RETIREMENT FROM

THE SERVICE
Retirement
Retirement is the withdrawal from office, employment or
occupation, upon reaching a certain age or after rendering a
certain number of years of service.
As to when an employee can retire or be retired, will primarily
be determined by the retirement plan, collective bargaining
agreement, or employment contract. If there is no retirement
plan, collective bargaining agreement, or employment contract,
the retirement of the employees will be governed by the
provisions of Labor Code.

Who are covered by the retirement provisions of the

Labor Code?
The Labor Code provisions on retirement apply to all
employees who have rendered service for at least five (5)
years, regardless of their position, designation, status and
irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid.
Who are not covered by the retirement provisions of the Labor Code?

a. Employees who have not rendered service for at least five (5) years;
b. Domestic helpers and persons in the personal service of another;
c. Employees of retail establishments regularly employing not more than ten (10)
employees;
“Retail establishment” is one principally engaged in the sale of goods to end users
for personal or household use. It shall lose its retail character qualified for
exemption if it is engaged in both retail and wholesale of goods.
d. Employees of service establishments regularly employing not more than ten (10)
employees;
“Service establishment” is one principally engaged in the sale of service to
individuals for their own or household use and is generally recognized as such.
e. Employees of agricultural establishments or operations regularly employing not
more than ten (10) employees. [Secs. 1 and 2, Rule II, Book VI, Rules Implementing
the Labor Code]
“Agricultural establishment/operation” refers to an employer which is engaged in
agriculture. This term refers to all farming activities in all branches and includes,
among others, the cultivation and tillage of soil, production, cultivation, growing and
harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural commodities, dairying, raising of
livestock or poultry, the culture of fish and other aquatic products in farms or ponds,
and any activities performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to, or in
conjunction with, such farming operations, but does not include the manufacture
and/or processing of sugar, coconut, abaca, tobacco, pineapple, aquatic or other farm
Note: Employees of the National Government and its political
subdivisions, including government-owned and/or controlled
corporations, if they are covered by the Civil Service Law and
its regulations.
Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7641, provides for two (2) types of
retirement:
(a) optional; and
(b) (b) compulsory.
Optional Retirement

Optional retirement may be based on age or length of service.

Thus, a retirement plan, collective bargaining agreement, or
employment contract which provides for retirement of
employees after rendering twenty-five (25) years of service is
valid and enforceable. It is not violative of the right to security
of tenure because the retirement plan forms part of the
employment contract. The intention and spirit of Article 292 of
the Labor Code is to give employers and employees a free hand
to determine and agree upon the terms and conditions of
retirement.
 1. PAL v Airlines Pilots' Association 373 SCRA 302
(2002)
FACTS: Respondent ALPAP is the exclusive bargaining
representative of all commercial airline pilots of PAL. The
issue is rooted in PAL's act of unilaterally retiring pilot Capt.
Albino Collantes under the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan,
which respondent claims is illegal dismissal and union busting.
ALPAP filed a Notice of Strike with the DOLE. DOLE
Secretary issued the assailed order upholding PAL's action of
retiring Capt. Collantes, and ordered the basis of computation
of his retirement benefits to be Art. 287 of the Labor Code and
no the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan. Secretary added that
PAL should first consult the pilot concerned before
implementing his retirement.
ISSUES: 1. What should be the basis for the computation of retirement
benefits? 2. W/N PAL should consult the pilot concerned before exercising
its option to retire pilots.

HELD1. Retirement benefits should be computed according to the PAL-

ALPAP Retirement Plan which provides: SECTION 1. Normal Retirement.
(a) Any member who completed twenty (20) years of service as a pilot for
PAL or has flown 20,000 hours for PAL shall be eligible for normal
retirement. The normal retirement date is the date on which he completes
twenty (20) years of service, or on which he logs his 20,000 hours as a pilot
for PAL. The member who retires on his normal retirement shall be entitled
to either (a) a lump sum payment of P100,000.00 or (b) to such termination
pay benefits to which he may be entitled to under existing laws, whichever
is the greater amount. SECTION 2. Late Retirement. Any member who
remains in the service of the Company after his normal retirement date
may retire either at his option or at the option of the Company and when so
retired he shall be entitled either (a) to a lump sum payment of P5,000.00
for each completed year of service rendered as a pilot, or (b) to such
termination pay benefits to which he may be entitled under existing laws,
whichever is the greater amount.
On the other hand, Art. 287 of the Labor Code provides: Art. 287. Retirement. – Any employee
may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining
agreement or other applicable employment contract. In case of retirement, the employee shall
be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and
any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements: provided, however, That an
employee’s retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not
be less than those provided herein. In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement plan
providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon
reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is
hereby declared as the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the
said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least
one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being
considered as one whole year. Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term ‘one-
half (1/2) month salary’ shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month
pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves. xxx xxx
xxx. The retirement benefits that a pilot would get under LC 287 are less than those under
PAL's retirement plan. Additionally, the Labor Code does not contemplate the peculiar
circumstance of PAL pilots, as LC 287 is intended for those who have no more plans of
employment after retirement. Thus, petitioner should be paid according to the PAL-ALPAP
Retirement Plan.
2. NO. Surely, the requirement to consult the pilots prior to their retirement defeats the
exercise by management of its option to retire the said employees. It gives the pilot concerned
an undue prerogative to assail the decision of management. Due process only requires that
notice be given to the pilot of petitioner’s decision to retire him. Hence, the Secretary of Labor
overstepped the boundaries of reason and fairness when he imposed on petitioner the
additional requirement of consulting each pilot prior to retiring him.
Who can exercise the option to retire?
As to who can exercise the option to retire will be primarily determined by
the terms of the retirement plan, collective bargaining agreement, or
employment contract. These could be gleaned from the provisions of Article
292 of the Labor Code which provides that:
“ART. 292. Retirement. – Any employee may be retired upon reaching the
retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other
applicable employment contract.”

On the other hand, if there is no retirement plan, collective bargaining

agreement or employment contract the option to retire can be exercised
only by the employee. This can be gleaned from the provisions of Article
292 of the Labor Code which provides that:
“ART. 292. Retirement. – xxx In the absence of a retirement plan or
agreement providing for the retirement benefits of employees in the
establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or
more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the
compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said
establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay
equivalent to at least one-half (½) month salary for every year of service, a
fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.”
The Optional Retirement Age Under Labor Code
Under Article 292 of the Labor Code, the optional retirement
age is

Sixty (60) years – for ordinary employees;

Fifty (50) years – for underground mining employees

The Compulsory Retirement Age

The compulsory retirement age under the Labor Code is:

Sixty-five (65) years old – for ordinary employees;

Sixty (60) years old – for underground mining employees
Amount of Retirement Pay
The amount of retirement pay will primarily be determined by
the provisions of the retirement plan, collective bargaining
agreement or employment contract, if any, but it should not fall
below the floor limits set by the Labor Code.
In the absence of the retirement plan, collective bargaining
agreement or employment contract, the retirement pay, as
provided for under the Labor Code is one-half (½) month salary
of every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months
being considered as one whole year. This translates to 22.5
days for every year of service because by law, it is composed of
the following:
• Fifteen (15) days salary based on the employee’s latest
salary rate;
• Cash equivalent of five (5) days service incentive leave; and
• One twelfth (1/12) of the thirteen month pay due to the
employee.
This could be gleaned from Article 292 of the Labor Code
which provides that:
“ART. 292. Retirement. – xxx In the absence of a retirement
plan or agreement providing for the retirement benefits of
employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching
the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five
(65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory
retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the
said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to
retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (½)
month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at
least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.
Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term
‘one half (1/2) month salary’ shall mean fifteen (15) days
plus one twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash
equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive
leaves.”
If the retirement pay under the retirement plan, collective
bargaining agreement or individual employment contract
is less than that provided for in the Labor Code, the
employer shall pay the difference.
If the retirement fund comes from the contribution of both
the employer and the employee, the employer’s total
contribution should not be less than the total retirement
benefits to which the employee would have been entitled
had there been no such retirement fund. In case the
employer’s contribution is less than the amount prescribed
by the Labor Code, the employer shall pay the difference.
[Sec. 3, 3.3, Rule II, Book VI, R ules Implementing the
Labor Code].
Employees will be entitled to retirement pay prescribed by
the Labor Code if they:
Have rendered service for at least five (5) years; and
Retire between the age of 60 and 65 years or between 50
and 60 years for underground mining employees.
Computation of Length of Service
Considering that the retirement pay is gauged by the term “for
every year of service” stress should be on actual service. The
period of time when the establishment of closed should not be
included. Likewise, the period of time when seasonal workers
did not render any service because of off-season, should not be
counted in computing the length of service. However, the
period covered by authorized leaves of absences, regular
holidays and the mandatory fulfillment of a military or civic
duty should not be deducted from the length of service.

Extension of Services After Retirement

Upon retirement of an employee, whether optional or
compulsory, his services shall be continued or extended on a
case-to-case basis upon agreement of the employer and the
employee.
VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATION
Meaning of Voluntary Arbitration
Voluntary arbitration is a system whereby the parties agree to
refer their dispute to an impartial third person called voluntary
arbitrator for a final and binding resolution. It differs from
compulsory arbitration in the sense that in compulsory
arbitration, the third party is appointed by the government.

Matters subject to Voluntary Arbitration

All grievances not settled at the grievance machinery are
subject to voluntary arbitration.

What is a grievance?
Grievance is a dispute or controversy between an employer and
the collective bargaining agent, individual employee or group of
employees, arising from interpretation or implementation of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) or interpretation
or enforcement of company personnel policies.
Grievances that are Cognizable by the Grievance
Machinery
Only grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of their CBA and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies
are cognizable by the grievance machinery.

Simple Violations of CBA Now Treated as Ordinary

Grievance
Violations of a CBA (except those which are gross in character),
are now considered as ordinary grievances to be resolved under
grievance machinery of the CBA. This could be gleaned from
Article 266 of the Labor Code which provides that:

“ART. 266. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary

Arbitrators – xxx violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except
those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor
practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the CBA. For the
purposes of this Article, gross violation of CBA shall mean flagrant and/or
Grievance Machinery – Mandatory for every CBA
In the Philippines, the parties are obliged to include in their
CBA a provision on grievance machinery. This is a mandatory
requirement. A CBA which does not contain a provision on
grievance machinery will not be registered. This could be
gleaned from Article 265 of the Labor Code which provides
that:
”ART. 265. Grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration - The parties to
a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions that will
ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. They shall
establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances
arising from the interpretation or implementation of their Collective
Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies.”
Jurisdictional Preconditions of Voluntary Arbitration
a. The dispute should be first brought to the grievance
machinery for resolution;
b. The grievance machinery failed to resolve the dispute; and
c. The parties must agree to submit the dispute for voluntary
Voluntary arbitrator

In its simplest term, a voluntary arbitrator is any person

chosen by the parties to resolve their disputes.

Who can be a voluntary arbitrator?

a. Any person accredited as such by NCMB;

b. Any person chosen or designated in the CBA;
c. Any person chosen pursuant to a selection procedure agreed
upon in the CBA; or
d. Any official who may be authorized by the SOLE to act as
voluntary arbitrator upon the written request of the parties.
[Art. 218(n), Labor Code]
The parties can even choose a LA to act as VA. There is
nothing in the law that prohibits LA from acting as VA as long
as the parties agree to have him hear and decide their dispute.
2. [G.R. No. 109383. June 15, 1998] MANILA CENTRAL LINE
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. MANILA CENTRAL LINE FREE
WORKERS UNION-NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and the
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

FACTS:
This case arose out of a collective bargaining deadlock between petitioner
Manila Central Line Corporation and private respondent Manila Central
Line Free Workers Union-National Federation of Labor. The parties’
collective bargaining agreement had expired on March 15, 1989. As the
parties failed to reach new agreement, private respondent Manila Central
Line Free Workers Union-National Federation of Labor sought the aid of
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board on October 30, 1989, but the
deadlock remained unresolved.
Private respondent Manila Central Line Free Workers Union-National
Federation of Labor filed a “Petition for Compulsory Arbitration” in the
Arbitration Branch for the National Capital Region of the National Labor
Relations Commission. At the initial hearing before the labor arbiter, the
parties declared that conciliation efforts before the NCMB had terminated
and it was their desire to submit the case for compulsory arbitration.
Accordingly, they were required to submit their position papers and
proposals, which they did, and in which they indicated portions of their
Labor Arbiter's Decision
The petitioner UNION and the respondent COMPANY are directed to
execute and formalize their new five-year collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) retroactive to the date of expiry of the 1986-1989 CBA

Petitioner appealed, but its appeal was denied by the NLRC. The NLRC
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition with the
following assignment of errors:
a) The NLRC erred in affirming the Labor Arbiter’s decision –
1. increasing the commission rate, the incentive pay, the salaries and
wages of the fixed income employees covered by the CBA.
2. granting P500.00 signing bonus to the complainant-appellee; and
3. holding that the effectivity of the renegotiated CBA shall be retroactive
to March 15, 1989, the expiry date of the old CBA
b) There are serious errors in the findings of facts of the Labor Arbiter
which were unqualified affirmed by the NLRC and which justify the review
by this Honorable SUPREME COURT.
c) The NLRC erred in upholding the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter; and
d) The NLRC erred in affirming the finalization of the CBA by the Labor
Arbiter in disregard of the provisions agreed upon by the parties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NLRC erred in upholding the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter.

HELD: No. (Art 250(e) and 262 of the Labor Code; Essence of voluntary
arbitration - agreement of the parties; nothing in the law that prohibits
these labor arbiters from also acting as voluntary arbitrators)

Indeed, the Labor Code formerly provided that if the parties in collective
bargaining fail to reach an agreement, the Bureau of Labor Relations
should call them to conciliation meetings and, if its efforts were not
successful, certify the dispute to a labor arbiter for compulsory arbitration.
But this was changed by R.A. No. 6715 which took effect on March 21, 1989.
Art 250(e) of the Labor Code now provides that if effects of conciliation fail,
the Board shall “encourage the parties to submit their case to a voluntary
arbitrator.” With specific reference to cases involving deadlocks in collective
bargaining, Art. 262 provides:
Jurisdiction over other labor disputes – The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel
of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and
decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and
bargaining deadlocks.
This is what the parties did in this case. After the Board failed to resolve
the bargaining deadlock between parties, the union filed a petition for
compulsory arbitration in the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. Petitioner
Manila Central Line Corporation joined the petition and the case was
submitted for decision. Although the union’s petition was for “compulsory
arbitration,” the subsequent agreement of petitioner to submit the matter
for arbitration in effect made the arbitration a voluntary one. The essence of
voluntary arbitration, after all is that it is by agreement of the parties,
rather than compulsion of law, that a matter is submitted for arbitration. It
does not matter that the person chosen as arbitrator is a labor arbiter who,
under Art 217 of the Labor Code, is charged with the compulsory arbitration
of certain labor cases. There is nothing in the law that prohibits these labor
arbiters from also acting as voluntary arbitrators as long as the parties
agree to have him hear and decide their dispute.
Moreover, petitioner Manila Central Line Corporation must be deemed to
be estopped from questioning the authority of Labor Arbiter Donato G.
Quinto, Jr., to act as voluntary arbitrator and render a decision in this case.
Petitioner Manila Central Line Corporation agreed together with the union,
to refer their dispute for arbitration to him.
Domestic Adoption
and
Inter-Country
Adoption
Adoption under Rule 99 of Rules of Court was superseded by
the Rule on Adoption per AM 02-6-02-SC.

Adoption is defined as the process of making a child,

whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general the
rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a
proceeding in rem which creates between two (2) persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate
paternity and filiation.

The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely

as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation
but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate
status (In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia, GR 148311. Mar. 31, 2005, 494 Phil. 515)
Distinctions between domestic adoption and inter-
country adoption
DOMESTIC ADOPTION
Governed by RA 8552, the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998; procedure
governed by AM No. 02-06-02-SC, Aug.
22, 2002.
Applies to domestic adoption of Filipino
children, where the entire adoption
process beginning from the filing of the
petition up to the issuance of the
adoption decree takes place in the
Philippines.
INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION
Governed by RA 8043, the Inter-
Country Adoption Act of 1995;
procedure governed by the Amended
Implementing Rules and Regulations
on ICAA.
Applies to adoption of a Filipino child
in a foreign country, where the petition
for adoption is filed, the supervised
trial custody is undertaken and the
decree of adoption is issued outside of
the Philippines.
Distinctions between domestic adoption and inter-
country adoption
DOMESTIC ADOPTION INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION
Who may be adopted Who may be adopted
A child legally available for adoption. Only a legally free child may be
Requisites: adopted.
a) Below 18 years of age; and Requisites:
b) Judicially declared available for a) Below 15 years of age; and
adoption. b) Has been voluntarily or
c) Exceptions: involuntarily committed to the DSWD
d) Legitimate son/daughter of one in accordance with PD 603.
spouse by the other spouse;
e) Illegitimate son/daughter by a
qualified adopter;
f) Person of legal age if, prior to the
adoption said person has been
consistently considered and treated by
the adopter/s as his/her own child since
minority.
Distinctions between domestic adoption and inter-
country adoption
DOMESTIC ADOPTION INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION
Who may adopt Who may adopt
1. FILIPINO CITIZENS A. FILIPINO CITIZENS
1) Of legal age; 1) Permanent resident of a foreign country;
2) In possession of full civil capacity and 2) Has the capacity to act and assume all rights
legal rights; and responsibilities of parental authority under
Philippine laws;
3) Of good moral character; 3) Has undergone the appropriate counseling
4) Has not been convicted of any crime from an accredited counselor in country of domicile;
involving moral turpitude; 4) Has not been convicted of a crime involving
5) Emotionally and psychologically capable moral turpitude;
of caring for children; 5) Eligible to adopt under Philippine laws;
6) In a position to support and care for 6) In a position to provide the proper care and
his/her children in keeping with the means of support and to give the necessary moral values and
example to all his children, including the child to be
the family; adopted;
7) At least 16 years older than the adoptee 7) Agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as
but this latter requirement may be waived if embodied under Philippine laws, the UN Convention
(a) the adopter is the biological parent of the on Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and
adoptee; or (b) the adopter is the spouse of the regulations issued to implement the provisions of the
adoptee‘s parent; and ICAA;
8) Permanent resident of the Philippines. 8) Residing in a country with whom the
Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose
government maintains a similarly authorized and
accredited agency and that adoption is allowed in
that country;
Distinctions between domestic adoption and inter-
country adoption
DOMESTIC ADOPTION INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION
Who may adopt Who may adopt
A. FILIPINO CITIZENS

9) Possesses all the qualifications and

none of the disqualifications provided in
the ICAA and in other applicable
Philippine laws;
10) At least 27 years of age at the time
of the application; and
11) At least 16 years older than the
child to be adopted at the time of
application, unless (a) adopted is the
parent by nature of the child to be
adopted; or (b) adopter is the spouse of
the parent by nature of the child to be
adopted.
Distinctions between domestic adoption and inter-
country adoption
DOMESTIC ADOPTION INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION
Who may adopt Who may adopt
2. ALIENS B. ALIENS

1) Same qualifications as above, and in addition:
2) His/her country has diplomatic relations with
the Republic of the Philippines; 3) His/her
government allows the adoptee to enter his/her
country as his/her adopted son/daughter;
4) Has been living in the Philippines for at least 3
continuous years prior to the filing of the application
for adoption and maintains such residence until the
adoption decree is entered; and
5) Has been certified by his/her diplomatic or
consular office or any appropriate government
agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in
his/her country. This requirement may be waived if
(a) a former Filipino citizens seeks to adopt a
relative within the 4th degree of consanguinity or
affinity; (b) one seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; (c) one who
is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt a
relative within the 4th degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the Filipino spouse.
1) At least 27 years of age at the time of the
application;
2) At least 16 years older than the child to be
adopted at the time of application unless the adopter
is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or
the spouse of such parent;
3) Has the capacity to act and assume all rights
and responsibilities of parental authority under his
national laws;
4) Has undergone the appropriate counseling
from an accredited counselor in his/her country;
5) Has not been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude;
6) Eligible to adopt under his/her national law;
7) In a position to provide the proper care and
support and to give the necessary moral values and
example to all his children, including the child to be
adopted;
 Distinctions between domestic adoption and inter-
country adoption
DOMESTIC ADOPTION INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION
Who may adopt Who may adopt
B. ALIENS
8) Agrees to uphold the basic rights of
the child as embodied under Philippine
laws, the UN Convention on the Rights
of the Child, and to abide by the rules
and regulations issued to implement the
provisions of the ICAA;
9) Comes from a country with whom
the Philippines has diplomatic relations
and whose government maintains a
similarly authorized and accredited
agency and that adoption is allowed
under his/her national laws; and
10) Possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided in
the ICAA and in other applicable
Philippine laws.
 Distinctions between domestic adoption and inter-
country adoption
DOMESTIC ADOPTION INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION
Requirement of Joint Adoption by Requirement of Joint Adoption by
Spouses Spouses
General rule: husband and wife shall Rule: if the adopter is married, his/her
jointly adopt; otherwise, the adoption spouse must jointly file for the adoption.
shall not be allowed.
Exceptions:
1) If one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate son/daughter of the other;
2) If one spouse seeks to adopt his/her
own illegitimate son/daughter but the
other spouse must give his/her consent;
3) If the spouses are legally separated
from each other.
 Distinctions between domestic adoption and inter-
country adoption
DOMESTIC ADOPTION INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION
Procedure Procedure
Where to file application: Where to file application:
In the Family Court of the province or Either in (a) Family Court having jurisdiction
city where the prospective parents over the place where the child resides or may
be found, or (b) Inter-Country Adoption Board
reside.
(ICAB) through an intermediate agency,
whether governmental or an authorized and
accredited agency, in the country of the
prospective adoptive parents.
After filing:
a) if filed in the FC, court determines
After filing: sufficiency of petition in respect to form and
The petition shall not be set for hearing substance, after which, petition is transmitted
to ICAB;
without a case study report by a licensed
b) if petition is already with ICAB, it
social worker. conducts matching of the applicant with an
adoptive child;
c) after matchmaking, the child is
personally fetched by the applicant for the
trial custody which takes place outside of the
Philippines.
 Distinctions between domestic adoption and inter-
country adoption
DOMESTIC ADOPTION
Procedure
Supervised Trial Custody:
a) Temporary parental authority is
vested in prospective adopter;
b) Period is at least 6 months, but may
be reduced by the court motu propio or
upon motion;
c) If adopter is alien, the law
mandatorily requires completion of the 6-
month trial custody and may not be
reduced, except if:
1) a former Filipino citizen seeks to
adopt a relative within 4th degree of
consanguinity or affinity;
2) one seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse;
3) one who is married to a Filipino
citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his/her spouse a relative within the 4th
degree of consanguinity or affinity of the
Filipino spouse.
INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION
Procedure
Supervised Trial Custody:
a) This process takes place outside of
the country and under the supervision of
the foreign adoption agency;
b) For a period of 6 months;
c) If unsuccessful, ICAB shall look for
another prospective applicant.
Repatriation of the child is to be resorted
only as a last resort;
d) If successful, ICAB transmits a
written consent for the adoption to be
executed by the DSWD, and the
applicant then files a petition for
adoption in his/her country.
 Distinctions between domestic adoption and inter-
country adoption
DOMESTIC ADOPTION
Procedure
Decree of Adoption:
Issued by Philippine Family Court.
Consent Required:
Written consent of the following to the
adoption is required, in the form of
affidavit:
1) adoptee, if 10 years of age or over;
2) biological parent/s of the child, if
known, or the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality which has
legal custody of the child;
3) legitimate and adopted sons or
daughters, 10 years of age or over, of the
adopter/s and adoptee, if any;
4) illegitimate sons/daughters, 10 years
of age of over, of the adopter if living with
said adopter and the latter‘s spouse, if any;
5) spouse, if any, of the person adopting
INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION
Procedure
Decree of Adoption:
Issued by a foreign court.
Consent Required:
1) Written consent of biological or
adopted children above 10 years of age,
in the form of sworn statement is
required to be attached to the
application to be filed with the FC or
ICAB;
2) If a satisfactory pre-adoptive
relationship is formed between the
applicant and the child, the written
consent to the adoption executed by the
DSWD is required.
A. DOMESTIC ADOPTION

Effects of adoption
Transfer of parental authority – except in cases where the
biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, the parental
authority of the biological parents shall terminate and the
same shall be vested in the adopters.
Legitimacy – the adoptee shall be considered the legitimate
son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and
as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by
law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without
discrimination of any kind.
Successional rights
In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee
shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from
legitimate filiation;
However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a
will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern;
The adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
Issuance of new certificate and first name and
surname of adoptee

The adoption decree shall state the name by which the child is to be known.
An amended certificate of birth shall be issued by the Civil Registry
attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s) by being
registered with his/her surname;
The original certificate of birth shall be stamped “cancelled” with the
annotation of the issuance of an amended birth certificate in its place and
shall be sealed in the civil registry records. The new birth certificate to be
issued to the adoptee shall not bear any notation that it is an amended
issue;
All records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of
the court, the DSWD, or any other agency or institution participating in the
adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential and the court may
order its release under the following conditions only: (1) the disclosure of the
information to a third person is necessary for purposes connected with or
arising out of the adoption; (2) the disclosure will be for the best interest of
the adoptee; and (3) the court may restrict the purposes for which it may be
used.
Instances when adoption may be rescinded
Grounds for rescission:
Repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s)
despite having undergone counselling;
Attempt on the life of the adoptee;
Sexual assault or violence; or
Abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.

Prescriptive period:
If incapacitated – within five (5) years after he reaches the age
of majority;
If incompetent at the time of the adoption – within five (5)
years after recovery from such incompetency.
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Effects of rescission of adoption

• Parental authority of the adoptee‘s biological parent(s), if

known, or the legal custody of the DSWD shall be restored
if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated;
• Reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the
adoptee to each other shall be extinguished;
• Cancellation of the amended certificate of birth of the
adoptee and restoration of his/her original birth certificate;
and
• Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to
adoption, but only as of the date of judgment of judicial
rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial
rescission shall be respected.
B. Inter-country adoption

Inter-country adoption; when allowed

Inter-country adoptions are allowed when the same shall
prove beneficial to the child‘s best interests, and shall serve
and protect his/her fundamental rights.
It is allowed when all the requirements and standards set
forth under RA 8043 are complied with.

Functions of the RTC in inter-country adoption

An application to adopt a Filipino child shall be filed either
with the Philippine Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction
over the child, or with the Board, through an intermediate
agency, whether governmental or an authorized and
accredited agency, in the country of the prospective adoptive
parents, which application shall be in accordance with the
requirements as set forth in the implementing rules and
regulations.
B. Inter-country adoption

“Best interest of minor” standard

In case of custody cases of minor children, the court
after hearing and bearing in mind the best interest
of the minor, shall award the custody as will be for
the minor‘s best interests.
“Best interests of the child” – means the totality
of the circumstances and conditions as are most
congenial to the survival, protection, and feelings of
security of the child and most encouraging to his
physical, psychological, and emotional development.
It also means the least detrimental available
alternative for safeguarding the growth and
development of the child.
1. In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michael Jude P. Lim,
GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
Facts:
Spouses Monina P. Lim and Primo Lim were childless. Subsequently, two
minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain
Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have children of their own, Monina and Primo
registered the children to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The
children were named Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim. The spouses reared and
cared for the children as if they were their own. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. On
27 December 2000, Monina married Angel Olario, an American citizen. Monina decided
to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who
simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of
Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already
married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband,
Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of
Consent. On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
petitions. The trial court ruled that since Monina had remarried, she should have filed
the petition jointly with her new husband. Monina appealed contending that the rule on
joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect
the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the
legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint
parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions were
filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already 18
years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been
emancipated having attained the age of majority.
Issues: 1. Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

2. Whether or not joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children
have been emancipated having reached the age of majority.

Held: 1. No. The law is explicit. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in the following cases: (i)
if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or (ii) if one spouse seeks to
adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified
his/her consent thereto; or (iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other, which was not
present in the case at bar. The use of the word “shall” means that joint adoption by the husband and
the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the
child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between
the spouses. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her
husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the
children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second,
the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not
legally separated from each other. The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in
his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply
being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as:
(1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2)
he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of
the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is
entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter
the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and
proved during the trial. These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification
to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the
 2. Whether or not joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the
children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority.

Held: 2. Petitioner's contention is untenable. Parental authority includes caring for

and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development
of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. The father and the
mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children. Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental
authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the
guardian of the person or property of the children. It is true that when the child
reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains the age of majority or
18 years of age — emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and
property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil
life. However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.
Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered
a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1)
to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their
parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights.
Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all
the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and
successional rights.
2. In the Matter of the adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia Honorato B.
Catindig, GR No. 148311, March 31, 2005

Doctrine: Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that

Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father
and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

Facts: Honorato B. Catindig (petitioner) filed a petition to adopt his minor

illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged that Stephanie was
born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie
has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s
middle name Astorga be changed to “Garcia,” her mother’s surname, and that her
surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig,” his surname. TC granted the petition
and held that pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG. Petitioner filed a
motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be
allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is
no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name.
Issue: W/N an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle
name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.

Held: YES, there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, (and there is
no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.) As correctly submitted by both
parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176 of
the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as “An
Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father,” is silent
as to what middle name a child may use. The middle name or the mother’s surname
is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names
and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle
name or the mother’s surname shall be added. Notably, the law is likewise silent as
to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely
provides that “an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.” Also,
Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is
likewise silent on the matter, thus: "(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall
be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child,
including theright of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters; x x x”
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino
custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle name.
Held: What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to
bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. Adoption is defined
as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the
rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity
and filiation. The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a
relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a
legitimate status. This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party
to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the
principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its
underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child. Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise
known as the “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,” secures these rights and privileges for the
adopted. Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her
mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be
noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18 Article V of RA 8552 (law on
adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological
parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural
mother in the future. Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living
together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag,
Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her
mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship
with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy. It is a settled rule that
adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the
beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary
and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
3. Diwata Ramos Landingin vs. Republic of the Philippines,
GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006

Doctrines: The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural

parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from
unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed
adoption. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for
the validity of a decree of adoption.— Indeed, the natural right of a parent
to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental
rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of
Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Merely permitting the child to remain for a
time undisturbed in the care of others is not such an abandonment.— To
dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown
to have existed at the time of adoption. Abandonment means neglect and
refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. Even
assuming that the minor children were abandoned by their biological
parents, Section 9 of R.A. 8552 applies. It provides that if the written
consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of
the legal guardian of the minors will suffice.
Facts: On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen, of Filipino parentage and a
resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos; Elma Dizon
Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos. The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos,
petitioner’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when
Manuel died on May 19, 1990, the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc
Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by
her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her
in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially
supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on
November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written
consent to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old
widow, has children of her own who are already married, gainfully employed and have their
respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship,
and works as a restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors;
her children gave their written consent to the adoption of the minors. Petitioner’s brother, Mariano
Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the
minors while in petitioner’s custody. Since her petition was unopposed, petitioner was allowed to
present her evidence ex parte. The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine
Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the written consent executed by her and her siblings.
The petitioner marked in evidence the Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children
Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and notarized by a notary public
in Guam, USA, as proof of said consent. In her Child Study Report, DSWD Social Welfare Officer II
Elizabeth Pagbilao recommended the grant of the petition. She alleged that the mother of minors
came home together with her son John Mario, in May 2002, for 3 week-vacation, to enable her
appear for the personal interview concerning the adoption of her children. The mother allegedly
voluntarily consented to the adoption. Petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in
evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to
present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the adoption. RTC Tarlac grated
the petition. CA reversed.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the written consent of the biological parents to
the adoption is indispensable? YES.

2. Whether or not Amelia abandoned her children by going to Italy and

leaving the children to the guidance and care of their paternal
grandmother, hence her written consent is not required? NO.

3. Whether or not the joint written consent of the petitioner’s legitimate

children notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA duly authenticated
and therefore admissible? NO.

4. Whether or not petitioner is financially capable? NO.

Held: 1. See Doctrine 1. We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that
she was able to interview Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines
with her son, John Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the
Philippines and Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is incredible that the
latter would not require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent to the
adoption of her minor children. Neither did the petitioner bother to present
Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the petition.
 See Doctrine 2. When Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, or
to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the
country by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish
entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased mother-in-law,
for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious personal
problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to the children, though in
minimal amounts as compared to what her affluent in-laws provide.

3. Petitioner failed to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103 for its authentication. Section 2
has something to do with acknowledgment before ambassador, minister, etc.; that person
taking acknowledgment certifies that he knows the person acknowledging the instrument
before him, etc.

4. Petitioner’s financial capability is doubtful. At the time of the filing of the petition,
petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an
hour and tips of around $1,000 a month. Petitioner’s main intention in adopting the children
is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam,
but the same is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the limited income might
be a hindrance to the adoption proceedings. Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful
whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three
children in the US. She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age. While petitioner
claims that she has the financial support and backing of her children and siblings, the OSG is
correct in stating that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as
adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the latter. Moreover, the records
do not prove nor support petitioner’s allegation that her siblings and her children are
financially able and that they are willing to support the minors herein.
THANK YOU!!!
Supervised trial custody and any exceptions

Consent of biological father, who abandoned his

illegitimate child, on the adoption of the child by the mother
and her new husband

Under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 the written

consent of the natural parent is required. Consent need not be
obtained if the father has abandoned the child and can no
longer be located despite earnest efforts. The best interest and
welfare of the child is still the consideration.

The specific provisions involving qualifications for US

immigration of a child (within the 4th civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity) adopted under the Domestic
Adoption Law of the Philippines by an American citizen
married to a Filipino or former Filipino citizen