By:

Zikri, Nabilah, Nadhirah, Natasya and Awadah

Timeline
June 25, 2003:
T2E was apart of the A structure without
France celebrated the
projected state-of-the-art interior columns, the 11 months
grand opening of
four terminals hub for Air futuristic tunnel was later
Terminal 2E at Charles de
France. admired by many.
Gaulle Airport in Paris.

The cables supporting the oval 23 May, 2004:

On a hot day, the cables concrete that were exposed to On an unusually cold morning,
lengthen and looses support the fluctuating temperature the temperature dropped
on the concrete, thus more outside, expand and contract sharply from 25C to 4C. The
likelihood for cracks to happen. more than the concrete. structure was extremely fragile.

From the changes of The concrete shell looses its

On that day, as the cables
temperature and the push and support and a section of the
shorten more than ever, they
pull from the cables, the vaulted roof measuring 20
pulled along the side of the
concrete shell is now flexible meters by 30 meters fell, killing
concrete to the ground.
and no longer rigid. four and injuring three.
 Ethics Issue Involved Lack of variant of
professional views

Aéroports de Paris (ADP) (Paris Airports) has always been both judge and jury when it comes to the design & construction
of the air terminals. ADP has always been the one that order the work and ADPi (subsidiary) has always executed the
work. This seemed like there was not a broad vision and an effective supervision of the project & construction site.

Lack of specificity

There was a huge number of stakeholders involved in the project: around 400 different firms or organizations. This is
proven to be difficult to manage as such high scale of a project must bring a high implicit degree of complexity. Therefore,
the probability of a coordination error or of an individual mistake (suppliers, contractors, constructors, supervisors, etc.) is
considerably high.
Lack of
consideration

The architect who is a difficult and obstinate character wants to impose his particular design shapes regardless of costs,
risks and efficiency. Although it is true that the calculations of the design of the structure were made first by ADPi then by
a third party, a simpler structure is obviously less risky and one has to consider the trade-off between the desire for
“elegance” & “highend” architectural designs and efficient less-risky designs.
 IMPACT TO THE COMPANY
• not only because they were one of the
Air France investors in the project but of course
because they were the main user of the
terminal

• since the new terminal 2E was able to

Airbus and the new A380 provide s ervices to at least two of them
simultaneously

• from a financial perspective

• from an institutional / media point of
ADP view. Its public image was severely
damaged after the accident, nationally
and internationally

• Working with an architect of difficult personality who

The ADPi engineers and wants to impose his particular designs regard less of
architects costs, risks and efficiency may result in negative
consequence
Financial repercussions
• The cost of the accident includes not only the initial
investment potentially lost but also the cost of
reconstruction, investigations & all the consequences
of the accident (basically for ADP or for the
stakeholder that will result accountable) , and
especially the cost for the airlines of operating with a
low level of service, of reallocation of gates and
terminals, etc.
IMPACT TO THE EMPLOYEE
• The official report stopped short of pointing a finger
of blame and refused to conclude there had been a
"conceptual error" in the design of Terminal 2E.
• Therefore, it was not clear from the report who
should be held responsible for these weaknesses in
construction and design.
• There are unknown immediate consequences ruled
on the employees of affected companies.
SOLUTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
• FOLLOW CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURE THOROUGHLY
• DIFFERENT TEAMS SHOULD DO THEIR OWN PART PROPERLY
• A PROPER PLANNING IS A MUST TO HAVE AN ALMOST-PERFECTION
CONSTRUCTION PROCESS
• SETTLING FOR EASE AND ECONOMY SHOULD NOT BE DONE
• AGENCIES SUCH AS STAKEHOLDERS SHOULD BE MINIMUM TO
PREVENT COMPLEXITY (400 IN THIS CASE)
• GOOD ATTITUDE IS A MUST IN EVERY WORKER INVOLVED – GOOD
COMUNICATION SKILL, TEAMWORK AND ETC.
• EXTRA REDUNDANCIES AND STRUCTURAL ROBUSTNESS SHOULD BE
PROVIDED – USE CORRECT MATERIALS (IN THIS CASE, STEEL IS BETTER
THAN CONCRETE)
• SAFETY SHOULD BE INCORPORATED AND TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION
DURING DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION PROCESS. ANY COMPLEXITY
MUST CONSIDER.
• INDEPENDENT NON-PROFITABLE CONSULTANT SHOULD BE
EMPLOYED TO JUDGE OR REVIEW THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
PROCESS.