring, the
air must be adjusted or the burner removed and cleaned.
• Sometimes it is necessary to reposition the burner in the tube so that the flame
does not contact the tube.
• Scale and Corrosion
• Scale deposits and accumulations or corrosion usually occur on the outside of the
tube, and result in localized hot spots which are normally visible from the
inspection hatch or peep sight.
• At night hot spots on the inside of the fire tube are easily seen as a red glow on
the metal tube.
• Fire tubes should be removed from heaters every three years and inspected for
scale or corrosion.
• If left uncorrected a hot spot will quickly deteriorate and eventually melt the tube
causing a massive fire.
• A small leak in a heater fire tube is visible in black smoke coming out of the
heater stack.
• As the leak becomes larger, liquid will drip or pour out of the burner assembly
end of the fire tube and may quickly ignite.
• A heater with a suspected tube leak must be reported immediately so that the
leak can be confirmed and the unit shut down before a total tube failure occurs.
SEPARATORS
• One of the most important controls on separator vessels is level.
• A failure or malfunction of level control devices can cause serious operational
problems:
1 A high liquid level will cause liquid carryover in the gas outlet stream.
• Liquid in the gas stream will cause foaming in the glycol dehydration unit, which
results in liquid in the fuel gas supply to the glycol reboiler heater. Liquid in the
fuel gas will cause flame failure, or worse!
2 A low liquid level will cause gas flow out of the oil outlet line and over-
pressure the downstream treating equipment.
• Pumps will vapour lock.
• Sight or level glasses are used to check the liquid level inside separators, and
they often become blocked with dirt, or show a false level.
• When both water and oil levels are measured in a level glass, a dirty cuff usually
appears at the interface which obscures the true level.
• This cuff must be flushed out to obtain a true interface level indication.
• Operators should keep level glasses clean, a practical method is shown in
Figure 14.08, reversing the drain valve.
1. WELLHEAD ASSEMBLIES
• The numerous valves, fittings and pressure gauges on a wellhead assembly are
all a possible source of leakage. All valves on the wellhead should be lubricated
so that they are free to move when required. Valves that are not connected to
lines should be plugged (bull plug) and have a pressure gauge and bleed valve
attached. See Figure 14.09. With this arrangement, pressure on the plugged
side can be safely bled off and indicated on the gauge before the plug is
removed.
• It is unsafe to fit bull plugs to unconnected valves without a gauge and bleed
valve.
• A slight leakage in the valve will produce wellhead pressure inside the plug,
which if loosened will blast off with great force.
• Before removing a fitting from a wellhead or changing a bean in a choke, two
pressure gauges should be installed to the fitting and the pressure vented.
• Many serious injuries to operators have occurred on high pressure gauge or
bleed valves becoming blocked with debris and the operator thought the fitting
had been depressured.
• A second pressure gauge reduces this hazard.
PUMPS
• The main hazard from gas plant process pumps is that of leaking seals or
packing.
• Repairs must be made promptly, because the leak quickly becomes worse if no
action is taken.
• Packing usually lasts for about a year in most applications; mechanical pump
seals are safer and more efficient and last a lot longer before requiring
maintenance.
• Hot oil,' pump seals, such as the stabilizer condensate circulation pumps should
be given special attention, because the failure of these mechanical seals has
caused many serious fires in the field.
• A common cause of seal failure on these pumps is insufficient cooling of the
seal flushing circulation.
1. ATMOSPHERIC STORAGE TANKS
• Crude oil storage tanks operate at or near atmospheric pressure; there is a
possibility of air entering into the tanks and creating a combustible mixture.
• When a crude oil tank is pumped out, pressure inside the tank falls and air
enters the tank, creating a possible hazardous combustible mixture of
hydrocarbon vapour and air. When pumping stops and crude oil production is
diverted back into the tank, the combustible mixture is forced out of the tank
vent and could be ignited by lightning or static electricity. The flame at the vent
could travel back into the tank, igniting the vapours. See Figure 14.10.
 FLAME ARRESTERS
• Atmospheric storage tanks usually have ‘flame arresters' installed in the vent
connections. A f lame arrester is a cooler.
• If the vapour leaving the tank ignites, the flame will move to the flame arrester,
where it cools to below the ignition temperature and extinguishes.
• Flame arresters should be inspected regularly by operators and cleaned as
necessary. See Figure 14.11.
BLANKET GAS
• Air can also be excluded from atmospheric tanks by using a blanket gas'
system, where a stream of gas (fuel gas) is introduced into the top of the tank to
maintain a slight positive pressure inside at all times.
• A pressure regulator in a supply blanket gas line maintains constant pressure of
a few inches water gauge inside the tank.
• A vent or pressure safety valve allows excessive gas pressure to exit the tank.
• The pressure in the system should be monitored frequently to ensure that the
pressure regulator and PSV are functioning correctly. See Figure 14.12.
 VACUUM
• Another problem that can occur with storage tanks is that of vacuum
• Tanks can collapse under a vacuum. A vacuum can occur when pumping out a
tank, if the blanket gas system or air vent is not functioning or if the operator
pumps out too quickly.
• A vacuum can also occur on a storage tank that is almost completely drained,
some of the vapour will condense and a vacuum can result.
• Vacuum can be prevented by connecting the tank to a source of pressure of, as
a last resort, opening a vent line.
• A vacuum breaking valve is usually fitted to the tank top to prevent a vacuum
condition occurring.
PRESSURE
• Although oil production and process facilities are designed and constructed with
a high margin of safety, failures will occur.
• Part of an operator's role is to be aware of the possibility of a failure occurring
on the equipment he is operating.
• This is especially true when working on wellhead assemblies.
• For example, because of the high pressure operation of plants even a simple task
like greasing a valve can be dangerous.
• Stand to one side when applying grease so that if the grease fitting fails, it will not
blow out into your face.
• Apply the same safe technique when opening or closing valves, draining level
glasses or performing other duties - stand to one side.
• Pressure gauges are useful operating aids, but they can give a false sense of
security.
• Gauges can fail just like any other item of equipment.
• Because a pressure gauge indicates 0' (zero) it does not necessarily mean that
there is no pressure in the equipment it is attached to.
• The gauge may:
a have failed,
b be blocked,
c have moved the pointer full scale around the dial so that it appears to
indicate zero, see Figure 14.13.
• Pressure gauges on wellheads and flowlines frequently block up with sand and
give false readings.
LEAKS
• An oil plant process facility contains so many valves, flanges and fittings that it
is difficult to stop all leaks.
• Leaks not only cause a loss of oil and gas product but also create a serious fire
and explosion hazard.
• Climatic conditions, such as clouds, can release enough static electricity to
ignite a combustible mixture from a gas leak.
• Detecting small leaks or valves that are passing is not so easy, but observing
moisture on the line or valve is a good method.
• The moisture forms from condensation that results from the reduced
temperature occurring when a gas or light liquid under high pressure leaks into
a lower pressure system.
• Ice will also form on lines and valves when the pressure drop is greater.
• Tightening the flange bolts or packing gland nuts can stop leaks in flanges and
valve packing.
• Never attempt to tighten threaded piping under pressure the pipe can break off.
• A leak in threaded piping in a pressurized line containing gas or liquid
hydrocarbons, such connections for pressure gauges, level glasses, etc., must
be depressured before trying to repair. New fittings should be used when
repairing threaded pressure piping. See Figure 14.14.
ELECTRICITY
• The electrical power generation system and equipment is usually the safest part
of an oil facility.
• However, when an electrical short-circuit occurs, the heat generated often melts
the conduit or housing containing the damaged cable, and may be a source of
ignition to a combustible mixture in the area.
• Electric switches and switchgear must be enclosed in explosion and spark-proof
housings to prevent sparks, that occur when the switch is operated, from igniting
a combustible mixture that may have leaked into the vicinity.
• A switch must never be operated if its explosion-proof housing has been
removed.
• The condition of electric motors on pumps should be checked periodically to
ensure that no sparking is occurring on the motor, this could also be a source of
ignition.
• Whenever any electrical work is being carried out, the master switch on the
equipment should be locked-off (padlocked) and a "Do Not Operate' tag
attached to the equipment and switch gear.
TOXIC MATERIALS
HYDROGEN SULPHIDE
• Sour gas contains sulphur compounds that have an obnoxious odour and are
toxic to humans.
• The roost objectionable is hydrogen sulphide, H2S. It smells like rotten eggs and
is highly corrosive.
• In addition, H2S is deadly if inhaled in concentrations as low as just -few parts of
H2S gas in a million parts of air.
• The danger of H2S to the operator is that in very small concentrations it deadens
the sense of smell, and therefore destroys a natural method of detection.
• Death occurs once the sense of smell is gone and the operator unknowingly
remains in the contaminated area.
• Equipment that handles sour gas must be checked closely for leaks.H2S gas
detection instrumentation and alarms are usually installed on sour gas plants
where the gas is known to have a high H2S content.
• If a leak is suspected from the bad odour in an area, protective-breathing
apparatus must be used before entering the area to locate the leak and isolate it.
• Never enter an area where H2S is known to be present unless another operator is
standing by, and has breathing apparatus ready to enter the area without
endangering himself.
• When H2S is present in gas, special procedures are developed for personnel
working with it, to include the use of breathing apparatus, working in pairs, rescue,
First Aid, etc.
• Most sour gases also contain mercaptans, which are also sulphur compounds.
• Mercaptans have the same bad odour as H2S and the same effect on the body but
to a much lesser degree.
• Inhalation of mercaptans will cause nausea and vomiting, but is seldom fatal.
 CHEMICALS
• The effects of exposure to oil field treating chemicals varies from mild skin
irritation from corrosion inhibitors to severe burns from acids, or lung
deterioration from inhalation of chlorine. In most cases, the more hazardous
chemicals are also the most corrosive.
• Plastic gloves, aprons, rubber boots, full face shields should be available for the
safe handling of chemicals.
• Even so, most accidents and injuries occur from improperly handling chemicals.
Be sure you know the chemicals you handle, use the safe handling techniques,
wear the correct protective clothing, and be able to give the appropriate
• First Aid treatment before attempting to handle chemicals.
• Chemical storage drums and containers can corrode on the inside and chemical
injection piping systems can fail because of internal corrosion
• A water 'body and face safety shower should be available on-site so the
operator can quickly wash off any chemical that accidentally splashes, sprays or
spills on him.
 CONCLUSION
• operating personnel often take short cuts or bypass safety devices and systems,
or fail to use the correct tools, or bypass safety procedures in order to keep
production at its maximum rate.
• Most of the time we get away with this smart' action.
• However, the one time in a thousand that a failure occurs usually costs far more
than the 999 times that nothing happened.