Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies

Conflict Mapping

Conflict Map: Colombia Zohe Aparicio, Kirsty Campbell, Elisa Dari The University of St Andrews 2009-06-01

Introduction History of the conflict

Geographic Map Bibliography

Interactive Map
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Introduction
The conflict in Colombia is one which is characterised by an often extreme and perceptible direct violence on the surface, with an underlying structural violence based on the inequitable distribution of wealth, extreme poverty, impunity, stigmatisation, and injustice (UNHCHR 2009: 2, 18). Throughout the course of the conflict civilians have been the main victim of violence and the main parties to the conflict have all been involved in massive breaches of international humanitarian law (Amnesty 2009b; UNHCHR 2009: 2). This map evaluates the Colombian conflict from a human rights perspective, whereby violence is understood as threats and abuses of individuals and groups fundamental human rights.
As a means of making sense of a conflict which is understood differently from different perspectives, this conflict map focuses solely on the actors in the conflict and their relationships. Theories of conflict as understood through analysis of actors and their relationships has been developed by scholars such as Galtung (1969; 1997) and Ramsbotham et al. (2005). The choice of actors included is based on their importance to the conflict in the contemporary era and the impact of their relationships on the conflict. An actor-oriented approach has the unintended effect of putting actors in boxes, thus it is acknowledged that the more subtle nuances of actors positions and perspectives is lost to some extent. In a similar sense, the authors acknowledge that the inclusion of exclusively bilateral relationships between actors detracts from a more comprehensive understanding of the complex reality of the Colombian context. Relationships between three or more actors are not represented as part of the map for purposes of visual and structural clarity, however they may still be considered as a significant dynamic of the conflict.
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Introduction
The authors intend this map to be used as a source of information for individuals intending to study the Colombian conflict. While acknowledging our own bias, agendas and partialities, we have attempted to maintain an impartial stance and present information as fairly as possible. It must be noted that limits in access to information particularly from the perspectives of civilians, FARC and the rightwing paramilitaries - may affect the neutrality of the map.

The actors included in the map are: The Colombian Government State Security Forces Guerrillas: FARC Rightwing Paramilitaries Narco-Traffickers Civilians International Actors: The USA Multinational Corporations (MNCs) Other International Actors: the EU and Neighbouring Countries.
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Introduction
At present the two strongest guerrilla movements are Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and Ejrcito de Liberacin Nacional (ELN) (International Crisis Group 2009c [online]). In this map of the Colombian conflict, we have developed a deeper understanding of the involvement of FARC and their relation to other conflict actors. Yet, it is necessary to clarify that ELNs participation in the conflict remains important. In the map that we have developed, we talk about the civilians as actors, as we define an actor as a party that is any way affected or involved in the conflict. We will clarify throughout the map how civilians are involved and are affected by the conflict both directly and indirectly, in particular through their interaction with other actors. At times we note a blurry distinction between civilians and the combatants of the conflict, which we believe is in part due to the indirect involvement of civilians through other conflict actors. This has created a diffuse distinction between civilians and combatants. We will develop this understanding deeper through the profiles of the actors. The first section of the map gives a brief overview of the history of the Colombian conflict, thus contextualises the position of the actors in the current conflict. The second section describes the position, status and activities of the actors. The third section examines the bilateral relationships between actors and how these have affected the conflict.
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Geographic Map

(Available at: http://geology.com/world/colombia-satellite-image.shtml )

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History of the Conflict

Colombia is the case of a long tradition of a two-party-system between the Liberal and Conservative Party, (Bailey 1967) in which their relation has been characterised by power disputes drawing partisans into violent struggles (Schmidt 1974: 98). The most violent of these power struggles broke out in 1948, when partisan civil war broke out as a cause of the assassination of Jorge Elicer Gaitn, the leader of the Liberal Party. The event has great historical significance for the Colombian conflict as it was the start of a time referred to as La Violencia (1948-1958) (Arnson 1999: 162), which literally means The Violence, and which in a sense has never ended. Between the years 1946-1964 approximately 200,000 people were murdered and two million peasants were forced to abandon their land (Solimano 2000: 33), causing armed peasant uprisings. In an attempt to control the widespread violence and armed self-defence that was causing a collapse of the social order (Schmidt 1974: 102), a power-sharing agreement was signed between the Liberal and Conservative Party that became the National Front (1958-1974) (Ebel 1991: 136). During this time the military gained political autonomy with timid political guidelines for [its] role in society, in order to handle public order (Buitrago 2004: 87). The bipartisan system was consolidated concentrating power to the elite and reducing the opportunities for alternative political parties, like communists to join the political arena (ICG 2009b). Meanwhile, the state became inefficient and less able to provide even basic services in many parts of the country, and further lacked a cohesive control over its national territory (Mainwaring and Scully 1995).
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History of the Conflict

Eventually, landless peasants declared isolated rural areas throughout the country as independent republics, trying to free themselves from the elitist national Government and as a response to the unequal distribution of land (Colombia Journal [online]). This caused the Government to launch military attacks on the independent republics (Boudon 1996: 280), condemning them politically, blocking them economically, and taking back land. With legitimate channels closed off, many Colombians resorted to violence, in the form of left-wing guerrilla groups, to gain their objectives (Boudon 1996: 282). The most prominent guerrillas founded in the 1960s were the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Ejrcito Popular de Liberacin (EPL), Ejrcito de Liberacin Nacional (ELN), and later on the April 19th Movement (M-19) (Arnson 1999: 164). The response from the state was a military campaign that at present is still ongoing. The conflict was transformed in early 1980s with the rise of the drug-export boom and the emergence of a third armed actor: the right-wing paramilitaries (Heiberg 2007: 57). The drug trade led to a worsening of agrarian conflicts on the countryside as narco-investors purchased large estates in traditional cattle and agricultural areas as a way to launder money, and expelled peasants believed to sympathise with the guerrillas. By the 1990s, the drug trade had become a principal way of financing for both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries (Heiberg 2007: 57). No real attempts were made to negotiate with the guerrillas until 1982 (Buitrago 2004: 90). However, despite various attempts and strategies to engage in a successful peace process, no president up to present has been successful in establishing a sustainable peace.
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The interactive Map

The visual map is intended to aid understanding of the conflict by illustrating through the medium of a diagram the many and varied relationships which form the conflict. Each box represents an actor, while each line represents their relationship with other actors involved in the conflict. The visual map effectively illustrates the interconnectedness of the actors in the conflict; however please note it represents only bilateral relationships between actors.

Click here for The Interactive Map

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Government RW Paramilitaries

Civilians

USA

Security Forces

International Actors

Guerrillas

Narco-traffickers

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The Colombian Government

In recent years the Government has contributed to both building peace and sustaining conflict in Colombia. President Andres Pastrana Arango took office in 1998 after an electoral campaign based on a commitment to peace (Hoskin and Murillo-Castao 2001). Peace negotiations between Pastrana and the leader of the FARC took place shortly after the election. Pastrana withdrew state security forces from five municipalities in the country as an offer of compromise to the FARC (Arnson 1999: 190) and in May of 1999 succeeded in negotiating a twelve-point reform agenda with the FARC (Hylton 2003: 87).
President Alvaro Uribes administration, which took office in 2002, also took important steps towards building peace. In 2008, Uribe implemented a deserters strategy, whereby members of the FARC and other guerrilla groups were financially rewarded for deserting armed insurgency campaigns, causing a short-term slowing of violence (Scotsman 2008). Both Governments have continued to be cooperative with international humanitarian agencies (see for example UNHCHR 2009), and Uribe continues to request international support to prevent narcotrafficking (Colombia Presidencia de la Republica 2009b). In April 2009, President Uribe was given the Cortes de Cdiz Freedom Award for his effort defending freedom and his progress fighting terrorism (Colombia Presidencia de la Republica 2009b).

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The Colombian Government

Conversely, the Colombian Government in its official and unofficial activity have contributed to the perpetuation of violent conflict. On an official level, Uribes administration have consistently denied the existence of armed conflict in the state, and have maintained that the conflict is a gang issue (UNHCHR 2005: 2-3). As a consequence, Uribes approach has significantly militarised the state response to the conflict. Beginning in 2004, the Plan Patriota began a military offensive against the Guerrilla forces (UNHCHR 2005: 10). Uribe has increased Governmental presence in the municipalities as part of the Governments Democratic Security Policy (UNCHR 2006; UNHCHR 2009: 2), yet the state have lacked sufficient military capacity to defeat the FARC (Arnson et al 2006: 6).
In recent years, President Uribe has verbally attacked human rights organisations, particularly Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, and accused international organisations of being connected with the FARC and hiring lawyers to discredit his Government and Armed Forces (Amnesty International 2008; Colombia Presidencia de la Republica 2008). The Governments economic and social policies have not lead to effective progress in decreasing the equality gap or confronting issues of poverty which have now been central to the conflict over a number of decades (UNHCHR 2005: 10).

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The Colombian Government

The Government have also acted on a more unofficial or extrajudicial level to sustain the conflict. There have been repeated reports of links between the Government and rightwing paramilitaries, and also the narco-traffickers (see for example Arnson et al. 2006; BBC News 2009; UNHCHR 2005, 2009). Uribe has repeatedly taken measures to sabotage investigations by justice institutions into paramilitary abuses (HRW 2009: 170). In a similar sense, there have been reports of extrajudicial arrests and mass searches by the Attorney-Generals Office (UNHCHR 2005: 4). Uribe made an official statement in April 2009 claiming that the arrests and captures of criminals by the armed forces allowed the Colombian people to feel calmed and proud of the state security apparatus (Colombia Presidencia de la Republica 2009c).
The Government have been an important actor in the Colombian conflict, primarily because they act on both sides of the peace/conflict and official/unofficial divide. Changes in administration in the last decade have had a significant effect on the dynamics of the conflict, and the relationship between the Government and other actors continues to significantly affect the course of the conflict.

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Civilians
In the Colombian conflict, the civilians have been trapped in the cross-fire of the widespread violence, since the time prior to La Violencia, when peasants and civilians were drawn into the violent political struggles between the two main political parties: Liberal Party and the Conservative Party (Schmidt, 1974). The situation for the majority of civilians can be described as an extensive insecurity of peoples everyday life; the fear and risk of kidnappings, abductions, threats and assassinations, by any of the conflict actors who believe civilians support their opponents. The armed conflict in Colombia has caused the displacement of thousands of people. According to the Government the number of displaced persons by 2008 was 2,649,139, and 4,361,355 people which is the number referred by a reliable non-Governmental source (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2008 [online]).

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Civilians
For trade unionists, the conflict situation has been shocking and unique in regard to the number of threats directed towards them and murders, which does not compare to any other conflict case. There are thousands of cases of threats and killings, in which there is a pattern of systematic attacks, according to Amnesty International (2007). This situation needs also to be seen in the context of the lack of investigations and prosecutions, consequently making Amnesty refer to Colombia as one of the worlds most dangerous places for trade unionists (Amnesty International 2007). According to numbers referred by Amnesty International, Colombias National Trade Union School documented 2,245 killings, 138 cases of forced disappearances, and 3,400 threats of trade unionists between January 1991 and December 2006 (Amnesty International 2007). Despite the dark history and violent past of Colombia, aiming at an end to the conflict. Several civil society being Colombianos por La Paz (Colombians for communication with FARC, pleading to end their part [online]). civilians stand united against the violence movements have developed, one of them Peace), which has engaged in letter of the violence (Colombianos por La Paz

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The Security Forces

The Army and the Police have been the most actively involved security forces of the conflict. Similar to the Colombian Government, these actors have operated on both sides of the official and unofficial divide. Officially, the Army have acted to carry out Colombian Government policies against narco-terrorists and Leftist insurgents. On an unofficial level, however, the army have also been extremely active. The armed forces have been reported as being responsible for extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, unlawful detentions, hostage-taking, sexual assaults and indiscriminate attacks (Amnesty 2008b; UNHCHR 2005; 2009). The army have generally targeted members of leftist insurgent groups including the FARC, but also peasant farmers and ordinary civilians (Amnesty International 2009b). Reports have suggested that there are up to 4000 minors serving in the Army and children have been used for intelligence-gathering activities by state forces (Barmen 1999 cf. Global March accessed 2009; Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2008).

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The Security Forces

In 2003, the UN reported that they suspected the Colombian Army of using antipersonnel landmines in the Southwest states. The Army claimed that the mines were labelled to avoid civilian casualties and were employed solely to protect a hydroelectric station from FARC attack. The army have divulged that there are over 20,000 mines in place for this use around military bases in the country (MAIC accessed 2009). The Police have been accused of in being involved in the murder of civilians, including civil rights activists and trade unionists (Arnson et al. 2006: 3). Similar to the Army, the Police have also been accused of extrajudicial punishments and detentions (UNHCHR 2009: 26). There have been repeated reports of the Polices widespread use and abuse of force, particularly in the city of Medellin (UNHCHR 2009: 26).

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Right Wing Paramilitaries

Paramilitarism in Colombia is a phenomenon far deeper than its military apparatus, penetrating Colombias political, economic, and institutional life (Arnson et al. 2006: 4). Rightwing paramilitaries maintain close links with the Government and state security forces, and have an important relationship with FARC and civilians in the conflict. The United Self Defence Forces or Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) formed in 1997 as an umbrella paramilitary group with the aim of protecting the state against the FARC and other leftist insurgencies and protect economic interests, particularly landowners (Global Security 2009). Since 2006, after 32,000 paramilitaries had been demobilised, and it is reported that the AUC has ceased to operate (US Department of State 2008). In March of 2009, however, attacks were carried out in the municipality of Nuevo Antioquia by a group identifying themselves as the AUC (Amnesty International 2009).

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Right Wing Paramilitaries

Following AUC demobilisation, new illegal armed groups have emerged in place of the AUC, who have operated in much the same way for similar objectives. Reports have suggested that the groups may be made of numbers of the formerly demobilised and non-demobilised paramilitary groups (UNHCHR 2009: 12). The organisation and interests of these groups do vary; however most engage in common criminal activities and also in legal organised activities such as lottery and personal security services (UNHCHR 2009: 12). Groups such as the Black Eagles (Aguilas Negras) and the New Generations Organisation (Organizacin Nueva Generacin) have formed particularly in the Antioquia, Cauca, Choc, Crdoba, Nario and Valle del Cauca areas (UNHCHR 2009: 12). Reports suggest these groups are not organised efficiently, sometimes act in an uncoordinated manner, and do not generally operate on the basis of territorial control (UNHCHR 2009: 12). These groups have been responsible for many of the worst human rights abuses in the conflict, including murders, death threats, extortion and forced displacement (Human Rights Watch 2009: 170; UNHCHR 2009: 12-3). The groups have also carried out social cleansing operations, whereby the groups target specific individuals who are then ordered to leave the area, assaulted or murdered (Amnesty International 2009; UNHCHR 2009: 12-3). It is believed that these groups are actively recruiting new members (Human Rights Watch 2009).

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Guerrillas - FARC
In Colombia guerrilla self-defence movements emerged in the 1950s, during the last period of La Violencia, as a response to the violent means of the army to gain public order (Buitrago 2004). Many peasants escaped the military offensive by starting long marches to uninhabited regions, under the auspices of the armed self-defence groups offering the peasants protection (Colombia Journal [online], 1999). The Government launched military attacks once the peasants colonised the isolated areas, and also taking back the land. Many peasants perceived their only chance to achieve social justice as resorting to armed struggle and war against the army, on a national level (Leech [online], 1999). This was the start of an armed self-defence struggle with several fronts, in which the guerrillas in 1964 issued an agrarian reform program, calling for confiscation of the large estates and the free distribution of land to the peasants (Gott, 1970, p. 192).
Two years later this guerrilla movement officially became what is known as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), representing the military wing of the Communist Party (Chernick, 1999). While other guerrilla movements agreed in the 1980s to reintegrate into civil society and the legal political system, FARC chose not to accept amnesty proposals and has remained in a military struggle with the Colombian army, with the political objective to continue to propose major social, structural, and economic reforms as part of any peace agreement (Chernick, 1999, p. 166). At the time of writing, their struggle continues.

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Narco-traffickers
Narco-traffickers should not be considered an exclusively internal actor as they not only interact with domestic parties to the conflict, but also engage in illegal activities at an international level, expanding the realm of the conflict and its impact. World demand of cocaine consumption is mainly provided for by Colombian coca production, especially US and European markets (Echeverry, 2004). Drug trade increased dramatically during the 1980s due to the growing US domestic demand. Until the 1980s, the main narcotic cultivation was marijuana, then coca plants took over the majority of dedicated fields (ICG, 2005). In order to maintain their lucrative trade, during the 1980s the drug cartels took violent actions and even terrorist attacks against the Government or any other actors considered an enemy opposed to their activities (PINR, 2004). The conflict between the Colombian Government and the cartels severely weakened the state institutions and increased the incidence of corruption. In the 1990s the state was able to defeat the cartels but the vacuum was soon filled by the left-wing guerrillas and paramilitaries; cocaine became the main source of financial support of the insurgency.

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Narco-traffickers
By the year 2000 it was calculated that the annual profit of the guerrillas from drug production was around $400m (PINR, 2004). The tentacles of narco-trafficking reached every level of Colombian society and actor involved in the conflict. The overlap of the guerrilla groups and the narcotraffickers affected the efforts of the Colombian state in putting an end to the civil war. Defeating the guerrillas meant to eradicate the coca leaf cultivation and production, however the coca leaf cultivation has become the only way of surviving for the peasants in guerrilla-controlled territories. This development has greatly complicated the approach of the war on drugs (Ungerman and Brohy, 2003). The struggle for the containment of these activities and eradication of the drug economy has become an international struggle with the involvement of the US in support of the Colombian State, especially with the beginning of Plan Colombia in the 2000. The role of the drug-trafficking within the Colombian conflict is strongly debated. It is considered one of the root causes of the conflict by some while a means to sustain it by others. The policies against these illegal activities depend on which role is given to them by the policy makers. The US and the Colombian Government in accordance tend to consider drug-trafficking as a cause of the conflict (Chouvy and Laniel, 2007). The relation between the conflict and drug-related activities is extremely complex, constantly changing and evolving.

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International Actors
i. Multinational Corporations
The foreign investments made by Multinational Corporations made up 15% of the national Gross National profit (GNP) in Colombia during the 1990s, impacting significantly on the national economy. MNCs mainly operate in the extractive sector, often in territories which are controlled by guerrillas rather than the state. International interest in natural resources, such as oil and coal, are fundamental and this factor internationalises the civil conflict in Colombia. Another type of Multinational Corporations operating in Colombia are the Private Security Corporations which rely on the environment of violence to make profits. These corporations, which are mainly US based, are directly catering to the other MNCs as well as to the Colombian Government itself. They arguably have interests in the continuation of the conflict as it legitimates their presence on the Colombian soil (Richani 2005). MNCs both fuel the dynamics of conflict and finance the insurgency groups supporting the economy of war.

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International Actors
ii. The European Union

Europe has been seen increasingly as a counterbalancing force to the US in Colombia, for example contributing to the negotiations with the paramilitaries. The conflict in Colombia is not central in European security policy agenda even if still relevant due to the good relations with the regions. Relations with Colombia are inscribed in a broader interregional agenda with the Community with Andean Nations. The EU favours a comprehensive regional approach. Illegal narcotics too are considered as a regional stability issue and not as specifically Colombian. According to the European vision the solution of the Colombian conflict depends mainly on long term policies of development and democratic institutions. Short term military operations are not seen as productive (Kunterbach 2005).

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International Actors
iii. Neighbouring countries

Colombia tends to consider the narco-trafficking and the guerrillas problems as regional, pertaining to Ecuador and Venezuela as well. The Government has claimed that the activities of both guerrillas and narco-traffickers take place on the border of Colombia and its neighbouring countries (Colombia Presidencia de la Republica 2009a). This approach allows Colombia to share responsibilities about the two endemic problems. On the other hand Ecuador and Venezuela have no interest or intention to involve themselves in what they consider to be solely Colombian internal troubles. Tensions between the two bordering countries and Colombia reached dangerous levels in 2008. The conflict has been avoided thanks to the intervention of the international community and especially of Brazil (Reuters, 2008).

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USA
The relations between the US and Colombia dates back to the 19th century. The two countries have maintained mutual diplomatic relations based on common economic interests and various trade agreements signed over last two centuries. Numerous US-owned companies had located their activities and production on Colombian soil thus linking the interests of the US in Colombia with the interests of these companies. The ties with the US were of great importance for the Colombian economy. The US market was the primary destination for Colombias main export and source of revenues, coffee, during the 19th and first decades of the 20th century. Later in the 20th century Colombia became the principal recipient for US aid, strengthening the relations between the two countries. However, the growth in drug production and trade to the US during the 1970s and 1980s caused tensions between the US and Colombia (Hanratty and Meditz 1988). The US became directly involved in the conflict in Colombia with the establishment of Plan Colombia. Support for plan Colombia began in 2000 after agreement between President Clinton and the Colombian Government. The aim of the plan is to prevent conflict through eradicating the war economy - based primarily on drug production - by means of economic development, strengthening of state power, humanitarian aid and military support to the Government (Solan 2006). The US provided one third of the funds necessary for the plan as well as military equipment and training and extended the financial support for subsequent years.

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USA
Plan Colombia soon focused primarily on addressing drug production and trade based on the justification that these activities provide the main financial support for the rebel movements. The US has been strongly affected by the increase in drug trade between Colombia and the US as the demand for cocaine rose in the country since the end of the 1980s. The main strategy used to limit the production of coca crops consisted of spaying herbicides onto over 2 million acres of crops fields (International Policy Report 2006). Crop spraying policies failed to decrease drug production but negatively affected agricultural production and ariable land to a great extent.

In 2002, a shift occurred in the political discourse concerning Plan Colombia and its anti-drug policy. After 9/11, the guerrilla groups in Colombia were classified as terrorist groups and as such they were included by the US in the global effort against terrorism (Ungerman and Brohy, 2003). Plan Colombia became primarily an anti-guerrilla effort. 80% of the financial support given to the Colombian Government by the US was used for the military operations aiming to regain control of the territories in the guerrillas hands.
With the new administration at the White House in 2009, Plan Colombia is considered mainly a failed strategy, and, in the context of limiting the US foreign expenditure, a drastic cut in US financial support is foreseeable, if not the definite outcome for Plan Colombia (The Guardian, 2009).

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Relation between Government and Security Forces

Until recently, the Government has persistently turned something of a blind eye to the extrajudicial activities of the army, and for a number of years in his first term, President Uribe denied any human rights issues existed with the Armys activities, blaming the Guerrillas for framing state security forces (HRW 2009: 173-4). In recent years, however, the Government has taken a very public stance promoting legitimacy, transparency and a zero tolerance human rights policy within the armed forces (UNHCHR 2009: 7). In January 2008, the Ministry of Defence adopted a Comprehensive Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Policy to monitor the actions of the security forces (UNHCHR 2009: 6). In October of the same year, President Uribe suspended 27 Army members from service for their part in extrajudicial activities (UNHCHR 2009: 7). The soldiers were implicated in a scandal over 11 men from Soacha in Bogota who disappeared in September that year. The 11 bodies were found in the distant state of Norte de Santander. The Army, initially supported by Uribe, maintained that the 11 men died through combat (HRW 2009: 174). Attorney General, Mario Iguaran debated this claim and a month later the chief of the Army resigned. Consequently, Uribe began discussions with senior Army representatives about the alleged continuing breach of international humanitarian law (UNHCHR 2009: 7). Complaints against the army for extrajudicial assaults and killings have been maintained since the adoption of the Governments zero tolerance policy, suggesting that it has not had its desired institutional effect (UNHCHR 2009: 7).

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Relation between Government and FARC

The Government with its security forces and the FARC can be said to be the most active actors in the Colombian conflict. Both have been engaged in a military struggle towards each other since the emergence of the guerrilla movement in 1950s and 1960s. To this point in time, the Governments state forces and FARC seem to be caught in a somehow negative stalemate, in which peace is elusive. Throughout the history of the conflict, the Government has sporadically been involved in peace talks with the guerrillas. The first real attempts to negotiate with the guerrillas were not made until 1982 (Buitrago in Koonings and Krujit, 2004). However, despite various attempts and strategies to engage in a successful peace process, no president up to present has been successful in establishing a sustainable peace.

There is however an important change in the dynamic between these two actors, as the two past years has implicated a severe weakening in the organisational structure of FARC. This is much due to Uribes hard-line against the guerrillas. In particularly this refers to the death of key figure of FARC, such as "Ral Reyes" and "Ivn Ros" and their legendary leader Manuel Marulanda, which have been part of the initial movement of FARC.

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Relation between Government and FARC

An important turning point in the dynamic between the FARC and the Governments security forces was the Operation Checkmate, which was a blow from the security forces side against the FARC, in which the most valuable hostages who had the most international impact were taken: Ingrid Betancourt a formal presidential candidate and three Americans (Semana [online] 2009 January 31st). This situation has led to a re-adaption from FARC towards the Government, hence their more human approach of releasing hostages held in their captivity. Additionally, FARC has decentralised its command and is said to be prioritising ambushes on Government forces, as well as the use of unconventional weapons such as landmines (Semana [online] 2009 January 31st). However, there is a belief that FARC is re-adapting and gaining strength back, as they have set a new leader Alfonso Cano to their organisation. So there are reasons to not see the current dynamic between the two actors as a military defeat of FARC by the state forces (International Crisis Group [online] 2009 March 26th).

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Relation between Government and Right Wing Paramilitaries

There have been repeated reports of the Governments close connections with the Rightwing Paramilitaries. Recent investigations by the High Court have exposed numerous entrenched links between the Government, particularly the Congress, and Rightwing paramilitary groups. Currently, 72 congressmen have been charged and 11 convicted for their links with paramilitaries, and a further 25 individuals have resigned so as not to be investigated (BBC News 2009; UNHCHR 2009: 15). In 2003, the Government and leaders of the AUC reached a peace agreement over prosecution of AUC members. The agreement allowed for reduced penalties for paramilitaries, and forced the Government to refrain from impeaching individuals solely for their membership in the AUC (Latin American Working Group 2008: 2). In 2005, the Justice and Peace law was passed which permitted demobilised paramilitary combatants to apply for reduced penalty laws in exchange for the release of kidnap victims, child soldiers, illegally-obtained assets and access to information (Latin American Working Group 2008: 2). The Uribe Administration has continuously attempted to sabotage these parapolitics investigations (HRW 2009:171). In 2008, the Government attempted to pass constitutional amendments which would inhibit Supreme Court Investigations of paramilitaries; however the proposal was drawn in November 2008 (HRW 2009:171).

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Relation between Government and Right Wing Paramilitaries

A recent scandal has implicated President Uribe in cooperating with one of the heads of the AUC to fund his electoral campaign in 2002 (BBC News 2009). Diego Murillo (also known as Don Berna) a former head of the AUC claimed, after he was sentenced to prison in the USA for narcotrafficking offences, claimed that he had funded a large part of Alvaro Uribes presidential campaign in 2002 (BBC News 2009). A second scandal has further implicated members of the Congress in illegal paramilitary activity. After police seized the computer of paramilitary leader Rodrigo Tovar (also know as Jorge 40), information detailing cocaine smuggling routes and a list of sympathetic congressmen was exposed by the Press (Arnson et al. 2006: 3). Accusations of links between the Congress and Colombias Department of Administrative Security (DAS) continue, with reports of collaboration between the DAS and paramilitaries over military investigations and extrajudicial assassinations (Arnson et al. 2006: 3). The Government has consistently downplayed the status and power of the newly emerged paramilitary groups and maintained that they are criminal gangs rather than paramilitary forces, and has in fact claimed that paramilitaries no longer exist (HRW 2009: 172). Colombian judicial institutions have demonstrated that a significant number of the 30,000 demilitarised paramilitaries were, in fact, civilians recruited to pose as members of the AUC and were never investigated fully (HRW 2009: 172).

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Relation between Government and Narco-traffickers

The Colombian Government played a dual role in relation with the narco-traffickers. First, drug trafficking deeply corrupted the Government and the state institutions especially during the Samper administration creating collusion between the two realms (Crandall, 2001). Later, however the fight against this illegal economy became the first aim of the Colombian Government, in particular with President Uribe. Moreover during the 1980s the war with the drug cartels weakened the state institution, its legitimacy and also its capacity to deliver security and to control the territory.

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Relation between Government and Civilians

The relationship between the Governments state forces and the civilians has been characterised by distrust and violence. The state forces, among other conflict actors have acted by defining a fine line between civilians and combatants, thus not respecting international humanitarian law. This has resulted in the engagement of systematic extrajudicial killings of civilians by the state forces, in which illegal application of the death penalty or killing of unarmed combatants without trial has been prevalent (Inter Press Service [online] 2008 October 30th). According to a top United Nations diplomat the extrajudicial killings of innocent civilians by the security forces is a strategy used in order to legitimise the Governments counterinsurgency campaign against the guerrillas. Typically, according to the U.N. and the attorney general's office, security forces will "disappear" or kill civilians and later present them to the media as leftist rebels or right-wing paramilitary fighters killed in combat (CNN [online] 2008 November 1st). The Government has also used its force of law to prevent and curb the recruiting of civilians into the rebel forces, which has revolved around their idea that the guerrillas pose as innocent civilians and that they get helped by the local populations concealing rebel equipment, weapons and munitions and the like. In this regard the Government see the link between the civilians and the guerrillas as something that needs to be addressed and removed (Inter Press Service [online] 2008 October 30th). One action followed by the Governments perception of the link between civilians and the guerrillas was a 2002 decree stating that civilians living in areas under rebel control are one of the "main supports" of the insurgent groups, according to Inter Press Service website (2008 October 30th). After the decree was announced the number of extrajudicial executions saw an increase in number (Inter Press Service [online] 2008 October 12th).

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Relation between Government and Civilians

According to the mission of the International Observation Mission on Extrajudicial Executions and Impunity in Colombia, alleged extrajudicial killings follows a certain pattern the victims are seized from their homes or workplaces, their bodies turn up in morgues in distant towns, often wearing fatigues, and they are reported as insurgents killed in combat, who were supposedly carrying guns or other military equipment when they were shot down. The report also mentioned widespread impunity, and recommended that the international community condition military aid to Colombia on a halt to extrajudicial executions (Inter Press Service [online] 2008 October 12th). The signs of a slowly growing civil society movement, has been met with dubious reaction from the current Government, as President lvaro Uribe view some of the organisations as the intellectual branch of FARC, as in the case of Colombians for Peace (Dagens Nyheter [online] 2009 March 26th). However, President Uribes has maintained popularity among the Colombian population, in particularly in regard to the implementation of the democratic security policy, which involved intensifying the military offensive against the insurgency. The result of this policy has in general terms meant an improvement of the security situation in the country, as the rate of homicides and kidnappings has drastically dropped since 2002. There are also signs of a rejection of the armed groups and support for Uribes policy, seen in public opinion polls (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre [online] 2008 October 17th). Yet the improved security situation is a very general description of the development of the country and not all groups in society have benefitted from the policy. The policy is said to have a negative impact on the rural population and has failed to prevent a continuing increase in the incidence of forced internal displacement (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre [online] 2008 October 17th).

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Relation between Government and USA

The Colombian Government needs US financial support in order to maintain the high military expenditures required by the civil war. From the US perspective, it has economic interests in Colombia especially with regards to its natural resources (Leech 2000). Aid to the Colombian Government can be understood in the context of maintaining the necessary environment for business and trade between the two countries. Moreover, the Multinational Corporations operating in Colombia, particularly in the extraction of oil and exploitation of other natural resources, are mainly US owned. The interests of these industries seem to be central in the decision of the US in supporting Colombian Government against the guerrilla groups and vice versa (Richani 2005).

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Relation between Government and Multinational Corporations

The Colombian Government has interests in getting the foreign investment of MNCs and therefore it gives concessions to the MNCs for them to operate and keep investing in the country. At the same time it is important for the Government to have control over the territories where the MNCs are located in order to guarantee the safety of their activities. In addition, the MNCs put pressure on the Government through the diplomatic channel of their home countries.

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Relation between the Security Forces and the Right Wing Paramilitaries
The Army and Rightwing Paramilitaries have maintained close links throughout the course of the conflict. Reports have suggested that Colombian military have aided Rightwing Paramilitaries in organising and carrying out their social cleansing and extrajudicial execution activities. In 2001, 50 paramilitaries were responsible for killing civilian men and setting fire to homes in the village of Chengue in Sucre. Residents of the village reported that the Army had aided in coordinating the killing, known as the Chengue Massacre, by ensuring safe passage of the paramilitaries and ensuring the area around the village was effectively sealed off so that the paramilitaries could identify and kill their targets (Latin American Working Group 2008: 3). The Mapiripn and El Salado Massacres in 1997 and 1999 respectively, also evidenced the cooperation between the security forces and the Army. At El Salado in Bolivar, approximately 300 paramilitaries set up a kangaroo court, then tortured and executed civilians. The Colombian Navys first Brigade set up road blocks around the area to prevent the International Committee of the Red Cross from entering the town, and only entered the town after the paramilitaries had left (Latin American Working Group 2008: 4). In Mapiripn, it was reported that the paramilitaries and Army worked together to murder 30 residents of the town in Meta (Latin American Working Group 2008: 4).

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Relation between the Security Forces and the Civilians

The Army and Police have been responsible for some of the worst human rights abuses directed towards civilians in the conflict. Frequent reports have continued in 2009 of extrajudicial killings, sexual assault and rape, custody beatings, destroying property and blackmail (Amnesty International 2009; HRW 2009: 170; UNHCHR 2009). In recent years there have been reports of an ominous practice undertaken by the Army, whereby pressured to demonstrate results by the Government soldiers have kidnapped civilians, killed them and dressed them in Guerrilla uniforms, then planted them to look like Guerrilla combatants killed in action (HRW 2009: 173). Another new modality of extrajudicial execution has also emerged, whereby members of the newly emerged illegal armed groups working alongside the army have set up networks which pretend to offer employment to civilians in distant states. The networks work to transport civilian away from their home where they are then murdered and presented as Guerrillas killed in combat as a means of supporting the States security campaign (UNHCHR 2009: 7-88). The Army has also caused injury to the civilian population in its more official activities. Civilians have been injured or killed when caught in crossfire between the Army and FARC (UNHCHR 2009: 30).
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Relation between the Right Wing Paramilitaries and FARC

In municipalities where FARC and other guerrillas have strengthened their presence and support, the pattern of paramilitaries challenging that presence has been noticeable. This has in turn exacerbated the conflict (Richani, 2005).

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Relation between the Narco-traffickers and FARC

The FARCs principal means of financial support has been the drug economy. FARC actively support cultivation of coca crops and also defend the territories of cultivation, laboratories and airfields (ICG 2005). These groups came to control all the means of production, from the cultivation of crops to the laboratories for the actual process of the coca leaves and its shipment. Because of the link between FARC and the drug activities these groups have been called narco-terrorists.

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Relation between FARC and Civilians

The relation between FARC and the civilian population is complex in the sense that FARC maintains the enhancement of the poor class as its formal objective, while at the same time engaging in abuses against civilians (Human Rights Watch 2009). FARC as a self-defence movement perceive itself as the representation of the civilians, but has during its years of existence developed strategies of survival that can be seen as controversial, and with a significant impact on the security situation of the civilians. Their tactics of has revolved around kidnappings, use of antipersonnel landmines, recruitment of child combatants, and harassments against rural population, ultimately forcing civilians to leave their homes and lands (Human Rights Watch World Report 2009 [online]; Dagens nyheter [online] 2009 March 26th). In addition, FARCs strategies of financing their movement has also caused an intensification of the violence in the conflict, as they are based on kidnappings for ransom, extortion schemes, and an unofficial taxes that it levies in the countryside for protection and social services. (Hanson, 2008 [online]) Due to the death of key leaders in the organisation and the political circumstances in the country which has put the FARC in a difficult political and military position, FARC has been forced to reconfigure their tactics and consequently released political and military hostages during the last two years. Some argue FARC is seeking room to maneuver, and that the only channel to do that at the moment is through their hostages (Semana [online] 2009 January 31st).

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Relation between FARC and the USA

The relation between FARC and the US has been a hostile one. FARC has been designated by the Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (Examiner [online] 2009 April 28th) and been target of the global war on terror, in which the US consequently has given its full support to the Colombian Government to fight the guerrillas, both through military and financial aid, as seen in the campaign Plan Colombia. The US also views FARC as a terrorist and money-seeking organisation that engages in narco-trafficking business in order to enhance its financial position. The US Treasury Department has accordingly frozen the assets of several individuals it asserts are significant foreign narcotics traffickers within the FARC (Hanson, 2008 [online]).
In February 2002 the US administrations priority of efforts in Colombia officially changed from anti-drug to anti-guerrillas. The expenditures directed to the Colombian Government aimed for military training and equipment in order to fight more effectively the guerrillas and to defend the US Multinational Corporations located in the territories controlled by them and as a consequence continuously threatened by them (Isacson, 2006). FARC has long opposed US politics and thus fought the presence of American multinational corporations as well as US influence in Colombia.

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Relation between FARC and the Multinational Corporations

FARCs political stand opposes the presence of multinational corporation extracting Colombian natural resources. The link between FARC and the multinationals have thus been characterised by threats and extortions by FARC, and in return extreme amounts of money from the multinational as a way to keep the guerrillas at a distance. FARC has used different forms of taxation, one of them being the most lucrative form of rent extraction is the retention tax, the kidnapping for ransom of the multinational corporations high-ranking employees. There are numbers indicating this form of financing as being the most important one for FARC, an estimated forty percent of the FARCs annual income (Richani, 2005, p. 125). In this sense employees of multinational corporations become targets of kidnapping, which FARC has used both for financing but also as a political weapon in order to be more interesting negotiators for releases of guerrilla prisoners held by the Government (Semana [online] 2009 April 24th). The dynamic between FARC and the multinationals has thus created incentives for kidnapping, and created a lucrative way of financing FARCs organisation despite the fact that they oppose this kind of capitalism, while at the same time letting the corporations proceed with their business activities, even though with a very high price of both money and security.

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Relation between Narco-traffickers and Right Wing Paramilitaries

The paramilitary groups were first created by the landowners of the coca fields in order to protect themselves from the attack and the kidnappings perpetrated by the guerrillas groups in order to finance their activities. This need for protection derived from the idea that the state was not able to deliver security and rule of law in the territories occupied by the guerrillas. These right-wing groups, especially the AUC, are in direct opposition with the guerrillas and proclaim themselves to fight for the liberation of the country from them. However their illegal activities often coincide with those of the guerrillas, first of all the reliance on drug activities to raise the necessary money to finance themselves (PINR, 2004).

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Relation between Right Wing Paramilitaries and Civilians

Throughout the conflict, rightwing paramilitaries have been continually involved in campaigns of violence and terror directed towards civilians. Civilian groups who have been involved in campaigns for peace or civil rights have tended to be targeted.

Peace Communities set up in San Jos de Apartad were set up by civilians in 1997 as a means of avoiding the violence of the conflict and persuading the FARC, Government and paramilitaries to come to an agreement (Amnesty International 2009). From 1997 until 2009, these communities have been targeted by rightwing paramilitaries who have, stolen food, destroyed homes, made death threats, killed or forced them to leave their community (Amnesty International 2009).
In March 2009, a group identifying themselves as the AUC set up a road block outside one of the peace hamlets between Nuevo Antioquia and Turb municipalities and distributed leaflets which outlined their social cleansing intentions (Amnesty International 2009).

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Relation between Right Wing Paramilitaries and Civilians

Civilians involved in a march against paramilitary violence were also targeted by paramilitaries in 2009. A number of human rights campaigners and trade unionists were threatened, assaulted and a number were killed (HRW 2009: 175). The threats were primarily targeted at the organisations of the Peace Brigades International Colombia Project, Semana News, the Workers Central Union, opposition politicians and Indigenous groups. The group responsible for these activities was identified as the Aguilas Negras (Black Eagles) (HRW 2009: 175). Civilians who have pursued justice for themselves or their family, or have been publicly supportive of truth campaigns have also been targeted and threatened by paramilitaries. Many of these threats have again been attributed to the Aguilas Negras (Black Eagles) (The Latin American Working Group 2008: 6-7). The rightwing paramilitaries also have a more formal relationship with civilians. In some communities, paramilitaries are responsible for enforcing social control (UNHCHR 2009: 123).

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Relation between Right Wing Paramilitaries and Multinational Corporations

Paramilitary groups were created for the defence of the MNCs from the guerrillas since the Colombian Government was unable to operate in those territories occupied by the guerrillas. Paramilitary groups also supported MCs interests against the labour forces and workers through intimidation, assassination and disappearances of trade unionists (Ortega, 2008). In 2007 Chiquita Brands was put on trail and finally admitted to have paid paramilitary groups for $1.7 million. Following Chiquita brands other MCs like Coca Cola and Drummond have been under investigation (Hanson, 2008).

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Relation between Narco-traffickers and Civilians

Narco-traffickers rely on the peasants cultivation of the coca crops. Rural farmers turned their fields to the coca leaf production mainly for two reasons: the drop in other cultivation prices made them non-profitable while the coca leaf production gives high profits (Holmes, Gutierrez de Pineres and Curtin, 2006); second, in the territories controlled by the guerrillas what to grow was often not a choice. However the farmers who dedicate their fields to the coca crops are subject to the coca plant eradication strategies included in Plan Colombia. The herbicides spraying over the fields hit not only the coca fields but also every other kind of cultivation. Moreover, the chemicals penetrate the soil, poisoning it, making it infertile and in this way worsening the rural population living conditions. In addition, the brutal fight between the leftwing guerrillas and rightwing paramilitaries over the drug activities calls around 3,500 casualties annually (PINR, 2004).

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Relation between Narco-traffickers and the USA

The US has been heavily impacted by the cocaine trade especially after the rise in the drug demand by the US market. The illicit activities, such as corruption and money laundering, related to the production of cocaine have risen dramatically on the US soil too, forcing the US to intervene directly to limit the cartels business since the early 1990s (Crandall, 2001). When the guerrillas started raising their funds through the illegal cultivation and production of cocaine the aim of the US shifted from simply fighting drug trade to eradicate the principal financial supports of the rebel groups.

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Relation between Civilians and Multinational Corporations

The presence of multinational corporations in Colombia have impacted on the situation for many civilians, in particular the indigenous population living in areas of interest of the multinationals. This is the case, for example, of the oil extracting companies, which have forced civilians from their land (See Richani, 2005; Davy et al., 1999). In areas were the multinationals are operating they have disintegrated the peasant economy of the local communities, exacerbating the precarious living conditions of the population. In addition, the Government concessions to the MNCs over the farmers land resulted in a dramatic loss of land and in a high amount of displaced people, increasing resentment and grievances amongst the rural population which in turn was more likely to join the guerrillas group as logical response (Ungerman and Brohy, 2003). Furthermore, the presence of multinationals has attracted guerrillas, opposing the multinationals, as well as paramilitaries defending the lucrative business of the corporations. In 2001, Colombian labour unions filed a lawsuit in the United States against Coca Cola for the alleged hiring of paramilitaries to assassinate union members (Ramrez, 2002 in Richani, 2005). The connection between the paramilitaries and the multinationals has consequently eroded the opportunities of civilians and, in particular, trade unionist to engage in labour right processes, sometimes opposed by multinationals through paramilitary activity.

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Relation between Civilians and International Community

The international community has been engaged in the defence of the civilians in Colombia. There have been statements from the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights expressing the concern over the forms of violence directed towards the civilian population in Colombia.

Recently, Navi Pillay, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, said the scale of the systematic extrajudicial killings could constitute a "crime against humanity" under international humanitarian law. There is also the possibility of international courts could intervening if the Colombian Government is "unwilling or unable" to handle the investigations itself (CNN [online] 2008 November 1st).

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