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Failure Mode and Effects Analysis

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Dont Let This Happen To You

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Increasing Customer Expectations


Additional Functions Increasing complexity Systems Products Higher Efficiency Extreme Operating conditions Processes Increased Reliability Service Friendliness Products with value for the money Shorter Development cycles

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Quality Planning
System Development Component Development Tryout Design Concept Mfg. Planning M/C: Eqpt, Tool Planning Procurement

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System FMEA

Finalise Measures

Further updating

Design FMEA

First Development

Finalise Measures

Further updating

Process FMEA

First Dev.

Finalise Measures Pilot Run

Further updating Production

Preliminary Special characteristics

QA1

Finalise special characteristics

QA2

Product SupplyRelease

QA3

Ensure Special Characteristics e.g. Cpk

System Dev.- order

Component Dev. - order

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Start B (C) Plan & order Proto sample Product Mfr. & Tryout pre-release

Product Release

Time Start Production

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Cost Effective in using FMEA


Identification and Prevention of Potential defects Design FMEA Process FMEA Detection and Removal of Internal defects. SPC PPM SPC Detection and Elimination of External defects

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Goods Inwards Inspection

Design and Manufacturing Development planning Planning Purchase


Manufacturing

Final Inspection

Manufacturer
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Inspection by customer

Useage
Customer

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What is An FMEA

Essae

A tool used to evaluate potential failure modes and their causes. Prioritizes Potential Failures according to their Risk and drives actions to eliminate or reduce their likelihood of occurrence Provides a discipline / methodology for documenting this analysis for future use and continuous process improvement By its self, an FMEA is NOT a problem solver. It is used in combination with other problem solving tools. The FMEA presents the opportunity but does not solve the problem.
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Application
Fundamental New Development Significant changes Technical Safety requirements Customer request

Essae

Updating on
Product changes New conditions / applications New materials / processes Complaints

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QFD Process
Design Requirement

Essae

Customer Requirements

Part Characteristics

Design Requirements

Part Characteristics

Product

Manufacturing Operations

Part

Production Requirement

Process

Manufacturing Operations

Production
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Origin & History

Essae

Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 1960s and 70s The FMEA discipline was developed in the United States Military. Military Procedure MIL-P-1629, It was used as a reliability evaluation technique to determine the effect of system and equipment failures. Failures were classified according to their impact on mission success and personnel/equipment safety. In 1988, the International Organization for Standardization issued the ISO 9000 series of business management standards. QS 9000 is the automotive analogy to ISO 9000 In accordance with QS 9000 standards, compliant automotive suppliers utilize Advanced Product Quality Planning (APQP), including design and process FMEAs, and develop a Control Plan. QS 9000 compliant automotive suppliers must utilize Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) in the Advanced Quality Planning process and in the development of their Control Plans.

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The FMEA Process


Identify Functions Identify Failure Modes Identify Effects of the Failure Mode Define severity Apply procedure for potential consequences Identify Potential Causes Determine occurrence Calculate criticality Identify Design or Process Control(s) Determine Detection RPN & Final Risk Assessment Take Actions to Reduce Risks Identify Special Characteristics Identify Root Causes

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Cause and Effect Cascade


Cause Design Effect Environmental Exposure Cause Moisture Effect

Essae

Cause = Corrosion Effect=High Resistance Cause = High Resistance Effect = Insufficient Current
Cause Effect Corrosion

Cause = Insufficient Current Effect = Dim Bulb


Poor contact (High Resistance) Cause Effect Insufficient Current Cause Effect Dim Bulb

Cause = Design Cause Effect=Env. Exposure Cause = Env. Exposure Effect = Moisture Cause = Moisture Effect = Corrosion

Effect

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Automotive FMEAs
Failure Mode
System The ramification FMEA of the problem

Essae

Effect
The Problem

Cause
The Cause(s) of the Problem

The Cause(s) of the The effect from the Design Problem from the system FMEA with a FMEA System FMEA Better Definition

New root causes for the design failure Modes

Process The Cause(s) of the The Same effect as Problem from the the Design FMEA FMEA Design FMEA
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Specific root Causes for the Process Failure Modes

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Automotive FMEA Timeline


System FMEA Design FMEA

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Process FMEA

Concept

Design Go-Ahead

Design Prototype Completion Build

Eng/Mfg Sign off

Production Start

Design FMEA

Start early in process, complete by the time preliminary drawings are done but before any tooling is initiated.

Process FMEA
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Start as soon as basic manufacturing methods have been discussed. Complete prior to finalizing production plans and releasing for production

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Essae

Important Factors Timeliness i.e. before the event Action and not after-the-Fact Exercise. Greatest value: before failure mode is designed into. Up front time spent on changes alleviate late changes crisis.

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Specific Uses

Essae

Design FMEAs are used to analyze products before they are released to production Focus on potential failure modes of products caused by design deficiencies. Identify potential designated characteristics called Special Characteristics Process FMEAs are used to analyze manufacturing and assembly processes. Focus on potential product failure modes caused by manufacturing or assembly process deficiencies. Confirm the need for Special Controls in manufacturing and confirm the designated potential Special Characteristics from the Design FMEA. Identify process failure modes that could violate government regulations or compromise employee safety.

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FMEA Outputs

Essae

Design FMEA Outputs A list of potential product failure modes. A list of potential Critical Characteristics and/or Significant Characteristics. A list of design actions to reduce Severity, eliminate the causes of product failure modes, or reduce their rate of Occurrence, or improve detection. Confirmation of the Design Verification Plan (DVP). Feedback of design changes to the design committee. Process FMEA Outputs A list of potential process failure modes. A list of confirmed Critical Characteristics and/or Significant Characteristics. A list of Operator Safety and High Impact Characteristics. A list of recommended Special Controls for designated product Special Characteristics to be entered on a Control Plan. A list of processes or process actions to reduce Severity, eliminate the causes of product failure modes, or reduce their rate of Occurrence, and to improve product defect detection if process capability cannot be improved. Changes to process sheets and assembly aid drawings.
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General Benefits of FMEAs


Prevention Planning Identifies change requirements Cost reduction Increased through-put Decreased waste Decreased warranty costs Reduce non-value added operations

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FMEA TEAM
Main Team
System FMEA Design FMEA System Dev.: Design:
Application Moderator

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Process FMEA Process Engg.:

Tryout Q.A. Plant (Q or Engg) Design or Tryout Moderator

Partly

Application Reliability testing Component Dev. Corporate Depts. Sales Sales Plant

Production Tryout or Design Corporate Depts.

Others: Interface FMEA; Logistics FMEA


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FMEA Prerequisites

Essae

Select proper team and organize members effectively Select teams for each product/service, process/system Create a ranking system Agree on format for FMEA matrix (Typically set by AIAG) Define the customer and customer needs/expectations Design/Process requirements Develop a process flow chart **
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FMEA Format Columns


Occurrence Detection Occurrence

Design FMEA

Essae
Detention Severity

RPN

Process FMEA
Potential Failure Mode Potential Effects of Failure Potential Causes/ Mechanism (s) of Failures Current Design Controls

Process Function Requirements

Detection

Severity

Responsible Activity and Recommended Action Target Actions and completion Taken Status Date

Occurrence Severity Detention

Occurrence

RPN

Nomenclature & Number. Enter all to be analysed. Basis for selection = importance to Q. function
Design FMEA System, Sub-system, component If > one function with diff. failure modes list all Basic function /Purpose to meet Example: Actuate relay Open valve 202 / FMEA / B 020 Process FMEA Process / Opns./Opnl. Steps If numerous opns, eg., Assly) with difference Failure Modes list all Example: Grind taper Insert shaft

RPN

RPN

ItemFunction

Potential Failure Mode

Potential Effects of Failure

Severity

Potential Causes/ Mechanism (s) of Failures

Current Design Controls

Recommended Responsible Actions and Activity and Status Target completion Date

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Design FMEA

Essae

A Design FMEA is an analytical technique utilized primarily by a Design FMEA team to ensure potential failure modes and their associated causes are identified, considered and addressed.

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Design FMEA Foci


Customers include: End User Repair Functions Dealership or other Sales Outlet Designer of the next level system or product Process Engineers Assembly Engineers Test Engineers Product Analysis

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Typical Design Considerations


Essae

Design Intent Customer Needs - Can be specified and measured Customer Wants - Some cant be explained Product Requirements Manufacturing assembly requirements
Quality Function Deployment Customer Contacts Competitive Analysis Known Product Quality Reliability Requirements Manufacturing Requirements

Start with a list of: What the design is expected to do What the design is expected NOT to do

Think about what documents in your company are used to define these

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Design FMEA Benefits

Essae

Aids in the objective evaluation of design requirements and alternatives. Increases the probability that potential failure modes and their effects on the system / product have been considered. Aids in the planning of design test and development programs. Aids in analyzing field concerns, design changes and in developing advanced designs. Ranks potential failure modes according to their effect on the customer, thus prioritizing improvements and development testing. Provides an open issue format for recommending and tracking risk reducing actions. Can reduce product development timing, production startup problems, reduce costs and enhance product quality, reliability and safety.

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The should be initiated at, or by, design concept completion. The Design FMEA should be continually updated as changes occur throughout all phases of product development. The Design FMEA should be fundamentally complete along with the final product drawings. The Design FMEA addresses the design intent and assumes the design will be manufactured / assembled to this intent. The Potential Failure Modes/Causes which can occur during manufacturing or assembly process are covered by the Process FMEA and therefore should NOT be included in a Design FMEA.
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More Design FMEA Considerations and Design FMEA is a living document

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CAUTION! DO NOT mix up:


Design Failures & Causes with Process Failures & Causes
Design Failures
Insufficient lubrication capability Incorrect material specified

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Process Failures
Insufficient lubrication applied Incorrect material used

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Design Block Diagram Example


System
Body

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If the product function is complex, break it down into smaller sub-systems. Identify Primary Vs Secondary functions

Sub System

Doors

Exterior

Window

Interior

Component

Door Inner Panel

Glass

Sealing With Strip

Latch / Lock

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FMEA Basic Columns


Column 2 : Failure Modes (potential)
Occurrence Occurrence Detection
ItemFunction Potential Failure Mode Potential Effects of Failure Potential Causes/ Mechanism (s) of Failures Current Design Controls Recommended Responsible Actions and Activity and Status Target completion Date

Essae

Detention

Severity

Severity

RPN

Manner in which A component / sub-system Process Could potentially fail to meet design intent Process requirements and / or design intent
2

Can be a cause of F.Mode in higher level sub-system in down stream opns. an effect of one in lower level component in a previous opn.

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RPN

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Failure Mode (Potential)


Assumption: Failure could occur but may not necessarily occur for PFMEA, incoming Parts / materials are correct.
Typical Modes: Design* : Mech: Broken, Deformed, Sticky Hydraulic: Untight, blocked, No Pressure. Electrical: Shorted, wrong poles, interrupted

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* - In physical terms not as a symptom noticed by customer. * - also modes under certain opr. Conditions / usage conditions.
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Failure Mode (Potential)


Process FMEA: In terms of components etc., or Process characteristic for the particular opn. Questions: How can the process / part fail to meet specifications? What would a customer (end user, subsequent operations) consider objectionable Starting point: Design FMEA: Past failures, concerns reports, Brain storming. Process FMEA: comparison of similar Process, Customer claims

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202 / FMEA / B 030

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FMEA Basic Columns


Column 3: Failure Effects
Occurrence Detection Occurrence
ItemFunction Potential Failure Mode Potential Effects of Failure Potential Causes/ Mechanism (s) of Failures Current Design Controls Recommended Responsible Actions and Activity and Status Target completion Date

Essae

Detention

Severity

Severity

RPN

Design FMEA On the function as Perceived by the Customer Internal as well as ultimate end user In terms of specific component etc., under analysis

Process FMEA On the customer

In terms of what the customer (s) might notice or experience

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RPN

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Effect(s) of Failure (Potential)


Two considerations 1. How does the failure affect ...? Component groups Product Vehicle Environment.

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System

Actuating Piston connects Piston Rod with Piston: Fails due to Fatigue resulting in Disengagement from Piston with Consequential Effect Loss of Braking Function.
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2. How does the customer experience the failure?

Effect(s) of Failure (Potential)

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notice

FUNCTIONAL ANNOYANCE SAFETY IMPAIRMENT - Noise, smell - Vehicle out of control - Ventilation Vapours Failure of Brakes - Starting Difficulties - Vibration - Failure of steering - Irregular Function - Leakages systems

Next process (Opn.): Can not mount; does not connect Does not match; can not bore / tap.

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FMEA Basic Columns


Column 5: Failure Causes
Occurrence Detection Occurrence RPN
ItemFunction Potential Failure Mode Potential Effects of Failure

Essae

Definition: Design FMEA: A Design weakness consequence is failure mode. Process FMEA : How failure could occur, in terms what can be corrected / controlled. List every conceivable cause for each Failure Mode Concise and completeness

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RPN

Potential Causes/ Mechanism (s) of Failures

Current Design Controls

Recommended Responsible Actions and Activity and Status Target completion Date

Detention

Severity

Severity

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Typical Causes: Examples

FMEA Failure Causes

Essae

Design FMEA: Incorrect Material Specification, Overstressing, Inadequate Lubrication Capability, Error in dimensioning Process FMEA: Torque less / more; Gauging inaccurate, Inadequate gating / venting, Improper HT temp., Timing Only specific Errors: Example: Opr. Fails to install seal. Not ambiguous Phrases : Example: Opr. Error; M/c. Malfunction TYPICAL FAILURE MECHANISM: YIELD, CREEP, CORROSION, WEAR
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Design Failure Cause Examples


Improper Tolerancing Incorrect Stress Calculations Wrong Assumptions Wrong Material Call Out Lower Grade Component Lack of Design Standards Improper Heat Treatment Improper Torque Call Out

Essae

Correcting the cause has direct impact on Failure Mode? If so FMEA thought process complete. DOE to find root cause (s) for correction or control
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FMEA Basic Columns


Column 7: Current Design Control
Occurrence Detection Occurrence RPN
ItemFunction Potential Failure Mode Potential Effects of Failure

Essae

(What measures to avoid failure causes have been implemented) Reduction in Ranking of Occurrence Severity (and/or) Detention Thro -Design Validation / Verification No No No - Design Revision (removal / controlling causes Yes Yes Yes Actions DOE; Revised test Plan Revised Design: material specification

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RPN

Potential Causes/ Mechanism (s) of Failures

Current Design Controls

Recommended Responsible Actions and Activity and Status Target completion Date

Detention

Severity

Severity

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Design Controls

Essae

Design controls are those actions taken as a normal part of the development process that are designed into the process to minimize the occurrence of failure or to detect specific failure modes . Design controls should directly relate to the prevention and / or detection of specific causes of failures
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Design Control Examples

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Reliability tests / prototype testing Design reviews Worst case stress analysis Consider Robust design Interpretation of Environmental stress testing data Designed experiments Finite element analysis Variation simulation FT Analysis
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Process FMEA Current Control


Hazardous to personnel Mfg. / Assembly? Prevention by eliminating or controlling causes (e.g Mistake proofing) OR operator Protection
Occurrence: To reduce probability - Process and / or Design Revision Initiate Process Study / Improvement for Defect Prevention
Severity: Design Revision Only brings Reduction in severity

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202 / FMEA / B 040

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Process FMEA Current Control


Detection: Process and/or Design revisions - Costly & Ineffective - Q.C. Inspection only to be temporary - Design change to specific part - Control system changes Prefer SPC & Process Improvement to Random Q. checks & Associated Inspection

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202 / FMEA / B 041

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FMEA Basic Columns


Column 8: Detection
Occurrence Detection Occurrence RPN
ItemFunction Potential Failure Mode Potential Effects of Failure

Essae

Assessment of ability of controls to identify:


* Design FMEA : Potential cause before production Release. Process FMEA: Failure Mode before part leaves Mfg. * For Lower ranking : improve validation / verification (Enter checks / Symptoms to detect the failure mode and / or Cause)

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RPN

Potential Causes/ Mechanism (s) of Failures

Current Design Controls

Recommended Responsible Actions and Activity and Status Target completion Date

Detention

Severity

Severity

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Assessment of ability of controls to identify:


* Design FMEA : Potential cause before production Release. Process FMEA: Failure Mode before part leaves Mfg.

Essae

* For Lower ranking : improve validation / verification (Enter checks / Symptoms to detect the failure mode and / or Cause)

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Generic Design FMEA Severity


FMEA Basic Column 4
Effect Criteria: Severity of Effect
HazardousVery high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle withoutoperation and /or involves non-compliance with government regulation Warningwithout warning HazardousVery high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle withoperation and /or involves non-compliance with government regulation Warningwithout warning Very HighVehicle / item inoperable, with loss of primary function. HighVehicle / item operable but at a reduced level of performance, customer dissatisfied ModerateVehicle /item operable, but control / convenience item(s) inoperable; customer experiences discomfort LowVehicle / item operable, but comfort / convenience item(s) operable at reduced level of performance. Customer experiences some dissatisfaction Very LowFit & finish/squeak & rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most customers. MinorFit & finish/squeak & rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by average customers. Very MinorFit & finish/squeak & rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by discriminating customers. NoneNo effect. 10

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8 7 6 5

4 3 2 1

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Generic FMEA Occurrence


FMEA Basic Column 6
Probability of Failure Possible Failure Rates

Essae

Ranking
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Very High: Failure is almost 1 in 2 inevitable 1 in 3 High: Repeated Failures1 in 8 1 in 20 Moderate: Occasional failures1 in 80 1 in 400 1 in 2,000 Low: Relatively Few Failures1 in 15,000 1 in 150,000 Remote: Failure Unlikely 1 in 1,500,000

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Generic FMEA Detection

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Detection

Criteria: Likelyhood of detection by Design Control

FMEA Basic Column 8

Essae

Ranking
10

Absolute Design Control will not and/or can not detect potential cause / mechanism Uncertainty and subsequent failure mode; or there is no design control Very Remote Remote Very Low Low Moderate Moderately High High Very High Almost Very remote chance the design control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Remote chance the design control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Very low chance the design control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Low chance the design control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Moderately high chance the design control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Moderate high chance the design control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. High chance the design control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Very high chance the design control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode. Design control will almost certainly detect a potential cause/mechanism

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202 / FMEA / B 046 subsequent failure mode. Certain and

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DFMEA Recommended Actions

Essae

When the failure modes have been ranked by their RPN, Corrective actions should be first directed at the highest ranked concerns and critical items identified The intent of any recommended action is to reduce one or more (or all) of the occurrence, severity and/or detection rankings. Only a design revision can bring about a reduction in the severity ranking. If no actions are recommended for a specific cause, this should be indicated. A reduction in the occurrence ranking can only be effected by removing or controlling one or more of the causes of the failure mode through a design revision. An increase in design verification actions will result in a reduction in the detection ranking only. Design FMEA doesnt rely on process controls to overcome potential weaknesses in the design; however, it does take technical and physical limitations of a process into consideration (Design Rules)
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Essae

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Essae

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Essae

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Process FMEA Foci


Customers include: End User Next Manufacturing or Process Step Process Engineers Repair Functions Test Engineers Product Analysis Dealership or other scales outlet

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Process FMEA Benefits

Essae

As a systematic approach, the process potential FMEA parallels and formalize the mental discipline that an engineer goes through in any manufacturing planning process. The process potential FMEA identifies potential product related process. The process potential FMEA assesses the potential customer effect of the failures. The process potential FMEA identifies potential manufacturing and/or assembly process causes. The process Potential FMEA identifies significant process variables to focus controls for occurrence reduction and detection of failure conditions. The process potential FMEA develops a list of potential failure modes ranked according to their affect on the customer, thus establishing a priority system for corrective and preventive action considerations.
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The process FMEA is living document. The process FMEA should be continually updated as changes occur throughout all phases of product development and on into and through to the end of production. The process FMEA should begin with a flow chart of process from receiving through shipping and warehousing. The potential failure modes/causes which can occur during manufacturing or assembly process are covered by the process FMEA but some information (severity ranking, identification of some effects) may come from the design FMEA. A reduction in occurrence ranking can only be achieved by implementing a process change that controls or eliminates one or more causes of the failure mode.

More Process FMEA Consideration

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202 / FMEA / B 053

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Process Failure Causes


1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Omitted processing Processing errors Errors setting up work pieces Missing parts Wrong parts Processing wrong work piece Mis-operation Adjustment error Equipment not set up properly Tools and/or fixtures improperly prepared 11. Poor control procedures 12. Improper equipment maintenance 13. Bad recipe 14. Fatigue 15. Lack of safety 16. Hardware failure 17. Failure to enforce controls 18. Environment 19. Stress connections 20. Poor FMEA(s)

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202 / FMEA / B 054

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Process Control Examples


1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. Standardized work instructions/procedures Fixtures and jigs Mechanical interference interfaces Mechanical counters Mechanical sensors Electrical/electronic sensors Job sheets or process packages Bar coding with software integration and control Marking Training and related educational safeguards Visual Checks Gage studies Preventive maintenance Automation (real time control)

Essae

Controls can be process controls such as fixture fool-proofing or SPC, or can be postprocess inspection testing Inspection / testing may occur at the subject operation or at subsequent operation(s) that can detect the subject failure mode.

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Typical Process Documents


SPC records Visual aides Work instructions Inspection instructions / records Equipment operating instructions Training records Traceability records

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Generic PFMEA Severity

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FMEA Basic Column 4


Effect Criteria: Severity of Effect
HazardousMay endanger machine or assembly operator. Very high severity ranking when a potential failure without mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves non complaisance with government Warning regulation. Failure will occur without warning 10

Essae
Ranking

HazardousMay endanger machine or assembly operator. Very high severity ranking when a potential failure with mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves non complaisance with government Warning regulation. Failure will occur without warning Very HighMajor disruption to production line. 100% of product may have to be scrapped. Vehicle/item inoperable, loss of primary function. Customer very dissatisfied. HighMinor disruption to production line. Product may have to be sorted and a portion (less than 100%) scrapped. Vehicle/item operable, but at reduced level of performance. Customer dissatisfied. ModerateMinor disruption to production line. A portion (les than 100%) of the product may have to be scrapped (no sorting). Vehicle/item operable but some comfort/convenience item(s) inoperable. Customers experiences discomfort. LowMinor disruption to production line. 100% of product may have to be reworked. Vehicle/item operable, but some comfort/convenience item(s) operable at reduced level of performance. Customer experiences some dissatisfaction. Very LowMinor disruption to production line. The product may have to be sorted and a portion (less than 100%) reworked. Fit & finish / squeak & rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most customers. MinorMinor disruption to production line. The product may have to be sorted and a portion (less than 100%) reworked on-line but out of station. Fit & Finish/squeak & rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by average customers. Very MinorMinor disruption to production line. The product may have to be sorted and a portion (less than 100%) reworked on line but in station. Fit & finish/squeak & rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by a discriminating customers. NoneNo effect.

8 7

202 / FMEA / B 057

Generic PFMEA Occurrence

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FMEA Basic Column 4


Probability of Failure Possible Failure Rates Very High: Failure is almost inevitable 1 in 2 1 in 3 High: Generally associated with1 in 8 process similar to previous process 1 in 20 which have often failed Moderate: Generally associated with1 in 80 process similar to previous process 1 in 400 which have experienced occasional failures, but not in1 in 2,000 major proportions. Low: Isolated failures associated with1 in 15,000 similar processes. Very Low: Only isolated failures1 in 150,000 associated with almost identical processes. Remote: Failure Unlikely. No failures 1 in 1,500,000 ever associated with almost identical processes. Cpk < 0.33 0.33 0.51 0.67 0.83 1.00 1.17 1.13 1.50 Ranking 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

Essae

1.67

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Generic PFMEA Detection

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FMEA Basic Column 8

Essae

DetectionCriteria: Likelyhood the existence of a defect will be Ranking detected by process controls before next or subsequent process, or before part or component leaves manufacturing assembly location. AlmostNo known control(s) available to detect failure mode. impossible Very RemoteVery remote likelyhood current control(s) will detect failure mode. RemoteRemote likelyhood current control(s) will detect failure mode. Very LowVery low likelyhood current control(s) will detect failure mode. LowLow likelyhood current control(s) will detect failure mode. ModerateModerate likelyhood current control(s) will detect failure mode. ModeratelyModerately high likelyhood current control(s) will detect High failure mode.
202 / FMEA /HighHigh likelyhood current control(s) will detect failure mode. B 059

10

9 8 7 6 5 4 3

Contd

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Generic PFMEA Detection


FMEA Basic Column 8

Essae

Assume the failure has Occurrence and then assess the capabilities of all current controls to prevent shipment or the part having this failure mode or defect Random quality controls checks would unlikely detect the existence of an isolated defect and therefore would result in low to remote detection ranking. Sampling done on a statistical basis is a valid detection control. A reduction in detection ranking can only be achieved by improving process control system(s)
202 / FMEA / B 060

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PFMEA

Recommended Actions Corrective action should first directed at the highest concern as rank ordered by RPN. The intent of any recommended action is to reduce the occurrence, severity and/or detection rankings. If no action are recommended for a specific cause, then this should be indicated. Only a design revision can bring about a reduction in the severity ranking. To reduce the probability of occurrence, process and/or specification revisions are required. To increase the probability of detection, process control and/or inspection changes are required. Improving detection controls is typically costly. The emphasis should be placed on preventing rather than detecting, defects.
Contd

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PFMEA Recommended Actions

Essae

The severity applies to the effect only. The effect of a given failure will not change unless you change the design of the system or part. In the parachute example. If the chute doesnt open, you probably die and therefore it is a 10 (failure occurs without warning). Now suppose I design a smart chute that has built in diagnostics that emits a loud audible alarm telling me it is not going to openIt still doesnt open, but warns me that I am about to die, therefore making it a 9 (failure occurs with warning). If I take it step further, and add a smaller backup chute that deploys, that allows me to land without dying, I can make a case for the severity being a 7 (item operable, but at a reduced level of performance. Customer dissatisfied)
202 / FMEA / B 062

Essae Chandran Institute

Action on severity

Essae

The Question of action should be based on the RPN, not severity alone. If the severity is high, we at least think about any changes that might be made. Often times, we have no control on what the vehicle does when our parts fail. This is determined by the car companies and we all know they are infinitely wise in areas of quality and safety. If changes are not feasible, we then focus on occurrence and detection to bring the RPN into an acceptable level.
202 / FMEA / B 063

Essae Chandran Institute

Essae

202 / FMEA / B 064

Essae Chandran Institute

Five Methods of Mistake-Proofing Essae


Variation control using assembly aids Identification by visual techniques Standardized work and workplace organization Self-check (in-process)

Poka-Yoke
Is a method which prevents a mistake from occurring or which
prevents a defective piece from further passing down the line POKA: Accidental or unintentional occurrence of a mistake. YOKE: Avoiding the production of a defective piece or its passage down the line.

202 / FMEA / B 065

Essae Chandran Institute

Risk Assessment (RPN) Factors


RPN=(S)x(0)x(D) S=Severity O= Likelihood of Occurrence D= Likelihood of Detection

Essae

Prevention Vs Detection Automotive Expectations: 1000 is the Maximum and 75 is considered OK High and low numbers are the important ones to consider input concept

202 / FMEA / B 066

Essae Chandran Institute

Assessment Rating Vs Actions


Action Taken O 1 1 1 1 10 S 1 1 10 10 1 D 1 10 1 10 1 1 10
Ideal situation Assured mastery Failure does not reach user Failure reaches user Freq. fails, detectable, costly Freq. fails w/o major impact Trouble!

Essae

Assessment Rating Causes of Failure

No Action N/A N/A YES YES YES YES YES YES

10 10 10 10

202 / FMEA / B 067

Essae Chandran Institute

Mistake-Proofing
Emphasizes Prevention! Principles
Build into processes Eliminate inadvertent errors Stop doing it wrong Do it Right! Work Together Find True Cause! Guide for part (fixture) Error detection alarm Limit switch Counter Check List

Essae

Examples

202 / FMEA / B 068

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