Failure Mode Effects Analysis in Half The Time

INCOSE Michigan – May Dinner Meeting
Failure Mode & Effect Analysis (FMEA)

in Half the Time
Howard C Cooper, MS, DFSS-BB
May 13th, 2014
Introduction
● Failure Mode & Effects Analysis (FMEA) is
an analytical tool and structured method to:
– Recognize and evaluate the potential failure
of a product/process and its effects
– Identify and prioritize actions which could
eliminate or reduce the chance of a potential
failure
– Document the process
Before they are “baked” into a product
2
Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, LogNo. 2014-07, 26 FEB 14
Common Types of FMEA
● Design FMEA
– Identify and mitigate potential design problems
early in the design cycle
● Process / Manufacturing FMEA
– Improve quality and reliability, during set-up of
initial manufacturing process
● Problem Solving / Six Sigma FMEA
– Understand failure modes and effects to identify
and solve quality or reliability issues
3
Where FMEA is Used
Common FMEA Usage
Product Mfg:
Definition: Process Process Work
Customer Definition: Control
Key Failure Strategy: Instructions
Reqmts: product Process Mode &
characterist Flow Analysis: Control Process
Vehicle
ics, Plan, Error Monitoring
Tech Specs Diagram Process proofing
Design (PFD) FMEA Six Sigma
FMEA FMEA
4
Prioritize Failure
Modes by Risk
Priority Number
Example Design FMEA SEV X OCC X DET = (RPN)
(physical or
chemical
processes,
DFMEA
design Prevention Field Failure DVP&R
Cause Failure
Local Next Level Up On Vehicle Mission
SEV defects, Design Controls OCC Detection Method Detection DET RPN
FM
Item
(What Failed) Effect
Mode Effect Soldier(s)
quality J1739 1629a J1739
Problem
Report #
defects, part
misapplication
, or other).
locked up, or 1.No provisioning of MRF = 1 - Combat
open output power for vehicle start up Mission Failure on
driver 100% of combat
missions. [System
Severity HALT tests
EMI CS-101 & MIL-
Abort (SA)]
PLCM Trip Status STD-1275
43v Transients Clamps on
Load Reporting Suseptability SPR-
5 all power supply inputs. 3 3 45
Controller PLCM Pass/ Fail Testing 00004339
FM & Effects of MIL-STD-1275 Compliant
Relay drivers and other
Reprting MIL-STD-810g
Environmental Life
each failure 1. Over
Voltage,
higher current loads have
transient protectoin.
Test
mode 2. Voltage
Transients
5 degree C Thermal Margin
on PLCMs Relative
PLCM Fault 2. No distribution of MRF = 1 - Combat
indicated power to hull and turret Mission Failure on Root Occurrence
systems (SA Example; 100% of combat
HALT tests
Generator Controller
Dead)
missions. [System
Abort (SA)]
Cause EMI CS-101 & MIL-
PLCM Trip Status STD-1275
43v Transients Clamps on
Load Reporting Suseptability SPR-
5 all power supply inputs. 3 3 45
Controller PLCM Pass/ Fail Testing 00004339
MIL-STD-1275 Compliant
Reprting MIL-STD-810g
Relay drivers and other
Environmental Life
1. Over higher current loads have
Test
Voltage transient protectoin.
2. Voltage 5 degree C Thermal Margin
Transients on PLCMs
PLCM Fault 1.No provisioning of MRF = 1 - Combat Transients Clamps on all HALT tests SPR-
indicated power to vehicle start up Mission Failure on power supply inputs. MIL- EMI CS-101 & MIL- 00004200
100% of combat STD-1275 Compliant PDCM Trip Status STD-1275
Load missions. [System Relay drivers and other Reporting Suseptability
Controller Items within the Abort (SA)]
5
1. Over higher current loads have
3
PDCM Pass/ Fail Testing
3 45
Voltage transient protectoin. Reprting MIL-STD-810g
system being 2. Voltage 5 degree C Thermal Margin Environmental Life
Transients on PLCMs Test
analyzed
ePDCM Failure 2. No distribution of MRF = 1 - Combat Transients Clamps on all
HALT tests
SPR-
power to hull and turret Mission Failure on power supply inputs. MIL- 00004200
EMI CS-101 & MIL-
Control systems 100% of combat 1. Over STD-1275 Compliant PDCM BIT Pass/
5 2 STD-1275 3 30
Module missions. [System Voltage Relay drivers and other Fail Reporting
Suseptability
Abort (SA)] 2. Voltage higher current loads have
Testing
Transients transient protectoin.
5
Example Process FMEA
Item
Occur
Detec
Potential Potential
RPN
Sev
Process Function Potential Effect(s) of Cause(s)/Mechanism(s) Current Process Controls
Failure Mode Failure of Failure Detection
3 - Front Door L.H.
Manual application of Insufficient Deteriorated life 5 Manually inserted spray 3 Visual check each hour - 5 75
chromate conversion chromate of part leading head not inserted far 1/shift for film thickness
coatings on exposed coating over to: enough. (depth meter) and coverage.
aluminum substrate specified - Unsatisfactory
surface. appearance due
(to retard corrosion)
to rust through
paint over time. Spray head clogged 2 Visual check each hour - 3 30
- Impaired - Viscosity too high 1/shift for film thickness
function of - Temperature too low (depth meter) and coverage.
hardware. - Pressure too low.
Spray head deformed due 2 Visual check each hour - 2 20

to impact. 1/shift for film thickness
(depth meter) and coverage.
Spray time insufficient. 1 Operator instructions and lot 2 10

sampling (10 doors/shift) to
check for coverage of critical
Steps within the areas.
process being
analyzed
6
Typical FMEA Process
1. Assemble team of people with diverse

knowledge of process & product
2. Bound the problem
3. Identify functions
4. Identify potential failure modes
5. Populate FMEA details
6. Prioritize failure modes based on RPN
7. Mitigate failure modes
7
Mission to Improve FMEA Development
Current FMEA problems: ● Challenge

Opportunity:
Time consuming Rapid (> 2x faster)
High rate of missed critical failure Critical failure modes are given
modes top-priority
Ad hoc identification of failure Process-driven identification of all
modes failure modes
Disjointed, undirected time- Focused, efficient development
consuming discussion effort
Allows prioritization only after Prioritization can happen before

FMEA development FMEA development
8
Improved FMEA Process
• In 2012, GDLS developed process to prepare
‘efficient’ and ‘effective’ FMEA at greatly
reduced time and cost
• Process involves four primary tools:
Block / Process Decomposition

p-Diagram FMEA
Diagram Table
Major innovation:
Decomposition Table identifies and prioritizes

Failure Modes (FMs) into FMEA. Focuses analysis
on critical failure modes
9
Step 1: Bound the System
Boundary Diagram / Process Flow

Vehicle
What Structure
Mount
Seal / Exhaust
Engine Elbow V- Brake Flex V- Muf f ler V- Exhaust
Flat V- Exhaust
Flange 90 Band (valve) Band Pipe Band Band Pipe Out
Insulation Mount
Vehicle
Structure
Identifies and verifies:

1. System functions: lines crossing the dotted boundary
2. “Items” within the dotted line system boundary
10
Step 2: Characterize the Process
P-Diagram What (From Boundary Diagram)
Why
Green blocks, identify functions of the system (or process)

Yellow blocks ~ Noise Factors, Blue block, Control Factors,
Pink blocks ~ Error States
11
Outstanding Problem & Opportunity
● Boundary or Process Flow Diagram
– Identifies “Items” for the FMEA, but not the
Failure Modes (FM) of those “items”
● P-Diagram
– Identifies system functions or requirements
(even noise factors) but not the function or FMs
of the “items”
● Opportunity
– Develop a table that will identify and link “items”
to their functions, and to their functional FMs
12
Step 3: Map Functions to Failure Modes
Function to Hardware Decomposition Table
System Functions
"Design" Functions: 3. Limited 5. Exhaust
P-Diagram (Ideal Functions from P- 1. Transfer Exaust from 2. Attenuate thermal Brake
Diagram / Functions Engine out of the Vehicle NVH transfer Engine
(lines crossing boundary
to vehicle Slowing
of B-Diagram "Design".)
Partially Restrict Exhaust

Contain Exhaust
Hardware
Attenuate NVH
Provide Flow
Contain Heat
Functions:
Secure
Hardware:
V-Band Clamps X
Boundary / Exaust Pipe X X
Process Flat Flange X
Diagram Seals X
Muffler X X X
Insulation X X
Isolation Mounts X X
Exaust Brake X X X
Flex Pipe X X
Elbow X X
13
System Functions
to vehicle Slowing

Contain Exhaust
Need to Hardware
Attenuate NVH
Provide Flow
Contain Heat
Identify Item / Functions:
HW Functions
Secure
Hardware:
V-Band Clamps X
Diagram Seals X
Muffler X X X
Insulation X X
Exaust Brake X X X
Flex Pipe X X
Elbow X X
14
System Functions
to vehicle Slowing

Contain Exhaust
Hardware
Attenuate NVH
Provide Flow
Contain Heat
Identify Functions:
Functions
Secure
Hardware:
V-Band Clamps X
Diagram Seals X
Muffler X X X
Insulation X X
Exaust Brake X X X
Flex Pipe X X
Elbow X X
15
System Functions
to vehicle Slowing

Contain Exhaust
Hardware
Attenuate NVH
Provide Flow
Contain Heat
Identify Functions:
Functions
Secure
Hardware:
V-Band Clamps X
Diagram Seals X
Muffler X X X
Insulation X X
Exaust Brake X X X
Flex Pipe X X
Elbow X X
16
System Functions
to vehicle Slowing

Contain Exhaust
Hardware
Attenuate NVH
Provide Flow
Contain Heat
Identify Functions:
Functions
Secure
Hardware:
V-Band Clamps X
Diagram Seals X
Muffler X X X
Insulation X X
Exaust Brake X X X
Flex Pipe X X
Elbow X X
17
Decomposition Table Structures FMEA
System Functions
(Ideal Functions from P- 1. Transfer Exaust from 2. Attenuate thermal Brake
functions Diagram / Functions Engine out of the Vehicle NVH transfer Engine
translate of B-Diagram "Design".)
to vehicle Slowing
to FMs

Contain Exhaust
Hardware
Attenuate NVH
Provide Flow
Contain Heat
3-4 FMs per Functions:
Function
Secure
From Hardware:
V-Band Clamps X
B-Diagram or Exaust Pipe X X
Pr-Flow Chart Flat Flange X
Seals X
Muffler X X X
“X” indicates a Insulation X X
Function (and 4 Isolation Mounts X X
FMs in the FMEA) Exaust Brake X X X
Flex Pipe X X
Elbow X X
18
3 Purposes of the Decomposition Table
• Ensures all items are captured into the

FMEA
• Ensures multiple function items and their
potential failure modes are identified into
the FMEA
• Provides opportunity to identify and
prioritize by criticality of hardware or
process functions before populating failure
modes into the FMEA
19
Decomposition Table Prioritizes Functions
Function to Hardware Decomposition Table (with Maximum Criticality Scored)
System Functions:
"Design" 3. Limited 5. Exhaust
Likelyhood of Failure: 1 - 5
Diagram / Functions
Engine out of the Vehicle NVH transfer Engine
to vehicle Slowing
Contain Exhaust
Restrict Exhaust
Attenuate NVH
Provide Flow
Contain Heat
Hardware
Functions:
Secure
Hardware: Severity: 3 5 3 3 3 3
V-Band Clamps 5 15
Exaust Pipe 2 10 6
Flat Flange 2 6 Criticality #
Seals 2 10 rather than “X”
Muffler 4 20 12 12
Insulation 1 3 3
Isolation Mounts 3 9 9
Exaust Brake 2 10 6 6
Flex Pipe 2 10 6
Elbow 1 5 3
20
Preparation Flow into Decomp Table

"Design"
System Functions: 3. Limited 5. Exhaust
Diagram / Functions
to vehicle Slowing
Contain Exhaust
Restrict Exhaust
Attenuate NVH
Provide Flow
Contain Heat
Hardware
Functions:
Secure
1. P-Diagram Ideal Functions – to Hardware: Severity: 3 5 3 3 3 3
Design Functions in F-H Decomp. V-Band Clamps
Exaust Pipe
5
2
15
10 6
Flat Flange 2 6
Vehicle
Seals 2 10
Structure Muffler 4 20 12 12
Mount Insulation 1 3 3
Engine
Seal /
Elbow V-
Exhaust
Brake Flex V- Muf f ler V- Exhaust
Flat V- Exhaust
Flange 90 Band (valve) Band Pipe Band Band Pipe Out Flex Pipe 2 10 6
Elbow 1 5 3
Insulation Mount
Vehicle
Structure
3. Identify all ‘Item’ Functions needed to
2. B-Diagram or Process Flow inner accomplish each System Function
blocks go to Decomp. Table 4. Mark with an “X” or with a “Criticality #”
21
Step 4: Use Decomp Table to Fill FMEA
"Design"
System Functions: 1 3. Limited 5. Exhaust
Diagram / Functions
to vehicle Slowing
of B-Diagram "Design".) 1
Contain Exhaust
Restrict Exhaust
Attenuate NVH
33
Provide Flow
Contain Heat
Hardware
Functions: 1
Secure
Hardware: Severity: 3 5 3 3 3 3
4
V-Band Clamps 22 5 15
Exaust Pipe 2 10 6
Flat Flange 2 6
Seals 2 10
Muffler 4 20 12 12
Insulation 1 3 3
Flex Pipe 2 10 6
Elbow 1 5 3
1 Function Local 4 Next Level Up

(measurable output, 2 Item 3 Potential Failure Mode
Effect Effect
design requirement)
1. Transfer Exaust from Exhaust leak Loss of 1. Transfering Exhaust from Engine to
Engine out of the out-side the Vehicle
Vehicle V-Band Clamps Loss of Securing
Partial Securing
Intermittent Securing
FMEA filled in from F-H Decomp Table
22
Benefits of Improved FMEA Development
Pareto Chart (80/20 Rule)
Four Step FMEA Process:

● Organizes and speeds FMEA failure
mode identification
● Ensures all hardware-functions and
FMs are identified
● Prioritizes critical hardware-functions
for FMEA analysis
● Provides power of 80/20 Rule on FMs
for best Reliability Growth
● Focuses attention and time on F-H Decomp Table now being used on
multiple GDLS Contracts: for DFR, to
mitigation of “significant few” (the most facilitate earlier diagnostics planning, to
critical failure modes (FMs) meet Weight and Testability Requirements
Addressing most critical FMs yields
greatest reliability growth.
23
Cost Savings Attributed to New Process
Before vs, After
Savings Calculation (savings to GDLS)
Facilitator Cost
Previous Programs doing DFMEA without 'F-H Decomp'
Start SFR End PDR Weeks Rel-Heads Hrs/Week Total Hrs. $Rate/Hr. Total $
FCS 01-Mar-06 15-Dec-09 185 3 35 19,425 $77 $1,495,725
Stryker-SMOD 01-Jan-10 15-Dec-10 50 4 35 7,000 $77 $539,000
Average: 117.5 3.5 Average: $1,017,363 Savings on
Facilitator Cost
2013 Programs using 'F-H Docomp Tool/Method' for DFMEA
Start SFR End PDR Weeks Rel-Heads Hrs/Week Total Hrs. $Rate/Hr. Total $
Stryker+Tr 16-Oct-12 15-Mar-13 20 1 35 700 $77 $53,900
Stryker-ECP 01-Oct-12 27-Sep-13 50 0.65 35 1,138 $77 $87,588
Abrams ECP1 04-Feb-13 14-Aug-13 27.3 1 35 956 $77 $73,574
Average: 32.43 0.88 931 $77 $71,687
Facilitator
Savings X 3 Savings
for FMEA $1,424,038 Savings over FCS - DFMEA Facilitator
Team, X 3 $467,313 Savings over SMOD - DFMEA Facilitator
Programs in $945,676 Savings over FCS & SMOD Average, for DFMEA Facilitator
2013 = Total
Savings X3 Facilitator labor Savings over SMOD baseline, for DFMEA Team (3-8)
$1,401,939 Average 2013 FH-Decomp Program Savings over SMOD baseline - DFMEA Cost
X3 Three 2013 Programs: Stryker+Tr, Stryker-ECP and Abrams ECP1
$4,205,817 Total 2013 Savings from using FH-Decomp to prepare DFMEA
24
Questions?
Presenters:
Howard C Cooper, MS, DFSS-BB
DFR Reliability Engineer
cooperh@gdls.com
Mark Petrotta, MS, DFSS-MBB

Engineering Process Excellence
petrotta@gdls.com
25

Failure Mode Effects Analysis in Half The Time

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INCOSE Michigan – May Dinner Meeting

Failure Mode & Effect Analysis (FMEA)

Before they are “baked” into a product

Spray head deformed due 2 Visual check each hour - 2 20

Spray time insufficient. 1 Operator instructions and lot 2 10

1. Assemble team of people with diverse

Current FMEA problems: ● Challenge

Time consuming Rapid (> 2x faster)

Allows prioritization only after Prioritization can happen before

Block / Process Decomposition

Decomposition Table identifies and prioritizes

Boundary Diagram / Process Flow

Identifies and verifies:

P-Diagram What (From Boundary Diagram)

Green blocks, identify functions of the system (or process)

Partially Restrict Exhaust

Partially Restrict Exhaust

Partially Restrict Exhaust

Partially Restrict Exhaust

Partially Restrict Exhaust

Partially Restrict Exhaust

• Ensures all items are captured into the

Function to Hardware Decomposition Table (with Maximum Criticality Scored)

1 Function Local 4 Next Level Up

Four Step FMEA Process:

Mark Petrotta, MS, DFSS-MBB

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