Defenses in Action for Quasi-

Delict
Applicability of Arts. 22 to 32
Human Relations (Special Torts)
Art 22
• Article 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him.
• ================================================
• Principle of solutio indebti, or unjust enrichment: “No one
shall enrich him/herself at the expense of another”
• When (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such
benefit is derived at the expense of or to the damage of
another, there is unjust enrichment .
Aniano Obaña vs Court of Appeals
• Article 1173. On November 21, 1964, Chan Lin offered to buy 170 cavans of rice from
Aniceto Sandoval at P37.25/sack (P6,332.50). Sandoval agreed; so from Rosales,
Pangasinan, Chan Lin accompanied Sandoval’s driver to have the rice be delivered to San
Fernando, La Union. Upon arriving, the sacks of rice were unloaded but when Sandoval’s
driver tried to collect the payment, Chan Lin was nowhere to be found. The driver then
tried to collect from Aniano Obaña, who was the owner of the store where they
unloaded the rice. But Aniano refused to pay, saying that he made the payment to Chan
Lin for P33/cavan and that he will not return the sacks of rice to Sandoval as they were
paid already. Apparently, Aniano and Chan Lin had an earlier agreement that Chan Lin
will sell him 170 cavans of rice for P33 each. Aniano said Chan Lin swindled Sandoval.
Sandoval filed for replevin.

• ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the 170 cavans of rice?

• HELD: Ownership was transferred to Chan Lin when the cavans of rice were delivered to
Aniano’s store. This was agreed upon in the contract between Sandoval and Chan Lin.
However, it was found that 3 days after the delivery, Chan Lin returned Aniano’s money.
Aniano claimed that he then returned the cavans of rice to Sandoval. But Sandoval’s
driver said Aniano never returned the sacks of rice. They would have withdrawn the
replevin case had the sacks of rice been returned. Sandoval has all the right to recover
the rice and rescind the contract as he was not paid. Aniano cannot unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of Sandoval.
Art 23
• Article 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to
another's property was not due to the fault or negligence
of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if
through the act or event he was benefited.
• ============================================
• Principle of solutio indebti, or unjust enrichment: “No one
shall enrich him/herself at the expense of another”
• Unforeseen event; could not be avoided
• Based on Equity
Art 24
• Article 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of
the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence,
ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other
handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
• ======================================================
• Principle: Parens patriae [Latin, Parent of the country.] A doctrine that
grants the inherent power and authority of the state to protect
persons who are legally unable to act on their own behalf.
• Protect the disadvantaged
• Implement the Social justice Clause of the Constitution
Heirs of John Sycip, et. al. v. CA
Facts:
Melecio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga are married. While they were separated, a certain
Alfonso Non approached Melecio and convinced him to s ell a parcel of land at 200.00 /sq.m
which belonged to his wife. He assured Melecio that he could secure his wife’ signature,
otherwise, the contract would be void. With such understanding, Melecio signed the
document. It turned out that the deed involve the sale of more than 54 hectares.
Issue:
Can land be re recovered?
Held:
Yes. It is not disputed that the private respondents are Muslims who belong to the cultural
minority or non-Christian Filipinos as members of the Maguindanao Tribe. Any transaction
involving real property with them is governed by the provisions of sec. 145 and 146 of the
Revised Admin Code of Mindanao and Sulu, CA 141, RA 3872, further amending Public Land
Act.
The obvious intent of the statutes is to guard the patrimony of illiterate non-Christians from
those who are inclined to prey upon their ignorance or ducility.
Celso Amarante, et. al. VS Court of Appeals, et. al.
Facts of the Case:
On 20 August 1954, petitioners filed a complaint against respondents for the recovery of a twenty-hectare parcel of
unregistered agricultural land situated in a remote, mountainous region of Negros Oriental. Allegedly, one of two pieces
of real property was originally owned and cultivated by the late Malonis Infiel, an Aeta. Petitioners were Infiel’s
grandchildren. The occupation and possession by Malonis Infiel, his children, and petitioners remained undisturbed until
sometime in 1953 when respondent Gregorio Bolo, a common law husband of one of the granddaughters of Felix
Malonis, caused the survey of the property, and proceeded to occupy part of it, claiming to have purchased the same on
11 April 1948 from respondent heirs of Felix Malonis. Petitioners contested the claim of respondent Bolo and asserted
that what had been sold to him was only 5 hectares of the entire property and that the other 20 hectares was
surreptitiously declared by respondent Bolo in the survey as property owned exclusively by Felix Malonis. Petitioners also
contended that respondent Bolo, in his desire to consolidate possession and ownership of the entire property in his
name, harassed petitioners by instituting a criminal case for qualified theft on 7 October 1953 against Eleuterio Amarante
and petitioner Celso Amarante, and by threatening to liquidate the other petitioners if they persisted in their refusal to
abandon the disputed property.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Court erred in its decision.
Ruling of the Court:
YES. The CA failed to take into account Article 24 of the Civil Code which states that “in all contractual, property or other
relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental
weakness, tender age or other handicap”, enjoins courts to be “vigilant for the protection of such party.” This same public
policy is manifested in the recognition in our statute law and case law that members of our cultural or ethnic minority
groups, such as Aetas, are commonly handicapped and vulnerable in dealing with other members of the community and,
therefore, need and deserve particular protection. The Supreme Court decided that the interests of substantial justice will
best be served by remanding this case to the trial court. The case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court.
Art 25
• Article 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display
during a period of acute public want or emergency may be stopped by
order of the courts at the instance of any government or private charitable
institution.
• ========================================================
• ‘Vanity of vanities’ (Ecclesiastes, Old Testament)
• Unrest of the masses; public morals…
• Manifests the power of the community to safeguard public welfare: Police
power
• Conditions: Declared public want and emergency, and only charitable
institutions (public or private) can ask court order
Art 26
• Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following
and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense,
shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other
relief:
• (1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
• (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of
another;
• (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
• (4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs,
lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal
condition.
Art 26
• Principle: A man’s home is his castle and even the king could not
enter without his permission
• Respect for Human Dignity, personality, privacy, peace of mind
Republic Act No. 9262 March 08, 2004
AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE
MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

• SECTION 34. Persons Intervening Exempt from Liability. – In every

case of violence against women and their children as herein defined,
any person, private individual or police authority or barangay official
who, acting in accordance with law, responds or intervenes without
using violence or restraint greater than necessary to ensure the safety
of the victim, shall not be liable for any criminal, civil or
administrative liability resulting therefrom.
• Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. (n)
 Lagon vs. Court of Appeals
• Jose Lagon purchased from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi two parcels of land located at Tacurong,
Sultan Kudarat, which covers commercial buildings.
• Said commercial buildings were constructed by the unnamed respondent pursuant to a contract of
lease between the respondent and the late Bai Tonina Sepi Mengelen Guibar wherein it was
stipulated that the private respondent would put up a commercial building which would be leased
to new tenants. The rentals to be paid by those tenants would answer for the rent private
respondent was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. It was alleged by the
unnamed respondent that the lease contract ended in 1974, but it was renewed since the
construction of the commercial buildings had yet to be completed.
• When Bai Tonina Sepi died, respondent started remitting his rent to the administrator of the
deceased’s estate until he was advised to stop collecting rentals from the tenants because the
property had been sold to Jose Lagon, and Jose Lagon had been collecting the same.
• Respondent thus filed a complaint against Lagon, accusing Lagon of inducing the heirs of Bai Tonina
Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold rights over it. Lagon denied that he
induced the heirs to sell him the property, contending that the heirs were in dire need of money to
pay off the obligations of the deceased and this was what led the heirs to sell him the property.
Lagon also maintained that he didn’t interfere with private respondents leasehold rights as there
was no lease contract covering the property when he
• purchased it; that his personal investigation and inquiry revealed no
claims or encumbrances on the subject lots.
• Lagon further alleged that before he bought the property, he went to
Atty. Fajardo who allegedly notarized the renewed lease contract but
the contract shown to him was unsigned. To refute the existence of a
lease contract, petitioner presented in court a certification from the
Office of the Clerk of Court confirming that no record of any lease
contract had been entered into their files. Petitioner added that he
only learned of the alleged lease contract when he was informed that
private respondent was collecting rent from the tenants of the
buildings.
• Finding the complaint for tortuous interference to be unwarranted,
Lagon filed his counterclaim for actual and moral damages.
ISSUE:
WON the purchase by Lagon of the subject property, during the supposed existence of the private respondent’s lease
contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for which Lagon should be held liable for damages.
HELD:
No, the interference of Lagon was with a legal justification (in furtherance of a personal financial interest) and without bad
faith.
Elements of Tortuous Interference with contractual relations (So Ping Bun v. CA):
1.Existence of a valid contract
2.Knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of the contract
3.Interference of the third person without legal justification or excuse
1.Existence of a valid contract: The Court declared that absent a clear, strong and convincing evidence, a notarized document
continues to be a prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise to its execution and delivery. This brought the Court to rule
that the notarized copy of lease contract presented in court appeared to be an incontestable proof that Bai Tonin Sepi and
private respondent renewed their contract.
2.Knowledge on the part of the interfere that the contract exists: The Court ruled that Lagon had no knowledge of the lease
contract as he even conducted his own personal investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no suspicious circumstance that
would have made a cautious man probe deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim over the property; that an
examination of the entire property title bore no indication of the leasehold interest of private respondent and that even the
registry of property had no record of the same.
3.Interference without legal justification or excuse: According to So Ping Bun v. CA, petitioner may be held liable only when
there was no legal justification or excuse for his action or when his conduct was stirred by a wrongful motive. To sustain a
case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or must have been driven by purely impious
reasons to injure the plaintiff.
• Even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease
contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or
bad faith on the part of petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the
claim of tortuous interference was never established.
• The disquisition in So Ping Bun applies squarely in this case. Lagon’s purchase of
the subject property was merely an advancement of his financial or economic
interests, absent any proof that he was enthused by improper motives. In the
very early case of Gilchrist v. Cuddy, the Court declared that a person is not a
malicious interferer if his conduct is impelled by a proper business interest. In
other words, a financial or profit motivation will not necessarily make a person an
officious interferer liable for damages as long as there is no malice or bad faith
involved.

• This case is one of damnum absque injuria or damage without injury.

• Injury- legal invasion of a legal right
• Damage- the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury
• BPI Card Corp vs CA: There can be damage without injury where the loss or harm
is not the result of a violation of a legal duty.
So Ping Bun v. CA
Facts:
In 1963, Tek Hua Trading Co. entered into lease agreements with lessor Dee C.
Chuan and Sons, Inc. involving four (4) premises in Binondo, which the former used
to store textiles. The agreements were for one (1) year, with provisions for month-
to-month rental should the lessee continue to occupy the properties after the
term. In 1976, Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved, and the former members formed
Tek Hua Enterprises Corp., herein respondent. So Pek Giok, managing partner of
the defunct company, died in 1986. Petitioner So Ping Bun, his grandson, occupied
the warehouse for his own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing. On March 1,
1991, private respondent Tiong sent a letter to petitioner, demanding that the
latter vacate the premises. Petitioner refused, and on March 4, 1992, he requested
formal contracts of lease with DCCSI. The contracts were executed. Private
respondents moved for the nullification of the contract and claimed damages. The
petition was granted by the trial court, and eventually by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
(1) Whether So Ping Bun is guilty of tortuous interference of contract
(2) Whether private respondents are entitled to attorney’s fees
• Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified where the
defendant acts for the sole purpose of furthering his own financial or
economic interest. One view is that, as a general rule, justification for
interfering with the business relations of another exists where the actor's
motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does not exist where his sole
motive is to cause harm to the other. Added to this, some authorities believe
that it is not necessary that the interferer's interest outweigh that of the party
whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts under an economic
interest that is substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and
malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in self-protection.
• Moreover justification for protecting one's financial position should not be
made to depend on a comparison of his economic interest in the subject
matter with that of others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a
proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives. Where there was no
malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind one's conduct
lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party
cannot be a malicious interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially
interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that he is
an officious or malicious intermeddler.
• In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI
to lease the warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of respondent
corporation. Though petitioner took interest in the property of respondent
corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes deliberate
wrongful motives or malice on him. Petitioner argues that damage is an
essential element of tort interference, and since the trial court and the
appellate court ruled that private respondents were not entitled to actual,
moral or exemplary damages, it follows that he ought to be absolved of any
liability, including attorney's fees.
• While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to
intrude into existing contracts at the expense of others, however, we find that
the conduct herein complained of did not transcend the limits forbidding an
obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice. The business desire
is there to make some gain to the detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of
malice, however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the
legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones.
St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. CA
• FACTS:
• Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to
recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his
house with Mr. Arcadio.
• St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading “where the heart is”. This was republished on
January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr Aramil’s house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the
company asked permission and the intended house to be published. After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a
letter to St. Louis demanding an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or apology was published
despite that it was received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr. Aramil’s
counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr.
Arcadio’s real house but nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for damages
on March 29. During the April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published.
• ISSUE: Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil.
• HELD:
• St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication. Furthermore, it never made
any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".
• The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees.
When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the judgement for the reason that “St. Louis
Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned
advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was
annoyed by that contretemps”.
Art 27
• Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a
public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to
perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other
relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken.
• ========================================================
• Neglect: implies the absence of care, prudence, and forethought as
under circumstances duly rewuired should bae given or
exercised…any injurious nlect of duty being actionable. (Cooley)
• Ministerial duty, not Discretionary Function
Zulueta v. Nicolas
• The complaint for libel filed by the plaintiff against the Governor of Rizal and
the staff members of the Philippine Free Press was dismissed by the
defendant fiscal after his investigation :revealed that there was no prima facie
case, and that the statements were made in good faith and for public interest.
Consequently, the plaintiff, invoking Article. 27 of the New Civil Code,
instituted this action to recover moral and pecuniary damages for failure to
discharge an official duty without just cause.
• Held, the fiscal's refusal to prosecute the case because of insufficiency of
evidence to establish a prima facie case is a refusal with just cause. In such
cases, the fiscal has the duty to dismiss the complaint.
• Vested with authority and discretion to determine the merits of a complaint,
the fiscal cannot be subjected to the dictates of the offended party.
Jose B. Ledesma vs Court of Appeals
• Facts:
• A student, Violeta Delmo, was not able to graduate as Magna Cum Laude, because the president, herein
petitioner Jose Ledesma, of the West Visayas College neglected his duty to inform the student on the
result of a case against the student which has, as its punishment, the removal of awards or citations of
the student. Said case was the extension of loans to students, which the president contends to be
against the school rules and regulations, and which the student innocently performed in her capacity as
the treasurer of the Student Leadership Club and in accordance to the Constitution and By-Laws of the
club, on the belief that said constitution was presented and approved by the president.
• The student appealed to the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools after being denied for
reconsideration by the president, where upon investigation, it was found out that the student acted in
good faith and that her awards be reinstituted. The president, upon receiving said decision, delayed
action and even e-mailed the director to reverse his decision. The student therefore graduated as a plain
student and without honors and her award as Magna Cum Laude was only entered on the scholastic
records weeks after the receipt by the president of the decision and after the graduation.
• Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
• Ruling:
• Yes. The president’s failure to graduate a student with honors and blatant disregard of the student’s
rights on the account of him being embarrassed shows neglect of duty without just cause, rendering him
liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code. Undoubtedly, the student and the student’s parents
went through a painful ordeal brought about by such neglect. Thus, moral and exemplary damages under
Article 27 are but proper.
Art 28
• Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial
enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method
shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers
damage.
• ========================================================
• A crime in Art. 189, RPC
• Regulating free enterprise
Art 29
• Article 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on
the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence.
Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to
file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.
• If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
 Drilon Vs. CA
Facts:
In 1973, the private respondents were charged with double murder before Military Commission No. 34.
July 27, 1973: the military promulgated a decision acquitting Raul Paredes but sentencing Rodolfo Ganzon to life
imprisonment with hard labor. Paredes was thereupon released from custody while Ganzon was made to serve sentence
until he was released on March 25, 1978 and placed under house arrest under guard. In 1985, Ganzon joined the Kilusang
Bagong Lipunan (KBL), the party in power, where he was designated as campaign manager.
In 1988, administration having changed, then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez directed State Prosecutor Aurelio
Trampe to conduct a preliminary investigation against the private respondents for the above murders. The private
respondents moved for dismissal, in Ganzon's case, on the ground that he, Ganzon, had been extended an absolute pardon
by the President Ferdinand Marcos, and he, having been previously convicted, can no longer be tried anew, and in Paredes'
case, on the ground that he, Paredes, had been acquitted. Trampe, however, denied both requests and reconsideration
having been likewise denied, the private respondents went to the Court of Appeals on prohibition.
The CA granted their petitions.
The petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals, in granting prohibition, committed a grave abuse of discretion: (1) Rodolfo
Ganzon has not adequately proved the fact of presidential pardon; (2) there exists no evidence in the files of the
Govemment to prove pardon; (3) Ganzon's copy is a bare machine copy and Ganzon has failed to adequately establish the
loss of the original; (4) the alleged pardon (or copy of it) had not been properly sealed and authenticated, or executed in
official Malacañang stationery; and (5) the disposition of the murder cases by the military does not preclude the filing of
new informations by the civilian government.
Issue:
WON the Government may proceed criminally against the private respondents despite verdict earlier rendered by Military
Commission No. 34.
Held:
• To the mind of the Court, Ganzon has accepted the judgment against him, and as Tan (case of Tan) asked, "why should [he] who has accepted the
justness of the verdict of the military court who is satisfied that he had a fair hearing, and who is willing to serve his sentence in full, be dragged
through the harrow of another hearing in a civil court to risk being convicted a second time perchance to serve a heavier penalty?"
• Under the 1973 Constitution, as is under the present Charter the "pardoning power" of the President (that is, to grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures) is final and unappealable so is commutation of sentence, in which the Chief Executive reduces a
sentence. It extinguishes criminal liability partially, and has the effect of changing the penalty to a lesser one.
• The Court does not believe, in Ganzon's case, that commutation of sentence need be in a specific form. It is sufficient, to mind, that Ganzon was
voluntarily released in 1978 wit terms or conditions, except that he should remain under house arrest. The Court can not consider Ganzon's house
arrest as a continuation of his sentence, first, because in no way is arrest a penalty, but rather a mere means of "taking ... a person custody in
order that he may be forthcoming to answer for commission of an offense," or, during early martial law, a means to carry out Proclamation No.
1881, and second, because of the records own scant condition as the exact terms of his "house arrest" (which, parenthetically, no longer exists.)
Hence, the view of the Court is that irrespective of the "pardon," Ganzon has served his sentence and to reiterate, he can no longer be
reinvestigated for the same offense, much more undergo further imprisonment to complete his service.
• The Court therefore need not consider whether or not Rodolfo Ganzon had been pardoned, and whatever "pardon" the former President may
have extended to him did not erase the fact that as early as 1978, he was a free man. Of course, he was supposed to have remained under house
arrest but as we said, not as a continuation of his sentence, but pursuant to Marcos' vast arrest and commitment powers during martial rule. The
question — of whether or not he should continue to remain under house arrest — is also a moot question as we noted, 28 and arrests except
upon lawful judicial orders are no longer possible. The Court's disposition, it is true, leaves Ganzon to all intents and purposes "scot-free", yet
whatever liberal treatment he may have received is not his fault either, and in the second place, "worse" people have been better rewarded in this
regime.

• Petition denied.
Urbano v. IAC
Facts:
• On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield.
He found the place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the
irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what happened, and
there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that
he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier
on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On
October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid
P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was
rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found
the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in
his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was
found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals.
Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain
who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals
on November 5
• Issue:
• [Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the
latter’s death] ..Relate to Article 29…
• Held:
• We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal
aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil
liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus,
in the recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:

• xxx xxx xxx

• ... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt,
only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that
the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).

• The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused
on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him
from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:

• The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is one of
the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given use to numberless instances of miscarriage
of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the
accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal
offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
Art 30
• Article 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil
liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings
are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance
of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Art 31
• Article 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.
Art 32
• Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
• (1) Freedom of religion;
• (2) Freedom of speech;
• (3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
• (4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
• (5) Freedom of suffrage;
• (6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
• (7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
• (8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
• (9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
• (10) liberty of abode and of changing the same;
• (11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
• (12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
• (13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;
• (14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;
Art 32
• What do we have here?
• Basic Constitutional rights
• Violation of the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability
• Civil action shall be proved only by a preponderance of evidence
Aberca v. Ver
• FACTS
• Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered by General Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes against
Communist- Terrorist underground houses. TFM raided several houses, employing in most cases defectively
judicial search warrants, arrested people without warrant of arrest, denied visitation rights, and interrogated
them with the use of threats and tortures. A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, stating that 1)
plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry about their detention because the writ of habeas corpus was
suspended; 2) defendants are immune from liability for acts done in their official duties; 3) there was no
cause of action. On Nov 8, 1983, Judge Fortun granted the motion to dismiss, which prompted plaintiffs to
file a MR on Nov 18, 1983. He later inhibited himself and was replaced Judge Lising, who denied the MR for
being filed out of time. Another MR was filed, and was only modified to include Maj. Aguinaldo and MSgt.
Balaba for officers accountable in the said complaint.

• ISSUES
• 1. Whether or not immunity from suit may be invoked?
• 2. Whether petitioners have the right to question the alleged violation of their rights in the constitution?
• 3. Whether the superior officers who gave the orders are liable?
• HELD
• 1. NO, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides a sanction to rights and freedom enshrined in
the constitution. These rights cannot be violated just because of an order given by a
superior. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Even though they just
followed the orders of their superior, these do not authorize them to disregard the rights
of the petitioners, and therefore cannot be considered “acts done in their official duties”.
Article 32 speaks of any public officer or private individual, and violation of these
constitutional rights does not exempt them from responsibility.
• 2. YES, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not prevent petitioners from
claiming damages for the illegal arrest and detention in violation of their constitutional
rights by seeking judicial authority. What the writ suspends is merely the right of an
individual to seek release from detention as a speedy means of obtaining liberty. It
cannot suspend their rights and cause of action for injuries suffered due to violation of
their rights.
• 3. YES, Article 32 speaks of the liabilities of people who are in direct violation of the
rights stated, as well as people who are indirectly responsible for such acts. In the case at
hand, the superior officers are the ones who gave the order, and can be considered
indirectly responsible. It was also stated in the complaint who were the ones who
directly and indirectly participated in those acts. By filing a motion to dismiss, they
admitted all the facts stated in the complaint.