Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Tegucigalpa, Honduras
April 23 - 25, 2008
Highways
Main Objective:
Mobilize Private Capital and
Management into Transport
Infrastructure Development
Contents
Transport Infrastructure Investment
The Economics of Transport Infrastructure
Fiscal Space (Public Investment)
The Real Gap : Cost Recovery and Affordability
Key Drivers of our clients demands
Way Forward
The Economics of Transport
Infrastructure Investments
Infrastructure investments are inherently “lumpy” (involve huge sunk costs
and create assets that are long-lived and location-specific).
Creation of Infrastructure has economics both of scale and scope (i.e.,
minimum size of facilities, inelastic adjustment of capacity to demand, long
term project completion, etc.).
Infrastructure supply systems contain elements of natural monopoly
(competition).
Demand is wide spread (difficult to target).
Revenues are usually in local currency (mismatch if foreign debt financing).
Transport services have an essentiality component that raise legitimate
public policy concerns of affordability.
However ………..
Sound transport infrastructure allows countries to integrate to the global
economy and increases competitiveness (transport and telecom sectors
are the highest contributors to a country’s competitiveness) impacting
economic growth.
Transport infrastructure development has a strong impact on
competitiveness, growth, poverty alleviation and MDGs.
Fiscal limits to increased public
investments in infrastructure
Public Investments needs are sizeable in most countries but difficult to
quantify.
Countries face important trade-offs between infrastructure spending and
other expenditure items (i.e., health and education).
Little empirical evidence that reductions in public investments had an
adverse impact on growth.
Countries with relatively high public debt burden have a limited scope for
increasing investment via public borrowing.
Significant scope to improve the quality of infrastructure investment.
Changes in fiscal accounting cannot create room for additional spending
for infrastructure.
Most of the public enterprises in the pilots did not meet the “commercially
run” criteria.
Effective PPPs is encourage as a way to bring in leveraging and efficiency
in infrastructure investment.
The Service Delivery Gap
The Service
There is limited affordability in the provision of Delivery Gap
most of infrastructure services (when including the
costs of the required infrastructure facilities), Tariffs
specially when considering low income end-users.
Cost recovery
Infrastructure services has strong characteristics
as a public good and creates major positive
externalities.
Time
There is a role for the provision of “smart”
subsidies to make possible the delivery of the
service.
Output
Output
BasedAid
Based Aid
Approaches
Approaches
Key Drivers for Client Demands
Change in the risk profile of our client base:
• 80s : developed and developing countries
• 2000s forward:
Need to fill the service delivery gap (full cost recovery not possible at
the required pace for market driven incentives to support investments)
Fiscal Space for Public Investments will be limited at best (limited new
borrowing capacities to allocate to infrastructure development)
Leveraging Public Money
• Need to reconcile infrastructure development needs with criteria for fiscal
prudence.
• Need to mobilize additional private capital to match the gap if
infrastructure development is to keep its pace sustaining economic growth.
• Need to maximize private capital mobilization per unit of public sector
contribution (e.g., direct investment, subsidies, guarantees, etc.).
• Need to develop PPPs approaches as a procurement tool for better and
efficient allocation of scarce public sector resources (the concept of value for
money).
• Need to develop an adequate risk management framework to manage
contingent liabilities arising for public money support to PPPs development.
PPPs : Spectrum of Options
(B) PPP via 100% shadow toll road equivalent to $ 1.68 per vehicle
Concession structured as an performance based scheme with shadow toll
paid by government budget allocations [tax payers] on the basis of
performance based criteria (i.e., maintenance and safety of road usage).
Shadow toll payments likely to need strong backstopped by MLAs and
Donors (e.g., guarantees, liquidity facilities)
Upfront investment by the PPP special purpose company.
SSA Toll Roads Case (4):
Scenario 2 : Willingness to pay = between zero and $ 1.68 per vehicle
($0.84 per vehicle)
(C) PPP via a collected toll fare ($0.84) plus a supplemental subsidy
($0.84).
Subsidy can be paid as a shadow toll or can be structured as a traffic
minimum revenue guarantee (defining a predetermined level of total
revenues). Performance risk is transfer to the private sector. No initial
disbursement by the public sector.
(D) PPP via a co-investment between the Public and Private sector. Size of
public co-investment will be equal to the difference between total
investment and the investment amount supported by the existing tariff
(i.e., $ 126.7). Performance risk is transfer to the private sector. Initial
disbursement by public sector.
SSA Toll Roads Case (5):
Scenario 3 : Willingness to pay = equivalent to required tariff ($ 1.68)
• A challenge for the government was to close this gap while maintaining fiscal discipline that had placed
public debt on a rapidly declining path. The solution lay in promoting private sector involvement in the
provision of public infrastructure through public-private partnerships (PPPs). Chile thus embarked on an ambitious
concessions program in 1994, centered around a number of projects to develop the highway network.
• The concessions program in Chile covers 44 contracted projects with a total value of US$5.7 billion
(about 6¼ percent of 2004 GDP). These include: 8 projects to rehabilitate and upgrade the Route 5 highway
which runs the length of Chile, with financing from tolls (US$2 billion); 11 other highway projects for connecting
roads to Route 5 (US$1.3 billion); 10 airport projects (US$240 million); 6 urban road projects (US$1.8 billion); and
9 other projects (including prisons, public buildings, a reservoir, for US$360 million). Approximately 75% was
funded in the local capital markets via local currency infrastructure bonds.
• The government provides guarantees to concession operators. A minimum revenue guarantee is provided
for highway and airport concessions, under which concession firms are compensated when traffic or traffic
revenue falls below an annual threshold. In return for the minimum revenue guarantee, the concession firm enters
into a revenue sharing agreement in which it shares a percentage of revenue with the government once a
threshold is exceeded.
PPP and Risk Management
Framework
PPP
PPP Sector Teams Projects
Coordinating Entity
Ministryofof Coordinating Entity
Ministry (Minister or Council
PublicWorks
Public Works (Minister or Council MOF
of Ministers) MOF
Water of Ministers) RiskManagement
Management
Ministryofof Risk
Ministry
Energy
Energy
Roads
Ministryofof Electricity
Ministry
Communication
Communication Gas CentralPPP
Central PPPUnit
Unit Selection Criteria
Selection Criteria
Risk Exposure
Risk Exposure
Ministryofof Pricing
Ministry Airport Coordinating Role
Coordinating Role Pricing
Transport
Transport Monitoring
Procurement Rules Monitoring
Procurement Rules
Ports Screening Documentation
Ministryofof Screening Documentation
Ministry Monitoring
SOEs
SOEs Railways Monitoring
Communication
Communication
Local
Local
Sanitation
Governments
Governments Telecom
OtherPublic
Other Public
Institutions
Institutions Public Sector Support for PPP
(guarantees, subsidies, etc.)
Bank’s response to client demands
(PPPs support)
Shift in development burden from central to local entities :
the challenge of financing sub-national entities (IFC
Municipal Fund, WBG scale up currently under
consideration)
Use of performance based subsidies (OBA approaches)
Innovative Risk Mitigation Products (new applications
partial risk guarantees)
Public Financial Support for PPP’s development (risk
management framework)
Infrastructure Finance Vehicles (guarantee funds)
Infrastructure:
Developing Local Capital Markets
• There is no best substitute for foreign exchange risk mitigation than matching the currency revenue
generation with the currency of debt payment services (matching assets and liabilities).
• Financing transport facilities and services (local currency based) in the foreign debt markets adds substantial
risk to the structuring of adequate PPPs creating the need for additional public money support.
• Local institutional investors (I.e., pension funds, insurance companies, life annuities, etc.) have a natural
demand for long-term local currency debt instruments to match their liabilities.
• In most cases, local capital markets initiate their development via the creation of a sovereign bond market
(long-term yield curve). After the establishment of such market, investors develop a need to diversify the risk
profile of their investments and the return mix, providing the incentives for the development of a private bond
market, creating the opportunity for the introduction of infrastructure or utilities bonds (long-term annuities).
• It is in the government’s best interest to stimulate, via adequate securities regulation and institutional
investors overseeing, the development of local capital markets as a source of long-term local currency
funding for needed PPPs infrastructure projects.
Innovative Risk Mitigation Products
Local Currency Debt Instruments
Development of Local Capital Markets (e.g., Chile and Korea)
IBRD (on-lending to private sector)
• Currency conversion option in fixed spread loans (FSL)
• Currency swap
• Rolling forward/1
IFC Local Currency
• Loans and Hedging Products
• Partial Credit Guarantees (asset backed securities)
Broader use of PPP schemes as a way to maximize public money leveraging for infrastructure development. Need to develop
adequate risk mitigation instruments to support public contribution to infrastructure projects. Options other than private
ownership of infrastructure assets are also effective to mobilize private capital and management into infrastructure development.
MLAs and Donors direct engagement with sub-national entities (well run public utilities) without central government support to
assist them accessing private financial markets. Need to improve accountability and use of performance based incentives
(commercially run entities).
Development of local capital markets (local currency debt instruments) as a mechanism for improving effective access to
infrastructure financing by PPPs.
Increasing use of output based subsidies as a way to utilize better private sector resources via effective allocation of
performance risks (PPPs to deliver services to poorer communities).
Build solid institutional capacities in the public sector to improve “good” infrastructure PPPs as well as the risk management of
contingent liabilities arising from PPP support . Development of specialized financing vehicles (public sector driven).
Case Study
Session 5.1
THANK YOU!
Highways
THANK YOU!
Highways