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Berdasarkan kepada s. 134 AK ini bermakna, hanya seorang saksi adalah memadai untuk
membuktikan sesuatu fakta.
Pada amnya, undang-undang tidak memfokuskan kepada jumlah saksi yang memberi
keterangan untuk menentukan sama ada sesuatu fakta yang ditegaskan itu telah dibuktikan.
Sebaliknya, undang-undang lebih mementingkan kualiti keterangan yang diberikan. Ini
adalah kerana sekiranya terdapat keterangan daripada seorang saksi yang boleh dipercayai,
maka ia adalah lebih baik daripada 10 orang saksi yang kualiti keterangan mereka diragui.
Credibility/ reliability is condition precedent to corroboration: Aziz bin
Muhamad Din v PP
• It must be noted that the question of corroboration does not arise unless the
evidence of the witness requiring corroboration is itself credible. In this regard Gunn
Chit Tuan J (as he then was) said in TN Nathan v PP [1978] 1 MLJ 134 at p 137:
• Lord Hailsham has expressed a similar opinion in the English House of Lord's case of
DPP v Kilbourne [1973] 1 All ER 440 when he said at p 452:
Rule of Prudence
1. Mangsa Kesalahan Seksual
2. Rakan Sejenayah
3. Saksi Berkepentingan
(only requires a more careful scrutiny of their evidence)
Aziz bin Muhamad Din v PP
• Generally in Malaysia there is no specific rule of law that requires
the evidence of a witness to be corroborated except in the case of
the evidence of a child of tender years under s 133A of the Act.
• However, in certain types of cases there is a rule of practice which
requires evidence to be corroborated. This includes the evidence of
a complainant in a case involving a sexual offence.
• Even in such cases a conviction based on uncorroborated evidence
is not illegal. But the rule of practice regulates the manner in which
uncorroborated evidence is to be treated, that is to say, the judge
must warn himself of the dangers of convicting on such evidence. In
saying that the warning must appear in the judgment or grounds of
decision of the trial court though no particular form of words need
be used.
Rationale of corroboration is different:
Din v Public Prosecutor
• The rule relating to corroboration, like most of the other rules of our law
of evidence, is not a purely technical rule contravention of which is fatal
to a conviction. The rules of evidence are not rules for governing a
forensic game of chess; they are rules for the administration of justice and
they are based on accumulated human experience and common sense.
That particularly applies to the rules relating to corroboration.
• In the case of accomplice evidence the need for corroboration arises from
the nature of the witness who is somebody who may have an interest in
making out the guilt of another in preference to his own. Again in the case
of children's evidence the need arises from the notorious unreliability of
children as witnesses and in particular their known aptitude to confuse
fact with fantasy. Neither in the case of accomplices nor children,
however, is there any connection with the nature of the offence. The
evidence of an accomplice or of a child calls for corroboration just as
much in a case of assault or theft as in a case of murder.
• But the desirability for corroboration of the evidence of the prosecutrix in a rape
case (which in any event has not yet crystallized into something approaching a rule
of law and which is still a rule of practice and of prudence) springs not from the
nature of the witness but from the nature of the offence. Never has it been
suggested that the evidence of a woman as such invariably calls for corroboration. If
a woman says her handbag has been snatched and if she is believed there can be no
question of a conviction on such evidence being open to attack for want of
corroboration. If, however, she complains of having been raped then both prudence
and practice demand that her evidence should be corroborated.
• Here, however, the necessity for corroboration, generally speaking, is not so
imperative with regard to the identity of her assailant as to the fact of the offence
itself. It is here that there is danger. The temptations of a woman to exaggerate an
act of sexual connection are well known and manifold. But though it might be
dangerous to find the factum of rape on the uncorroborated evidence of the
prosecutrix, once that factum of rape is established, there seems to be nothing left
to support the view that her identification of the assailant calls for corroboration
any more than it would in relation to any other type of offence.
Mohd Yusof B. Rahmat v Pendakwa Raya
[2009] 2 CLJ 273
• We must distinguish between a statement that should be
corroborated because of the nature of the offence e.g. rape or
corruption and that because the tender age of the witness.
• The first requires corroboration because the honesty of the
witness may be questionable. These offences are easy to allege
but difficult to disprove.
• The second because of the tender age of the witness who
could be influenced by adults and his own imagination.
• The evaluation of evidence in each of the categories must be
distinguished.
Apa itu Keterangan Sokongan?
Attan Abdul Ghani v Public Prosecutor [1970] 2 MLJ 143, keterangan sokongan
adalah keterangan yang boleh menyokong atau dapat menunjukkan bahawa
keterangan yang diberikan oleh saksi yang keterangannya perlu disokong itu benar.
The nature of the corroboration will necessarily vary according to the particular
circumstances of the offence charged. It would be in high degree dangerous to attempt to
formulate the kind of evidence which would be regarded as corroboration, except to say
that:
Corroborative evidence is evidence which shows or tends to show that the story
of the accomplice that the accused committed the crime is true, not merely that the crime
has been committed, but that it was committed by the accused.
R v Baskerville [1916]2 KB 658
Evidence in corroboration must be independent testimony which affects
the accused by connecting or tending to connect him with the crime. In
other words, it must be evidence which implicate him, that is, which
confirms in some material particular not only the evidence that the crime
has been committed but also that the prisoner committed it.
(keterangan sokongan dalam undang-undang keterangan hendaklah
bebas, melibatkan tertuduh dan juga mengaitkan tertuduh dengan
kesalahan yang dipertuduh)
R v Kerim
The word 'implicate' does not necessarily mean 'incriminate' or
'inculpate'; it may mean only 'involve‘.
R v Baskerville [1916]2 KB 658
• "confirmation does not mean that there should be independent evidence of that
which the accomplice relates, or his testimony would be unnecessary": Reg. v.
Mullins (1), per Maule J.
• Indeed, if it were required that the accomplice should be confirmed in every detail
of the crime, his evidence would not be essential to the case, it would be merely
confirmatory of other and independent testimony.
• Again, the corroboration must be by some evidence other than that of an
accomplice, and therefore one accomplice's evidence is not corroboration of the
testimony of another accomplice: Rex v. Noakes.
• The corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed the
crime; it is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence of his connection with
the crime. A good instance of this indirect evidence is to be found in Reg. v. Birkett.
(2) Were the law otherwise many crimes which are usually committed between
accomplices in secret, such as incest, offences with females, or the present case,
could never be brought to justice.
• Dalam kes Brabakar v PP :
Corroborative evidence is not necessarily restricted to the oral evidence of
an independent witness. Corroboration can equally well be afforded by
established facts and the logic of established facts sometimes speaks more
eloquently than words.
Prinsip
Mahkamah tidak menetapkan apakah fakta yang terjumlah kepada keterangan
sokongan. Sebaliknya ia bergantung pada fakta kes untuk menentukan jenis
keterangan sokongan yang diperlukan.
PP v. LIM KIANG CHAI [2016] 4 CLJ 173
Thus, corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused
committed the crime. It is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial
evidence of his connection with the crime. Corroboration must be in
material particulars and it is not necessary that the whole
prosecution story or all material particulars should be corroborated.
• The other statements or circumstances are only of value if, having regard to what
is in issue, they come from a source or sources independent of the accomplice
and go some part of the way towards proving guilt, by tending to show that the
offence was committed and that the accused committed it.
• It is therefore always important to consider:
• (1) what are the real issues in the case;
• (2) what the evidence being put forward as corroboration
does in fact prove. The proof may of course come from
several sources, and in that sense corroboration may be
cumulative as already illustrated;
• (3) whether that evidence: (a) comes from a source or
sources independent of the accomplice; (b) goes some
significant part of the way towards showing that the
offence was committed and that the accused committed it.
Corroboration Warning
(Aziz bin Muhamad Din v PP [1997] 1 CLJ supp. 523)
• Generally in Malaysia there is no specific rule of law that requires the evidence
of a witness to be corroborated except in the case of the evidence of a child of
tender years under s 133A of the Act. However, in certain types of cases there is
a rule of practice which requires evidence to be corroborated. This includes the
evidence of a complainant in a case involving a sexual offence.
• Even in such cases a conviction based on uncorroborated evidence is not illegal.
But the rule of practice regulates the manner in which uncorroborated evidence
is to be treated, that is to say, the judge must warn himself of the dangers of
convicting on such evidence. In saying that the warning must appear in the
judgment or grounds of decision of the trial court though no particular form of
words need be used.
Ng Yau Thai v PP [1987] 2 MLJ 214